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SCIENTISTS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND POLITICS

Warner R. Schilling
Columbia University

> *. . . we must take, so far as we can, a picture of the world into our minds. Is it not a startling circumstance for one thing that the great discoveries of science, that the quiet study of men in laboratories, that the thoughtful developments which have taken place in quiet lecture rooms, have now been turned to the destruction of civilization? . . . The enemy whom we have just overcome had at its seats of learning some of the principal centres of scientific study and discovery, and used them in order to make destruction sudden and complete; and only the watchful, continuous cooperation of men can see to it that science, as well as armed men, is kept within the harness of civilization.*[1]

I

These words were spoken in Paris in January 1919 by Woodrow Wilson, addressing the second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference. Wilson believed he had found a watchdog for civilization in the League of Nations. In this he was sadly mistaken. Science and armed men have indeed been harnessed, but in order to promote and maintain the goals of conflicting polities. Whether in the pursuit of these ends the cause of civilization will yet be served remains, we may hope, an open question.

The cooperation of scientists and armed men was not a new relationship, even in Wilson's day. In the United States, for example, the president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science had declared in 1861:

> . . . it is easy to see that there are few applications of science which do not bear on the interests of commerce and navigation, naval or military concerns, the customs, the lighthouses, the public lands, post offices or post roads, either directly of remotely. If all examination is refused . . . the Government may lose a most important advantage.[2]

As a result of the interest of a number of American scientists and government officials, the National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 for the purpose of providing scientific advice to the United States Government. The use made of this Academy by the War Department between 1863 and 1913 bespeaks a bygone era. During those years the Department requested the Academy to constitute scientific committees on exactly five matters:

> On the Question of Tests for the Purity of Whiskey; On the Preservation of Paint on Army Knapsacks; On Galvanic Action from Association of Zinc and Iron; On the Exploration of the Yellowstone; On questions of Meteorological Science and its Applications.[3]

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[1] U. S. Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Peace Conference*, 13 vols. (Washington, 1942–1947), vol. 3, p. 179.

An earlier version of this paper was prepared for discussion at the Fifth Congress of the International Political Science Association in Paris, September, 1961. The points made in it owe much to the comment and counsel of William T. R. Fox.

[2] Quoted in *Science and Technology Act of 1958*, Staff Study of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, 1958, p. 110.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

It would be unfair to presume from this list that the War Department was uninterested in new weapons systems. Until about the turn of the century, military technology, like industrial technology, generally developed independently of advances in basic scientific knowledge. Thus, in 1915, when Wilson's Secretary of the Navy decided to establish a "Department of Invention and Development" in the hope of securing effective weapons with which to combat that "new and terrible engine of warfare . . . the submarine," it was the inventor, Thomas Edison, who was asked to head the new organization.[4] Although the contributions of university and industrial scientists to the fighting of World War I were marked enough to have caught Wilson's imagination, it was not until a generation later, with the advent of World War II, that the mobilization of scientists brought military results which were of great and in some instances decisive importance to the course of combat.

What has transformed the relationship between science and war has been the fact that in the twentieth century the development of technology has become increasingly dependent upon advances in basic knowledge about the physical world. Moreover, in the technically advanced nations, both the rate of technological innovation and the growth of new scientific knowledge have been increasing exponentially. As crudely measured by the volume of scientific publication, scientific knowledge has been doubling every ten to fifteen years.[5] In a non-Wilsonian world, the consequences of these conditions for national security policy have been as necessary as they are obvious. As the United States and the Soviet Union throw one weapons system after another into the effort to maintain at least a balance of terror, neither dares fall behind in either the discovery of new physical relationships or in the application of scientific knowledge to military hardware and political-military strategy. Thus, by the end of the first decade of the Cold War, about 50 per cent of the engineers in the United States and 25 per cent of the scientists were employed by the Federal government, either directly or on contract, and about 65 per cent of the scientific research in universities and 57 per cent of that in private industry was government-financed.[6]

Indicative of the new relationship between science and war, figures and graphs comparing the Great Powers in numbers of scientists and engineers have become as familiar as those in the 1930s which compared the Powers in their output of steel, coal, and oil. Nor is it only in the military field that science and technology have become vital to the course of foreign policy. Science has been harnessed to the advancement of foreign policy goals in such diverse fields as the exploration of space, birth and disease control, weather modification, economic development, and global communications.[7]

Present, prospective, and future developments in science and technology are certain to bring a host of problems and opportunities to those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. In recognition of this fact, the governments of the major Powers have endeavored to find ways to make themselves more alert to such developments and more active in determining the course of science and technology. The United States and the Soviet Union are the most extensively engaged in this effort, but it should not be forgotten that the nations of Western and Central Europe were among the pioneers in cultivating the relationship between science and government. The three elements that have revolutionized current military technology and strategy (electronics, missiles, and nuclear weapons) had their harbingers in the World War II development of British radar, the German V-2, and the American A-bomb, and it is noteworthy that the two European developments were conceived, initiated, and directed by officials and employees of established government organizations. In contrast, the American A-bomb was the result of conceptions and initiatives that came from outside the government—and primarily from exiled Europeans at that.

As an integral part of the efforts of governments to become both more responsive to and responsible for the development of science and technology, scientists have been invited into the highest councils of government, and it is with some of the problems occasioned by the presence of these "new" participants in the making of national policy that the remainder of this article will be concerned. Although some illustrative material will be drawn from the experience of other grovernments, the paper focuses on problems associated with the participation of scientists in the American policy process.

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[4] See Daniels' letter to Edison, in Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910–1917* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 491.

[5] Ellis A. Johnson, "The Crisis in Science and Technology and its Effect on Military Development," *Operations Research*, January-February 1958, pp. 14–15.

[6] See Lee A. DuBridge, "The American Scientist: 1955," *Yale Review*, Spring 1955, p. 13, and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1957, p. 82, and May-June 1961, p. 254. The figure for private industry is for the year 1959; the others are for the year 1955.

[7] For a more detailed treatment of some of the points in the preceding paragraphs and a general discussion of the effect of science on international relations, see the present writer's "Science, Technology, and Foreign Policy," *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 1959, pp. 7–18.

Needless to say, the problems in policy-making that may arise will vary greatly with the kind of scientist participating (oceanographer, theoretical physicist, specialist in space medicine, industrial chemist), with the nature of the policy issue at stake (weapons development, science education, public health, the exploration of space, the allocation of funds for basic research), and with the manner in which the scientist is involved in the policy process (member of the attentive public, adviser to the President, worker in a government laboratory, official in an executive department or agency). This article will make no attempt to deal systematically with the combinations possible among these three variables (profession, issue, and involvement). The discussion will be confined to a few of the central problems that the layman and the scientist are likely to encounter in working together on national security issues; and the treatment, as will become evident, will be of a very general and suggestive order.

In their general character, the problems occasioned by the participation of scientists in the determination of high policy are not nearly so novel as is generally supposed. The scientist has been brought into the councils of government because he possesses specialized skills and information believed relevant to the identification and resolution of particular policy problems. His relationship to the policy process is therefore a familiar one, that of an expert. Just as Sputnik I precipitated the establishment of a Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, so the earlier problems of fighting World War II and insuring postwar employment had brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Council of Economic Advisers into the Offices of the President.

The central problems in policy-making posed by the entry of scientists into the policy process are thus formally no different from those associated with any other expert involved in the determination of national security policy. In particular, four such problems can be noted. (1) Like all experts, scientists will at times disagree, and the non-scientist (be he politician, administrator, or an expert in some other field) will confront the problem of choosing a course of action in the face of conflicting scientific advice. (2) Like all experts, scientists will at times evince certain predispositions toward the resolution of the policy problems on which their advice is sought, and the non-scientist will confront the problem of identifying the policy predilections peculiar to scientists and being on his guard against them. (3) The non-scientist and scientist will confront one problem in common, and that is how to organize themselves to maximize the contribution that science can make to the government's programs, opportunities, and choices. Finally, (4) the scientist will confront a problem common to all experts who participate in the American policy process, and that is how to engage in politics without debasing the coinage of his own expertise.

II

The difficulties the non-scientist confronts in choosing a course of action in the face of conflicting scientific advice seem inherently no more formidable than those a non-expert would face in deciding what to do in the event of conflicting advice from economists, soldiers, or specialists on Soviet foreign policy. There are at least seven procedures that the non-expert can follow in such circumstances, singly or in combination, and they appear to have about the same promise, for better or for worse, regardless of the kind of experts involved.[8]

The first step the non-scientist can take is to make certain that it is really conflicting *scientific* advice he is receiving. In the fall of 1949 President Truman asked Secretary Acheson to look into the disputes then current within the Atomic Energy Commission and elsewhere about the consequences of undertaking an intensive effort to make an H-bomb. Upon investigation the Secretary of State concluded that the scientists involved were not really very far apart except on the foreign policy issues that were his and Truman's responsibility to decide.[9]

[8] *Cf.* the implication in the following remarks of Glenn T. Seaborg, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission: "Scientists don't necessarily have to make the final political decisions, but it might be easier to let a capable scientist learn political reality than to teach a politician science." Quoted in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1961, p. 79.

[9] In this and subsequent undocumented references the present writer has drawn upon personal interviews during 1956–1958 with participants in the H-bomb decision.

Procedures two and three are simple: the non-scientist may be guided by quantitative or qualitative features of the division (he can side with the majority, or with that side whose past record is the more confidence-inspiring). Failing these, there is, four, the "principle of least harm" and, five, the "principle of minimal choice." In the former, one chooses that course of action which appears to involve the least cost if the technical premise on which it is based proves to be wrong. Thus in World War II, given the American belief that the Germans were hard at work on an A-bomb, it seemed more sensible to spend $2 billion on the assumption that the bomb could be made than to do little or nothing on the assumption that it could not. In the case of the "principle of minimal choice," one chooses that course of action which seems to close off the least number of future alternatives. This was the character of President Truman's first decision on the H-bomb. He decided to go ahead in the effort to explore the feasibility of an H-bomb, but nothing was decided about technical steps of a greater political or military consequence (for example, testing a device if one were fabricated, or preparing to produce the materials that would be required for weapons production in the event of a successful test).[10]

In the case of procedure six the non-scientist can make his choice among conflicting scientists on the basis of whichever technical estimate is most in accord with policy on which he was already intent. (In contrast to the first procedure, where the non-scientist endeavors to factor out of the conflict the policy preferences of the scientists, here he is factoring into the conflict his own policy preferences.) In the spring of 1942, the British scientists Henry Tizard and F. A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell) diverged greatly in their estimates of the destruction that could be accomplished by an intensive bombing of the homes of the German working class. There was general agreement among the soldiers and politicians involved that if the lower estimate were correct there were better military uses for the resources the bombing campaign would require, but in the end the campaign was made in the expectation that the higher estimate would prove to be the more accurate (which it did not). This choice was clearly influenced by Churchill's interest in presenting the Russians with a dramatically visible contribution to the war against Germany and by the fact that British air doctrine had long presumed the efficacy of strategic bombing.[11]

In procedure seven the non-scientist is guided by his own sense for the scientific and technical problems involved. In the 1949 H-bomb debate, some of the politicians involved were little deterred by the fact that the scientists were by no means confident that they could make such a weapon and by the possibility that an all-out but failing effort might entail very high costs for the A-bomb program. These politicians were willing to press ahead in part because of their belief that the scientists were not really aware of their own potential. Similarly, when the German soldiers, scientists, and engineers engaged in the development of the V-2 divided on the question of whether it should be launched from mobile or fixed batteries, Hitler's own technical enthusiasm for large, hardened bunkers led him, unwisely as it turned out, to decide on behalf of the latter.[12]

In concluding this survey of the problem of conflicting advice, it should be noted that one of the more likely outcomes is that the actions of the contending scientists may prove much more influential than the procedures followed by the non-scientist. Divided experts will not always be equal in their physical or personal access to the decision-maker, in the persistence with which they state their case, or in the force and clarity of their arguments. Thus, in the H-bomb debate, there were instances where equally qualified scientists differed greatly in the time and energy they spent circulating their views of the technical (and political) prospects, and such differences were by no means without consequence for the judgments of others.[13]

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[10] For the "principle of least harm," see Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," *World Politics*, July 1949, p. 479n. On the H-bomb choice, see the present writer's "The H-Bomb Decision: How To Decide Without Actually Choosing," *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1961, pp. 37–38.

[11] See C. P. Snow, *Science and Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 47–51, the review of this book by P. M. S. Blackett in *Scientific American*, April 1961, pp. 192–194, and Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 281. For British air doctrine see also Herbert S. Dinnerstein, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene, 1933–1940," *Military Affairs*, Summer 1955, pp. 67–68.

[12] Maj. Gen. Walter Dornberger, *V-2* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1954), pp. 97, 158–160, and Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York, 1958), pp. 76–77.

[13] Note should also be taken of the problem the policy-maker faces when all his experts are *agreed*. The present writer is unable to suggest a useful

III

The discussion of the policy predispositions displayed by scientists must be entered with considerable caution. The major theoretical premise involved is that all experts will evidence certain predilections with regard to policy and policy-making which are the result of the character of their expertise: their skills, knowledge, and experience. Since experts differ in the skills, knowledge, and experience they command (or in the responsibilities with which they are charged), they will differ in the biases they characteristically exhibit. Thus scientists, soldiers, and diplomats jointly concerned with a policy problem are likely to approach the question of how and in what manner it should be resolved with rather dissimilar predispositions.

These points, however, are easier stated than demonstrated. To begin with, it should be clear that, insofar as policy is concerned, "the scientific mind" is as much a chimera as "the military mind." Scientists, like soldiers and the rest of us, differ greatly in the ideas they have about the political world and the things that will (or ought to) happen in it, and their views on foreign policy matters are far more likely to be reflective of these differences than conditioned by their common professional skills and interests. Moreover, even if differences in expertise or responsibility were the only factors determining the views of policy-makers (and they certainly are not), one would still have to take account of the fact that scientists are as varied in their professional skills and pursuits as soldiers. The perspectives of a theoretical physicist engaged in basic research are no more to be equated with those of an organic chemist engaged in applying extant knowledge to the improvement of an industrial product than is the outlook of a staff officer in Washington drafting a war plan to be considered identical with that of a general in charge of a theatre of operations.

In addition to these difficulties, analysis must also contend with the fact that it is directed toward a moving target. The policy perspectives that a physicist may have developed as a result of two decades in a university laboratory are unlikely to endure without change after a few years on a Washington advisory committee. Many American scientists are well along the same route that transformed the policy perspectives of large numbers of the American military profession during the war and immediate postwar years. As a result of new problems and new responsibilities, these soldiers acquired new skills, knowledge, and experience. In consequence, with regard to their approach to foreign policy, some are, for all practical purposes, interchangeable between the Pentagon and the State Department, and one could wish that there were more diplomats equally well equipped to work on both sides of the Potomac.

With these reservations in mind, six policy perspectives will be presented here which seem moderately characteristic of many scientists, most of them physicists, who have participated in national security policy in recent times. Most of these predispositions were first evidenced during their work with the military during World War II, and the extent and manner in which they have been later operative in reference to larger foreign policy issues is not always easy to document, since most of the sources are still classified. Needless to say, in outlining these predispositions, one is presenting a cross between a caricature and a Weberian ideal type, not describing real people. In discussing these predispositions, the present writer does not mean to convey the impression that they are either "good" or "bad" from the point of view of policy or policy-making, or that one or another of these predispositions may not also be evidenced by groups other than scientists. The point to this discussion is that if certain orders of scientists are indeed prone to these or other policy predispositions, the non-scientist will be wise to be alert to them, even if in the event he should conclude that they are all for the good.

Naive utopianism or naive belligerency. C.P. Snow has described the scientist as an impatient optimist in his approach to social wrongs; he is quick to search for something to do and

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procedure here (other than variations on numbers five, six, and seven above); but that the problem is a real one can be seen in the conclusion of the German physicists that it would be infeasible for any Power to develop an atomic bomb during World War II. Some of the German scientists later stated that political considerations were partly responsible for their advice and for the fact that they made so little progress themselves on an A-bomb (*cf.* procedure one).

The German work on the A-bomb during World War II is described in Samuel A. Goudsmit, *Alsos* (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1947). For various appraisals of the influence exercised by political considerations, see Robert Jungk, *Brighter than a Thousand Suns* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), pp. 88–104, Hans Bethe in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1958, p. 427, and William L. Laurence, *Men and Atoms* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 90–93.

inclined to expect favorable results.[14] Certainly, the scientist's profession inclines him to look at problems in terms of searching for a solution to them. When this perspective is turned to problems of international politics, however, the scientist's approach often appears open to the characterization of "naive utopianism or naive belligerency."[15] His approach to international relations appears simplistic and mechanistic. It is almost as if he conceives of policy being made primarily by forward-looking, solution-oriented, rational-thinking types like himself.

In these perspectives the scientist is likely to find little in common with the diplomat (who is inclined to believe that most of his problems have no solution, and who is in any event too busy with the crises of the day to plan for tomorrow), or with the politician (whose approach to problems is so spasmodic as to seem neither analytical nor rational, and whose policy positions are anyway soon blurred by his efforts to accommodate to the positions of others), or with the professional student of international politics (who, when the opportunity permits, lectures the scientist on the elegant complexity of the political process, but who never seems, to the scientist at least, to have any really good ideas about what to do). It is perhaps these differences in perspective that lead the scientist on occasion to seem "intellectually arrogant"; it is as if he concludes that those who have no promising solutions or are not seeking them cannot be very bright. In his predisposition toward action and solutions, the scientist comes closest to sharing the predilection of the soldier for decision, which may be one reason why their partnership has been so spectacularly successful.

The whole problem approach. The first grant made by the United States Government for experimental research was in 1832 to the Franklin Institute. The scientists were asked to investigate the reasons for explosions in steamboat boilers. They reported back not only with a technical explanation but with a draft bill to provide for Federal regulation of steamboats.[16] In this they evidenced the scientist's predilection for the "whole problem approach." The reluctance of scientists to apply their expertise to mere fragments of the total problem, especially under conditions where those who prescribe the fragments do not reveal the whole of which they are a part, was evident in the work of both British and American scientists during World War II. Military officials initially approached the scientists with requests for the development of particular weapons and devices without revealing the military problems or reasoning responsible for their requests. The scientists objected to this procedure, and they were eventually able to persuade the soldiers to inform them of the general military problems involved in order that the scientists might reach their own conclusions about the kinds of weapons and devices the military would need to meet those problems.[17]

In 1952, in connection with an Air Force project on air defense, a group of American scientists were asked to review the prospects for improving the nation's continental air defense. The scientists concluded that some new and promising systems were possible, and they submitted an estimate of what the developments might cost. They also recommended that the money be spent. The Air Force did not approve the recommendation, and as is customary in Washington the disputants on both sides began to search for allies and to leak their cases to the press. Certain Air Force officials, who feared that additional funds for air defense would come at the expense of dollars otherwise available for the Strategic Air Command and who were convinced that this would be militarily undesirable, charged that the scientists by entering into matters of military strategy and budget policy had exceeded both their assignment and their expertise. Commenting on this charge, one of the scientists involved later explained that he would have little interest in working on a study project that did not have the potential for leading into the question of whether the conclusions should be acted upon.[18]

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[14] C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 9–11.

[15] I am indebted to Hans Speier for the phrasing of this point.

[16] Don K. Price, *Government and Science* (New York: New York University Press, 1954), pp. 10–11.

[17] This persuasion was largely accomplished through demonstrations of the military utility of the scientists' taking such an approach, although in the early history of the M.I.T. Radiation Laboratory a certain amount of polite bargaining was apparently practiced. One scientist involved, whenever told that the reason for a request was a problem for Washington, not him, to worry about, adopted the practice of working on something else until he was given a description of the problem involved. For a brief summary of the British experience, see Alexander Haddow, "The Scientist as Citizen," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1956, p. 247.

[18] *Cf.* the following exchange between Gordon Gray and Jerrold Zacharias during the Oppen-

The predisposition to want to be told and to deal with the whole problem no doubt has its base in the professional experience of scientists (and one of the central credos of science) that good ideas on a problem may come from the most unexpected quarters and that the widest possible dissemination of information about a problem will significantly enhance its chances for an early solution.[19] Still, there are problems and problems; some are open to determinate solutions, and others can be resolved only through the exercise of political power. The point about the "whole problem approach," as the air defense example illustrates, is that it not only helps propel the scientists from an advisory to a political role but it serves to make the scientist somewhat blind to the fact that he is so moving. In its most extreme form, the "whole problem approach" coupled with the "intellectual arrogance" perspective can lead to such instances as when, on one high-level advisory committee concerned with several areas of national security policy, a scientist whose formal claim to participation was a knowledge of infra-red ray phenomena was reportedly quite free with his proposals for what political policies should be adopted with regard to the United Nations.

Quantum jumps versus improvements. A number of scientists have advanced the proposition that the military tend to be more interested in improving existing weapons than in developing radically new ones, and they have urged that a separate civilian agency be established to undertake such development. Both scientists and soldiers have explained this difference in their approach to military research and development, "quantum jumps versus improvements," with the hypothesis that the soldier's interest in developing entirely new weapons must always be inhibited by his concern for the possibility that war may come in the near future, since in this event his interests are best served by improving existing weapons. It has also been suggested that military leaders, who must be prepared at any time to ask others to take up the weapons at hand and fight with them, cannot afford to let themselves or others become too impressed with the deficiencies of those weapons as compared with others that might have been had.[20]

An explanation less flattering to the military for this difference is the occasional assertion by scientists that theirs is a profession which stimulates original and creative thought, while that of the military tends to develop minds which accept the existing situation without too much question. As indicated in the discussion of the first predilection, this is a judgment which the scientist may extend to the diplomat and the politician as well. The structure of both the domestic and the international political process is normally such as to make "quantum jumps" in policy infeasible. Diplomats and politicians are accustomed to seeing the same old policy problems come around year after year, and they are generally intent on policies which promise only slow and modest change. Scientists, on the other hand, have been demanding and searching for quantum jumps in foreign policy ever since the end of World War II. It is symptomatic that the first proposal developed by the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology to the Democratic National Advisory Council, established in 1959, was for the creation of a new scientific agency, independent of the State and Defense Departments, whose function would be "to face all the problems of disarmament."[21]

Technology for its own sweet sake. In the sum-

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heimer hearing. Gray: "If you were directing a study which had to do with electronics, a pretty clearly defined field, and it started to come up with recommendations with respect to foreign policy, would you feel that an official of the Defense Department who urged that you stick to electronics was acting with impropriety?" Zacharias: "I think I would not direct a project that was as restrictive as that, sir, as to be restricted only to electronics." U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board,* Washington, 1954, p. 930.

For some of the issues involved in the 1952 air defense study, see *ibid.*, pp. 598–99, 749–50, 763–65, 923–24, 930–31, 935, 938, and also the account in Price, *Government and Science,* pp. 136–38.

[19] General Leslie Groves, who directed the Manhattan project, was especially sensitive to the scientists' tendency to take on the whole problem. (Some even advised him on how the garbage should be collected at Los Alamos, an act which may possibly have reflected self- rather than scientific interest.) One reason for his effort to compartmentalize the work scientists were doing was his fear that "if I brought them into the whole project, they would never do their own job. There was just too much of scientific interest, and they would just be frittering from one thing to another." *Oppenheimer Transcript,* p. 164.

[20] See, for example, Lloyd V. Berkner, "Science and National Strength," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* June 1953, pp. 155, 180.

[21] See the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* December 1959, p. 412.

mer of 1945, after the A-bomb had been tested but before the first drop on Japan, the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, J. Robert Oppenheimer, suggested to his superior, General Leslie Groves, that if some improvements were made in the design of the bomb it would be more effective. Groves decided against the improvements because he did not want to incur any delay in the use of the bomb, which he expected would end the war with Japan. In the summer of 1943, after the Director of the German V-2 project, General Dornberger, had finally secured a first-class priority for the use of the weapon, those responsible for producing it in quantity were increasingly handicapped by the scientists and engineers who kept improving but changing its design. Dornberger was finally obliged to issue a flat order against any further improvements.[22]

There was nothing irresponsible in these scientists' actions. Charged with the technical development of weapons, they would have been remiss in their responsibilities if they had failed to call attention to the prospects for improvement. The point to the examples is that scientists and engineers, in the pursuit of their own responsibilities and interests, may easily lose sight of those of the policy maker.

The scientists on the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission who recommended against the development of an H-bomb in 1949 did so in part because of their concern for the foreign-policy consequences of introducing a weapon of such destructive power into the world. Oppenheimer, the Chairman of the Committee, later stated that the thermonuclear design developed by Edward Teller in 1951 was "technically so sweet" that, if it had been available in 1949, the Committee would probably not have made the recommendation that it did. Since, with a technically more promising design at hand, one might suppose that the Committee's foreign-policy concerns would have been all the greater, some observers have concluded that in the pursuit of his technical interests the scientist can also easily lose sight of his own policy concerns.[23]

Such a judgment ignores the complexity of the Committee's position. For example, one of the reasons why the Committee thought the United States should take the initiative in renouncing the H-bomb was precisely because the device then in view seemed likely to be both difficult to make and of dubious military value. It was thought that for this reason the Russians might be willing to follow the American example and that, if they did not, the United States would not have risked much by the delay. These were considerations which obviously would have been changed if a technically more promising design had been available in 1949.[24] Still, the comments of several scientists close to these events are not without relevance. It is their feeling that there are times when the technician does take over, that when the scientist is faced with an interesting and challenging problem his inclination is to get to work on it, and that under these circumstances he should not be the first person to be expected to keep larger policy considerations in balance.

This predisposition, "technology for its own sweet sake," appears to have its roots in two more of science's central credos: the belief in the value of pursuing knowledge for its own sake, and the belief that the best motivation for the direction of research is the strength and character of individual curiosities. But the direction and strength of scientific interests and curiosities is not necessarily coincident with the requirements of military or foreign policy. One of the most recent examples of the scientist's capacity to get caught up in a challenging problem (assigned, to be sure, by policy-makers) is afforded by the ingenious techniques scientists conceived for evading nuclear-test detection systems and for the design of new systems to meet those evasions. In the light of the later course of negotiations, an American statesman who believed there was considerable foreign-policy gain in a test-ban treaty and who believed that the Russians were at one time seriously interested in such a treaty might well conclude that the formula developed by Watson-Watt, the scientist who fathered radar, with reference to the problem of meeting wartime military requirements was not without its implications for meeting peacetime foreign policy requirements: "Give them the third best to go with; the second comes too late, the best never comes."[25] This observation is not intended as an argument that the interests of the United States would have been better served by a test-ban treaty with a "third best" detection system than by no treaty at all. The point is that the policy maker must be sensitive to the prospect that, because of the constant advance of technology, his only real choices may be of this order.

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[22] *Oppenheimer Transcript*, p. 33, and Dornberger, *V-2*, pp. 134–137.

[23] *Oppenheimer Transcript*, p. 251. For an extreme judgment, see Jungk, *Brighter Than a Thousand Suns*, p. 296.

[24] See Oppenheimer's statements in *Oppenheimer Transcript*, pp. 81, 251, 897, and "The H-bomb Decision: How to Decide Without Actually Choosing," *loc. cit.*, pp. 30–36.

[25] Sir Robert Watson-Watt, *Three Steps to Victory* (London: Odhams, 1957), p. 74.

The sense for paradise lost. This predisposition is likely to be more characteristic of the scientists who had their graduate training and early professional experience in the years before World War II than of those who have known only war or Cold War conditions.[26] The prewar scientists took it as an article of faith that certain conditions were essential for the progress of science, in particular that scientists be free to select their research problems and that both scientists and scientific information be free to move among as well as within nations.[27] All of these conditions were violated during World War II, and as a result of the Cold War they were never fully re-established. The nuclear physicists had had perhaps the most highly developed sense of international community. They were relatively few in number, had intimate personal relationships at home and abroad, and had been experiencing an exciting exchange of discoveries since Rutherford identified the nucleus in 1911. They also lost the most, for theirs was militarily the most sensitive knowledge, and the pages of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* offer eloquent testimony to their ideological disturbance.

The result is that the senior scientists tend to be especially sensitive to possibilities which hold some promise for restoring the former order. They may usually be found on the side (or in front) of those urging freer exchange of scientific and military information with allied governments, less secrecy in the circulation of scientific (and sometimes military) information, and more extensive cultural, and especially scientific, exchanges with the Soviet Union. Similarly, the major activities of the Foreign Policy Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee and of the Office of the Science Adviser to the Secretary of State have been in connection with the Science Attaché program, the facilitation of international scientific programs and conferences, and the exchange of scientists with the Soviet Union.[28]

Science serves mankind. For at least 300 years the western scientific tradition has assumed that the unrestricted generation of new knowledge about the world was a social good. Over these years science in its purest form (the discovery of the facts of nature for knowledge's sake alone) became increasingly an autonomous social institution; research scientists were largely disassociated from the practical applications of their discoveries, but they took it for granted that these discoveries would ultimately benefit mankind.[29] The advent of nuclear and bacteriological weapons systems which have the potential of destroying so much of mankind and his works has called this faith sharply into question. It does not take much imagination to wonder if man, in view of his apparent inability to escape from the order of conflicts which have historically resulted in war, would not be better off in a world where the knowledge that has made the new weapons possible did not exist. For some of the senior nuclear physicists this is more than a philosophical question. They are unable to avoid a sense of real personal responsibility; they reason from the premise that they were few, and if they had acted differently weapons development might not have taken the turn it did.

In the immediate postwar years, the apparent contradiction between the good of science and the evil of war was resolved by the expectation that the very destructiveness of the new weapons would lead man to renounce at last the folly of war. The course of foreign policy in later years has weakened these expectations but not destroyed them, as the recent flurry of arms-control proposals premised on the rational self-interest of both sides in avoiding mutual destruction testifies.

The need to preserve their sense of service to mankind led some American scientists to refuse to work on weapons. Similarly, there are reports that several Russian scientists were imprisoned, exiled, or placed under surveillance for refusing to participate in weapons work between 1945 and 1953, and in 1957 a number of Germany's elite physicists announced that they would have no part in nuclear weapons work.[30] Such cases are dramatic, but nowhere have they prevented the development of weapons on which governments were determined. The more consequential resolutions have been those in which scientists have simply identified the good of mankind with the strength of their nation or have endeavored to develop new weapons systems which would be as effective as the old in promoting national policy but which would result in less slaughter if used. This was part of the rationale behind the recommendation made by a group of American scientists in 1951 that the government undertake the development and production of a large number of A-bombs for tactical use in the ground defense of Western Europe. Their hope was that such an innovation would relieve the United States of the burden of having to rely solely on the threat of strategic bombing to contain the Red Army.[31]

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[26] In 1955 slightly more than half of the active research physicists in the United States were under forty years of age and had received their doctorates after December 7, 1941. Lee A. DuBridge, "The American Scientist: 1955," *Yale Review*, September 1955, p. 1.

[27] These assumptions are excellently set forth in Margret Smith Stahl, "Splits and Schisms: Nuclear and Social," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1946, ch. 4.

[28] For the activities of the Panel and the Office, see James R. Killian, "Science and Public Policy," Address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 29, 1958, as printed in *Science Program—86th Congress*, Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959), pp. 12–13, and *The Science Adviser of the Department of State*, Department of State Publication 7056 (Washington, 1960).

[29] See Stahl, *op. cit.*, ch. 4.

The failure of the United States to orbit a satellite before the Soviet Union did was the result of the State Department's insensitivity to the political implications of the event and the decision of the President and the Secretary of Defense not to let a satellite program interfere with military missile programs. A small part of the story, however, is to be found in the reluctance of some of the American scientists involved in the programming of the International Geophysical Year to see an American IGY satellite propelled by an operational military weapon. Their preference for the less developed but non-military Vanguard over the Army's Redstone appears to have reflected a combination of the "sense for paradise lost" and the "science serves mankind" predispositions, in this case an interest in showing the world the peaceful side of science and in demonstrating that the scientists of the world could cooperate in the interests of knowledge as well as compete in the interests of nations.[32]

IV

With regard to the two remaining problems to be discussed—how to organize relations between science and government, and how the scientist can participate in policy-making and still keep his expert standing—four points seem deserving of special emphasis: (A) the problem of organization, especially in the area of foreign policy, is still very much in the research and development stage, and so it may long remain, considering the precedent set by the problem of how to relate military experts and foreign policy; (B) in many areas of policy it will never be possible to specify what constitutes "the best" organization; the way in which policy-makers are organized is not without influence on the kind of policies they will produce, and so long as there are differences over policy there will be no agreement about organization; (C) in the American political system, at least, the science expert at the high-policy level has no real hope of keeping out of politics; his only choice is in the character of his political style; and finally, (D) it should not be forgotten that organization and policy-making are not the same as policy; successful instances of foreign policy capitalizing on or guiding developments in science and technology will not automatically follow just because scientists have been liberally injected into the policy-making process.

Organization. Current American organization in the area of science and foreign policy still reflects the emergency responses to the Russian ICBM and Sputnik I. One effect of these events was that scientists were rushed to the most important single center of power, the Office of the President, by means of the creation of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee.

The President certainly needs men around him sensitive to the areas of interaction between science and foreign policy. But a case can be made for the proposition that the center of gravity for the input of scientific advice into the policy-making process should be at a lower level than the White House. The President's political interests lie in keeping the staff about him small and generalized. Well-developed plans and programs will have a better chance of maturing in the larger and more diversified facilities that departments and agencies can provide. Secondly, as C. P. Snow concludes in his account of the differences between Tizard and Lindemann, there are risks in having a single science adviser sitting next to the center of political power. Although it should be noted that Churchill fared better with a single science adviser than Hitler did with none ("The Führer has dreamed," Dornberger was told, "that no [V-2] will ever reach England"), Snow's point has merit and it holds for institutions as well as for individuals.[33] The President will generally find his choices facilitated by the existence of multiple and independent sources of scientific advice.

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[30] See Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 105. Kramish states that it is not certain whether the objections of the Russian scientists were technical or political. For the declaration of the German physicists, see the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1957, p. 228.

[31] *Oppenheimer Transcript*, pp. 584, 594–95, 891–94.

[32] See Walter Sullivan, *Assault on the Unknown* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 79–81.

This is a condition that already prevails in the case of many of the departments and agencies whose actions have significant foreign policy consequences, especially in the use of scientists by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It is, however, a condition notably absent in the case of the Department of State. As it now stands, the President has more scientists to advise him on the scientific and technical aspects of various foreign policy issues, particularly in the national security field, than has the Secretary of State.

Excluding the science attachés overseas, the Department of State's Office of the Science Adviser numbers six people of whom three, including the director, are professional scientists. There are no scientists, full or part-time, in the Department's offices for policy planning, space and atomic energy, or political-military affairs. As might be inferred from these arrangements, many of the policy-makers concerned believe that their needs for scientific advice are adequately met through formal and informal communication with scientists employed in the operating agencies and departments and with the President's own Science Advisory Committee. (It should also be noted that in at least one office the need for additional political personnel is clearly more urgent than the need for scientists.) The Department's Science Adviser, who participates in the work of both the President's Committee and the Federal Council on Science and Technology, serves to facilitate such communication; otherwise both the demands placed on the Office and its own interests have limited its activity, as previously noted, to a relatively narrow range of foreign policy problems.[34]

Whether the interests of the Department of State would be better served by a larger "in-house" scientific competence is a question that an outside observer cannot easily answer. Much depends on the validity of the expectations that the Department can rely on the scientists of the operating agencies to alert it to developments and information relevant to foreign policy. Even more depends on how determined the Department is to play an active and influential part in shaping the scientific and technical programs of the government to conform to its own conception of national needs and priorities.[35] Should this determination be high, it is difficult to avoid the hypothesis that if the President has found it useful to have a relatively large science advisory body to help him monitor and direct the course of science and technology as they affect foreign and domestic policy, so too might the Secretary of State in the area of his own more limited but still extensive responsibilities.

Organization and purpose. Since administrative organizations exist for the purpose of serving policy goals and implementing policy programs, it is to be expected that those who differ on the goals and programs of policy will differ about the proper design of administrative organizations. The desire of many scientists in 1945 to see atomic energy used for peaceful rather than military purposes was one of the reasons for their political campaign to place the postwar atomic energy program in the hands of a civilian commission instead of the War Department. Similarly, more recent differences about how to organize the government's space effort reflect, in part, policy differences about whether space will or should be an area for major military operations.

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[33] Snow, *Science and Government*, pp. 66–68, and Dornberger, *V-2*, p. 87.

[34] There are eighteen scientists on the President's Science Advisory Committee; its working panels also contain participants from outside the committee. In December 1958 the Committee and the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology had together some 75 scientists and engineers serving part time. See Killian, "Science and Public Policy," *loc. cit.*, p. 8. The work of the Committee and the Office are additionally described and appraised in *Science Organization and the President's Office*, Staff Study of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961).

The information presented about the Department of State is based on U. S. Department of State, *The Science Adviser of the Department of State*, and interviews with several Department officials in February 1962. Needless to say, the description and interpretation made above are entirely the present writer's responsibility.

[35] These two conditions are not unrelated. The more influence the Department exercises in determining the goals and programs of other agencies, the more confident it can be that scientists in those agencies will call the Department's attention to goals and programs which they believe to be receiving too much or too little attention.

The same point can be seen in the proposal to create a Department of Science and Technology which would include the variety of "little" science programs now scattered throughout the Executive structure (for example, those of the Weather Bureau, National Bureau of Standards, the Antarctic Office) but would exclude those of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Space Administration. The hope behind this proposal is that, combined together, the "little" programs would be able to compete more effectively in the struggle for government dollars with the "big" science programs of the military, atomic energy, and space organizations.[36]

The question of the "best" science organization is thus inescapably tied to the question of what is the "best" science policy. But who can demonstrate whether science and foreign policy would be better served by allocating dollars to a program to control weather or to a program to explore Mars? There are no determinate solutions to problems of this order. Neither, for that matter, is there any "one right amount" of the nation's scientific resources that should be allocated to basic as compared to applied research. Differences on policy questions such as these are unavoidable among scientists and non-scientists alike, and they can be resolved in but one manner: through the interplay of power and interest in a political arena.

This condition, plus the increasing dependence of scientific programs and research on government funds, plus the increasing consequences of the choices the government makes in allocating those funds, all promise to put the politicians and the scientists under increasing pressure. As the opportunities for further development in each of a thousand different scientific fields mushroom with the acceleration of scientific knowledge, whatever the government decides to support, it will be deciding *not* to support more. Indeed, it is not too difficult to see the scientists becoming practiced advocates and lobbyists for the government's support of their cherished fields and projects, or to imagine the day when the politicians start to complain about "interscience rivalry" and begin to fancy that, if only there were a single Chief of Science, competition and duplication could be ended and the nation could have an integrated science policy.

Scientists in politics. The American political system is not one that insulates its experts from the politics of choice.[37] The scientist involved in high-policy matters is likely to find himself propelled into the political arena, either by a push from behind or by his own interest in seeing that the "right" choices are made. Some of the incentives the scientist may have, to follow up his advice with an effort to see that it is accepted (and to take a hand in a few other matters while he is at it), were outlined and illustrated in the preceding section. It is equally important to recognize that the scientist may find himself on the political firing line, placed there by a politician interested in using the scientist's prestige as an "expert" to disarm the critics of his (the politician's) choices.

Thus, prior to the moratorium on nuclear tests, the Eisenhower administration appeared to be using scientists and their scientific facts on fall-out as a means of justifying and defending a policy that was obviously compounded of a variety of considerations besides that of the radiological hazard. The comparison with Truman's use of the prestige of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to defend his choices in the Korean War comes easily to mind. So, too, do the statements of various Republican leaders that they had lost confidence in the Joint Chiefs and their determination, when they came to power, to get rid of the "Democratic" Chiefs and to appoint Chiefs in sympathy with Republican policies.

The scientist, in short, is not likely to orbit the centers of political power emitting upon request "beeps" of purely technical information. He will inevitably be pulled into the political arena. If his participation there is to be either productive or personally satisfying, both the scientist and the non-scientist need to be highly conscious of the character of their activity and the problems involved. The scientist (and many a non-scientist) must learn that the making of foreign policy is not a quest for the "right" answers to the problems of our time. There are only hard choices, the consequences of which will be uncertain and the making of which will often seem interminable.

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[36] See Lloyd V. Berkner, "National Science Policy and the Future," Address at Johns Hopkins University, December 16, 1958, as printed in *Science Program—86th Congress*, pp. 116–18.

[37] This point, especially as it relates to science experts, is discussed in Price, *Government and Science*, pp. 61–62, and in Herman Finer, "Government and the Expert," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1956, pp. 331–32.

in time and irrational in procedure.

The debate and disagreement over these choices will be heated and confused under the best of circumstances, but emotion and misunderstanding can be eased if scientists and non-scientists are both alert to the limits as well as the potential of the scientist's contribution. On the scientist's part, there is the obvious need to exercise the utmost care in making clear to himself and to others the areas where he speaks as a concerned citizen and those where he speaks as a professional expert. More difficult will be the task of learning how and to whom to address himself in each of these capacities when he is dissatisfied with the outcome of a policy decision in which he has participated. There is, as Don Price has pointed out, no clear code in Washington to govern the conduct of dissenting experts, only a "flexible" set of possible relationships with one's immediate superiors and those whose authority competes with or exceeds that of one's superiors. In contrast to the soldier, who can find some although not complete guidance in the doctrine of "civilian control," the very nature of the scientist's intellectual habits and many of his policy predispositions may make especially difficult his task in determining the limits to which he can stretch his dissent.[38]

On their part, the non-scientists need to recognize that scientists can hardly be expected to remain politically indifferent or inactive about the policy issues with which they are involved (especially when no one else in Washington practices such restraint). It was the naivete of this expectation that was so appalling in the conclusion of the Gray Board that Oppenheimer was a security risk because (among other reasons) "he may have departed his role as scientific adviser to exercise highly persuasive influence in matters in which his convictions were not necessarily a reflection of technical judgment, and also not necessarily related to the protection of the strongest offensive military interests of the country."[39] It is unlikely that "civil-scientist" relations will ever get any worse than this. With time and experience one can expect many of these problems to be eased, but it would be unrealistic to expect them to disappear. Military experts have participated in the making of foreign policy far longer than scientists, and the question of how they can best do so is still the subject of more than a little disagreement.

Policy processes and policy. In closing this discussion of scientists and the problems of their organizational and political relationships to others engaged in the determination of foreign policy, it is important to remember that the policy process can bring minds together but it cannot make them think. It is worth noting that, in the political and administrative structure of the Soviet Union, no scientist is as institutionally close to the Premier as is the Special Assistant for Science and Technology to the President of the United States and that there is no equivalent of the Science Advisory Office in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[40] Yet one would not say that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has appeared either ineffectual or insensitive in its response to developments in science and technology.

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[38] See the discussion in Price, *Government and Science*, pp. 131, 133, 138–42. The point about the scientists' lacking a tradition of "civilian control" was suggested by William T. R. Fox.

[39] U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Texts of Principal Documents and Letters* (Washington, 1954), pp. 19–20. Note the policy predisposition in the phrase "strongest offensive military interests."

It should not be comfortable for an American to reflect on the career of Peter Kapitsa, a Soviet physicist who was a student of Rutherford and who worked in England from 1922 to 1934 and then returned to the Soviet Union. Kapitsa was placed under house arrest in 1947 and remained there until after Stalin's death. Kapitsa has told western scientists and newsmen that his arrest was the result of his refusal to work on nuclear energy for military purposes. Kramish believes that his arrest was due to the government's dissatisfaction with his advice on certain technical approaches to weapons development. In either event, it is noteworthy that Kapitsa is believed to have recently been, on an informal basis, one of Khrushchev's main science advisers.

On the matter of his arrest, see the report by Harrison Salisbury in the *New York Times*, July 11, 1956; the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1957, p. 38; and Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*, pp. 109–110. The information on his recent activity was supplied by the staff of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senate Committee on Government Operations.

[40] On Soviet government and science organization, see *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union*, Report of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 86th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1949), pp. 24–35, 59–62, and Nicholas DeWitt, "Reorganization of Science and Research in the U.S.S.R.," *Science*, June 23, 1961, pp. 1981–91. The points made above were additionally confirmed by the staff of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.

The circumstances attendant on the development of radar by the British from 1935 to 1940 provide a useful insight into both the potential and the limits of effective organization. Essential, obviously, were the scientific and technical ideas that Watson-Watt and his colleagues had in mind in 1935, ideas which in turn were the result of the earlier years of research they had been free to conduct in the facilities of a government laboratory. Certainly, it was important that there were administrative scientists in the Air Ministry who were so alert to the military problems of the Air Force that they could see on their own initiative the need to establish a special scientific committee for the study of air defense (the Tizard Committee) and who were so alert to the work of the scientific community that they made their first request for information to Watson-Watt.[41] Of consequence, too, was the fact that the personal and political relations of the members of the Tizard committee with the members of the military, administrative, and political hierarchies whose interest and cooperation were vital for the subsequent progress of the research and development program were relations characterized by mutual ease, respect, and understanding.

But these conditions would not have led from the formation of the Tizard Committee in 1935 to a chain of operational radar stations by 1940 and a Fighter Command practiced in their use if it had not been for the military ideas of members of the Royal Air Force. It was they who first thought of the formation of a committee to look specifically into the problem of detection, they who recommended more funds than those first proposed by the Tizard Committee for the development of an electromagnetic detection system, and they who were responsible for the decision to start constructing the stations and training the personnel while the equipment was still under development.[42] The explanation for this interest and support is to be found in their theories about the next World War. They believed the Germans were planning to engage in the strategic bombing of Great Britain, and they wished to be prepared for it.[43]

The point is obvious but important. British scientists and science organization were in the final measure but ready tools. They were good tools, but the use to which they were put was the result of the kind of ideas the military men had about war. The same will hold in the other areas in which science may affect foreign policy. The contributions that science and technology will bring to international politics will largely turn, not so much on the particular arrangements of scientists in the policy-making process, but on the purposes of statesmen and the theories they have about the political world in which they live.

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[41] The circumstances provide an interesting variation of the "whole problem approach." The Tizard Committee was initially interested in techniques for destroying aircraft or their crews, and Watson-Watt was asked in 1935 to investigate the possibility of using electromagnetic radiation for this purpose. He reported that such a use was apparently infeasible. In any event, he went on to note, the aircraft would first have to be located, and if anyone was interested electromagnetic radiation might be useful for this. Watson-Watt, *Three Steps to Victory*, pp. 81–83.

[42] For the development of radar, see *ibid.*, pp. 108–09; C. P. Snow, *Science and Government*, pp. 24–38, 60–61, 74–75; P. M. S. Blackett, "Tizard and the Science of War," *Nature*, March 5, 1960, pp. 648–49; and Basil Collier, *The Defense of the United Kingdom* (London: H.M.S.O., 1957), pp. 33, 36–39.

[43] Ironically, the British were mistaken in their theory. The German Air Force had no such strategy in mind, and in 1940 when it tried to improvise a strategic bombing campaign it had neither the equipment nor the doctrine with which to conduct the campaign effectively. See Herbert Dinnerstein, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene: 1933–1940," *Military Affairs*, Summer 1955, pp. 65–71; Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), pp. 24–30; and Adolf Galland, *The First and the Last* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1954), chs. 2–5.

A POLITICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN AID*

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Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid. The very assumption that foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a subject of controversy. For, on the one hand, the opinion is widely held that foreign aid is an end in itself, carrying its own justification, both transcending, and independent of, foreign policy. In this view, foreign aid is the fulfillment of an obligation of the few rich nations toward the many poor ones. On the other hand, many see no justification for a policy of foreign aid at all. They look at it as a gigantic boondoggle, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations.

The public debate on foreign aid has contributed little to understanding. In the spring of every year the nation engages in such a debate, carried on almost exclusively in terms of the amount of money to be spent for purposes of foreign aid rather than of the substantive purposes which a policy of foreign aid is supposed to serve. The Administration tries, as it were, to sell a certain amount of foreign aid to Congress, and Congress refuses to buy that amount. Congress generally appropriates about ten per cent less than what the Administration has requested, and the Administration spends what is appropriated as it sees fit within the general categories authorized. Only when glaring abuses and inefficiencies are uncovered, as for instance in our foreign aid to Laos, is the question of the substance of our foreign aid policy raised in public, and even then it is put in the negative terms of remedying the abuses and inefficiencies rather than in the positive terms of the purposes our foreign aid policy may be supposed to advance and the kinds of measures best calculated to serve these aims.

It is in fact pointless even to raise the question whether the United States ought to have a policy of foreign aid—as much so as to ask whether the United States ought to have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has interests abroad which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid is not available they will not be supported at all.

The question, what kind of policy of foreign aid we ought to have, can then not be evaded. As it has developed in recent years, the kind we have is fundamentally weak. It has been conceived as a self-sufficient technical enterprise, covering a multitude of disparate objectives and activities, responding haphazardly to all sorts of demands, sound and unsound, unrelated or only by accident related to the political purposes of our foreign policy. The United States, in short, has been in the business of foreign aid for more than two decades, but it has yet to develop an intelligible theory of foreign aid that could provide standards of judgment for both the supporters and opponents of a particular measure.

I. SIX TYPES OF FOREIGN AID

The first prerequisite for the development of a viable foreign aid policy is the recognition of the diversity of policies that go by that name. Six such can be distinguished which have only one thing in common: the transfer of money, goods and services from one nation to another. They are humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and foreign aid for economic development.

Of these distinct types, only humanitarian foreign aid is *per se* nonpolitical. The aid which governments have traditionally extended to nations which are victims of natural disasters, such as floods, famines and epidemics falls in that category. So do the services, especially in the fields of medicine and agriculture, which private organizations, such as churches and foundations, have traditionally provided in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

While humanitarian aid is *per se* nonpolitical, it can indeed perform a political function when it operates within a political context. The foreign aid that private organizations provide will be attributed for better or worse to their respective governments insofar as humanitarian aid emanating from a foreign country is recognized by the recipient country or its inhabitants to perform a political function. Thus the agricultural aid which the Rockefeller

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Foundation has provided for many years to certain Latin American countries is likely to take on under contemporary conditions a political function which it did not perform previously. The same has from the beginning been true of the work the Ford Foundation has been doing in India. By the same token, humanitarian aid extended by a government may have political effects.

Subsistence foreign aid is extended to governments, such as those of Jordan and Niger, which do not command the resources to maintain minimal public services. The giving nation makes up the deficit in the budget of the recipient nation. Subsistence foreign aid is akin to the humanitarian type in that it seeks to prevent the breakdown of order and the disintegration of organized society. But it also performs the political function of maintaining the *status quo*, without, however, as a rule, increasing its viability. Where a political alternative to a nonviable regime may exist, subsistence foreign aid diminishes the chances of its materializing.

Bribes proffered by one government to another for political advantage were until the beginning of the nineteenth century an integral part of the armory of diplomacy. No statesman hesitated to acknowledge the general practice of giving and accepting bribes, however anxious he might be to hide a particular transaction. Thus it was proper and common for a government to pay the foreign minister or ambassador of another country a pension, that is, a bribe. Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister of Elizabeth, received one from Spain. Sir Henry Wotton, British Ambassador to Venice in the seventeenth century, accepted one from Savoy while applying for one from Spain. The documents which the French revolutionary government published in 1793 show that France subsidized Austrian statesmen between 1757 and 1769 to the tune of 82,652,479 livres, the Austrian Chancellor Kaunitz receiving 100,000. The Prussian Ambassador in Paris summed up well the main rule of this game when he reported to his government in 1802: "Experience has taught everybody who is here on diplomatic business that one ought never to give anything before the deal is definitely closed, but it has only proved that the allurement of gain will often work wonders." It is worthy of note that the first appropriation act adopted by the first Congress of the United States in 1789 included a modest contingent fund for such purposes.

Much of what goes by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes. The transfer of money and services from one government to another performs here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered. These bribes differ from the traditional ones exemplified above in two respects: they are justified primarily in terms of foreign aid for economic development, and money and services are transferred through elaborate machinery fashioned for genuine economic aid. In consequence, these bribes are a less effective means for the purpose of purchasing political favors than were the traditional ones.

The compulsion of substituting for the traditional businesslike transmission of bribes the pretense and elaborate machinery of foreign aid for economic development results from a climate of opinion which accepts as universally valid the proposition that the highly developed industrial nations have an obligation to transfer money and services to underdeveloped nations for the purpose of economic development. Thus, aside from humanitarian and military foreign aid, the only kind of transfer of money and services which seems to be legitimate is one ostensibly made for the purpose of economic development. Economic development has become an ideology by which the transfer of money and services from one government to another in peace time is rationalized and justified.

The present climate of opinion embraces another assumption as universally valid: that economic development can actually be promoted through such transfers of money and services. Thus economic development as an ideology requires machinery that makes plausible the postulated efficacy of the transfer for the stated purpose of economic development. In contrast to most political ideologies, which operate only on the verbal level and whose effects remain within the realm of ideas, this political ideology, in order to be plausible, requires an elaborate administrative apparatus serving as an instrument for a policy of make-believe. The government of nation A, trying to buy political advantage from the government of nation B for, say, the price of 20 million dollars, must not only pretend, but also act out in elaborate fashion the pretense, that what it is actually doing is giving aid for economic development to the government of nation B.

This practice of giving bribes as though they were contributions to economic development inevitably creates, in the giver and the recipient, expectations which are bound to be disappointed. Old-fashioned bribery was a relatively straightforward transaction; services were to be rendered at a price, and both sides knew what to expect. Bribery disguised as foreign aid for economic development makes of giver and recipient actors in a play which in the end they may no longer be able to distinguish from reality. In consequence, both may come to expect results in terms of economic development which in the nature of things may not be forthcoming. Thus both are likely to be disappointed, the giver blaming the recipient for his inefficiency and the recipient accusing the giver of stinginess and asking for more. The ideology, if taken for reality, gets in the way of the original purpose of the transaction, and neither side believes that it has received what it is entitled to.

For the past decade, military aid took the lion's share of the foreign aid programs of the United States. A shift in favor of nonmilitary aid occurred during the 1961 session when Congress appropriated somewhat over 2 billion dollars for military aid, while the total voted for all the other foreign aid programs ran in excess of 3 billion dollars. To the latter amount must be added the equivalent of approximately 1 billion dollars in foreign currencies, the proceeds of the sale of agricultural commodities abroad, to be used for economic grants and loans to purchasing governments.

Foreign aid for military purposes is a traditional way by which nations buttress their alliances. Rome used to receive tribute from its allies for the military protections it provided. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are the classic period of military subsidies, by which nations, and especially Great Britain, endeavored to increase the military strength of their allies. Glancing through the treaties of alliance of that period, one is struck by the meticulous precision with which obligations to furnish troops, equipment, logistic support, food, money, and the like were defined. The loans which France extended to Russia after the conclusion of the alliance between the two nations in 1894 fall in the same category. This traditional military aid can be understood as a division of labor between two allies who pool their resources, one supplying money, matériel, and training, the other providing primarily manpower.

In contrast to traditional practice, military aid today is extended not only to allies but also to certain uncommitted nations. The military aid the United States has been giving to Yugoslavia is a case in point. The purpose is here not so much military as political. It seeks political advantage in exchange for military aid. It obligates by implication, the recipient toward the giver. The latter expects the former to abstain from a political course which might put in jeopardy the continuation of military aid. Military aid is here really in the nature of a bribe.

What appears as military aid may also be actually in the nature of prestige aid, to be discussed below. The provision of jet fighters and other modern weapons for certain underdeveloped nations can obviously perform no genuine military function. It increases the prestige of the recipient nation both at home and abroad. Being in the possession of some of the more spectacular instruments of modern warfare, a nation can at least enjoy the illusion of having become a modern military power.

As bribery appears today in the guise of aid for economic development, so does aid for economic development appear in the guise of military assistance. In the session of 1961, for instance, Congress appropriated 425 million dollars for economic aid to strategic areas, and it is likely that in the total appropriations of over 2 billion dollars for military aid other items of economic aid are hidden. This mode of operation results from the reluctance of Congress to vote large amounts for economic aid in contrast to its readiness to vote virtually any amount requested for military purposes. Yet the purposes of aid for economic development are likely to suffer when they are disguised as military assistance, as we saw the purposes of bribery suffer when disguised as aid for economic development. The military context within which such aid is bound to operate, even though its direct administration be in the hands of the civilian authorities, is likely to deflect such aid from its genuine purposes. More particularly, it strengthens the ever-present tendency to subordinate the requirements of aid for economic development to military considerations.

Prestige aid has in common with modern bribes the fact that its true purpose, too, is concealed by the ostensible purpose of economic development or military aid. The unprofitable or idle steel mill, the highway without traffic and leading nowhere, the airline operating with foreign personnel and at a loss but under the flag of the recipient country—all ostensibly serve the purposes of economic development and under different circumstances might do so. Actually, however, they perform no positive economic function. They owe their existence to the penchant, prevalent in many underdeveloped nations, for what might be called "conspicuous industrialization," spectacular symbols of, and monuments to, industrial advancement rather than investments satisfying any objective economic needs of the country.

This tendency sheds an illuminating light upon the nature of what is generally referred to as the "revolution of rising expectations." We are inclined to assume that the urgent desire to improve one's lot by means of modern technology and industry is a well-nigh universal trend in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Actually, however, this trend is universal only in the sense that virtually all underdeveloped nations want to appear as having achieved industrialization, while only a fraction of the population, and frequently only small elite groups within it, seek the social and economic benefits of industrialization and are willing to take the measures necessary to achieve them. For many of the underdeveloped nations the steel mill, the highway, the airline, the modern weapons, perform a function that is not primarily economic or military, but psychological and political. They are sought as the outward show of modernity and power. They perform a function similar to that which the cathedral performed for the medieval city and the feudal castle or the monarch's palace for the absolute state. Nehru is reported to have said, when he showed Chou-En-Lai a new dam: "It is in these temples that I worship." And the more underdeveloped and less viable a nation is, the greater is likely to be its urge to prove to itself and to the world through the results of prestige aid that it, too, has arrived in the mid-twentieth century.

The advantage for the giver of prestige aid is threefold. He may receive a specific political advantage in return for the aid, very much like the advantage received for a bribe. Also, the spectacular character of prestige aid establishes a patent relationship between the generosity of the giver and the increased prestige of the recipient. The giver's prestige is enhanced, as it were, by the increase of the recipient's prestige. Finally, prestige aid comes relatively cheap. A limited commitment of resources in the form of a spectacular but economically useless symbol of modernity may bring disproportionate political dividends.

The giver of foreign aid is therefore well advised to distinguish between prestige aid and aid for economic development, though both are justified by the prospective recipient in terms of genuine economic development. The prospective giver, if unaware of the distinction, is likely to fall into one of two errors. By mistaking prestige aid for aid for economic development, he may waste human and material resources in support of the latter when the purpose of prestige aid could have been achieved much more simply and cheaply. Or else he may reject out of hand a request for prestige aid because he cannot justify it in terms of economic development, and may thereby forgo available political advantages. The classic example of this error is the American rejection of the Afghan request for the paving of the streets of Kabul as economically unsound. The Soviet Union, pursuing a politically oriented policy of foreign aid, did pave the streets of Kabul.

II. FOREIGN AID FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PARTICULAR

None of the types of foreign aid discussed thus far poses theoretical questions of great magnitude; rather they raise issues for practical manipulation which can be successfully met by common sense tested by experience. Foreign aid for economic development has been the primary area for theoretical analysis and speculation, and these have been primarily of an economic nature. Economic thought, true to its prevailing academic tradition, tends to look at foreign aid as though it were a self-sufficient technical enterprise to be achieved with the instruments, and judged by the standards, of pure economics. And since Western economic development, from the first industrial revolution onwards, has been due to the formation of capital and the accumulation of technical knowledge, we have tended to assume that these two factors would by themselves provide the impetus for the economic development of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This tendency has been powerfully supported by the spectacular success of the Marshall Plan, the political origins and motivations of which were easily forgotten in its justification as a strictly economic measure for the provision of capital and technological know-how. Yet it is not always recognized that this success was made possible only by the fact that, in contrast to the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the recipients of Marshall aid were among the leading industrial nations of the world, whose economic systems were but temporarily in disarray.

The popular mind, on the other hand, and, through it, much of the practice of foreign aid have proceeded from certain unexamined assumptions, no less doubtful for being deeply embedded in the American folklore of politics. Thus the popular mind has established correlations between the infusion of capital and technology into a primitive society and its economic development, between economic development and social stability, between social stability and democratic institutions, between democratic institutions and a peaceful foreign policy. However attractive and reassuring these correlations may sound to American ears, they are borne out neither by the experiences we have had with our policies of foreign aid nor by general historic experience.

The first of these assumptions implies that underdevelopment is at least primarily the result of lack of capital and technological know-how. Underdevelopment is regarded as a kind of accident or at worst as a kind of deficiency disease, which can be taken care of through subcutaneous injections of the missing ingredients. Yet a nation may suffer from deficiencies, some natural and insuperable, others social and remediable, which no amount of capital and technological know-how supplied from the outside can cure. The poverty of natural resources may be such as to make economic development impossible. Nations such as Jordan and Somalia are in all likelihood permanently incapable of economic development for that reason. Many of the nations which are the perennial recipients of subsistence aid are likely to fall in the same category.

A nation may also suffer from human deficiencies which preclude economic development. As there are individuals whose qualities of character and level of intelligence make it impossible for them to take advantage of economic opportunities, so are there nations similarly handicapped. To put it bluntly: as there are bums and beggars, so are there bum and beggar nations. They may be the recipients of charity, but short of a miraculous transformation of their collective intelligence and character, what they receive from the outside is not likely to be used for economic development.

Other nations are presently deficient in the specific qualities of character and intelligence that go into the making of a modern economic system, even though their general or inherent capabilities qualify them potentially for the necessary transformation sometime in the future. They are, to use a rough analogy, in a medieval stage of cultural development, still awaiting the equivalent of the moral and intellectual revolutions which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries created the cultural preconditions for the economic development of the West. Yet we tend to take the existence of these preconditions for granted, forgetting that without the secularization and rationalization of Western thought and society the industrialization of the West would not have been possible.

A civilization, such as the Burmese, which deprecates success in this world because it stands in the way of success in the other world, puts a cultural obstacle in the path of industrial development, which foreign aid by itself cannot overcome. Saving, that is, the preservation of capital or goods for investment or future use, has become so integral a part of our economic thought and action that it is hard for us to realize that there are hundreds of millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the world who are oblivious of this mode of operation, indispensable to economic development. We have come to consider the productive enterprise as a continuum in the betterment of which the individual owner or manager has a personal stake. Yet in many underdeveloped areas the productive enterprise is regarded primarily as an object for financial exploitation, to be discarded when it has performed its function of bringing the temporary owner the largest financial return in the shortest possible time. Foreign aid poured into such a precapitalistic and even prerational mould is less likely to transform the mould than to be forced by it, in ways hardly predictable in advance, into channels serving the interests of a precapitalistic or prerational society.

The economic interests which tend to prevent foreign aid from being used for economic development are typically identified with the ruling groups in underdeveloped societies, which derive their political power in good measure from the economic *status quo*. The ownership and control of arable land, in particular, is in many of the underdeveloped societies the foundation of political power. Land reform and industrialization are in consequence an attack upon the political *status quo*. In the measure that they succeed, they are bound to affect drastically the distribution of economic and political power alike. Yet the beneficiaries of both the economic and political *status quo* are the typical recipients of foreign aid given for the purpose of changing the *status quo*. To ask them to use foreign aid for this purpose is to require a readiness for self-sacrifice and a sense of social responsibility which few ruling groups have shown throughout history. Foreign aid proffered under such circumstances is likely to fail in its ostensible purpose and, performing the function of a bribe to the ruling group, to strengthen the economic and political *status quo*. It is more likely to accentuate unsolved social and political problems than to bring them closer to solution. A team of efficiency experts and public accountants might well have improved the operations of the Al Capone gang; yet by doing so, it would have aggravated the social and political evils which the operations of that gang brought forth.

Given this likely resistance of the ruling group to economic development, foreign aid requires drastic political change as a necessary condition for its success. Foreign aid must go hand in hand with political change, either voluntarily induced from within or brought about through pressure from without. The latter alternative faces the giving nation with a dilemma. On the one hand, to give foreign aid for economic development without stipulating conditions that maximize the chances for success will surely maximize the chances for failure. On the other hand, to give aid "with strings" arouses xenophobic suspicions and nationalistic resentments, to be exploited both by the defenders of the *status quo* and the promoters of Communist revolution.

Furthermore, once one has decided to bring about political change in opposition to the ruling group, one must identify some alternative group as the instrument of political change. Sometimes, the only choice is among alternative groups which are equally unattractive. Sometimes, and not infrequently, the absence of any available alternative group leaves only the choice between creating one or doing nothing.

Finally, the promotion of drastic social change on the part of the giving nation may create the indispensable condition for economic development, but it also conjures up the spectre of uncontrollable revolution. In many of the underdeveloped nations peace and order are maintained only through the ruthless use of the monopoly of force by the ruling group. Determined and skillful foreign intervention may find little difficulty in weakening or even removing altogether the power of the ruling group. It is not so easy to finish what has thereby been started. While the interventionist nation may be able to control events up to the point of instigating drastic reform and revolution, it may well prove unable to control the course of the revolution itself. More particularly, a democratic nation, such as the United States, is greatly handicapped in competing with Communists in the control of a revolution. The revolution may start, as it did in Cuba, under the democratic auspices of unorganized masses dedicated to social reform and supported by the United States, and may in the course of its development be taken over by the highly organized and disciplined Communist minority, the only organized and disciplined revolutionary group on the scene.

Successful foreign aid for economic development may have similarly unsettling political results. Economic development, especially by way of industrialization, is bound to disrupt the social fabric of the underdeveloped nation. By creating an urban industrial proletariat, it loosens and destroys the social nexus of family, village and tribe, in which the individual had found himself secure. And it will not be able, at least not soon, to provide a substitute for this lost social world. The vacuum so created will be filled by social unrest and political agitation. Furthermore, it is not the downtrodden peoples living in a static world of unrelieved misery who are the likely protagonists of revolution, but rather those groups that have begun to rise in the social and economic scale have not enough to satisfy their aroused expectations. Thus, economic development is bound to disturb not only the economic *status quo* but, through it, the political *status quo* as well. If the change is drastic enough, the social and political effects of economic development may well bring about a prerevolutionary or revolutionary situation. And while the United States may have started the revolutionary process, it will again be uncertain under whose auspices it will be ended.

The United States faces a number of formidable handicaps in trying to control social and political change in the underdeveloped nations either as a prerequisite for, or a result of, foreign aid for economic development. First of all, as a Western capitalistic nation, the United States is a conservative power both domestically and internationally, and must appear particularly so to the underdeveloped nations. Both in its civilization and its social and economic structure, it belongs to that complex of nations which until recently were able to hold Africa, Latin America, and the outlying areas of Asia in a condition of colonial or semicolonial dependency. It has military alliances with these nations, and while it has generally shunned and even opposed outright colonial policies, it has actively and successfully participated in the semicolonial exploitation of backward nations. Thus the resentment against the former colonial powers attaches also, to it and its policies of foreign aid are frequently suspect, as serving in disguise the traditional ends of colonialism.

Furthermore, the United States, by dint of its pluralistic political philosophy and social system, cannot bring to the backward nations of the world a simple message of salvation, supported first by dedicated and disciplined revolutionary minorities and then by totalitarian control. In the nature of things, the advantage lies here with the Communist powers. They are, as it were, specialists in exploiting a revolutionary situation, which is bound to cause us embarrassment. For while the Communists are able to direct a revolution into the desired channels through their use of a disciplined minority, we, even if we are convinced that revolution is inevitable and therefore do not oppose it, tend to look on it with misgivings since we cannot control the direction it will take.

The Communist powers have still another advantage over the United States in that, at least on the surface, their problems and achievements are more meaningful to the underdeveloped nations than ours. The Soviet Union has achieved, and Communist China attempts to achieve, what the more enlightened underdeveloped nations seek: a drastic increase in national output through rapid industrialization. The Communist powers use totalitarian control as their instrument and Communist doctrine as rationalization. Seeking the same results, the underdeveloped nations cannot help being attracted by the methods which brought about these results elsewhere. In contrast, the slow process, stretching over centuries, through which the nations of the West achieved a high standard of living through industrialization must appeal much less to them. That appeal is further lessened by the economic processes of the free market and the political processes of liberal democracy through which in large measure Western industrialization was achieved. For these processes require a degree of moral restraint and economic and political sophistication which are largely absent in the underdeveloped nations. The simple and crude methods of totalitarianism must appear to them much more congenial.

Thus we arrive at the disconcerting conclusion that successful foreign aid for economic development can be counterproductive if the social and political goal of the giving nation is the recipient's social and political stability. In some cases at least, the failure of American aid for economic development may have been a blessing in disguise in that it did not disturb a stable *status quo* whose continuance was in our interest. Such aid, intended for economic development, actually performs the function either of a bribe or of prestige aid. Here again, however, these functions are likely to be impaired by disappointed expectations of economic development on the part of the giving and the recipient nation.

It is equally a moot question whether successful foreign aid for economic development is conducive to the development of democratic institutions and practices. Without stopping here to examine the complexities of the relationship between democracy and economic development, it is enough to observe, as recent history has made clear, that no necessary causal relationship exists between the two. The most impressive example is the Soviet Union. Its rapid economic development has gone hand in hand with totalitarian government, and a case could well be made for the proposition that the former would have been impossible without the latter. It is more likely than not that where the intellectual and moral preconditions for economic development are lacking in the population at large and are present only in a small elite, as is true in many of the underdeveloped nations, the imposition of the will of that small minority upon the majority of the population is a prerequisite not only for the start of economic development but also for sustained economic growth.

As concerns the promotion of a peaceful foreign policy, economic development is likely to be counterproductive if a political incentive for a belligerent foreign policy is present. The contrary conclusion derives from the popular, yet totally unfounded assumption that "poor" nations make war on "rich" nations for economic advantage and that "rich" nations are by definition peaceful because they have what they want. In truth, of course, most wars have been fought not for economic but political advantage, and, particularly under modern technological conditions, only economically advanced nations are capable of waging modern war. We did not consider the Soviet Union a military threat as long as it was economically underdeveloped; it became one when its economic development had transformed it into a modern industrial power. Similarly, Communist China today, except to its immediate neighbors, is only a potential military threat by virture of its economic potential, both likely to be activated by economic development.

Foreign aid for economic development, then, has a very much smaller range of potentially successful operation than is generally believed. Its success depends in good measure not so much upon its soundness in strictly economic terms as upon intellectual, moral, and political preconditions, which are not susceptible to economic manipulation, if they are susceptible to manipulation from the outside at all. Furthermore, the political results of successful foreign aid for economic development may be either unpredictable or counterproductive in terms of the political goals of the giving nation. In any event, they are in large measure uncontrollable. Foreign aid proffered and accepted for purposes of economic development may turn out to be something different from what it was intended to be, unless it is oriented toward the political conditions within which it must operate. Most likely, it will turn out to be a bribe or prestige aid, or else a total waste. To do too much may here be as great a risk as to do too little, and "masterly inactivity" may sometimes be the better part of wisdom.

III. CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY

The major conclusions for policy to be drawn from this analysis are three: the requirement of identifying each concrete situation in the light of the six different types of foreign aid and of choosing the quantity and quality of foreign aid appropriate to the situation; the requirement of attuning, within the same concrete situation, different types of foreign aid to each other in view of the over-all goals of foreign policy; and the requirement of dealing with foreign aid as an integral part of political policy.

The task of identifying concrete situations with the type of foreign aid appropriate to them is a task for country and area experts to perform. Can country A not survive without foreign aid? Is its government likely to exchange political advantages for economic favors? Would our military interests be served by the strengthening of this nation's military forces? Does this country provide the non-economic preconditions for economic development to be supported by foreign aid? Are our political interests likely to be served by giving this nation foreign aid for purposes of prestige? Can a case be made for foreign aid in order to alleviate human suffering? What kind and quantity of foreign aid is necessary and sufficient to achieve the desired result?

To answer these questions correctly demands first of all a thorough and intimate knowledge and understanding of the total situation in a particular country. But it also requires political and economic judgment of a very high order, applied to two distinct issues. It is necessary to anticipate the receptivity of the country to different kinds of foreign aid and their effects upon it. When this analysis has been made, it is then necessary to select from a great number of possible measures of foreign aid those which are most appropriate to the situation and hence most likely to succeed.

In most cases, however, the task is not that simple. Typically, an underdeveloped country will present a number of situations indicating the need for different types of foreign aid simultaneously. One type given without regard for its potential effects upon another type risks getting in the way of the latter. One of the most conspicuous weaknesses of our past foreign aid policies has been the disregard of the effect different types of foreign aid have upon each other. Bribes given to the ruling group, for instance, are bound to strengthen the political and economic *status quo*. Military aid is bound to have an impact upon the distribution of political power within the receiving country; it can also have a deleterious effect upon the economic system, for instance, by increasing inflationary pressures. Similarly, the effect of subsistence foreign aid is bound to be the support of the *status quo* in all its aspects. Insofar as the giving nation desires these effects or can afford to be indifferent to them they obviously do not matter in terms of its over-all objectives. But insofar as the giving nation has embarked upon a policy of foreign aid for economic development which requires changes in the political and economic *status quo*, the other types of foreign aid policies are counterproductive in terms of economic development; for they strengthen the very factors which stand in its way.

This problem is particularly acute in the relations between prestige aid and aid for economic development. The giving nation may seek quick political results and use prestige aid for that purpose; yet it may also have an interest in the economic development of the recipient country, the benefits of which are likely to appear only in the more distant future. Prestige aid is at best only by accident favorable to economic development; it may be irrelevant to it, or it may actually impede it. What kind of foreign aid is the giving country to choose? If it chooses a combination of both it should take care to choose an innocuous kind of prestige aid and to promote economic development the benefits of which are not too long in coming. Afghanistan is the classic example of this dilemma. The Soviet Union, by paving the streets of Kabul, chose a kind of prestige aid that is irrelevant to economic development. The United States, by building a hydroelectric dam in a remote part of the country, chose economic development, the very existence of which is unknown to most Afghans and the benefits of which will not appear for years to come.

It follows, then, from the very political orientation of foreign aid that its effect upon the prestige of the giving nation must always be in the minds of the formulators and executors of foreign aid policies. Foreign aid for economic development, in particular, which benefits the recipient country immediately and patently is a more potent political weapon than aid promising benefits that are obscure and lie far in the future. Furthermore, the political effects of foreign aid are lost if its foreign source is not obvious to the recipients. For it is not aid as such or its beneficial results that creates political loyalties on the part of the recipient, but the positive relationship that the mind of the recipient establishes between the aid and its beneficial results, on the one hand, and the political philosophy, the political system, and the political objectives of the giver, on the other. That is to say, if the recipient continues to disapprove of the political philosophy, system, and objectives of the giver, despite the aid he has received, the political effects of the aid are lost. The same is true if he remains unconvinced that the aid received is but a natural, if not inevitable, manifestation of the political philosophy, system, and objectives of the giver. Foreign aid remains politically ineffectual—at least for the short term—as long as the recipient says either: "Aid is good, but the politics of the giver are bad"; or "Aid is good, but the politics of the giver—good, bad, or indifferent—have nothing to do with it." In order to be able to establish psychological relationship between giver and recipient, the procedures through which aid is given, and the subject matter to which it is applied, must lend themselves to the creation of a connection between the aid and the politics of the giver which reflects credit upon the latter.

The problem of foreign aid is insoluble if it is considered as a self-sufficient technical enterprise of a primarily economic nature. It is soluble only if it is considered an integral part of the political policies of the giving country—which must be devised in view of the political conditions, and for its effects upon the political situation, in the receiving country. In this respect, a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation.

As military policy is too important a matter to be left ultimately to the generals, so is foreign aid too important a matter to be left in the end to the economists. The expertise of the economist must analyze certain facts, devise certain means, and perform certain functions of manipulation for foreign aid. Yet the formulation and over-all execution of foreign aid policy is a political function. It is the province of the political expert.

It follows from the political nature of foreign aid that it is not a science but an art. That art requires by way of mental predisposition a political sensitivity to the interrelationship among the facts, present and future, and ends and means. The requirements by way of mental activity are two-fold. The first is a discriminating judgment of facts, ends and means and their effects upon each other. However, an analysis of the situation in the recipient country and, more particularly, its projection into the future and the conclusions from the analysis in terms of policy can only in part be arrived at through rational deduction from ascertainable facts. When all the available facts have been ascertained, duly analyzed, and conclusions drawn from them, the final judgments and decisions can be derived only from subtle and sophisticated hunches. The best the formulator and executor of a policy of foreign aid can do is to maximize the chances that his hunches turn out to be right. Here as elsewhere in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, the intuition of the statesman, more than the knowledge of the expert, will carry the day.

THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION

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Studies of Congress by political scientists have produced a time-tested consensus on the very considerable power and autonomy of Congressional committees. Because of these two related characteristics, it makes empirical and analytical sense to treat the Congressional committee as a discrete unit for analysis. This paper conceives of the committee as a political system (or, more accurately as a political subsystem) faced with a number of basic problems which it must solve in order to achieve its goals and maintain itself. Generally speaking these functional problems pertain to the environmental and the internal relations of the committee. This study is concerned almost exclusively with the internal problems of the committee and particularly with the problem of self-integration.[1] It describes how one congressional committee—The Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives—has dealt with this problem in the period 1947–1961. Its purpose is to add to our understanding of appropriations politics in Congress and to suggest the usefulness of this type of analysis for studying the activities of any congressional committee.

The necessity for integration in any social system arises from the differentiation among its various elements. Most importantly there is a differentiation among subgroups and among individual positions, together with the roles that flow therefrom.[2] A committee faces the problem, how shall these diverse elements be made to mesh together or function in support of one another? No political system (or subsystem) is perfectly integrated; yet no political system can survive without some minimum degree of integration among its differentiated parts. Committee integration is defined as the degree to which there is a working together or a meshing together or mutual support among its roles and subgroups. Conversely, it is also defined as the degree to which a committee is able to minimize conflict among its roles and its subgroups, by heading off or resolving the conflicts that arise.[3] A concomitant of integration is the existence of a fairly consistent set of norms, widely agreed upon and widely followed by the members. Another concomitant of integration is the existence of control mechanisms (*i.e.*, socialization and sanctioning mechanisms) capable of maintaining reasonable conformity to norms. In other words, the more highly integrated a committee, the smaller will be the gap between expected and actual behavior.

This study is concerned with integration both as a structural characteristic of, and as a functional problem for, the Appropriations Committee. First, certain basic characteristics of the Committee need description, to help explain the integration of its parts. Second comes a partial description of the degree to which and the ways in which the Committee achieves integration. No attempt is made to state this in quantitative terms, but the object is to examine the meshing together or the minimization of conflict among certain subgroups and among certain key roles. Also, important control mechanisms are described. The study concludes with some comments on the consequences of Committee integration for appropriations politics and on the usefulness of further Congres-

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[1] On social systems, see: George Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950); Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1957); Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, *Toward A General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 190–234. Most helpful with reference to the political system has been David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics* (April, 1957), pp. 383–400.

[2] On the idea of subgroups as used here, see Harry M. Johnson, *Sociology* (New York, 1960), ch. 3. On role, see specifically Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1951), p. 280; see generally N. Gross, W. Mason and A. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York, 1958). On differentiation and its relation to integration, see Scott Greer, *Social Organization* (New York, 1955).

[3] The usage here follows most closely that of Robert Merton, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–29.

sional committee analysis in terms of functional problems such as this one.

I

Five important characteristics of the Appropriations Committee which help explain Committee integration are (1) the existence of a well-articulated and deeply rooted consensus on Committee goals or tasks; (2) the nature of the Committee's subject matter; (3) the legislative orientation of its members; (4) the attractiveness of the Committee for its members; and (5) the stability of Committee membership.

Consensus. The Appropriations Committee sees its tasks as taking form within the broad guidelines set by its parent body, the House of Representatives. For it is the primary condition of the Committee's existence that it was created by the House for the purpose of assisting the House in the performance of House legislative tasks dealing with appropriations. Committee members agree that their fundamental duty is to serve the House in the manner and with the substantive results that the House prescribes. Given, however, the imprecision of House expectations and the permissiveness of House surveillance, the Committee must elaborate for itself a definition of tasks plus a supporting set of perceptions (of itself and of others) explicit enough to furnish day-to-day guidance.

The Committee's view begins with the pre-eminence of the House—often mistakenly attributed to the Constitution ("all bills for raising revenue," Art, I, sec. 7) but nevertheless firmly sanctioned by custom—in appropriations affairs.

It moves easily to the conviction that, as the efficient part of the House in this matter, the Constitution has endowed it with special obligations and special prerogatives. It ends in the view that the Committee on Appropriations, far from being merely one among many units in a complicated legislative-executive system, is *the* most important, most responsible unit in the whole appropriations process.[4] Hand in hand with the consensus on their primacy goes a consensus that all of their House-prescribed tasks can be fulfilled by superimposing upon them one, single, paramount task—*to guard the Federal Treasury.* Committee members state their goals in the essentially negative terms of guardianship—screening requests for money, checking against ill-advised expenditures, and protecting the taxpayer's dollar. In the language of the Committee's official history, the job of each member is, "constantly and courageously to protect the Federal Treasury against thousands of appeals and imperative demands for unnecessary, unwise, and excessive expenditures."[5]

To buttress its self-image as guardian of public funds the Committee elaborates a set of perceptions about other participants in the appropriations process to which most members hold most of the time. Each executive official, for example, is seen to be interested in the expansion of his own particular program. Each one asks, therefore, for more money than he really needs, in view of the total picture, to run an adequate program. This and other Committee perceptions—of the Budget Bureau, of the Senate, and of their fellow Representatives—help to shape and support the Committee members in their belief that most budget estimates can, should and must be reduced and that, since no one else can be relied upon, the House Committee must do the job. To the consensus on the main task of protecting the Treasury is added, therefore, a consensus on the instrumental task of *cutting whatever budget estimates are submitted.*

As an immediate goal, Committee members agree that they must strike a highly critical, aggressive posture toward budget requests, and that they should, on principle, reduce them. In the words of the Committee's veterans: "There has never been a budget submitted to the Congress that couldn't be cut." "There isn't a budget that can't be cut 10 per cent immediately." "I've been on the Committee for 17 years. No subcommittee of which I have been a member has ever reported out a bill without a cut in the budget. I'm proud of that record." The aim of budget-cutting is strongly internalized for the Committee member. "It's a tradition in the Appropriations Committee to cut.""You're grounded in it. . . . It's ingrained in you from the time you get on the Committee." For the purposes of a larger study, the appropriations case histories of 37 executive bureaus have been examined for a 12-year period, 1947–1959.[6] Of 443 separate bureau estimates, the Committee reduced 77.2 per cent (342) of them.

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[4] This and all other generalizations about member attitudes and perceptions depend heavily on extensive interviews with Committee members. Semi-structured interviews, averaging 45 minutes in length were held with 45 of the 50 Committee members during the 86th Congress. Certain key questions, all open-ended, were asked of all respondents. The schedule was kept very flexible, however, in order to permit particular topics to be explored with those individuals best equipped to discuss them. In a few cases, where respondents encouraged it, notes taken during the interviews. In most cases notes were not taken, but were transcribed immediately after the interview. Where unattributed quotations occur in the text, therefore, they are as nearly verbatim as the author's power of immediate recall could make them. These techniques were all used so at to improve *rapport* between interviewer and respondent.

[5] "History of the Committee on Appropriations," House Doc. 299, 77th Cong., 1st sess.. 1941–1942, p. 11.

It is a mark of the intensity and self-consciousness of the Committee consensus on budget-cutting that it is couched in a distinctive vocabulary. The workaday lingo of the Committee member is replete with negative verbs, undesirable objects of attention, and effective instruments of action. Agency budgets are said to be filled with "fat," "padding," "grease," "pork," "oleaginous substance," "water," "oil," "cushions," "avoirdupois," "waste tissue," and "soft spots." The action verbs most commonly used are "cut," "carve," "slice," "prune," "whittle," "squeeze," "wring," "trim," "lop off," "chop," "slash," "pare," "shave," "fry," and "whack." The tools of the trade are appropriately referred to as "knife," "blade," "meat axe," "scalpel," "meat cleaver," "hatchet," "shears," "wringer," and "fine-tooth comb." Members are hailed by their fellows as being "pretty sharp with the knife." Agencies may "have the meat axe thrown at them." Executives are urged to put their agencies "on a fat boy's diet." Budgets are praised when they are "cut to the bone." And members agree that "You can always get a little more fat out of a piece of pork if you fry it a little longer and a little harder."

To the major task of protecting the Treasury and the instrumental task of cutting budget estimates, each Committee member adds, usually by way of exception, a third task—*serving the constituency to which he owes his election.* This creates no problem for him when, as is sometimes the case, he can serve his district best by cutting the budget requests of a federal agency whose program is in conflict with the demands of his constituency.[6a] Normally, however, members find that their most common role-conflict is between a Committee-oriented budget-reducing role and a constituency-oriented budget-increasing role. Committee ideology resolves the conflict by assigning top, long-run priority to the budget-cutting task and making of the constituency service a permissible, short-run exception. No member is expected to commit electoral suicide; but no member is expected to allow his district's desire for federal funds to dominate his Committee behavior.

Subject Matter. Appropriations Committee integration is facilitated by the subject matter with which the group deals. The Committee makes decisions on the same controversial issues as do the committees handling substantive legislation. But a money decision—however vitally it affects national policy—is, or at least seems to be, less directly a policy decision. Since they deal immediately with dollars and cents, it is easy for the members to hold to the idea that they are not dealing with programmatic questions, that theirs is a "business" rather than a "policy" committee. The subject matter, furthermore, keeps Committee members relatively free agents, which promotes intra-Committee maneuvering and, hence, conflict avoidance. Members do not commit themselves to their constituents in terms of precise money amounts, and no dollar sum is sacred—it can always be adjusted without conceding that a principle has been breached. By contrast, members of committees dealing directly with controversial issues are often pressured into taking concrete stands on these issues; consequently, they may come to their committee work with fixed and hardened attitudes. This leads to unavoidable, head-on intra-committee conflict and renders integrative mechanisms relatively ineffective.

The fact of an annual appropriations process means the Committee members repeat the same operations with respect to the same subject matters year after year—and frequently more than once in a given year. Substantive and procedural repetition promotes familiarity with key problems and provides ample opportunity to test and confirm the most satisfactory methods of dealing with them. And the absolute necessity that appropriations bills do ultimately pass gives urgency to the search for such methods. Furthermore, the House rule that no member of the Committee can serve on another standing committee is a deterrent against a fragmentation of Committee member activity which could be a source of difficulty in holding the group together. If a committee has developed (as this one has) a number of norms designed to foster integration, repeated and concentrated exposure to them increases the likelihood that they will be understood, accepted and followed.

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[6] The bureaus being studied are all concerned with domestic policy and are situated in the Agriculture, Interior, Labor, Commerce, Treasury, Justice and Health, Education and Welfare Departments. For a similar pattern of Committee decisions in foreign affairs, see Holbert Carroll, *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs* (Pittsburgh, 1958), ch. 9.

[6a] See, for example, Philip A. Foss, "The Grazing Fee Dilemma," Inter-University Case Program, No. 57 (University, Alabama, 1960).

Legislative Orientation. The recruitment of members for the Appropriations Committee produces a group of individuals with an orientation especially conducive to Committee integration. Those who make the selection pay special attention to the characteristics which Masters has described as those of the "responsible legislator"—approval of and conformity to the norms of the legislative process and of the House of Representatives.[7]

Key selectors speak of wanting, for the Appropriations Committee, "the kind of man you can deal with" or "a fellow who is well-balanced and won't go off half-cocked on things." A Northern liberal Democrat felt that he had been chosen over eight competitors because, "I had made a lot of friends and was known as a nice guy"—especially, he noted, among Southern Congressmen. Another Democrat explained, "I got the blessing of the Speaker and the leadership. It's personal friendships. I had done a lot of things for them in the past, and when I went to them and asked them, they gave it to me." A Republican chosen for the Committee in his first term recalled,

> The Chairman [Rep. Taber] I guess did some checking around in my area. After all, I was new and he didn't know me. People told me that they were called to see if I was—well, unstable or apt to go off on tangents . . . to see whether or not I had any preconceived notions about things and would not be flexible—whether I would oppose things even though it was obvious.

A key criterion in each of the cases mentioned was a demonstrable record of, or an assumed predisposition toward, legislative give-and-take.

The 106 Appropriations Committee members serving between 1947 and 1961 spent an average of 3.6 years on other House committees before coming to the Committee. Only 17 of the 106 were selected as first term Congressmen. A House apprenticeship (which Appropriations maintains more successfully than all committees save Ways and Means and Rules[8]) provides the time in which legislative reputations can be established by the member and an assessment of that reputation in terms of Appropriations Committee requirements can be made. Moreover, the mere fact that a member survives for a couple of terms is some indication of an electoral situation conducive to his "responsible" legislative behavior. The optimum bet for the Committee is a member from a sufficiently safe district to permit him freedom of maneuver inside the House without fear of reprisal at the polls.[9] The degree of responsiveness to House norms which the Committee selectors value may be the product of a safe district as well as an individual temperament.

Attractiveness. A fourth factor is the extraordinarily high degree of attractiveness which the Committee holds for its members—as measured by the low rate of departure from it. Committee members do not leave it for service on other committees. To the contrary, they are attracted to it from nearly every other committee.[10] Of the 106 members in the 1947–1961 period, only two men left the Committee voluntarily; and neither of them initiated the move.[11] Committee attractiveness is a measure of its capacity to satisfy individual member needs—for power, prestige, recognition, respect, self-esteem, friendship, etc. Such satisfaction in turn increases the likelihood that members will behave in such a way as to hold the group together.

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[7] Nicholas A. Masters, "House Committee Assignments," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June, 1961), pp. 345–357.

[8] In the period from 1947 through 1959, (80th to 86th Congress) 79 separate appointments were made to the Appropriations Committee, with 14 going to freshmen. The Committee filled, in other words, 17.7 per cent of its vacancies with freshmen. The Rules Committee had 26 vacancies and selected no freshmen at all. The Ways and Means Committee had 36 vacancies and selected 2 freshmen (5.6 per cent). All other Committees had a higher percentage of freshmen appointments. Armed Services ranked fourth, with 45 vacancies and 12 freshmen appointed, for a percentage of 26.7. Foreign affairs figures were 46 and 14, or 30.4 per cent; UnAmerican Activities figures were 22 and 7, or 31.8 per cent. cf. Masters, *op. cit.*

[9] In the 1960 elections, 41 out of the current 50 members received more than 55.1 per cent of the vote in their districts. By a common definition, that is, only 9 of the 50 came from marginal districts.

[10] The 106 members came to Appropriations from every committee except Ways and Means.

[11] One was personally requested by the Speaker to move to Ways and Means. The other was chosen by a caucus of regional Congressmen to be his party's representative on the Rules Committee. Of the 21 members who were forced off the Committee for lack of seniority during a change in party control, or who were defeated for re-election and later returned, 20 sought to regain Committee membership at the earliest opportunity.

The most frequently mentioned source of Committee attractiveness is its power—based on its control of financial resources. "Where the the money is, that's where the power is," sums up the feeling of the members. They prize their ability to reward or punish so many other participants in the political process—executive officials, fellow Congressmen, constituents and other clientele groups. In the eyes of its own members, the Committee is either the most powerful in the House or it is on a par with Ways and Means or, less frequently, on a par with Ways and Means and Rules. The second important ingredient in member satisfaction is the government-wide scope of Committee activity. The ordinary Congressman may feel that he has too little knowledge of and too little control over his environment. Membership on this Committee compensates for this feeling of helplessness by the wider contacts, the greater amount of information, and the sense of being "in the middle of things" which are consequent, if not to subcommittee activity, at least to the full Committee's overview of the federal government.

Thirdly, Committee attractiveness is heightened by the group's rcognizable and distinctive political style—one that is, moreover, highly valued in American political culture. The style is that of *hard work;* and the Committee's self-image is that of "the hardest working Committee in Congress." His willingness to work is the Committee member's badge of identification, and it is proudly worn. It colors his perceptions of others and their perceptions of him.[11a] It is a cherished axiom of all members that, "This Committee is no place for a man who doesn't work. They have to be hard working. It's a way of life. It isn't just a job; it's a way of life."

The mere existence of some identifiable and valued style or "way of life" is a cohesive force for a group. But the particular style of hard work is one which increases group morale and group identification twice over. Hard work means a long, dull, and tedious application to detail, via the technique of "dig, dig, dig, day after day behind closed doors"—in an estimated 460 subcommittee and full committee meetings a year. And virtually all of these meetings are in executive session. By adopting the style of hard work, the Committee discourages highly individualized forms of legislative behavior, which could be disruptive within the Committee. It rewards its members with power, but it is power based rather on work inside the Committee than on the political glamour of activities carried on in the limelight of the mass media. Prolonged daily work together encourages sentiments of mutual regard, sympathy and solidarity. This *esprit* is, in turn, functional for integration on the Committee. A Republican leader summed up,

> I think it's more closely knit than any other committee. Yet it's the biggest committee, and you'd think it would be the reverse. I know on my subcommittee, you sit together day after day. You get better acquainted. You have sympathy when other fellows go off to play golf. There's a lot of *esprit de corps* in the Committee.

The strong attraction which members have for the Committee increases the influence which the Committee and its norms exercise on all of them. It increases the susceptibility of the newcomer to Committee socialization and of the veteran to Committee sanctions applicable against deviant behavior.[12]

Membership Stability. Members of the Appropriations Committee are strongly attracted to it; they also have, which bears out their selection as "responsible legislators," a strong attraction for a career in the House of Representatives. The 50 members on the Committee in 1961 had served an average of 13.1 years in the House. These twin attractions produce a noteworthy stability of Committee membership. In the period from the 80th to the 87th

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[11a] A sidelight on this attitude is displayed in a current feud between the House and Senate Appropriations Committees over the meeting place for their conference committees. The House Committee is trying to break the century-old custom that conferences to resolve differences on money bills are always held on the Senate side of the Capitol. House Committee members "complain that they often have to trudge back to the House two or three times to answer roll calls during a conference. They say they go over in a body to work, while Senators flit in and out . . . . The House Appropriations Committee feels that it does all the hard work listening to witnesses for months on each bill, only to have the Senate Committee sit as a court of appeals and, with little more than a cursory glance, restore most of the funds cut." *Washington Post,* April 24, 1962, p. 1.

[12] This proposition is spelled out at some length in J. Thibaut and H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York, 1959), p. 247, and in D. Cartwright and A. Zander, *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory* (Evanston, 1953), p. 420.

Congress, 35.7 per cent of the Committee's membership remained constant. That is to say, 15 of the 42 members on the Committee in March, 1947, were still on the Committee in March, 1961.[13] The 50 members of the Committee in 1961 averaged 9.3 years of prior service on that Committee. In no single year during the last fourteen has the Committee had to absorb an influx of new members totalling more than one-quarter of its membership. At all times, in other words, at least three-fourths of the members have had previous Committee experience. This extraordinary stability of personnel extends into the staff as well. As of June 1961, its 15 professionals had served an average of 10.7 years with the Committee.[14]

The opportunity exists, therefore, for the development of a stable leadership group, a set of traditional norms for the regulation of internal Committee behavior, and informal techniques of personal accommodation. Time is provided in which new members can learn and internalize Committee norms before they attain high seniority rankings. The Committee does not suffer from the potentially disruptive consequences of rapid changeovers in its leadership group, nor of sudden impositions of new sets of norms governing internal Committee behavior.

II

If one considers the main activity of a political system to be decision-making, the acid test of its internal integration is its capacity to make collective decisions without flying apart in the process. Analysis of Committee integration should focus directly, therefore, upon its subgroups and the roles of its members. Two kinds of subgroups are of central importance—subcommittees and majority or minority party groups. The roles which are most relevant derive from: (1) positions which each member holds by virtue of his subgroup attachments, *e.g.*, as subcommittee member, majority (or minority) party member; (2) positions which relate to full Committee membership, *e.g.*, Committee member, and the seniority rankings of veteran, man of moderate experience, and newcomer;[15] (3) positions which relate to both subgroup and full Committee membership, *e.g.*, Chairman of the Committee, ranking minority member of the Committee, subcommittee chairman, ranking subcommittee member. Clusters of norms state the expectations about subgroup and role behavior. The description which follows treats the ways in which these norms and their associated behaviors mesh and clash. It treats, also, the internal control mechanisms by which behavior is brought into reasonable conformity with expectations.

Subgroup Integration. The day-to-day work of the Committee is carried on in its subcommittees each of which is given jurisdiction over a number of related governmental units. The number of subcommittees is determined by the Committee Chairman, and has varied recently from a low of 9 in 1949 to a high of 15 in 1959. The present total of 14 reflects, as always, a set of strategic and personal judgments by the Chairman balanced against the limitations placed on him by Committee tradition and member wishes. The Chairman also determines subcommittee jurisdiction, appoints subcommittee chairmen and selects the majority party members of each group. The ranking minority member of the Committee exercises similar control over subcommittee assignments on his side of the aisle.

Each subcommittee holds hearings on the budget estimates of the agencies assigned to it, meets in executive session to decide what figures and what language to recommend to the full Committee (to "mark up" the bill), defends its recommendations before the full Committee, writes the Committee's report to the House, dominates the debate on the floor, and bargains for the House in conference committee. Within its jurisdiction, each subcommittee functions independently of the others and guards its autonomy jealously. The Chairman and ranking minority member of the full Committee have, as we shall see, certain opportunities to oversee and dip into the operations of all subcommittees. But their intervention is expected to be minimal. Moreover, they themselves operate importantly within the subcommittee framework by sitting as chairman or ranking minority member of the subcommittee in which they are most interested. Each subcommittee, under the guidance of its chairman, transacts its business in considerable isolation from every other one. One subcommittee chairman exclaimed,

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[13] This figure is 9 per cent greater than the next most stable House Committee during this particular period. The top four, in order, were Appropriations (35.7%), Agriculture (26.7%), Armed Services (25%), Foreign Affairs (20.8%).

[14] The Committee's permanent and well integrated professional staff (as distinguished from its temporary investigating staff) might be considered as part of the subsystem though it will not be treated in this paper.

[15] "Newcomers" are defined as men who have served no more than two terms on the Committee. "Men of moderate experience" are those with 3–5 terms of service. "Veterans" are those who have 6 or more terms of Committee service.

> Why, you'd be branded an impostor if you went into one of those other sub-committee meetings. The only time I go is by appointment, by arrangement with the chairman at a special time. I'm as much a stranger in another subcommittee as I would be in the legislative Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Each one does its work apart from all others.

All members of all subcommittees are expected to behave in similar fashion in the role of subcommittee member. Three main norms define this role; to the extent that they are observed, they promote harmony and reduce conflict among subcommittees.[16] Subcommittee autonomy gives to the House norm of *specialization* an intensified application on the Appropriations Committee. Each member is expected to play the role of specialist in the activities of one subcommittee. He will sit on from one to four subcommittees, but normally will specialize in the work, or a portion of the work, of only one. Except for the Chairman, ranking minority member and their confidants, a Committee member's time, energy, contacts and experience are devoted to his subcommittees. Specialization is, therefore, among the earliest and most compelling of the Committee norms to which a newcomer is exposed. Within the Committee, respect, deference and power are earned through subcommittee activity and, hence to a degree, through specialization. Specialization is valued further because it is well suited to the task of guarding the Treasury. Only by specializing, Committee members believe, can they unearth the volume of factual information necessary for the intelligent screening of budget requests. Since "the facts" are acquired only through industry an effective specialist will, perforce, adopt and promote the Committee's style of hard work.

Committee-wide acceptance of specialization is an integrative force in decision-making because it helps support a second norm—*reciprocity*. The stage at which a subcommittee makes its recommendations is a potential point of internal friction. Conflict among subcommittees (or between one subcommittee and the rest of the Committee) is minimized by the deference traditionally accorded to the recommendation of the subcommittee which has specialized in the area, has worked hard, and has "the facts." "It's a matter of 'You respect my work and I'll respect yours.' " "It's frowned upon if you offer an amendment in the full Committee if you aren't on the subcommittee. It's considered presumptuous to pose as an expert if you aren't on the subcommittee." Though records of full Committee decisions are not available, members agree that subcommittee recommendations are "very rarely changed," "almost always approved," "changed one time in fifty," "very seldom changed," etc.

No subcommittee is likely to keep the deference of the full Committee for long unless its recommendations have widespread support among its own members. To this end, a third norm—*subcommittee unity*—is expected to be observed by subcommittee members. Unity means a willingness to support (or not to oppose) the recommendations of one's own subcommittee. Reciprocity and unity are closely dependent upon one another. Reciprocity is difficult to maintain when subcommittees themselves are badly divided; and unity has little appeal unless reciprocity will subsequently be observed. The norm of reciprocity functions to minimize inter-subcommittee conflict. The norm of unity functions to minimize intra-subcommittee conflict. Both are deemed essential to subcommittee influence.

One payoff for the original selection of "responsible legislators" is their special willingness to compromise in pursuit of subcommittee unity. The impulse to this end is registered most strongly at the time when the sub-committee meets in executive session to mark up the bill. Two ranking minority members explained this aspect of markup procedure in their subcommittees:

> If there's agreement, we go right along. If there's a lot of controversy we put the item aside and go on. Then, after a day or two, we may have a list of ten controversial items. We give and take and pound them down till we get agreement.

> We have a unanimous agreement on everything. If a fellow enters an objection and we can't talk him out of it—and sometimes we can get him to go along—that's it. We put it in there.

Once the bargain is struck, the subcommittee is expected to "stick together."

It is, of course, easier to achieve unity among the five, seven, or nine members of a subcommittee than among the fifty members of the full Committee. But members are expected wherever possible to observe the norm of unity in the full Committee as well. That is, they should not only defer to the recommendations of the subcommittee involved, but they should support (or not oppose) that recommendation when it reaches the floor in the form of a Committee decision. On the floor, Committee members believe, their power and prestige depend largely on the degree to which the norms of reciprocity and unity continue to be observed. Members warn each other that if they go to the floor in disarray they will be "rolled," "jumped," or "run over" by the membership. It is a cardinal maxim among Committee members that "You can't turn an appropriations bill loose on the floor." Two senior subcommittee chairmen explain,

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[16] A statement of expected behavior was taken to be a Committee norm when it was expressed by a substantial number of respondents (a dozen or so) who represented both parties, and varying degrees of experience. In nearly every case, moreover, no refutation of them was encountered, and ample confirmation of their existence can be found in the public record. Their articulation came most frequently from the veterans of the group.

> We iron out our differences in Committee. We argue it out and usually have a meeting of the minds, a composite view of the Committee. . . . If we went on the floor in wide disagreement, they would say, 'If you can't agree after listening to the testimony and discussing it, how can we understand it? We'll just vote on the basis of who we like the best.'

> I tell them (the full Committee) we should have a united front. If there are any objections or changes, we ought to hear it now, and not wash our dirty linen out on the floor. If we don't have a bill that we can all agree on and support, we ought not to report it out. To do that is like throwing a piece of meat to a bunch of hungry animals.

One of the most functional Committee practices supporting the norm of unity is the tradition against minority reports in the subcommittee and in the full Committee. It is symptomatic of Committee integration that custom should proscribe the use of the most formal and irrevocable symbol of congressional committee disunity—the minority report. A few have been written—but only 9 out of a possible 141 during the 11 years, 1947–1957. That is to say, 95 per cent of all original appropriations bills in this period were reported out without dissent. The technique of "reserving" is the Committee member's equivalent for the registering of dissent. In subcommittee or Committee, when a member reserves, he goes on record informally by informing his colleagues that he reserves the right to disagree on a specified item later on in the proceedings. He may seek a change or support a change in that particular item in full Committee or on the floor. But he does not publicize his dissent. The subcommittee or the full Committee can then make an unopposed recommendation. The individual retains some freedom of maneuver without firm commitment. Often a member reserves on an appropriations item but takes no further action. A member explained how the procedure operates in subcommittee,

> If there's something I feel too strongly about, and just can't go along, I'll say, 'Mr. Chairman, we can have a unanimous report, but I reserve the right to bring this up in full Committee. I feel duty bound to make a play for it and see if I can't sell it to the other members.' But if I don't say anything, or don't reserve this right, and then I bring it up in full Committee, they'll say, 'Who are you trying to embarrass? You're a member of the team, aren't you? That's not the way to get along.'

Disagreement cannot, of course, be eliminated from the Committee. But the Committee has accepted a method for ventilating it which produces a minimum of internal disruption. And members believe that the greater their internal unity, the greater the likelihood that their recommendations will pass the House.

The degree to which the role of the subcommittee member can be so played and subcommittee conflict thereby minimized depends upon the minimization of conflict between the majority and minority party subgroups. Nothing would be more disruptive to the Committee's work than bitter and extended partisan controversy. It is, therefore, important to Appropriations Committee integration that a fourth norm—*minimal partisanship*—should be observed by members of both party contingents. Nearly every respondent emphasized, with approval, that "very little" or "not much" partisanship prevailed on the Committee. One subcommittee chairman stated flatly, "My job is to keep down partisanship." A ranking minority member said, "You might think that we Republicans would defend the Administration and the budget, but we don't." Majority and minority party ratios are constant and do not change (*i.e.*, in 1958) to reflect changes in the strength of the controlling party. The Committee operates with a completely non-partisan professional staff, which does not change in tune with shifts in party control. Requests for studies by the Committee's investigating staff must be made by the Chairman and ranking minority member of the full Committee and by the Chairman and ranking minority member of the subcommittee involved. Subcommittees can produce recommendations without dissent and the full Committee can adopt reports without dissent precisely because party conflict is (during the period 1947–1961) the exception rather than the rule.

The Committee is in no sense immune from the temperature of party conflict, but it does have a relatively high specific heat. Intense party strife or a strongly taken presidential position will get reflected in subcommittee and in Committee recommendations. Sharp divisions in party policy were carried, with disruptive impact, into some areas of Committee activity during the 80th Congress and subsequently, by way of reaction, into the 81st Congress.[17] During the Eisenhower years, extraordinary presidential pleas, especially concerning foreign aid, were given special heed by the Republican members of the Committee.[18] Partisanship is normally generated from the environment and not from within the Committee's party groups. Partisanship is, therefore, likely to be least evident in subcommittee activity, stronger in the full Committee, and most potent at the floor stage. Studies which have focussed on roll-call analysis have stressed the influence of party in legislative decision-making.[19] In the appropriations process, at any rate, the floor stage probably represents party influence at its maximum. Our examination, by interview, of decision-making at the subcommittee and full Committee level would stress the influence of Committee-oriented norms—the strength of which tends to vary inversely with that of party bonds. In the secrecy and intimacy of the subcommittee and full Committee hearing rooms, the member finds it easy to compromise on questions of more or less, to take money from one program and give it to another and, in general, to avoid yes-or-no type party stands. These decisions, taken in response to the integrative norms of the Committee are the most important ones in the entire appropriations process.

Role Integration. The roles of subcommittee member and party member are common to all. Other more specific decision-making positions are allocated among the members. Different positions produce different roles, and in an integrated system, these too must fit together. Integration, in other words, must be achieved through the complementarity or reciprocity of roles as well as through a similarity of roles. This may mean a pattern in which expectations are so different that there is very little contact between individuals; or it may mean a pattern in which contacts require the working out of an involved system of exchange of obligations and rewards.[20] In either case, the desired result is the minimization of conflict among prominent Committee roles. Two crucial instances of role reciprocity on the Committee involve the seniority positions of old-timer and newcomer and the leadership positions of Chairman and ranking minority member, on both the full Committee and on each subcommittee.

The differentiation between senior and junior members is the broadest definition of who shall and who shall not actively participate in Committee decisions. Of a junior member, it will be said, "Oh, he doesn't count—what I mean is, he hasn't been on the Committee long enough." He is not expected to and ordinarily does not have much influence. His role is that of apprentice. He is expected to learn the business and the norms of the Committee by applying himself to its work. He is expected to acquiesce in an arrangement which gives most influence (except in affairs involving him locally) to the veterans of the group. Newcomers will be advised to "follow the chairman until you get your bearings. For the first two years, follow the chairman. He knows." "Work hard, keep quiet and attend the Committee sessions. We don't want to listen to some new person coming in here." And newcomers perceive their role in identical terms: "You have to sit in the back seat and edge up little by little." "You just go to subcommittee meetings and assimilate the routine. The new members are made to feel welcome, but you have a lot of rope-learning to do before you carry much weight."

At every stage of Committee work, this

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[17] See, for example, the internal conflict on the subcommittee dealing with the Labor Department. 93 *Cong. Record,* pp. 2465–2562 passim; 94 *Cong. Record,* pp. 7605–7607.

[18] See, for example, the unusual minority report of Committee Republicans on the foreign aid appropriations bill in 1960. Their protest against Committee cuts in the budget estimates was the result of strenuous urging by the Eisenhower Administration. House Report No. 1798, *Mutual Security and Related Agency Appropriation Bill,* 1961, 86 Cong. 2d sess. 1960.

[19] David Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959); Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951).

[20] The ideas of "reciprocity" and "complementarity," which are used interchangeably here, are discussed in Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity," *American Sociological Review* (April, 1960). Most helpful in explaining the idea of a role system has been the work of J. Wahlke, H. Eulau, W. Buchanan, L. Ferguson. See their study, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962), esp. Intro.

differentiation prevails. There is remarkable agreement on the radically different sets of expectations involved. During the hearings, the view of the elders is that, "Newcomers . . . don't know what the score is and they don't have enough information to ask intelligent questions." A newcomer described his behavior in typically similar terms: "I attended all the hearings and studied and collected information that I can use next year. I'm just marking time now." During the crucial subcommittee markup, the newcomer will have little opportunity to speak—save in locally important matters. A subcommittee chairman stated the norm from his viewpoint this way: "When we get a compromise, nobody's going to break that up. If someone tries, we sit on him fast. We don't want young people who throw bricks or slow things down." And a newcomer reciprocated, describing his markup conduct: "I'm not provocative. I'm in there for information. They're the experts in the field. I go along." In full Committee, on the floor, and in conference committee, the Committee's senior members take the lead and the junior members are expected to follow. The apprentice role is common to all new members of the House. But it is wrong to assume that each Committee will give it the same emphasis. Some pay it scant heed.[21] The Appropriations Committee makes it a cornerstone of its internal structure.

Among the Committee's veterans, the key roles are those of Comittee Chairman and ranking minority member, and their counterparts in every subcommittee. It is a measure of Committee integration and the low degree of partisanship that considerable reciprocity obtains between these roles. Their partisan status nevertheless sets limits to the degree of possible integration. The Chairman is given certain authority which he and only he can exercise. But save in times of extreme party controversy, the expectation is that consultation and cooperation between the chairman-ranking minority member shall lubricate the Committee's entire work. For example, by Committee tradition, its Chairman and ranking minority member are both *ex officio* voting members of each subcommittee and of every conference committee. The two of them thus have joint access at every stage of the internal process. A subcommittee chairman, too, is expected to discuss matters of scheduling and agenda with his opposite minority number. He is expected to work with him during the markup session and to give him (and, normally, only him) an opportunity to read and comment on the subcommittee report.[22] A ranking minority member described his subcommittee markup procedure approvingly:

> Frequently the chairman has a figure which he states. Sometimes he will have no figure, and he'll turn to me and say, '——, what do you think?' Maybe I'll have a figure. It's very flexible. Everyone has a chance to say what he thinks, and we'll move it around. Sometimes it takes a long time. . . . He's a rapid partisan on the floor, but he is a very fair man in the subcommittee.

Where influence is shared, an important exchange of rewards occurs. The chairman gains support for his leadership and the ranking minority member gains intra-Committee power. The Committee as a whole insures against the possibility of drastic change in its internal structure by giving to its key minority members a stake in its operation. Chairmen and ranking minority members will, in the course of time, exchange positions; and it is expected that such a switch will produce no form of retribution nor any drastic change in the functioning of the Committee. Reciprocity of roles, in this case, promotes continued integration. A ranking minority member testified to one successful arrangement when he took the floor in the 83d Congress to say:

> The gentleman and I have been see sawing back and forth on this committee for some time. He was chairman in the 80th Congress. I had the privilege of serving as chairman in the 81st and 82nd Congresses. Now he is back in the saddle. I can say that he has never failed to give me his utmost cooperation, and I have tried to give him the same cooperation during his service as chairman of this Committee. We seldom disagree, but we have found out that we can disagree without being disagreeable. Consequently, we have unusual harmony on this committee.[23]

Reciprocity between chairmen and ranking minority members on the Appropriations Committee is to some incalculable degree a function of the stability of membership which allows a pair of particular individuals to work out the kind of personal accommodation described above. The close working relationship of Clarence Cannon and John Taber, whose service on the Committee totals 68 years and who have been changing places as Chairman and ranking minority member for 19 years, highlights and sustains a pattern of majority-minority reciprocity throughout the group.

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[21] For example, the Committee on Education and Labor, see footnote 26.

[22] See the exchange in 101 *Cong. Rec.* pp. 3832, 3844, 3874.

[23] 99 *Cong. Rec.*, p. 4933.

Internal Control Mechanisms. The expectations which apply to subcommittee, to party, to veterans and to newcomers, to chairmen and to ranking minority members prescribe highly integrative behaviors. We have concentrated on these expectations, and have both illustrated and assumed the close correlation between expected and actual behavior. This does not mean that all the norms of the Committee have been canvassed. Nor does it mean that deviation from the integrative norms does not occur. It does. From what can be gathered, however, from piecing together a study of the public record on appropriations from 1947 to 1961 with interview materials, the Committee has been markedly successful in maintaining a stable internal structure over time. As might be expected, therefore, changes and threats of change have been generated more from the environment—when outsiders consider the Committee as unresponsive—than from inside the subsystem itself. One source of internal stability, and an added reason for assuming a correlation between expected and actual behavior, is the existence of what appear to be reasonably effective internal control mechanisms. Two of these are the socialization processes applied to newcomers and the sanctioning mechanisms applicable to all Committee members.

Socialization is in part a training in perception. Before members of a group can be expected to behave in accordance with its norms, they must learn to see and interpret the world around them with reasonable similarity. The socialization of the Committee newcomer during his term or two of apprenticeship serves to bring his perceptions and his attitudes sufficiently into line with those of the other members to serve as a basis for Committee integration. The Committee, as we have seen, is chosen from Congressmen whose political flexibility connotes an aptitude for learning new lessons of power. Furthermore, the high degree of satisfaction of its members with the group increases their susceptibility to its processes of learning and training.

For example, one half of the Committee's Democrats are Northerners and Westerners from urban constituencies, whose voting records are just as "liberal" on behalf of domestic social welfare programs as non-Committee Democrats from like constituencies. They come to the Committee favorably disposed toward the high level of federal spending necessary to support such programs, and with no sense of urgency about the Committee's tasks of guarding the Treasury or reducing budget estimates. Given the criteria governing their selection, however, they come without rigid preconceptions and with a built-in responsiveness to the socialization processes of any legislative group of which they are members. It is crucial to Committee integration that they learn to temper their potentially disruptive welfare-state ideology with a conservative's concern for saving money. They must change their perceptions and attitudes sufficiently to view the Committee's tasks in nearly the same terms as their more conservative Southern Democratic and Republican colleagues. What their elders perceive as reality (*i.e.*, the disposition of executives to ask for more money than is necessary) they, too, must see as reality. A subcommittee chairman explained:

> When you have sat on the Committee, you see that these bureaus are always asking for more money—always up, never down. They want to build up their organization. You reach the point—I have—where it sickens you, where you rebel against it. Year after year, they want more money. They say, 'Only $50,000 this year'; but you know the pattern. Next year they'll be back for $100,000, then $200,000. The younger members haven't been on the Committee long enough, haven't had the experience to know this.

The younger men, in this case the younger liberals, do learn from their Committee experience. Within one or two terms, they are differentiating between themselves and the "wild-eyed spenders" or the "free spenders" in the House. "Some of these guys would spend you through the roof," exclaimed one liberal of moderate seniority. Repeated exposure to Committee work and to fellow members has altered their perceptions and their attitudes in money matters. Half a dozen Northern Democrats of low or moderate seniority agreed with one of their number who said: "Yes, it's true. I can see it myself. I suppose I came here a flaming liberal; but as the years go by I get more conservative. You just hate like hell to spend all this money. . . . You come to the point where you say, 'By God, this is enough jobs.' " These men will remain more inclined toward spending than their Committee colleagues, but their perceptions and hence their attitudes have been brought close enough to the others to support a consensus on tasks. They are responsive to appeals on budget-cutting grounds that would not have registered earlier and which remain meaningless to liberals outside the Committee. In cases, therefore, where Committee selection does not and cannot initially produce individuals with a predisposition toward protecting the Treasury, the same result is achieved by socialization.

Socialization is a training in behavior as well as in perception. For the newcomer, conformity to norms in specific situations is insured through the appropriate application, by the Committee veterans, of rewards and punishments. For the Committee member who serves his apprenticeship creditably, the passage of time holds the promise that he will inherit a position of influence. He may, as an incentive, be given some small reward early in his Committee career. One man, in his second year, had been assigned the task of specializing in one particular program. However narrow the scope of his specialization, it had placed him on the road to influence within the Committee. He explained with evident pleasure:

> The first year, you let things go by. You can't participate. But you learn by watching the others operate. The next year, you know what you're interested in and when to step in. . . . For instance, I've become an expert on the — program. The chairman said to me, 'This is something you ought to get interested in.' I did; and now I'm the expert on the Committee. Whatever I say on that, the other members listen to me and do what I want.

At some later date, provided he continues to observe Committee norms, he will be granted additional influence, perhaps through a prominent floor role. A model Committee man of moderate seniority who had just attained to this stage of accomplishment, and who had suffered through several political campaigns back home fending off charges that he was a do-nothing Congressman, spoke about the rewards he was beginning to reap.

> When you perform well on the floor when you bring out a bill, and Members know that you know the bill, you develop prestige with other Members of Congress. They come over and ask you what you think, because they know you've studied it. You begin to get a reputation beyond your subcommittee. And you get inner satisfaction, too. You don't feel that you're down here doing nothing.

The first taste of influence which comes to men on this Committee is compensation for the frustrations of apprenticeship. Committee integration in general, and the meshing of roles between elders and newcomers in particular, rests on the fact that conformity to role expectations over time does guarantee to the young positive rewards—the very kind of rewards of power, prestige, and personal satisfaction which led most of them to seek Committee membership in the first place.

The important function of apprenticeship is that it provides the necessary time during which socialization can go forward. And teaching proceeds with the aid of punishments as well as rewards. Should a new member inadvertently or deliberately run afoul of Committee norms during his apprenticeship, he will find himself confronted with negative sanctions ranging in subtlety from "jaundiced eyes" to a changed subcommittee assignment. Several members, for example, recalled their earliest encounter with the norm of unity and the tradition against minority reports. One remembered his attempt to file a minority report. "The Chairman was pretty upset about it. It's just a tradition, I guess, not to have minority reports. I didn't know it was a tradition. When I said I was going to write a minority report, some eyebrows were raised. The Chairman said it just wasn't the thing to do. Nothing more was said about it. But it wasn't a very popular thing to do, I guess." He added that he had not filed one since.

Some younger members have congenital difficulty in observing the norms of the apprentice's role. In the 86th Congress, these types tended to come from the Republican minority. The minority newcomers (described by one of the men who selected them as "eight young, energetic, fighting conservatives") were a group of economy-minded individuals some of whom chafed against any barrier which kept them from immediate influence on Committee policy. Their reaction was quite different from that of the young Democrats, whose difficulty was in learning to become economy-minded, but who did not actively resent their lack of influence. One freshman, who felt that "The appropriations system is lousy, inadequate and old fashioned," recalled that he had spoken out in full Committee against the recommendations of a subcommittee of which he was not a member. Having failed, he continued to oppose the recommendation during floor debate. By speaking up, speaking in relation to the work of another subcommittee and by opposing a Committee recommendation, he had violated the particular norms of his apprentice role as well of the generally applicable norms of reciprocity and unity. He explained what he had learned, but remained only partially socialized:

> They want to wash their dirty linen in the Committee and they want no opposition afterward. They let me say my piece in Committee. . . . But I just couldn't keep quiet. I said some things on the floor, and I found out that's about all they would take. . . . If you don't get along with your Committee and have their support, you don't get anything accomplished around here. . . . I'm

> trying to be a loyal, cooperative member of the Committee. You hate to be a stinker; but I'm still picking at the little things because I can't work on the big things. There's nothing for the new men to do, so they have to find places to needle in order to take some part in it.

Another freshman, who had deliberately violated apprenticeship norms by trying to ask "as many questions as the chairman" during subcommittee hearings, reported a story of unremitting counteraction against his deviation:

> In the hearings, I have to wait sometimes nine or ten hours for a chance; and he hopes I'll get tired and stay home. I've had to wait till some pretty unreasonable hours. Once I've gotten the floor, though, I've been able to make a good case. Sometimes I've been the only person there. . . . He's all powerful. He's got all the power. He wouldn't think of taking me on a trip with him when he goes to hold hearings. Last year, he went to———. He wouldn't give me a nudge there. And in the hearings, when I'm questioning a witness, he'll keep butting in so that my case won't appear to be too rosy.

Carried on over a period of two years, this behavior resulted in considerable personal friction between a Committee elder and the newcomer. Other members of his subcommittee pointedly gave him a great lack of support for his non-conformity. "They tried to slow him down and tone him down a little," not because he and his subcommittee chairman disagreed, but on the grounds that the Committee has developed accepted ways of disagreeing which minimize, rather than exacerbate, interpersonal friction.

One internal threat to Committee integration comes from new members who from untutored perceptions, from ignorance of norms, or from dissatisfaction with the apprentice role may not act in accordance with Committee expectations. The seriousness of this threat is minimized, however, by the fact that the deviant newcomer does not possess sufficient resources to affect adversely the operation of the system. Even if he does not respond immediately to the application of sanctions, he can be held in check and subjected to an extended and (given the frequency of interaction among members) intensive period of socialization. The success of Committee socialization is indicated by the fact that whereas wholesale criticism of Committee operations was frequently voiced among junior members, it had disappeared among the men of moderate experience. And what these middle seniority members now accept as the facts of Committee life, the veterans vigorously assert and defend as the essentials of a smoothly functioning system. Satisfaction with the Committee's internal structure increases with length of Committee service.

An important reason for changing member attitudes is that those who have attained leadership positions have learned, as newcomers characteristically have not, that their conformity to Committee norms is the ultimate source of their influence inside the group. Freshman members do not as readily perceive the degree to which interpersonal influence is rooted in obedience to group norms. They seem to convert their own sense of powerlessness into the view that the Committee's leaders possess, by virtue of their positions, arbitrary, absolute, and awesome power. Typically, they say: "If you're a subcommittee chairman, it's your Committee." "The Chairman runs the show. He gets what he wants. He decides what he wants and gets it through." Older members of the Committee, however, view the power of the leaders as a highly contingent and revocable grant, tendered by the Committee for so long and only so long as their leaders abide by Committee expectations. In commenting on internal influence, their typical reaction is: "Of course, the Committee wouldn't follow him if it didn't want to. He has a great deal of respect. He's an able man, a hard-working man." "He knows the bill backwards and forwards. He works hard, awfully hard and the members know it." Committee leaders have an imposing set of formal prerogatives. But they can capitalize on them only if they command the respect, confidence and deference of their colleagues.

It is basic to Committee integration that members who have the greatest power to change the system evidence the least disposition to do so. Despite their institutional conservatism, however, Committee elders do occasionally violate the norms applicable to them and hence represent a potential threat to successful integration. Excessive deviation from Committee expectations by some leaders will bring counter-measures by other leaders. Thus, for example, the Chairman and his subcommittee chairmen exercise reciprocal controls over one another's behavior. The Chairman has the authority to appoint the chairman and members of each subcommittee and fix its jurisdiction. "He runs the Committee. He has a lot of power," agrees one subcommittee chairman. "But it's all done on the basis of personal friendship. If he tries to get too big, the members can whack him down by majority vote."

In the 84th Congress, Chairman Cannon attempted an unusually broad reorganization of subcommittee jurisdictions. The subcommittee chairman most adversely affected rallied his senior colleagues against the Chairman's action—on the ground that it was an excessive violation of role expectations and threatening to subcommittee autonomy. Faced with the prospect of a negative Committee vote, the Chairman was forced to act in closer conformity to the expectations of the other leaders. As one participant described the episode,

> Mr. Cannon, for reasons of his own, tried to bust up one of the subcommittees. We didn't like that. . . . He was breaking up the whole Committee. A couple of weeks later, a few of the senior members got together and worked out a compromise. By that time, he had seen a few things, so we went to him and talked to him and worked it out."

On the subcommittees, too, it is the veterans of both parties who will levy sanctions against an offending chairman. It is they who speak of "cutting down to size" and "trimming the whiskers" of leaders who become "too cocky," "too stubborn" or who "do things wrong too often." Committee integration is underwritten by the fact that no member high or low is permanently immune from the operation of its sanctioning mechanisms.

III

Data concerning internal committee activity can be organized and presented in various ways. One way is to use key functional problems like integration as the focal points for descriptive analysis. On the basis of our analysis (and without, for the time being, having devised any precise measure of integration), we are led to the summary observation that the House Appropriations Committee appears to be a well integrated, if not an extremely well integrated, committee. The question arises as to whether anything can be gained from this study other than a description of one property of one political subsystem. If it is reasonable to assume that the internal life of a congressional committee affects all legislative activity involving that committee, and if it is reasonable to assume that the analysis of a committee's internal relationships will produce useful knowledge about legislative behavior, some broader implications for this study are indicated.

In the first place, the success of the House Appropriations Committee in solving the problem of integration probably does have important consequences for the appropriations process. Some of the possible relationships can be stated as hypotheses and tested; others can be suggested as possible guides to understanding. All of them require further research. Of primary interest is the relationship between integration and the power of the Committee. There is little doubt about the fact of Committee power. Of the 443 separate case histories of bureau appropriations examined, the House accepted Committee recommendations in 387, or 87.4 per cent of them; and in 159, or 33.6 per cent of the cases, the House Committee's original recommendations on money amounts were the exact ones enacted into law. The hypothesis that the greater the degree of Committee unity the greater the probability that its recommendations will be accepted is being tested as part of a larger study.[24] House Committee integration may be a key factor in producing House victories in conference committee. This relationship, too, might be tested. Integration appears to help provide the House conferees with a feeling of confidence and superiority which is one of their important advantages in the mix of psychological factors affecting conference deliberations.

Another suggested consequence of high integration is that party groups have a relatively small influence upon appropriations decisions. It suggests, too, that Committee-oriented behavior should be duly emphasized in any analysis of Congressional oversight of administrative activity by this Committee. Successful integration promotes the achievement of the Committee's goals, and doubtless helps account for the fairly consistent production of budget-cutting decisions. Another consequence will be found in the strategies adopted by people seeking favorable Committee decisions. For example, the characteristic lines of contact from executive officials to the Committee will run to the chairman and the ranking minority member (and to the professional staff man) of the single subcommittee handling their agency's appropriations. The ways in which the Committee achieves integration may even affect the success or failure of a bureau in getting its appropriations. Committee members, for instance, will react more favorably toward an administrator who conforms to their self-image of the hard-working master-of-detail than to one who does not—and Committee response to individual administrators bulks large in their determinations.

Finally, the internal integration of this Committee helps to explain the extraordinary stability, since 1920, of appropriations procedures—in the face of repeated proposals to change them through omnibus appropriations, legislative budgets, new budgetary forms, item veto, Treasury borrowing, etc. Integration is a stabilizing force, and the stability of the House Appropriations Committee has been a force for stabilization throughout the entire process. It was, for example, the disagreement between Cannon and Taber which led to the indecisiveness reflected in the short-lived experiment with a single appropriations bill.[25] One need only examine the conditions most likely to decrease Committee integration to ascertain some of the critical factors for producing changes in the appropriations process. A description of integration is also an excellent base-line from which to analyze changes in internal structure.

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[24] *Cf.* Dwaine Marvick, "Congressional Appropriations Politics," unpublished manuscript (Columbia, 1952).

All of these are speculative propositions which call for further research. But they suggest, as a second implication, that committee integration does have important consequences for legislative activity and, hence, that it is a key variable in the study of legislative politics. It would seem, therefore, to be a fruitful focal point for the study of other congressional committees.[26] Comparative committee analysis could usefully be devoted to (1) the factors which tend to increase or decrease integration; (2) the degree to which integration is achieved; and (3) the consequences of varying degrees of integration for committee behavior and influence. If analyses of committee integration are of any value, they should encourage the analysis and the classification of congressional committees along functional lines. And they should lead to the discussion of interrelated problems of committee survival. Functional classifications of committees (*i.e.*, well or poorly integrated) derived from a large number of descriptive analyses of several functional problems, may prove helpful in constructing more general propositions about the legislative process.

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[25] See Dalmas Nelson, "The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950," *Journal of Politics* (May, 1953).

[26] This view has been confirmed by the results of interviews conducted by the author with members of the House Committee on Education and Labor, together with an examination of that Committee's activity in one policy area. They indicate very significant contrasts between the internal structure of that Committee and the Appropriations Committee—contrasts which center around their comparative success in meeting the problem of integration. The House Committee on Education and Labor appears to be a poorly integrated committee. Its internal structure is characterized by a great deal of subgroup conflict, relatively little role reciprocity, and minimally effective internal control mechanisms. External concerns, like those of party, constituency and clientele groups, are probably more effective in determining its decisions than is likely to be the case in a well-integrated committee. An analysis of the internal life of the Committee on Education and Labor, drawn partly from interviews with 19 members of that group, will appear in a forthcoming study, *Federal Aid to Education and National Politics*, by Professor Frank Munger and the author, to be published by Syracuse University Press. See also Nicholas R. Masters, *op. cit.*, note 7 above, pp. 354–555, and Seymour Scher, "Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case Study," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (December 1960), pp. 911–920.

SUPREME COURT BEHAVIOR IN RACIAL EXCLUSION CASES: 1935–1960

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The United States Supreme Court is often guided by rules of law which make the disposition of cases depend upon singular combinations of circumstances. It is a relatively simple procedure to go through the cases in a subject matter area and compile a list of the facts the justices seem to have considered material to their solution of the issue at hand. But the identification of the peculiar combinations of events which push the decisions in one direction or the other is more difficult. The number of possible combinations is almost endless: with as few as twenty specified circumstances there are more than one million possible combinations. And the weight of a particular circumstance may depend on the combination of factors in which it appears.

Fred Kort has pointed to the "concrete differentiation of factual elements" which seem decisive in cases involving such procedural civil rights as protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, coerced confessions, and unfair trial procedures.[1]

This paper does not employ the methods developed by Kort, but its point of departure is also a recognition of the fundamental importance of factual elements in certain kinds of cases. The subject area here is the type of unfair trial procedure at issue in cases involving the exclusion of Negroes from jury service in state courts. Supreme Court decisions on this issue are well known and the general topic has been well plowed by students of constitutional law. My purpose is to see whether inferences about Supreme Court behavior in racial exclusion cases can be sharpened by a shift from the traditional method of analysis. The shift in method involves no change in focus since my investigation will use the same facts chosen as material by those employing other workways. But my aim is quantitative generalization.

I

Racial exclusion in the Federal courts has been barred by a congressional statute for many years and since 1875 state officials discriminating against Negroes in determining jury service in state courts have been subject to a fine of not more than $5,000.[2] But the vindication of Negro rights in this area has depended not on prosecutions under this statute but primarily on appeals to the Supreme Court invoking the Fourteenth Amendment against convictions in state courts obtained from juries from which Negroes are said to have been systematically excluded. In deciding these appeals the Court has developed the concept of a "representative" jury that is "an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the community."

As Black put it in *Smith v. Texas:*

> It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution . . . but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.[3]

The Court has held that this principle entitles the Negro to a jury system in which Negroes are not intentionally and systematically excluded solely on account of race or color. But whether exclusion is intentional and systematic and solely on the basis of race or color must be determined on the facts.[4] If the facts suggest a *prima facie* case of discrimination, the burden is on the state to rebut the presumption. In deciding whether a *prima facie* case has been made out the Court has chosen to focus on a particular type of fact, *i.e.*,—as David Fellman has expressed it—"Usually it is a matter of numbers."[5] The crucial facts, in short, seem to be qualitative variables, the variations in which may be represented numerically. A judgment as to discrimination is a rebuttable inference from a particular combination of numerically expressed facts or factual relationships. The lawyer, by necessity, must be interested in identifying the criteria which guide the formulation of such a judgment. The political scientist specializing in public law may equally have an interest if he would explain the Court's actions. The test which the Court has used to distinguish the combinations of circumstances which show unconstitutional exclusion seems to have been clearly stated on several occasions by several different justices.

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[1] Fred Kort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the Right to Counsel Cases," this Review, Vol. 51 (March, 1957), pp. 1–12.

[2] 18 USC at 243.

[3] 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).

[4] As Black expressed it in Patton v. Mississippi: "Whether there has been systematic racial discrimination . . . in the selection of jurors is a question to be determined from the facts in each particular case." 332 U. S. 463 at 466.

[5] David Fellman, *The Defendant's Rights* (1958), p. 103.

In *Smith v. Texas,* for instance, Justice Black declared that "Chance and accident alone could hardly have brought about the listing for grand jury service of so few negroes from among the thousands shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications for jury service."[6] Stone remarked in *Hill v. Texas* that ". . . chance or accident could hardly have accounted for the continuous omission of negroes from the grand jury lists for so long a period as sixteen years or more."[7] And as late as 1958, Black, speaking for a unanimous Court in *Eubanks v. Louisiana* said, " . . . the uniform and long-continued exclusion of Negroes from grand juries shown by this record cannot be attributed to chance [or] to accident . . ."[8]

These statements, and others like them, suggest that while the Court sees the event of exclusion as a juncture of innumerable forces, a distinction is made between determinative and chance factors. When convictions have been upset in exclusion cases, the Court has found that intentional and purposeful racial discrimination has determined the exclusion. It seems perfectly clear at the same time that exclusion resulting from chance factors constitutes no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In deciding whether a particular exclusion of Negroes from some part of the jury system is a chance occurrence, the Court has been careful to note two types of statistics. One is the ratio of qualified Negroes to qualified whites in the jurisdiction involved. In determining this ratio the Court has utilized such measures as the percentage of Negro taxpayers, the percentage literate, the percentage of Negro males 21 years and older, and the percentage of Negroes in the total population of the county. It has not, however, considered all these factors in every case. In fact, the only statistic running through all cases is the raw population figure.

The second type of statistic the Court has looked at is the ratio of Negroes to whites in the area of service from which exclusion is charged. The ratio chosen for emphasis usually depends on the nature of the claim, since exclusion from petit juries, grand juries, or jury lists may be involved.

Evidently, we have here an application of the statistical concept of sampling, and it suggests a testable hypothesis, namely, that the outcome in racial exclusion cases depends upon the relationship of a sample to a population on a particular attribute—racial heterogeneity (RH). The population consists of the Negroes and whites from which the sample (read jury or jury list) is drawn. The play in the joints of the judicial machine is of great importance here. For whether the racial heterogeneity of a sample is representative of a population is a meaningful question only if the population and sample are relevant for each other.

The racial heterogeneity of a population or a sample may be measured by an index of qualitative variation. This method essentially counts differences. The greater the number of differences among a set of items, the more heterogeneous the aggregate and hence the greater the variation in it. By counting the differences between each item and every other item in a set, we get a total number of differences in the aggregate. This becomes meaningful when we relate the observed differences to the maximum number of differences possible. The index of qualitative variation is the ratio of total observed differences to maximum possible differences, a ratio that can vary between zero and 100 per cent.

II

An idea of what the court has been doing in exclusion cases can be gained by comparing the racial heterogeneity of the populations and samples to which the court has paid attention. RH values for populations and samples are presented in Table I for the 13 cases decided in the period 1935–1960. The table shows that the court has often used the racial composition of a total county population as a basis for comparison with the racial composition of juries and jury lists. Yet, it is safe to say that in no county or state is the total population the relevant base for determining jury service. Total population always needs refining by the elimination of those who lack the requisite qualities and characteristics specified by the statutes. There is some tension between the notion of a representative cross-section of the community and the long lists of requirements and exemptions which characterize jury selection procedures in many states.[9] But as long as the Supreme Court

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[6] *Loc. cit.*, p. 131.

[7] 316 U. S. 400, 404.

[8] 356 U. S. 584, 587.

[9] For example, Alabama excludes those who are under age, habitual drunkards, permanently diseased or unfit because of physical weakness, il-

TABLE I. COMPARATIVE RACIAL HETEROGENEITY* IN SELECTED POPULATIONS WITH ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES FOR BI-RACIAL SAMPLES

Case	Year	Out-come	RHP %	RHS %	P	Vote
Norris v. Alabama	1935	+	29.8(M)	0		8–0
Hale v. Kentucky	1938	+	41(Tx)	0		8–0
Pierre v. Louisiana	1939	+	88.8(R)	0		8–0
Smith v. Texas	1940	+	36(PT)	13.4(JL)	<.001	9–0
Smith v. Texas	1940	+	13.4(JL)	4.5(GJ)	<.05	
Hill v. Texas	1942	+	52.3(R)	0		9–0
Akins v. Texas	1945	−	52.3(R)	23(JL)	<.05	6–3
Patton v. Mississippi	1947	+	92.1(R)	0		9–0
Brunson v. N. Carolina	1948	+	9.3(JP)	3.1(JL)	<.001	9–0
Cassell v. Texas	1950	+	24.3(PT)	25(GJ)	>.7	7–1
Cassell v. Texas	1950	+	24.3(PT)	24(GJ)	P_{21} <.01	
Brown v. Allen	1953	−	53.7(Tx)	53.3(JL)	>.8	6–3
Brown v. Allen	1953	−	53.7(Tx)	34.4(JL)	>.16	
Speller v. Allen	1953	−	94.2(Tx)	26(JB)	<.001	6–3
Reece v. Georgia	1955	+	37.5(M)	4.3(JL)	<.001	9–0
Eubanks v. Louisiana	1958	+	88.8(R)	.07(GJ)	<.001	9–0

* Distinguishing Negroes and Whites only.

Legend: + = decision for the Negro claimant
− = decision against the Negro claimant
RHP = racial heterogeneity of the relevant population
RHS = racial heterogeneity of the relevant sample
M = males, 21 and over
Tx = total tax paying population
R = raw population
PT = poll tax paying population
GJ = grand jury
JL = jury list
JP = jury pool
JB = jury box
P = probability of the difference between RHP and RHS occurring by chance

has not seen fit to prohibit such disqualifications, the representative jury should be interpreted as one which represents fairly the population of qualified prospects. And indeed, the justices have at times used a refined rather than a raw population count as a basis for their computations, though they have not been as careful to distinguish the one from the other as might be wished.[10]

In five of the 16 relationships examined, the court used total population statistics. In four of these the racial heterogeneity of the sample

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literates (except property holders), and those convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Alabama exempts from jury service judges, attorneys, officers of the United States, officers of the Executive Department of the state, sheriffs, deputies, clerks of court, county commissioners, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, optometrists, teachers, actuaries, boat engineers, bus drivers, truck drivers (under jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission), railroad engineers, firemen, conductors, train dispatchers, bus dispatchers, railroad station agents, telegraph operators, reporters, embalmers, radiobroadcasting engineers and announcers, superintendents, doctors and regular employees of Bryce and Searcy Hospitals, officers and enlisted men of the National Guard and Naval Militia, convicts and prison guards. See Anderson v. Alabama, pending before the U. S. Supreme Court, 1961 Term, Docket No. 326.

[10] It is only fair to say that the necessary distinction with supporting statistical data has not often been presented in the parties' briefs. On several occasions, the court has apparently found it necessary to take judicial notice of census data in order to reach a determination.

population over extended periods of 16 years or more was zero. In the fifth case, the court used the county tax list to identify the qualified population, but here again exclusion was total over a period of 30 years. Since all five cases were decided against the state, it seems fair to conclude that where the Negro population is substantial (7.2 per cent or more), and exclusion from the sample absolute, the court has required no further test. Indeed, the language in the opinions occasionally suggests that proof of total exclusion alone may be sufficient for showing racial discrimination, assuming there were some qualified Negroes in the county. Typical of this view is the comment of Black in *Patton v. Mississippi* that

> . . . whatever the precise number of qualified colored electors in the county, there were some. . . . We hold that the state wholly failed to meet the very strong evidence of purposeful racial discrimination made out by the petitioner upon the uncontradicted showing that for thirty years or more no Negro had served as a juror in the criminal courts of Lauderdale County.[11]

Total exclusion cases, therefore, appear to require no further analysis, though problems could arise if the period of exclusion is sufficiently shortened. For the court has often asserted that exclusion of a race from a small enough sample is not sufficient for showing intentional and purposeful discrimination on a racial basis.[12]

The remaining cases raised problems of the type likely to plague the court in the future. In these cases the sample was racially heterogeneous as was also the population with which it was compared. The question the court has been asking is whether the differences in degree of heterogeneity are due to chance or intentional racial policy. As Frankfurter put it in *Cassell v. Texas*, the question is whether there was "a purposeful non-inclusion of Negroes because of race or a merely symbolic representation, not the operation of an honest exercise of relevant judgment or the uncontrolled caprices of chance."[13] While the court has not publicly used statistical tests of significance for the differences observed, nothing prevents us from doing so in our search for a standard. Associated probabilities have been calculated for each of the bi-racial distributions in Table I.[14] In *Smith v. Texas*, the grand jury list was rated 13.4 per cent on the RH factor as compared to 36 per cent for the relevant population, composed of those paying poll taxes in the county. The chance expectation of such a difference is much less than 1 in 1,000. But when the grand jury list and the grand jury are compared on the same factor, the former exceeds the latter by a three-to-one-ratio—a difference expected by chance less than five times in a hundred. In *Brunson v. North Carolina*,[15] *Reece v. Georgia*[16] and *Eubanks v. Louisiana*,[17] the differences observed have associated probabilities of considerably less than .001. In *Brown v. Allen*[18] on the other hand, the observed differences in drawing grand jury and petit jury lists would be expected by chance about nine times

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[11] 332 U.S. 463, 468–469. This comment was in response to an attempt by the Mississippi Supreme Court to play the role of statistician. "Of the 25 qualified Negro male electors there would be left, therefore, as those not exempt, 12 or 13 available male negro electors as compared with 5,500 to 6,000 male white electors as to whom, after deducting 500 to 1,000 exempt, would leave a proportion of 5,000 non-exempt white jurors to 12 or 13 non-exempt negro jurors, or about one fourth of one per cent negro jurors,— 400 to 1. . . . For the reasons already heretofore stated there was only a chance of 1 in 400 that a Negro would appear on such a venire and as this venire was of 100 jurors, the sheriff, had he brought in a negro, would have had to discriminate against white jurors, not against negroes,—he could not be expected to bring in one fourth of one Negro." (p. 467).

[12] *E. g.*, Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286; Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 403.

[13] *Loc. cit.*, p. 291.

[14] Unless otherwise indicated, all probability statistics used in this paper are two-tailed and were computed with the binomial expansion if N was small and with the binomial test and the Yates correction for continuity if N was large. The formula for the binomial expansion is

$$P(x) = \binom{N}{x} P^x Q^{N-x}$$

where P = proportion of cases expected in one category,

$$Q = 1 - P \text{ and } \binom{N}{X} = \frac{N!}{x!(N-x)!}.$$

For large samples

$$(N > 25)Z = \frac{(x \pm .5) - NP}{\sqrt{NPQ}}$$

[15] 333 U.S. 851 (1948).

[16] 350 U.S. 85 (1955).

[17] 356 U.S. 584 (1954).

[18] 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

in ten for the latter and approximately 17 times in 100 for the former. Social scientists analyzing these data would be likely to reject chance as an explanation in the first three cases but not in the *Brown* case since .05 is the usual cutting point. In these cases, the Supreme Court consciously or unconsciously has chosen to use a region of rejection consistent with established statistical procedures. And in *Brown*, the decision is for the state, racial discrimination not having been proved.

The remaining three cases do not fit the same pattern. In *Cassell v. Texas*, the difference between the racial heterogeneity of the poll tax population and that of the grand jury is so minimal that its associated probability of occurrence is about eight times in ten. On that basis, we might expect a decision for Texas. In *Akins v. Texas*,[19] the disparity between the RH of the poll tax population and the jury list would be expected by chance less than five times in a hundred. We should therefore anticipate a decision for the Negro claimant. Contrary to these expectations, Texas won the decision in *Akins* but lost it in *Cassell*. The difficulties of squaring the two cases in terms of legal doctrine have been recognized. Herman Pritchett says that "the authority of the *Akins* ruling was subsequently impaired by the somewhat confused decision in *Cassell v. Texas*."[20] And it is true that the seven members of the majority in Cassell split 4-3 in choosing a rationale for their decision. The behavior of this majority, however, is entirely consistent with the statistical considerations previously introduced. For Reed, speaking for the court, was no more impressed by the differences in the racial heterogeneity of the poll tax population and that of the grand jury population than we are. And he declared, "Without more it cannot be said that Negroes had been left off grand-jury panels to such a degree as to establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination."[21]

The decision in the case turned, therefore, on the second charge that "the Dallas County grand-jury commissioners for 21 consecutive lists had consistently limited Negroes selected for grand-jury service to not more than one on each grand jury."[22] While the justices split 4-3 in agreeing with this charge, the decision for the Negro can be explained statistically since the associated probability of no more than one Negro on 21 consecutive grand juries is less than .01. This explanation eliminates the confusion in Reed's opinion and makes the outcome in *Cassell* consistent with the outcome in the other cases. In *Akins*, on the other hand, the Negro claimant failed because his sample was too small, not because the observed differences between sample and population were insignificant. As Reed pointed out for the court, the only complaint was said "to consist of an arbitrary and purposeful limitation by the Grand Jury Commissioners of the number of Negroes to one who was to be placed upon the grand jury panel of sixteen for the term of court at which the indictment against petitioner was found. This is petitioner's only complaint as to racial discrimination."[23] If this is viewed as a claim for proportional representation, it would have no standing. If it is viewed as a claim of intentional racial discrimination, a sample of 16 persons containing one Negro was not sufficient to prove racial discrimination where Negroes constituted 15.5 per cent of the population sampled. The court, indeed, seems to have found the sample inadequate even when doubled to 32 persons including two Negroes. It may be surmised that had no more than one Negro name appeared on 21 consecutive lists, the sample would have been sufficiently large to support an inference consistent with that drawn in *Cassell*.

While the court has not been prone to use such terms as "sample size," an inference that such a factor is important in exclusion cases is entirely consonant with the data we have examined. The sample size in the 13 cases studied varied from 16 in *Akins* to 2,126 in *Speller*. And the sample in *Akins* was only about one-fourth the size of the next smallest sample. This alone is sufficient to put *Akins* in a class by itself. But even more striking is the fact that the court has decided no case in favor of a Negro claimant where the sample available numbered less than 252 names. It is also worth noting that a total of 25 different justices have compiled, over a period of 24 terms, a record of remarkable consistency in racial exclusion cases. For, as Table I shows, the 25 justices cast a total of 113 votes; all but 10 of these were cast consistently with the statistical explanations here advanced. This record shows that the liberal-conservative dichotomy which often characterizes the Supreme Court has not been operative in this area of litigation. It also shows that the court did not wait for Earl Warren to bring unanimity to one area of decision making of vital importance to those subjected to racial discrimination.

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[19] 325 U.S. 398 (1945).

[20] C. Herman Pritchett, *The American Constitution* (1959), p. 546.

[21] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 285–286.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

[23] *Loc. cit.*, p. 400.

The final case, *Speller v. Allen*, is the only one not decided consistently with the statistical formulations we have advanced. In *Speller* no Negro had served on a Vance County, North Carolina jury in "recent" years. In examining the jury box, it was found that of 2,126 names, only 145 were those of Negroes. The majority of six justices (Vinson, Reed, Jackson, Burton, Clark and Minton) failed to find racial discrimination. Yet the probability of such an observed difference in the racial composition of the tax list and the jury box would be less than .001. *Speller*, therefore, is a deviant case not explained by our formulations. In terms of the standards seemingly used by the court before and after that decision it would appear, as Black and Frankfurter agreed, that there was "unconstitutional discrimination" in the make-up of the jury box in *Speller*.

III

What may be concluded from all this? Basically, that it is now possible to formulate a set of explanatory hypotheses as follows:

(1) The total absence of Negroes from a state jury system or a part thereof is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment given two conditions:

(a) The proportion of Negroes in the qualified population is substantial (*i.e.*, 7.2 per cent or more).
(b) The period of exclusion is long (*i.e.*, 16 years or more).

(2) Partial absence of Negroes from a state jury system or a part thereof is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment given two conditions:

(a) The racial heterogeneity of a sample population (read jury or jury list) differs from that of a qualified population to an extent expected by chance less than five times in one hundred.
(b) The sample is sufficiently large (60 or more cases).

These hypotheses are not offered as final explanations or as complete explanations or as the only explanations for the Supreme Court's decisions in racial exclusion cases. They are submitted as explanations consonant with the data examined and are stated with sufficient precision to make empirical testing possible.

KANT, LIBERALISM, AND WAR*

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Many liberals of the nineteenth century, and their predecessors of the middle eighteenth, thought the natural condition of men to be one of harmony. Dissension and strife do not inhere in man and society; they arise instead from mistaken belief, inadequate knowledge, and defective governance. With the evils defined, the remedies become clear: educate men and their governors, strip away political abuses. This is one theme in the history of liberal thought. Urged by humane philosophers and supported by pacifistic economists, its appeal in Western society is immense and enduring.

There is in liberal thought another theme as well, which is often obscured though it goes back to the earliest philosophers who can fairly be called liberal. Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Kant made no easy assumptions about the rationality and goodness of man. Among men in nature and states in a world of states, they found not harmony and peace but hostility and war to be the natural condition.

The two liberal traditions are partly contradictory. Kant is often improperly placed in the first of them, which helps to account for many of the misinterpretations of his political philosophy. His essay *Eternal Peace* is seen as one of a succession of peace plans going back to Dante and Dubois in the early fourteenth century, encompassing the French monk Crucé and the abbé St. Pierre, and culminating in the League and the United Nations. Some emphasize the plan, that is, international organization; others the importance of its being based on republican or democratic governments. In his guise as a philosopher urging the peaceful proclivities of democracy, Kant has even infiltrated the State Department. Giving full credit to the analysis of Kant, George V. Allen, an assistant secretary, once said: "The United Nations, with all its virtues, has not yet been able to achieve freedom from fear. The reason is easy to understand. Its second most powerful member is not a democracy."[1]

Some have accepted such an interpretation not to applaud Kant's commanding vision and high moral purpose but rather to decry his political naiveté and simple-minded optimism Kant's supposed conviction that a Europe of republics would be peaceful, Crane Brinton finds to be a pathetic relic of the Enlightenment.[2] The statement exposes one of the problems of interpretation. Kant is a child of the Enlightenment; he is also the father of a critical philosophy that goes beyond it. Sometimes he writes as though peace were inevitably coming; at other times, as though *Realpolitik* were the mode of the present and the future. One who cannot ignore the latter aspect may label it a Germanic aberration, as Gooch did in his work on Germany and the French Revolution.[3] While Kant may be seen as a backsliding liberal, he may also be considered a theorist of power politics who hid his Machiavellian ideas by hanging 'round them the fashionable garments of liberalism. Since he explained and in a sense accepted the practice of power politics in the relations of states, since he wrote of nature's plan and man's predetermined destiny, this interpretation too becomes plausible, the more so if his *Rechtsstaat* is taken to be a thinly disguised despotism with the sovereign supposedly limited by law but actually free of any human constraint.[4]

It is little trouble to collate passages that would support in turn each of the preceding interpretations of Kant, but the whole man would thereby elude us. There is a unity in his thought that is hard to grasp. His manner of thinking is foreign to social-science fashions, his mode of analysis rigorous and yet subtle, his style difficult but clear, his writing crabbed and still, as Goethe said, sometimes slyly ironic and even eloquent.

I

"A true political philosophy . . . cannot advance a step without first paying homage to the principles of morals. . . . "[5] It is incumbent upon us to take Kant at his word and begin by briefly discussing his moral philosophy. Kant was neither an empiricist nor an idealist. Empiricism he criticizes as leading to "merely contingent" knowledge; idealism as exceeding the bounds of reason. Man is a member of two worlds: the phenomenal and the noumenal. In the first, he is a creature of the senses, of impulse and desire. Utility or happiness as a standard of morals or legislation is mere caprice, for the object of action is taken from the realm of contingency. There can be no certainty nor universality of agreement. If your happiness is not mine, a government that presumes to tell either of us what objects we should seek and how we should seek them exceeds the bounds of permissible legislation. It undertakes to do what all men could not possibly have assented to.[6] This is the kernel of all liberalism, rigorously defined. It is expressed, for example, by Lord Acton in his argument that liberty is the only end of government that can be generally pursued without producing tyranny. In Kant's words: "No one may force anyone to be happy according to his manner of imagining the well-being of other men; instead, everyone may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him as long as he does not infringe on the freedom of others to pursue a similar purpose, when such freedom may coexist with the freedom of every other man according to a possible and general law."[7] Where others have grounded the injunction more pragmatically, Kant roots the limitation in a profound analysis of the nature of reason.

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[1] George V. Allen, "Perpetual Peace Through World-Wide Federation," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 20 (June 19, 1949), pp. 801–802.

[2] Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution, 1789–1799* (New York, 1934), p. 261.

[3] G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution* (London, 1920), p. 271.

[4] For a recent example, see the lead review of *The Times Literary Supplement*, January 23, 1959.

[5] Kant, *Eternal Peace and other International Essays*, tr. W. Hastie (Boston, 1914), p. 118. This book contains: pp. 1–25, "The Natural

By his possession of reason, man is distinguished from all mere animals. Man's reasoning abilities are, however, circumscribed. He can know that noumena, things-in-themselves, exist; he cannot know their content. The imperative, which is the basis of morality and of legislation, is then necessarily without content. "Act according to a Maxim which can be adopted at the same time as a Universal Law."[8] My act is proper if everyone could, without contradiction and conflict, claim the right to act similarly. Men would always act in accordance with the categorical imperative if they were wholly creatures of reason. They are not. From the sensual nature of man conflict and violence arise. The contradiction between his condition and his potential gives the right to compel others to enter with him into a civil society in which his rights are secured, and with them the possibility of moral behavior.[9] The criterion of legislation is abstract in order that it may be, within the limits of reason, of general validity. The purpose of legislation is negative: to "hinder hindrances" to freedom so that each may enjoy his antecedently existing rights unmolested.

Each man is an end in himself. The rights of one man before the law are the same as the rights of another. Kant is sharply critical of all practice contrary to this dictum. In the state of nature men have possessions; in the civil state their possessions are secured to them by law and become property. Men have equal rights to property but in varying amounts depending on their situation and abilities. There can, by right, be no nobility of birth but only gradations of rank according to merit. Great inequalities of wealth may, however, limit or even destroy equality of opportunity, as Kant himself remarks. The remedy, negative and typically liberal, is to arrange the laws so as to lessen the perpetuation of family lands by inheritance.[10] To take another example and one that will incline our analysis toward the problem of war, Kant steadfastly opposed the impressment of subjects into military service. The practice was widespread. Karl Alexander, nephew of Frederick the Great, sold his regiments to England for the American War. At the bidding of his English mistress, he finally sold his principality to Prussia for cash and retired to England. In England impressment of sailors

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Principle of the Political Order Considered in Connection with the Idea of a Universal Cosmopolitan History"; pp. 27–54, "The Principles of Political Right Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in Natural Law"; pp. 55–66, "The Principle of Progress Considered in Connection with the Relation of Theory to Practice in International Law"; pp. 67–168, "Eternal Peace, A Philosophical Essay."

[6] See *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, esp. sec. 2; and in general, *Critical Examination of Practical Reason*. Both are in Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, tr., *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, 6th ed. (London, 1909). For the political parts of the argument, see "Principles of Political Right."

[7] Acton, "Nationality," *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London, 1907), pp. 270–300; Kant, "Theory and Practice: Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory But Does Not Apply to Practice," tr. Carl J. Friedrich, *The Philosophy of Kant* (New York, 1949), p. 416.

[8] *The Philosophy of Law*, tr. W. Hastie (Edinburgh, 1887), p. 34.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78, 157.

[10] "Principles of Political Right," pp. 34–39.

was regarded as an undeniable prerogative of the Crown, and the brutal and inefficient practice not eliminated until it was made unnecessary by the Continuous Service Scheme adopted in 1853.[11] In the face of such practices, Kant writes:

> A State is not to be regarded as a property or patrimony like the soil on which it may be settled. It is a society of men, over which no one but itself has the right to rule . . . and to incorporate it as a graft in another State is to destroy its existence as a moral person; it is to reduce it to a thing, and thereby to contradict the idea of the original compact without which a right over a people is inconceivable.

Subjects are not, like the vegetables the farmer uproots and carts off to market, objects that the ruler can dispose of according to his whim. In many states the ruler does so treat them. Where war does not require of the ruler the least sacrifice of his pleasures he may

> resolve for war from insignificant reasons, as if it were but a hunting expedition; and, as regards its propriety, he may leave the justification of it without concern to the diplomatic body, who are always too ready to give their services for that purpose.[12]

The practices of governments contradict the principles of right. How are the required limitations to be secured? The answer has two parts: first, the institutions that are appropriate, and then how they may come to exist. Only in a republic can it be hoped that the principles of right will prevail. In such a state the executive is made up of one or a few; separated from it is an assembly representing the self-dependent citizens, men of property, profession, or craft. The executive presents its proposed legislation, the assembly chants its ayes and nays. The question put to it is not, for example, is a 10 per cent tax on bread supportable as compared to a tax of 5 per cent? The question, in the manner of Rousseau, is simply this: Does the proposed law accord with the general will? Is it one that everyone, though he would have preferred the lower tax, could conceivably have agreed to? If it is such, then the idea of the original contract is preserved. Still, what if the assembly says "nay" and the executive refuses to listen?

Kant's philosophy, including his political philosophy, moves forward by resolving a series of antinomies or tensions. The enjoyment, as distinct from the possession, of rights depends on the state. However imperfect the state may be, it is greatly preferable to anarchy. On such grounds as these, revolution is absolutely enjoined. Yet one may, as Kant did, view with sympathy revolutions that according to the principles of right would stand condemned. There is no contradiction. He writes, one might say, sometimes noumenally and sometimes phenomenally, or, more accurately, with both aspects of human affairs clearly in his mind. Careful analysis and the clear specification of standards square easily in Kant's philosophy with caution, flexibility, and moderation in the judgment of human behavior.

The other institutional arrangement that is essential to proper governance is freedom of expression. Kant takes *Sapere Aude*! as the motto of the Enlightenment, and one of the most frequently quoted of his statements is that "the liberty of the press is the sole palladium of the rights of the people."[13] One hears a distinct reverberation from the Philosophes' Shield of Evidence or an echo, to take a German formulation, of Schlözer's dictum that statistics and despotism cannot coexist. In his own and his subjects' interest, the ruler ought to permit the widest freedom of expression; but again, if he does not, there is nothing that can rightfully be done about it.

At such points as these some have concluded that Kant's political theory is a defense of despotism coupled with a hope that the despot will rule by law. He does, it is true, reflect the widespread ideas of his time. But they were ideas shared by many who were liberals as well as by others. Only a government secure in its power, Hegel once wrote, can permit the conscientious objector to live by his scruples. Across the North Sea one finds Lord Hardinge, Secretary at War in Wellington's Cabinet, describing the army as

> a protection rather than any detriment to Liberty. We permitted a licentiousness which under any other constitution might be fatal to the public peace. Meetings were held and language was used which no other empire would permit and which nothing but the confidence of the Crown in the Standing Army would justify even our Government in permitting."

Neither Hegel nor Hardinge were liberals, but they reflect the idea that Kant emphasizes: A government that while limited is strong in its sphere can permit a freedom to its subjects that would otherwise endanger the state. Thus Kant, with obvious reference to Frederick the Great, applauds the strength of the Prussian state upon which the individual's liberty depends.[14]

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[11] Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution*, p. 12; Christopher Lloyd, *The Nation and the Navy* (London, 1954), pp. 131, 209.

[12] "Eternal Peace," pp. 70, 78; *Philosophy of Law*, p. 217.

[13] "What is Enlightenment?" tr. Friedrich; *Philosophy of Kant;* "Principles of Political Right," p. 50.

So long at least as the state "runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States," it must be powerful externally as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. The republican form is preferable, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; but despotisms are stronger—and no one would expect or wish to bring the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength.[15] Standing armies are dangerous, arms races themselves being a cause of war, but in the absence of an outside agency affording protection, each state must look to the effectiveness of its army.[16] A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies or to maintain itself as a commonwealth."[17] Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war.

Kant's concern with the strength and thus the safety of the state is part of his perception of the necessities of power politics. Among states in the world, as among individuals in the state of nature, there is constantly either violence or the threat of violence. States, like "lawless savages," are with each other "naturally in a nonjuridical condition."[18] There is no law above them; there is no judge among them; there is no legal process by which states can pursue their rights. They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. A treaty of peace can end only a particular war; a pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as unjust; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."[19] More surely than those who extract and emphasize merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "War," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "is not fatalistically inevitable."[20]

Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.[21] He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or diplomatically composed codes have not, nor could have, the slightest legal force, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint. . . . "[22] His intention clearly is that the "oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

This is the culminating problem of Kant's philosophy. Men need the protection of law before they have any chance of leading the moral life to which their reason commands them. The civil state is not sufficient. Peace among, as well as within, states is essential to the development of uniquely human capacities. "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."[23] This is the form of the imperative that is most appropriate here. The constant hostility of states and the pressures of recurring war make its fulfillment impossible. How can the problem be solved?

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[14] Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York, 1937), pp. 167–168; "What is Enlightenment?" p. 139.

[15] "Eternal Peace," p. 108.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 71. In a way that long remains typical of liberals, Kant, in effect, criticizes the army that has nobility as officers and rabble for its soldiers. He would prefer not the nation-in-arms but an army of citizen-soldiers periodically and voluntarily rehearsing their military duties.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 98–99; "Principles of Political Right," pp. 42–43.

[18] *Philosophy of Law*, p. 214; *cf.* pp. 223–224: "Further, it may be said that the expression 'an unjust enemy in the state of Nature' is *pleonastic;* for the state of Nature is itself a state of injustice."

[19] "Eternal Peace," p. 83; *cf.* p. 76.

[20] *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress. Cf. Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgement*, tr. James C. Meredith (Oxford, 1928), p. 96. Referring to "a system of all states that are in danger of acting injuriously to one another" Kant says: "In its absence, and with the obstacles that ambition, love of power, and avarice, especially on the part of those who hold the reins of authority, put in the way even of the possibility of such a scheme, *war* is inevitable."

[21] *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 219–225; "Eternal Peace," pp. 69–75.

[22] "Eternal Peace," p. 83.

[23] *Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 47.

II

As is well known, Kant proclaims the *Rechtsstaat*, or republic, as preeminently the peaceful form of the state. In a republic the unambiguous test of right is applied to every piece of legislation, and every act of the executive will in turn follow the universally established law.[24] Such a state could not undertake an aggressive war, for its sole purpose, a purpose guaranteed by its structure, is to further the moral life of its subjects by enacting and administering positive, general law.[25] There may be reasons for a republic to fight, but they are not internally generated. Kant records, as had Hume, the couplet from Pope's *Essay on Man:*

> For Forms of Government let fools contest;
> Whate'er is best administered is best.

And, just as with Hume, he cites the thought in order to disagree with it. The point for both of them is that as the context of action varies, similar causes have different effects. Notice what Kant has done. With no comforting illusions about man, he seeks in the state, and among states as will be seen in a moment, the structure that will turn men's "unsocial sociability," their conflict and violence, toward a constructive result.[26]

How are the appropriate structures to come into being, nationally and in the world at large? Kant sees in history, indeed in the very horrors of war, "a deep-seated, maybe far-seeing, attempt on the part of supreme wisdom, if not to found, yet to prepare the way for a rule of law governing the freedom of states, and thus bring about their unity in a system established on a moral basis."[27] Aha! one may say, an overriding determinism, an uncritical teleology, an Hegelian world-spirit marching with benign purpose, a sterile optimism. Kant succumbs to none of these. He is neither determinist, uncritical, nor rosy-faced with hope. A universal plan of nature, unknowable in detail but dimly discernible in outline, must be assumed; it cannot be known. He is moving at the outermost rim of reason to establish the necessity of an act of faith and its compatibility with his own critical philosophy. We can discern in nature "a design to bring forth concord out of the discord of men. . . . " This must be so if Kant's moral theory is correct, for only in concord can man follow the categorical imperative. But, he warns,

> human reason, when dealing with the relation of effects to their causes, must keep within the limits of possible experience; and to speak of Providence as knowable by us in this relation would be putting on Icarian wings with presumptuous rashness in order to approach the mystery of His unfathomable purposes.[28]

His argument, both of limits and of possibilities, is established in the *Pure Reason* and elaborated in the *Practical Reason*. Along with its relation to moral philosophy, his reasoning is great with political implications.

The activities of bees and beavers, guided by instinct, produce regular patterns and predictable results. Citizens of a purely rational world, on the other hand, would act according to a preconcerted plan. Because men behave in neither of these ways, "no regular systematic history of mankind" appears to be possible. But if we take progress not as a final cause but as a postulate of the practical reason, "the cheerless gloom of chance" is illumined by "the guiding light of reason."[29] In the economic world of Adam Smith, men scratch and claw, each seeking his profit. The result is the greater good of all. If we look at the world and see discrete events, we are overwhelmed by the chaos: each event without cause and all events without meaning. But if we look at the aggregate of events with a proper organizing principle in our minds, we may see in the chaos, order; in the welter of events, a plan of nature. Newton, as Darwin said, did not explain why there is a gravitational force but that there is such a force. The cause, as Kant would put it, located in the bodies, is inaccessible to our reason; but the rules by which it operates can be discerned.[30] And so it is that out of the "universal violence" of the state of nature and "the necessity arising therefrom" comes the resolution of a people "to subject themselves to national law. . . . "[31] The juridical union itself is "a condition of [legal] equality . . . determined by the action and reaction of free wills limiting one another. . . . "[32] And

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[24] *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 210–211.

[25] "Principle of Progress," p. 64: Each republic "unable to injure any other by violence, must maintain itself by right alone; and it may hope on real grounds that the others being constituted like itself will then come, on occasions of need, to its aid."

[26] "That politics may be reduced to a science," *Hume's Political Discourses* (London, n.d.), pp. 229-243; Kant, "Eternal Peace," p. 80n.

[27] *Teleological Judgement*, p. 96.

[28] "Eternal Peace," p. 91.

[29] "Principle of the Political Order," pp. 3–5.

[30] Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (London, 1928), p. 455.

[31] "Principle of the Political Order," pp. 15–17; "Principle of Progress," p. 62.

> even if a people were not compelled by internal discord to submit to the coercion of public laws, war as an external influence would effect this. For, according to the arrangement of nature already indicated, every people finds another pressing upon it in its neighborhood and it must form itself internally into a State in order to be equipped as a power so as to defend itself.[33]

Men and states seek their ends little knowing that they are by their actions producing a result that may have been no part of their intentions. Smith's invisible hand is at work in the realm of politics. The "planless aggregate" of human actions can be represented as "constituting a system," though the demonstrations of Kant in the realm of the political are necessarily vaguer, crasser, and less certain than are those of Smith.[34]

There is a sense of progress but not a naive optimism, for as we advance Kant sees that the dangers and difficulties also grow. The practical reason pronounces its irresistible veto: "There shall be no war."[35] Yet without war in the past, men now would be feeble types sheltering in caves and feeding on nuts and berries. The development as conceived by Kant is dialectic:

> By the expenditure of all the resources of the commonwealth in military preparations against each other, by the devastations occasioned by war, and still more by the necessity of holding themselves continually in readiness for it, the full development of the capacities of mankind are undoubtedly retarded in their progress; but, on the other hand, the very evils which thus arise, compel men to find out means against them. A law of equilibrium is thus discovered for the regulation of the really wholesome antagonism of contiguous States as it springs up out of their freedom; and a united power, giving emphasis to this law, is constituted, whereby there is introduced a universal condition of public security among the nations.[36]

Kant mentions, by way of suggestion, some of the ways in which peace may come out of war. The strength of a state is directly related to its general prosperity and well-being, and these in turn to the amount of liberty enjoyed by its subjects. "If the citizen is hindered in seeking his prosperity in any way suitable to himself that is consistent with the liberty of others, the activity of business is checked generally; and thereby the powers of the whole State are again weakened." Since states are in close competition, the sovereign, to avoid weakening his state, must grant a greater liberty to his subjects. Meanwhile the growing intensity of the competition among states leads them to spend larger amounts of money, even in time of peace, in military preparation. Prices rise, the national debt mounts, and finally the states are so weakened by this competition and by actual war that the sovereign is forced to give in peacefully to the people and place in their hands the power to choose between war and peace.[37] The attempt to win in the competition of states leads the sovereign to make some concessions; the impossibility of winning leads to the final concession, at which point, presumably, the republican form becomes the pattern of government throughout the world.

The manner of approach is immensely impressive. Its execution is accomplished with modesty, perception, and political sensibility. This is not to say that the vision is without flaw, the plan without blemish. Kant, if read from one point of view, can be taken as a study in the futility of the unsoundly based "ought." This was clear in his analysis of the individual in a state of nature where, he argued, the moral obligations, the "oughts" that apply to every rational being, cannot possibly be fulfilled. Prior to the establishment of a pacific federation, the "oughts" in international law turn out to mean as little as those applied to man in the state of nature. When the state of nature gives way to the civil state, the "oughts" applied to moral man take on a practical meaning. Those that apply to states can be taken seriously only if the environment of the state is similarly improved. For he says: "Every people, for the sake of its own security, thus may and ought to demand from any other that it shall enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil constitution, in which the right of each shall be secured."[38] The civil state is necessary for two reasons, because men are imperfect and because even good men may fall into dispute and require a legally established mediator. The universal law-state would seem to be necessary for a similar pair of reasons.

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[32] "Principles of Political Right," pp. 34–35.

[33] "Eternal Peace," p. 95.

[34] "Principle of the Political Order," p. 22.

[35] *Philosophy of Law*, p. 230.

[36] "Principle of the Political Order," p. 17; *cf.* p. 23: "Applying the same method of study everywhere, both to the internal civil constitutions and laws of the States and to their external relations to each other, we see how in both relations the good they contained served for a certain period to elevate and glorify particular nations, and with themselves, their arts and sciences,—until the defects attaching to their institutions came in time to cause their overthrow."

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 20; "Principle of Progress," p. 63.

[38] "Eternal Peace," p. 81.

Yet in spite of a number of statements such as the one just quoted, Kant will not accept the "legal state of Society" on a grand scale, the world constitution "similar to the civil constitution," as a solution to the problem. Every time he uses such phrases he quickly adds qualifications that materially change their meaning. His "universal International State, or Union of Nations," turns out to be "a voluntary combination of different States that would be *dissoluble* at any time, and not such a union as is embodied in the United States of America, founded upon a political constitution, and therefore indissoluble."[39] In such a voluntary organization, Kant says, the settlement of disputes among states can be conducted according to a civil process instead of by war. And yet he has also said in the clearest terms that against the evils of war and the general insecurity of states "there is no possible remedy but a system of international right founded upon public laws conjoined with power, to which every State must submit,—according to the analogy of the civil or political right of individuals in any one State."[40] The seeming contradiction calls for some explanation.

III

Why does Kant, after having constructed an argument internally consistent, turn to the conclusion that not government but a voluntary organization is the solution to the problem of war? He gives two reasons. The first is partly a logical proposition resting on his definition of terms. States already have a legal constitution; it would be illogical to place them under another. Individuals in a condition of nature have a right to compel others to join with them to form a state. The right of a state to demand that other states submit to the rule of law is not comparably strong. As a matter of right, no state can interfere with the internal arrangements of another. Kant, in contrast to Mazzini and Woodrow Wilson, is a non-interventionist liberal.[41] One suspects that his second reason for shying away from a world state is more important. He fears that such a state, once achieved, would be a greater evil than the wars it is designed to eliminate. It could so easily become a terrible despotism, stifle liberty, kill initiative, and in the end lapse into anarchy.[42]

States in the world are like individuals in the state of nature. They are neither perfectly good nor are they controlled by law. Consequently conflict and violence among them are inevitable. This statement does not lead Kant to the conclusion that a world state is the answer. Distrusting that solution, he casts about for another. The other possibility open to him is that all states so improve that they will act according to maxims that could be universally followed without conflict. While he fears the former solution, he is too cautious and critical to place his faith entirely in the latter. Instead he attempts to combine them. It is the aim of his political philosophy to establish the hope that states may improve enough and learn enough from the suffering and devastation of war to make possible a rule of law among them that is not backed by power but is voluntarily observed. The first factor is the internal improvement of states; the second, the external rule of law. But the second, being voluntary, is dependent on the perfection with which the first is realized. The "power" to enforce the law is derived not from external sanction but from internal perfection.

Can one sensibly expect all states gradually to conform to a pattern that, once universally established, would provide the basis for perpetual peace? At one point Kant says: "Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and then will your object, the benefit of perpetual peace, be added unto you."[43] This is a strange injunction to come from Kant, for he has pointed out, as we have several times noted, that it is only in the civil state that man has the possibility of living the moral life. The civil state made changes in man's behavior possible; it was not the other way around. And this is also the view that Kant takes of the relation between the internal and external affairs of states. In the 7th Proposition of his "Principle of the Political Order," for example, he avers that without the proper ordering of the external relations of states, the internal establishment of the perfect civil constitution is impossible.

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[39] *Philosophy of Law*, p. 225.

[40] "Principle of Progress," p. 65. *Cf.* "Eternal Peace," pp. 122–123; and *Philosophy of Law*, pp. 163–164, where Kant emphasizes that the federation must have the function of determining according to law, wherever there is a significant conflict, which interpretation of right should prevail.

[41] "Eternal Peace," p. 81; and see above, n. 9. For differences among liberals on this question, see Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York, 1959), ch. 4.

[42] "Principle of Progress," pp. 62–63; "Eternal Peace," pp. 97–98.

[43] "Eternal Peace," p. 114.

For the moment, however, let us assume that, without profound change in their external relations, all states have become republics. Kant's conclusion is that at this point perpetual peace is established, at least approximately. The international rule of law is realized, for the law is voluntarily agreed upon and voluntarily obeyed. This whole system of voluntary universal law rests upon an equilibrium of forces that is the culmination of world history.

To show that the equilibrium, once realized, is bound to collapse, one need only refer to Kant's own analysis. He points out that in a state of nature, where each state must define its rights and prosecute them with its own power, no one country can be secure against any other. "Lesion of a less powerful country may be involved merely in the condition of a more powerful neighbor prior to any action at all; and in the State of Nature an attack under such circumstances would be warrantable." This is a logical justification of the right of preventive war. From it Kant derives the principle of the balance of power.[44] How, one may ask, does the final equilibrium of the voluntary federation among states differ from the equilibrium sometimes attained by balance-of-power politics, an equilibrium that Kant properly labelled precarious? It should be clear by now that it differs in only one of the two respects that Kant believes to be essential. He ridicules the balance of power by comparing it with "the house described by Swift, which was built by an architect so perfectly in accordance with all the laws of equilibrium that when a sparrow lighted upon it it immediately fell." Yet the same doubt would seem to apply to Kant's hope for a pacific world secured "not by the weakening of all the separate powers of the States, but by an equilibrium which is brought forth and guaranteed through their rivalry with each other."[45] It is, in Kant's impeccable logic, necessary to supersede the state of nature among states and establish the rule of law. It is, by the same logic, impossible for a voluntary international federation effectively to guarantee the peace. If equilibrium depends on spontaneous agreement or if equilibrium depends on a balance of forces, the federation of Kant is either way doomed to be transitory and shifting. Just as the house designed by a Laputian would collapse under the weight of a sparrow so Kant's structure falls to the ground whenever one major state chooses to forsake the international federation and flout its universal law.

The difficulty is made all the clearer by noting how, in a republic, the general will pronounces on the question of war and peace. The unambiguous test of right is again applied to a proposed act of the executive. The question is, as with domestic legislation, abstractly put. The answer to it must be a simple yes or no. Since the point is important and generally overlooked, I quote the relevant passage.

> If, for example, a proportioned war-tax were imposed on all the subjects, they are not entitled . . . to say that it is unjust because somehow, according to their opinion, the war was unnecessary. For they are not entitled to judge of this; whereas, because it is at least always possible that the war was inevitable and the tax indispensable, it must be regarded as rightful in the judgment of the subject.[46]

IV

Kant has held out a hope for perpetual peace, which upon closer scrutiny seems to disappear. Has he deluded himself with a false optimism, which has then been transferred to many of his interpreters? To answer the question we have to complete the circle and return to a consideration of his moral philosophy.

It is, Kant writes in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, "absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which" an act was purely moral. However,

> whether this or that takes place is not at all the question; but that reason of itself, independent on [sic] all experience, ordains what ought to take place, that accordingly actions of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example, the feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds everything on experience, are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by reason. . . . [47]

A moral act may never have been performed; yet moral behavior is a "necessary" or "practical" goal of mankind. When Kant uses such adjectives he means that the action described is the only action in accordance with man's noumenal nature, that its performance is a duty. Kant demonstrates that the categorical imperative exists and that to follow it is not impossible; he does not imply that men will live according to it. From the moral duty inherent in man's noumenal nature arise other of Kant's postulates. He accords to man in the form of practical reason, or will, what he has denied to him in the form of pure reason. If we are ever to fulfil the moral law, we must assume the existence of progress, an immortal soul, a God.[48]

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[44] *Philosophy of Law*, p. 218, where in addition to what is quoted above, he writes: "This international relation is the foundation of the Right of Equilibrium, or of the 'balance of Power,' among all states that are in active contiguity to each other."

[45] "Principle of Progress," p. 65; "Eternal Peace," p. 98.

[46] "Principles of Political Right," p. 41n.

[47] *Metaphysic of Morals*, pp. 23–24.

Kant approaches the problem of war in similar fashion. Perpetual peace is a particular reading of the postulate of progress, for if a condition of peace is not possible, then the prospect of one day realizing the ideal of moral behavior disappears. It is a partial and erroneous interpretation of Kant to say that he thought the realization of "necessary" or "practical" goals something that would occur in anyone's lifetine. Kant's analysis makes the conclusion that a universal rule of law can be achieved almost incomprehensible, but even this conclusion makes sense in his way of thinking; for to say that we can only "comprehend the incomprehensibility" of something is simply to face up to the inherent limitations of reason.[49]

The conclusion that follows from considering Kant's political philosophy in the context of his moral philosophy is borne out by many of his more purely political statements. In the *Philosophy of Law*, after one of his many iterations of the proposition that only in a universal state can man find security, he raises the argument that if the state is extended over too large an area it becomes physically incapable of protecting its members. "Hence," he says,

> the *Perpetual Peace*, which is the ultimate end of all the Right of Nations, becomes in fact an impracticable idea. The political principles, however, which aim at such an end, and which enjoin the formation of such unions among the States as may promote a continuous approximation to a Perpetual Peace are not impracticable. . . .[50]

As he had demonstrated the possibility of moral behavior, so he must establish the possibility of perpetual peace. The second is the precondition of the first, and nothing that is impossible can be imperatively commanded. Peace is possible. This Kant has sought to prove. Its achievement remains an improbability.

> Now, as a matter of fact, the morally practical Reason utters within us its irrevocable *Veto: 'There shall be no War.'* . . . Hence the question no longer is as to whether Perpetual Peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must *act* on the supposition of its being real. . . . And although the realization of this purpose may always remain but a pious wish, yet we do certainly not deceive ourselves in adopting the maxim of action that will guide us in working incessantly for it; for it is a duty to do this.[51]

V

Kant shares the major tenets of liberalism: the source of the individual's rights lies outside of the state; his freedom may be limited only when its exercise interferes with the rights of others; such limitation must be by known general laws before which all men stand equal; men's capacities are greater than is shown by their present accomplishments; and, finally, their potential will unfold in time, with education being one of the important means of progress. But Kant sees in combination what others have often separated—the defects, or as he says, the evil of men and the possibility of their living good lives, the strength of the state and the liberty of its subjects, progress amidst ever greater difficulties, the approach to peace as wars become fiercer and more frequent. He has, as many liberals do not, an appreciation of politics as struggle, an idea of possible equilibrium not as simple and automatic harmony but always as something perilously achieved out of conflict.

Let the philosophers scribble as they will, writes Kant at the beginning of "Eternal Peace." There is no danger, for rulers will not listen. This has been taken as criticism of states and condemnation of their rulers. But to the philosopher's advice rulers cannot listen, as Kant well knew. He was not engaged in the puerile task of telling men of affairs to stop behaving badly. Nor could he have been, for the dependence of behavior upon condition is one of his major theses. Taken as a King's Mirror, Kant's "Eternal Peace" is lost in futility. But so to take it requires a very unKantian interpretation. In describing what the states and the world will have to do and to become if moral behavior is to be possible, Kant makes understandable and in a sense excuses the failures of men and their rulers to achieve moral rectitude.

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[48] We must, for example, "postulate the *existence of God,* as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*. . . ." *Practical Reason,* p. 221.

[49] *Metaphysic of Morals,* p. 84. This is a difficult problem. To put peace in the infinite future would be to demonstrate its impossibility. Kant must therefore think of sequences in the phenomenal world that are not infinite but do continue without end. This abstruse statement of the problem may help to make clear the philosophic context of Kant's political thought. For this resolution of the problem, I am indebted to S. Körner's superb little book, *Kant* (Penguin, 1955), pp. 163–174.

[50] *Philosophy of Law,* p. 224; *cf.* "Principle of the Political Order," p. 13.

[51] *Philosophy of Law,* pp. 229–230.

Many liberals of Kant's time and after have looked upon war as annoyance or aberration, as something, one might say, that lies outside of history. Kant, in contrast, at once condemns war and demonstrates that its occurrence is expected rather than accidental. In the end we are left not with a confident foretelling of "the end of wars and the reign of international law"[52] but with a deeper appreciation of the causes of war and the immense difficulty of doing anything about them.

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[52] Edwin D. Mead's introduction to the book cited above, n. 5.

THE REVIVAL OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A CRITIQUE*

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If wishes were horses,
Then beggars would ride . . .

Perhaps no single individual has had as much impact on the discipline of political science during the past several years as has Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago. Both he and his disciples (and they are disciples in the "classical" sense) have engaged in a full scale attack upon the premises underlying the contemporary study of politics.[1]

Strauss argues that these premises are ill-founded and self-contradictory, and, if taken seriously, lead to moral nihilism. He contends, further, that another set of premises, those of "classical natural right," which treat man in terms of his natural end and his relation to the "mysterious whole," are capable of providing a more adequate foundation for the study of politics.

Given the vigor with which Strauss' criticisms have been developed, it is only legitimate that the attackers and the alternatives proposed be themselves subject to examination. The argument of this essay is that while Strauss raises a number of interesting and important questions, his own thinking is marked by at least as much confusion as that of those he criticizes. The essay will first summarize Strauss' position, along with some preliminary comments, and will then proceed to a more detailed examination of its assumptions, logic and implications.[2]

I

According to Strauss, both contemporary political philosophy and contemporary political science are in a state of "decay and perhaps of putrefaction."[3] Political philosophy, originally the attempt to understand man's social life as a "whole," has been replaced by narrow empirical studies which eschew value judgments as unscientific, and which tend to reduce the political to the sub-political, *i.e.*, to reduce politics to psychology or sociology and to explain political decisions in terms of primitive drives whose direction is determined by one's culture or epoch.[4]

The sources of this decay seem to lie in the abandonment of classical natural right and the domination of contemporary social science by positivism and historicism. These two sources are closely related, Strauss argues, for historicism is the logical consequence of positivism.[5]

Positivists, he argues, deriving their study of man from a "mechanical"[6] and materialistic view of natural science, maintain that values are matters of personal choice and hence not subject to discussion in terms of any natural standard. Thus, they argue that social science is incapable of passing upon questions of value. And, since values are not to be found in the nature of things, the sources of moral conceptions must be sought in the passions as these are channelled by environment. Hence the reductionist tendency of which we spoke earlier.[7]

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* I wish to thank Professors Cecelia M. Kenyon, Guenter Lewy, John Ladd and Felix Oppenheim, all of whom read an earlier version of this essay.

[1] The most articulate of Strauss' students include Walter Berns, Joseph Cropsey, Harry V. Jaffa and Allan Bloom.

[2] The bulk of Strauss' criticism of contemporary political theory and political science is to be found in three books: *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe, 1958), and *What Is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe, 1959). The last named is a collection of essays and book reviews which have appeared in various journals. Henceforth the volumes will be cited as *NRH*, *TM* and *WPP*, respectively.

[3] *WPP*, p. 17 and p. 25 f.

[4] *WPP*, p. 38. See also the epilogue by Strauss in Herbert J. Storing (ed.) *Essays on the Science of Politics* (New York, 1962), especially pp. 311, 322, 325; Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Sciences and the Study of Political Things: The Case of Christian Bay's *The Structure of Freedom*," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (September, 1961), p. 550, and Joseph Cropsey, "On the Relation of Political Science and Economics," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (March, 1960), pp. 3–14.

[5] *WPP*, pp. 18–25 and *passim*.

[6] By a "mechanical" interpretation of nature Strauss means one which attempts to understand the present in terms of the past (*i.e.*, in terms of efficient rather than "final causes"), and the complex in terms of the more simple (*i.e.*, the whole in terms of its parts).

[7] *WPP*, pp. 18–25 and *passim*.

Historicism, Strauss maintains, carries this one logical step further. If the whole is unknowable, if men's preferences, and hence the framework of men's preferences, are purely subjective, then neither ethical judgments nor the principles of science can be regarded as true for all times. Even the so-called facts of any epoch or culture (since these are determined by assumptions as to what constitutes a fact) must be regarded as purely subjective. The only valid historical proposition open to historicists, according to Strauss, is that one cannot develop valid historical propositions:

> After having reached its full growth historicism is distinguished from positivism by the following characteristics. (1) It abandons the distinction between facts and values, because every understanding, however theoretical, implies specific evaluations. (2) It denies the authoritative character of modern science, which appears as only one form among many of man's thinking orientation in the world. (3) It refuses to regard the historical process as fundamentally progressive. . . . (4) It denies the relevance of the evolutionist thesis by contending that the evolution of man out of non-man cannot make intelligible man's humanity.[8]

The destruction of political philosophy by positivism and historicism has had practical as well as theoretical consequences.[8a] The denial of the possibility of judging between the "base" and the "noble" leads to nihilism and the glorification of personal self-aggrandisement at worst or a blind conformism at best.[9] (If American social scientists have maintained some integrity it is only because, failing to understand the consequences of their own position, they remain attached to humane values.[10])

These practical consequences are disastrous and, according to Strauss, help explain the general character of the contemporary world, including the development of both National Socialism and Communist totalitarianism.[11] But, he admits, pointing this out is not sufficient. It is not enough to be appalled at the present state of social science and its consequences. One must demonstrate that political philosophy is possible, that it is possible to distinguish between the noble and the base. For if one cannot achieve this any hope for improvement must remain a "wish," and "a wish is not a fact."[12]

One can demonstrate the possibility of political philosophy, in part, by demonstrating that the premises conventionally accepted by contemporary social scientists are not satisfactory for explaining what they purport to explain, or by proving that these premises are self-contradictory. The latter is quite clear in the case of historicism. Historicism, Strauss argues, leads inevitably to the conclusion that historicism itself is historically determined.

In other words, to maintain that all thought is historically determined is to be forced to admit that one's own thought is so determined. To argue that no statement possesses absolute validity is to argue that one's own statements lack absolute validity:

> Only under one condition could historicism claim to have done away with all pretense to finality, if it presented the historicist thesis not as simply true, but as true for the time being only. In fact, if the historicist thesis is correct we cannot escape the consequence that the thesis itself is "historical" or valid because meaningful, for a specific historical situation only. Historicism is not a cab which one can stop at his convenience: historicism must be applied to itself.[13]

Positivist thought is characterized by a similar contradiction. Positivists claim to eschew value judgments, but they constantly bring these in through the backdoor, as when they use such terms as "the authoritarian personality," for example, or contrast the normal with the "neurotic."[14]

Further, it is not at all obvious that value judgments and descriptions belong to different realms of discourse. To prove such an assertion would require an effort comparable to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and such a critique has yet to be developed.[15] On the contrary, it can be shown that in general one cannot describe social acts—or at least talk significantly about important social acts—without evaluating them.[16] The very decision to define the political involves understanding the purpose of a society and hence admits the necessity of standards of judgment. And, even more narrowly, one cannot develop important propositions dealing with political events without making value judgments:

> Scientific concern with political facts . . . requires

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[8] *WPP*, p. 26.

[8a] Strauss differentiates "political philosophy" from both "political theory" and "political thought in general"; see *WPP*, pp. 11–15.

[9] *WPP*, p. 20, *NRH*, p. 6.

[10] *NRH*, p. 4.

[11] *WPP*, pp. 41, 54, 55.

[12] *NRH*, p. 6.

[13] *WPP*, pp. 72–3.

[14] *WPP*, p. 21.

[15] *WPP*, p. 22.

[16] *WPP*, p. 21.

> isolation of the phenomena which it is studying. But if this isolation is not to lead to irrelevant or misleading results, one must see the phenomena in question within the whole to which they belong.[17]

> But it is impossible to define the political . . . or the "state," without answering the question of what constitutes this kind of society. Now a society cannot be defined without reference to its purpose. . . . But by defining the state, or rather civil society, with reference to its purpose, one admits a standard in the light of which one must judge political actions and institutions: the purpose of civil society necessarily functions as a standard for judging of civil societies.[18]

> Or can one say anything relevant on public opinion polls, for example, without realizing the fact that many answers to the questionnaires are given by unintelligent, uninformed, deceitful, and irrational people, and that not a few questions are formulated by people of the same caliber—can one say anything relevant about public opinion polls without committing one value judgment after another?[19]

> . . . if the historian shows, by objectively measuring the action of a statesman against the model of "rational action in the circumstances," that the statesman made one blunder after another, he makes an objective value judgment to the effect that the statesman was singularly inept. In another case the historian arrives by the same procedure at the equally objective value judgment that a general showed unusual resourcefulness, resolution and prudence. It is impossible to understand phenomena of this kind without being aware of the standard of judgment that is inherent in the situation. . . .[20]

However, pointing out that positivists and historicists contradict themselves, or that description of social acts entails evaluation, is still not sufficient to establish the validity of classical natural right. It is, therefore, necessary to go further, *i.e.*, to demonstrate that classical natural right (or a philosophic position which takes its bearings from classical natural right) both resolves this dilemma and stands up against criticism which may be directed against it.[21] Strauss' major efforts have been directed to this dual task. These efforts will be summarized and evaluated later, but, at this point, certain preliminary comments are in order.

Strauss' analysis of the historicist implications of positivism (as he defines it) is not very convincing.[22] It is not a logical contradiction to accept the view that values are a matter of personal commitment, and at the same time to assert that empirical propositions can, in principle, be verified. In fact, on the face of it, the opposite position seems far more cogent, *i.e.*, it is only when men clearly differentiate between what is and what they feel should or must be that both natural and social science become possible. The failure of Greek science was partially the result of an attempt to tie science to a cosmology which insisted upon the fusion of the descriptive and the normative, and the rise of modern science was closely related to a break with that tradition.[23] Interestingly enough, Strauss does not carry his argument to its logical conclusion. If he had he would be forced to assert that a "mechanical" conception of science makes science impossible. (It can be argued that the tendency of many social scientists to confuse personal commitments with empirical propositions is a major impediment to the development of the social sciences.)

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[17] *WPP*, p. 24. As Walter Berns puts it: The political, generally speaking, is not visible to any of our senses, or even a combination of them. Racial segregation in the United States is seen by the observer because he can see the injustice of the practice; racial segregation in South Africa is seen by the same observer because of an understanding of justice and injustice that is not confined by a parochial "value system." Through the "eye of the mind" we are able to see the injustice and hence the political. Walter Berns, "The Behavioral Sciences. . . . " *Op. cit.*, p. 550.

The above example is, incidentally, rather surprising given the contention of Strauss and his disciples that the modern world is characterized by moral regression rather than moral progress. After all, it is only very recently in human history that dominant opinion has come to regard slavery itself as morally bad.

[18] *WPP*, p. 22.

[19] *NRH*, p. 53.

[20] *NRH*, p. 54.

[21] *NRH*, pp. 1–8. According to Strauss the dilemma is that: "The more we cultivate reason, the more we cultivate nihilism." (*Ibid.*, p. 6.)

[22] One wonders why, in these passages at least, Strauss identifies modern positivism, and related positions, with both materialism and a "mechanical" conception of natural science, rather than with the critique of the possibilities of knowledge which culminates in Hume. Certainly modern positivists as well as other "moderns" who take their bearings from the same tradition, would not accept his categories. See, for example, Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1953) and Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York, 1960).

[23] See Giorgio de Santillána, *The Origins of Scientific Thought* (New York, 1961), and Charles C. Gillispie, *The Edge of Objectivity* (Princeton, 1960).

Nor is the argument that one must understand the "whole" before one can develop empirical propositions any more convincing.[24] Again, the physical sciences have proceeded with considerable success on just the opposite assumption. In fact, it was only when "narrow" empirical studies were substituted for analysis of the "whole" that modern science was born.

It is true, of course, that the objects of investigation and even the very formulation of problems are shaped by personal interests or commitments, but just as the accuracy or meaningfulness of propositions dealing with the nature of cancer is logically independent of the universal desire to discover a cure for the disease, so the accuracy or meaningfulness of propositions dealing with the sources of racial prejudice is logically independent of ethical views on the subject. And, of course, many very significant investigations are motivated simply by the desire to understand or master nature. While the question of whether or not man should master nature may, under certain circumstances, become a moral question, the fact that all or most men desire to do so says nothing about propositions dealing with nature nor even, as Strauss must admit, about the moral rightness of engaging in this task.[25]

The direction of men's interests or commitments indicates only the direction of their interests or commitments, and the sources of this direction are a legitimate subject for investigation, although the uncovering of sources has little or nothing to do with the validity of propositions dealing with these interests or commitments.

Strauss' argument that social scientists cannot develop significant propositions without evaluating is based on the conflation of terms which should be kept analytically distinct. No one in the empirical tradition would deny that normative judgments or evaluations are a legitimate part of scientific discourse. There is all the difference in the world, however, between talking about "deceitful" individuals and "neurotic" individuals. While both are evaluations the first is quite clearly a moral evaluation which carries with it heavy elements of condemnation. The latter, however, more nearly resembles what Nagel has aptly termed a "characterizing value judgment" and contains little or no moral content in conventional discourse, despite what Strauss has argued. In this sense it is little different from the statement "This is a healthy (or unhealthy) person" which also relates to standards having a descriptive function, and which can easily be reduced to purely descriptive terms.[26]

The case of the prudent general is a little more difficult, for the term "prudence" generally carries with it some element of commendation. However, the term is not generally thought to convey a moral connotation when used functionally. (It is certainly possible to argue that General X, an imprudent general, may be a more moral man than General Y who is quite prudent as a general.) The example closely resembles the statement "X is a good thief." In both instances the phrase involves commendation in terms of an evaluative standard which has very little direct relevance to moral concerns.

Further, both the statement "this is a prudent general" and "this is a deceitful person" imply that the speaker can offer reasons for the judgment, and these reasons are descriptive statements. General X is prudent because he knows how to place his men so as to keep casualties at a minimum, etc. Y is deceitful because he lies continuously, etc. Of course one could respond to a query as to why General X is prudent by offering reasons which themselves contain evaluative terms, but in that case the questioner could still legitimately ask for further explication, and, in the last analysis, such explication would necessarily involve descriptive statements.[27]

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[24] By the "whole" I assume Strauss means the "natural order" of the universe and man's place in that order.

[25] Although Strauss and his disciples often imply otherwise, they would certainly admit that one cannot argue from conventional standards to the existence of a natural order. Such an argument would be akin to maintaining, on the other side, that natural right cannot exist because people disagree as to the content of any number of very important moral imperatives.

Strauss' assertion, incidentally, that one cannot understand any society except in terms of its purpose, is merely an assertion. Most societies are characterized by the presence of many conflicting human purposes.

[26] The difficulty of formulating a definition of "normal" or "healthy" which would enable one to fully differentiate even between very close cases is not, as Strauss would admit, a legitimate argument against regarding the terms as primarily descriptive. For discussions of these issues see Nagel, *op. cit.*, pp. 485–502. See also R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (London, 1952); P. H. Noel-Smith, *Ethics* (Penguin Books Ltd.: Middlesex, 1954), and Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca, 1958).

Once the description was complete both the original speaker and the questioner might conceivably disagree as to whether the individual being described was indeed a prudent general or a deceitful person, depending on the standards which they accepted, and the discussion then would come to an end. The point is, however, that unless one can describe without at the same time evaluating, rational discussion cannot even begin.

The fact that Strauss and his disciples can point to many instances where social scientists use evaluative standards without clearly specifying this, or even make moral judgments without realizing that they are doing so, proves nothing except that some social scientists are mediocre. And the fact that conventional language sometimes makes it difficult to avoid such confusions proves nothing except that perhaps we require the development of a "meta-language" which eliminates such confusions.

"Characterizing evaluations" will continue to be used in both the social sciences and the sciences because they serve human purposes, *i.e.*, the description and control of the natural and social environment. It can be argued, too (and I think legitimately), that many evaluations which have a generally commendatory or even a moral connotation can be used in analysis, provided that the social scientist is aware of the standards on which they are based. Finally, social scientists will and should continue to explore problems which are related to a moral commitment.[28] But to argue from the fact that human beings develop evaluations which derive from their interests and standards, to the existence of an objective moral basis for such standards is only legitimate if it can be shown that these interests and standards cannot be understood except in terms of some norm which transcends them. But this is just what Strauss is trying to prove. His critique of the modern position assumes what it must demonstrate.

And, finally, there remains a large core of propositions which are not evaluative in any sense of the term. Strauss' argument is ambiguous on this score, for he uses the words "in general" and "important." But most political scientists would accept the following, among myriads of others, as both value-free and significant propositions, though they might disagree with them: (1) "The Supreme Court has never struck down national legislation designed to curtail the key prerequisites to popular equality and popular sovereignty." (2) "The extent of consensus on the basic norms of democracy is a function of the extent of agreement on choices among policy alternatives."[29] However, given the possibility of disagreement, let us take an example which Strauss offers.

Strauss criticizes Max Weber's discussion of the relationship between Protestantism and Capitalism on two grounds: (1) Weber is forced to make moral judgments in his analysis in spite of himself. (2) Weber's refusal to make moral judgments leads to errors of analysis.[30] Weber is forced to make value judgments, Strauss argues, because he must admit that it was not Calvin's thinking but the thinking of "epigones" (intellectual descendants, generally of an inferior variety) which provided the justification of capitalist virtues. Again, the word epigone (if used simply to describe a person with, say, less capacity for abstraction) can be considered a descriptive evaluation rather than a moral judgment. The key point, however, is this: The logic of Strauss' position requires him to maintain that purely descriptive propositions are not merely wrong but rather that they are meaningless. His statement that Weber was "incorrect," however, implicitly accepts the possiblity of developing purely descriptive proposition dealing with significant social action.

Beyond this, Strauss, in a footnote to these passages, gives a more correct interpretation of the developments which Weber was attempting to describe. What Weber failed to consider, Strauss notes, was that:

> . . . in the course of the sixteenth century there was a conscious break with the whole philosophic

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[27] Most discussions of this kind between individuals of similar cultural background do not proceed this far. However, one could not explain what one means by the expression "good" car to a Martian who only knew the referent of the word car, except by pointing to differences between existing cars.

[28] For a discussion of some of these issues see David Braybrooke, "The Relevance of Norms to Political Description," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (December, 1958), pp. 989–1006.

[29] The examples are from an article by Robert A. Dahl in which he makes just this point, in reply to a student of Strauss who had criticized his *Preface to Democratic Theory*. Robert A. Dahl, "A Rejoinder," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (December, 1957), p. 1060.

[30] *NRH*, pp. 59–61.

tradition, a break that took place on the plane of purely philosophic or rational or secular thought. This break was originated by Machiavelli, and it led to the moral teachings of Bacon and Hobbes. . . . [31]

While this self-admittedly significant proposition contains a number of evaluations it does not evaluate the break which occurred. In that sense, at least, it is a purely descriptive proposition.

The analysis of Strauss' thinking thus far has been incomplete in that it has concededly approached his critique of modern thought from the standpoint of modern thought. Since it may be argued that such an approach misses the point, it would seem wise to follow Straussss in his restatement of the implications of classical political philosophy and the modern break with that thought. The task is made difficult by the fact that Strauss seems to have shifted his position after completing *Natural Right and History*. I shall describe and evaluate his earlier position before turning to his later one.[32]

It is imperative that his restatement carry more conviction than his critique of modern thought. Having opened the eyes of American political scientists to the "nihilistic" and "Machiavellian" implications of their thought, he would indeed be subject to reproach if he did not draw them back from the abyss to whose edge he had led them.

II

According to Strauss, classical political philosophers considered the universe a cosmos, that is, a purposively ordered whole.[33] Within this cosmos all things, including man, tend toward their natural place. For the order, while never completely realized, nevertheless tends toward realization. The natural order defines the good, and to understand the natural order one must examine it in terms of the purposes which infuse its parts. Thus heavy objects fall toward the center of the earth (and heavier objects fall more rapidly than lighter objects) because they aim toward their natural resting place. This mode of explanation applies equally to nature and to man. In fact the separation of man and nature, and the attempt to apply different modes of analysis to each, was inconceivable to classical political philosophy, and is a product of the break with that philosophy. One can see why then, in classical political philosophy, every description was at the same time an evaluation. To describe a thing fully was to describe its natural (*i.e.*, right or good) place in the cosmos.[34]

Thomistic philosophy, Strauss argues, continued the classical tradition. The differences between the two were designed to subordinate philosophy to theology and to make room for revelation and a transcendent personal God. However, while philosophy was subordinated to religion, religion was not divorced from philosophy. The existence of a natural purposive order is fundamental to the proof of God's existence, and, in general, to Thomistic ethics.[35]

The rejection of classical natural right and of classical political philosophy was based on the Hobbesian interpretation of the modern "scientific" outlook. While Machiavelli had "discovered" the new terrain, it was Hobbes who described it systematically. Machiavelli had rejected the classics because their idealism did not permit them to develop an effective social order. To achieve this a political science was necessary which began from an extreme rather than the ideal case.[36] Hobbes was encouraged or led (Strauss is unclear) to the systematic development of Machiavelli's insight, however, because the new science seemed to pave the way for a view of the universe based on scientific materialism and hence both a nominalistic and mechanical view of the world.[37]

Hobbes' analysis involved a fundamental attack upon classical philosophy. If the universe is to be understood mechanically, it lacks a purpose which informs its component parts, and one cannot evaluate the moral rightness of individual and collective purposes in terms of a given natural order. Under such circumstances only human passions and desires can serve as a basis for action and these passions and desires cannot be justified beyond the fact that they are wishes or passions.[38]

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[31] *NRH*, p. 61.

[32] The break seems to have come with the publication of "What Is Political Philosophy," in the *Journal of Politics* in August, 1957. The essay is reprinted in an expanded form in the book of the same title.

[33] *NRH*, p. 7.

[34] *NRH*, pp. 81–164.

[35] *NRH*, pp. 163–4.

[36] *NRH*, pp. 77–181.

[37] According to Strauss, Hobbes recognized that a consistent materialism would lead to self-negating skepticism. Thus he adopted a "methodical" materialism. The natural world remains fundamentally unknowable. However, we can know the concepts we use to master the world, since they are our free creation. Hence science must always retain a hypothetical character. *NRH*, pp. 171–5.

[38] *NRH*, pp. 181–3 *passim*.

It is upon these premises that Hobbes sought to develop an axiology compatible with the method of the new science. If the desires of men are equally legitimate and not additive, the only "goods" are those which men call good, and these are, basically, the avoidance of pain and the achievement of pleasure. The only function of reason is to inform the passions, *i.e.*, to guide the passions to the achievement of these goals. The social good, thus, can only be that which all men agree is good (or would agree is good if their view of reality were not distorted by pride or false doctrine). For only that which all men agree is good can serve as a norm through which individual actions may be judged. And, of course, the one desire which all men share in common, and which is the most powerful of all, is the desire to avoid violent death.

Hobbes' efforts to construct a new social science and a new philosophy were too radical for the society of which he was part and his name was "justly decried." However, his thought, in disguised and more respectable garb, provided the basis for the philosophy of John Locke and hence for the development of modern natural right and modern Liberalism.[39] Locke's moral and political conclusions still dominate English and American political thought, even though American political thinkers have long since rejected his premises in favor of either positivism or historicism or both.

Hobbes provides the basis for Liberal democracy for this reason: If the interests of all men are equally legitimate, then the only justifiable basis upon which one man can exercise authority over another is if the latter is convinced that this authority is being exercised in his own interest. In other words, given the natural equality of the passions of all men, only direct or representative government is legitimate.[40] The classics, on the other hand, legitimized the rule of the wise, *i,e.*, of those who understand the cosmos, *i. e.*, the nature of the good.

Liberalism ends in positivism and historicism, according to Strauss, because its fundamental assumptions are untenable in the form in which Hobbes developed them. Rousseau rejected Hobbes because, on the basis of Hobbes' own premises, he was led to conclude that the laws of nature must be rooted directly in the passions of natural man. But since these passions are "sub-human," they cannot provide a norm for human beings. The ultimate results of Rousseau's critique are not only the nihilism of Nietzche, but also the whole pattern of contemporary historicism and positivism.[41] Thus, Liberalism negates itself. At the same time, however, it serves as the basis of modern social science. Modern economics starts with the individual seeking to "rationally" maximize his non-rational passions, and political science and sociology concern themselves with an investigation of the social and cultural sources of values. For if values are largely a reflection of the direction given to the passions by the environment, the social sciences as disciplines turn quite naturally to understanding this relationship.[42]

And, finally, Liberalism gives rise to modern technology. The classics, if not hostile to technological change, at least regarded it as inimical to an ordered society. However, if the only goal is the satisfaction of individual and collective passions, then the development of technology becomes a supreme good.[43]

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[39] *NRH*, p. 181 and pp. 202–251. Most English and American political theorists, Strauss notes, fail to see that Locke is essentially a consistent (though more respectable) Hobbesian. Rather they assume that the contradictions which they seem to find in Locke's political philosophy are a sign of confusion and failure to realize the implications of his own thought. However, if one examines Locke carefully one recognizes that he was "cautious" rather than naive or stupid, and one can uncover his Hobbesian premises. Of course, contemporary historians of political philosophy, mistakenly believing that the history of political philosophy represents a progression, are all too inclined to misunderstand philosophers of the past, and to assume that they were victims of their epoch or culture. Thus, they fail to realize that the discovery of simple-minded errors is the beginning of the quest for the real intention of these philosophers. One can only recognize this if one takes the history of political philosophy seriously and becomes aware that Locke and Hobbes were giants. See *WPP*, pp. 221–232. (It is surprising that Strauss should so fully agree with contemporary historians of political philosophy on who the "greats" in the history of political philosophy really were. After all, given the inability of contemporary historians to understand not only classical political philosophy but most political philosophy, we might expect Strauss to come up with some seminal thinkers whom these historians had failed to notice.)

[40] *NRH*, p. 182 and p. 231.

[41] *NRH*, pp. 252–323 and *WPP*, pp. 41–55. I have used *WPP* because *NRH* carries the analysis only through Burke. The essential difference between Strauss' earlier and later work revolves about the relationship between Machiavelli and Hobbes, and does not seem to affect his interpretation of the consequences of their thinking.

[42] See Cropsey, *op. cit.*

How does an examination of classical natural right and the modern break with the classical position enable us to overcome the dilemma into which modern thought has led us? Strauss himself sets the conditions:

> We all are in the grip of the same difficulty. Natural right in its classic form is connected with a teleological view of the universe. All natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is good for them. In the case of man, reason is required for discerning these operations: reason determines what is by nature right with ultimate regard to man's natural end. The teleological view of the universe, of which the teleological view of man forms a part, would seem to have been destroyed by modern natural science. From the point of view of Aristotle—and who could dare to claim to be a better judge in this matter than Aristotle?—the issue between the mechanical and the teleological conception of the universe is decided by the manner in which the problem of the heavens, the heavenly bodies, and their motion is solved.[44]

Thus Strauss notes:

> The fundamental dilemma, in whose grip we are, is caused by the victory of modern natural science. An adequate solution to the problem of natural right cannot be found before this basic problem has been solved.[45]

We see now why Strauss rejects the typically modern differentiation between evaluations which have a descriptive function and evaluations which have a commendatory function, and between evaluations in general and ethical evaluations. In the classical view *all* descriptions are evaluations and all evaluations are moral evaluations. If the universe is "purposively" ordered, then the normative and the descriptive are fused. It becomes more difficult, however, to understand why Strauss limited his demands to "important social acts." For if he agrees with the classics, not only all social acts but all phenomena can only be described in normative terms. Thus it logically follows from Strauss' analysis, though Strauss appears to miss the implication, that propositions such as e equals mc^2, or PV equals nRT, are either both descriptive and evaluative or else they are meaningless.

The modern mind undoubtedly finds it difficult to understand such a contention, or what is meant by a purposive universe, unless the universe as a whole is to be regarded as an organism, or as the work of an intelligence which transcends it. However, evidence tending to support the argument that the universe is a cosmos will certainly win a hearing.[46] And "faith" is not admissible as proof, since Strauss identifies himself with the Aristotelian position (as against the Thomist) which maintains that the structure of the universe can be understood through human reason.[47]

And again, contrary to what Strauss has stated elsewhere, it is his task which is of Kantian dimensions. In fact it is a more difficult task than Kant set for himself. Kant, after all, accepted the picture of the universe offered by Newtonian physics. His effort was directed to providing a basis for both ethics and faith by demonstrating that Newtonian physics presupposes a cosmology which limits its competence, for he recognized that unless this were so, ethical statements would be little more than meaningless.[48]

Strauss rejects this solution, and thus his effort must be directed to proving that classical physics is superior to modern and contemporary physics.[49] But what does such proof involve? It certainly requires much more than indicating, after the fact, that the categories of classical physics are capable of subsuming the discoveries of modern physics. With the proper juggling this is easily done. Rather it involves demonstrating that classical physics is superior in *creativity* to modern and contemporary physics. The test of a particular proposition lies in its empirical verification, and the choice of one conceptual scheme (or cosmology) over another is determined by the number and range of verifiable propositions to which it gives rise.

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[43] *NRH*, p. 23 and pp. 244–5.

[44] *NRH*, pp. 7–8.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] We may leave aside some dilemmas which Strauss' position seems to involve, for example: In what sense is a norm which can be violated natural? In what sense can someone be called a "base" or evil person if his acts are the result of error rather than of willfulness? And, of course, why is the natural good? If the natural is good by definition, the statement that something is good because it is natural is a tautology and adds nothing. But, if the statement is not analytic, one can still legitimately ask why "the natural" is necessarily good.

[47] *NRH*, pp. 7–8. See also *NRH*, p. 164.

[48] At least this is the conventional view of Kant's efforts. Since Strauss seems to reject this view it is possible that he conceives of Kant having had another, more esoteric, enterprise.

[49] Modern writers generally use the term "classical physics" to describe the Newtonian world view, and the term "modern physics" to describe developments since quantum and relativity theory. In this essay classical physics refers to Aristotelian physics, Newtonian physics is referred to as modern physics, and post-Newtonian physics is referred to as contemporary physics.

Of course, the restoration of classical natural right would not resurrect creative political philosophy. Since it would be the "truth," all that would be left after this restoration would be the practical application of the "truth."

Newton's laws and the method associated with them were a landmark not only or even primarily because they enabled us to deal economically with the motion of the planets, but because they opened vistas. The concepts of force, mass acceleration, etc., as well as Newton's laws, served as the basis for the development of all of modern physics, and provided answers to question after question. Further, Newtonian physics, through Boyle's gas law and Avogadro's hypothesis, provided the basis for all of modern chemistry and, increasingly, for new breakthroughs in biology.

But nowhere in Strauss' writings do we find a systematic discussion of the relevance of the categories of classical physics to an understanding of the physical universe. We must then attempt to determine its relevance for ourselves as best we can.

Modern physics certainly developed categories which lead one to the conclusion that the universe is to be understood in terms of "efficient" causes. With this statement Strauss agrees, at least implicitly. But what about developments in contemporary physics? The great revolution in contemporary physics has been the development of quantum mechanics and relativity. But quantum mechanics arose out of, and still uses most of the concepts of, Newtonian physics (which, incidentally, remains applicable in very large areas). A conservative interpretation of the implications of quantum mechanics does not affect the Newtonian world view.[50] A more radical interpretation of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy gives rise to the possibility of elements of randomness on the micro-level.[51] But even if the more radical view were correct it would give no comfort to proponents of classical natural right. For both the classics and Newtonian physics assumed a totally causal universe. In fact both also assume a continuous universe, and quantum mechanics would seem to destroy this view, for quanta of energy are emitted in discrete stages. Nor does field theory associated with the general theory of relativity and, more practically, as applied to electromagnetic phenomena, offer any encouragement to those who would restore a teleological universe. It is true that field theory is incompatible with a simple-minded mechanical view, but field theory possesses a deterministic structure, and changes in state over time are dealt with mechanically, if one regards "mechanism" as referring to analysis in terms of efficient causes.[52]

In fact, contemporary physics takes another step to complete the destruction of the possibility of a restoration of classical natural right. According to classical physics the fundamental tendency of the universe is toward order. However, the second law of thermodynamics tells us that the fundamental tendency of the universe is toward randomness or disorder. At very most it can only be argued that order and disorder are equally characteristic of the universe and that the pattern may be cyclical.

Nor do any of the other sciences offer much encouragement to the classical view. Chemistry is increasingly being reduced to physics, at least in its more creative aspects. And while it is true that, for some purposes, functional explanation of biology is more useful than mechanical explanation, it can be shown that: (1) Functional explanation is reducible to mechanical explanation.[53] (2) The most dynamic areas in biology today are those in which biological phenomena are being explained in terms of the more fundamental categories of chemistry and physics. It is this approach which has permitted the synthesis of of amino acids and even proteins in the laboratory.

But unless Strauss can demonstrate the superiority of classical over modern and contemporary science, his whole case collapses, including his reinterpretation of the history of political thought. For example, the conventional interpreters of Locke are willing to accept the apparent contradictions in his thought as evidence of real confusion, and excuse him because he lived and wrote at a time when progress in the physical and social sciences had not gone far enough to permit the development of insights which they now have. They admit that Locke was a giant, but argue that they are standing on the backs of giants. Strauss' contention that Locke did not contradict himself is based on the assumption that, if anything, the modern period has been marked by retrogression rather than progress. But, again, on Strauss' own conditions, this assumption does not seem to be tenable.[54]

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[50] E. Nagel, "The Causal Character of Modern Physical Theory," in Feigl and Brodbeck (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 419–437. Incidentally, there seems to be little difference, for theoretical purposes, between a universe in which the fundamental categories are particles of matter and one in which matter and energy are interchangeable.

[51] Henry Morgenau, *The Nature of Physical Reality: A Philosophy of Modern Physics* (New York, 1960).

[52] Nagel, *The Structure of Science, op. cit.*, pp. 287–288.

[53] E. Nagel, "Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems," in Feigl and Brodbeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 537–558.

In the foregoing light it is perhaps not surprising that in his later writing Strauss takes still another position, a position which seems to deny the dependence of classical natural right upon a teleological physics. One must still examine man in relation to the "mysterious whole" but, he argues:

> . . . granted that there are no valid moral or political objections to classical political philosophy—is that political philosophy not bound up with an antiquated cosmology? Does not the very question of the nature of man point to the question of the nature of the whole, and therewith to one or the other specific cosmology? Whatever the significance of modern natural science may be, it cannot affect our understanding of what is human in man.[55]

This later position is unlikely to develop much appeal to any but the already convinced. We would want to know why Strauss rejected his earlier views, what evidence he can offer for this new view, and, finally, in what ways this new view differs from other "modern" views which separate man from the rest of nature. Without such an analysis, the implications of a purposeless universe still seem to involve moral skepticism.[55a]

And, when we search (in either his earlier or his later writings) for a discussion of what Strauss considers the limits of the implications of modern science, all we find are a few brief and rather cryptic remarks. These seem to reveal an inadequate view of contemporary developments.

According to Strauss, "positivists" (a label which he never really defines with any precision) accept and are proud of the fact that they are concerned only with the "how?" rather than the "why?" of things.[56] Thus the universe remains unintelligible, for the admissibility of any proposition depends upon its contribution to our dominating the universe rather than to our understanding of it. The fruit of modern science is technology rather than wisdom.[57]

Again, the "modern" approach to science "implies a depreciation" of common sense or "pre-scientific" knowledge:

> . . . positivism preserves in a scarcely disguised manner Descartes' universal doubt of pre-scientific knowledge. . . . This superstition fosters all sorts of sterile investigations or complicated idiocies. Things which every ten-year-old child of normal intelligence knows are regarded as being in need of scientific proof. . . .[58]

Finally, Strauss argues, those who accept the model of modern science attempt to understand man entirely in terms of the "subhuman" (in terms of his desires and passions). In these terms man is unknowable.[59]

Surely this is a caricature. While some "positivists" may hold some of the above positions, Strauss here has set up a straw man. First, whatever the philosophic origins of modern science, and whatever value one may set upon technology, contemporary philosophers of science do not make technological success the test of propositions. In fact the only requirements are certain criteria of verification, the most important of which demand that all propositions be stated in such form as to be capable of being validated by empirical procedures, and that propositions which form part of a system not contradict each other.[60]

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[54] See footnote 39 above. Strauss' reinterpretation of political philosophy has another interesting implication. He asserts that while modern social scientists are pigmies compared to Locke, so Locke was a pigmy compared to Thomas or Aristotle. This we may indeed accept, but Strauss' position further entails the proposition that Locke and Hobbes were pigmies compared to Strauss and his disciples.

[55] *WPP*, p. 38.

[55a] In his epilogue to the Storing volume, *op. cit.*, which, unfortunately, came to my attention only after this essay had been written, Strauss seems to change front on a number of points. On the issue which concerns us here he cites Aristotle to prove that "the practical sciences do not depend on the theoretical sciences or are not derivative from them." (309). This is true because: "The principles of action (of the practical sciences) are the natural ends of man of which he has by nature some awareness." (*Ibid.*) The argument is not very convincing, nor, for that matter, very clear.

[56] *WPP*, p. 18.

[57] *NRH*, p. 177 and pp. 285–6.

[58] *WPP*, p. 23.

[59] *NRH*, p. 8 and *WPP*, p. 38. Strauss' assertion that the passions and desires of men are "subhuman" is only an assertion.

[60] For a discussion of these rules of procedure see Felix Kaufman, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1944), pp. 33–66.

Second, those in the empirical tradition would deny that explanation in terms of efficient causes leads to an unintelligible universe. They would assert the opposite, *i.e.*, that modern science has led to an increasingly intelligible universe. Third, empiricists would regard as empty the distinction between the "how" and the "why" which Strauss seems to be making. Modern and contemporary science are certainly attempting to answer the why, and the answer is given either in terms of an "efficient cause" or in terms of a higher level of generality. Nor would they accept the argument that the classics had discovered the correct answer to any particular "why" which is unanswerable within a modern framework.

Fourth, modern science does not cultivate a spirit of universal doubt, nor does it "depreciate" common sense. Rather it builds on common sense, questioning "pre-scientific" knowledge only when it seems unsatisfactory. All that modern empiricists do assert is that no particular set of ideas is sacrosanct, and that some apparently obvious matters turn out, upon further investigation, not to be so, or to need refinement and qualification.

Finally, modern science does not necessarily imply that human behavior must be fully reduced to the desires or passions, whatever some scientists or social scientists may believe. In fact Weber, whom Strauss takes as epitomizing modern social science, deals seriously with human ideas as analytically independent variables, not entirely reducible to psychological or social and economic categories.

Whether or not the modern position is tenable, one cannot refute it by setting up straw men. Nor are a series of brief remarks a substitute for a detailed analysis of the issues involved.[61]

Associated with Strauss' revised position is a somewhat different interpretation of the development of modern political thought and the break with classical natural right. The rejection of classical natural right now seems to stem almost entirely from Machiavelli's conviction that the classics, in developing an ideal model, reduced the possibility of achieving more limited goals. Thus Machiavelli, and following him Hobbes, *et. al.*, chose rather the extreme case in order that more limited goals might be attained. Under this interpretation Machiavelli becomes the central character and the development of modern physics plays little or no role. In fact, Strauss now argues that the idea of the controlled experiment (*i.e.*, "torturing nature," whatever that may mean) rose from shifts in political philosophy rather than *vice versa*.[62]

It now seems that Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc., rejected the classics because of the idealism of the classics. However, Strauss finds it very easy to prove (what no one denies) that the classics are practical, *i.e.*, that the development of an ideal model does not preclude satisfaction with lesser goals.[63] Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc. were indeed either stupid or näive. But, if they were so, it seems equally plausible to believe that they were guilty of simple-minded self-contradictions, or that they were unable to recognize the full consequences of their own premises.

It would seem, then, that Strauss has not provided a solution to the dilemma in which we find ourselves and that the restoration of natural right remains only a "wish." But wishes are *not* horses and beggars do *not* ride.

III

If I am right in thinking that Strauss' efforts have not been successful, the question remains, what is the source of his appeal? In part, I suggest, the readiness with which some political scientists accept Strauss' arguments reveals a regrettable illiteracy as to the nature and sources of modern and contemporary science. However this alone does not explain the attractiveness of his analysis. To understand this we must turn once again to his writings.

Strauss has made a fetish of the esoteric content of the writings of political philosophers. If a philosopher, he argues, notes that prudence may require esoteric writing, and speaks even once of the need for apparent contradiction, we must assume that the contradictions and obscurity we find in his writing are purposive rather than that he is naive. Whether this argument is correct or not for most philosophers, we have some warrant to wonder whether it might be true for Strauss himself, since concern with esoteric writing permeates the whole corpus of his work.[64]

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[61] For a general discussion of these issues which elaborates most of the points made above in answer to arguments developed by Maritain, Gilson, Wheelwright and other Catholic or "classical" thinkers, see Ernest Nagel, *Sovereign Reason* (New York, 1954), pp. 1–35. I have not developed the above points in detail, because it is almost impossible to determine where Strauss really stands. I am aware of Catholic and other conventional views of the classics, but, since Strauss' views are, he argues, unconventional, a criticism of conventional views might be wide of the mark.

[62] See *TM* and *WPP*, especially pp. 40–55 of the latter.

[63] *WPP*, pp. 27–40 and 78–94.

Strauss argues that the classics, while not considering democracy an "ideal," are less hostile to democratic forms than one might suppose. He notes that, according to Plato, since the principle of democracy is freedom it permits all human types to develop freely, and hence in particular the best human type. After all, Socrates was permitted to live in democratic Athens for 70 years.[65] Here Strauss is evidently referring, in part, to the eighth book of the *Republic*, where Socrates compares democracy to a "garment of many colours."[66] But, reading this metaphor in context, it is quite clear that it is meant to be pejorative, and to help explain both why the worst types come to the surface in a democratic polity and why democracy is so readily transformed into tyranny. Further, while in the sixth book of the *Republic* Plato argues that no existing constitution is compatible with philosophy, he draws his examples entirely from democratic cities.[67] The implication would seem to be that democracy is the worst offender.

Further, Strauss makes much of the fact that, as he puts it, America is the only country which was founded on the basis of an anti-Machiavellian tradition, and he is fond (it often seems over-fond) of citing Jefferson or even Tom Paine to bolster particular philosophic points.[68] But the whole thrust of Strauss' analysis is that the American tradition stems from Hobbes and Locke.[69] In other words, the American tradition is Machiavellian.

How can we explain these seeming contradictions? One is strongly tempted to believe that Strauss is following the advice given by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric;* that is, he is attempting to convince his audience that his basic premises do not differ from theirs. We are drawn to the further conclusion that this "prudence" is accompanied by the rejection of the values underlying the American experience, and is designed to prepare the way for that unlikely conjunction of philosophy and power which will place in power the philosopher king and the guardians, *i.e.*, Strauss and his disciples.

This analysis is not meant to be taken more than half-seriously, but it does open the way to an understanding of the peculiar attraction which classical natural right seems to hold for some of the current generation of intellectuals. The attraction of Marxism in the pre-war period stemmed from what appeared to be the failures of "liberal *clichés*" and the prospect that Marxism offered a comprehensive and (as vulgarly interpreted) simple key to the universe. The attraction of classical natural right stems, one suspects, from the continued rejection (for the opposite reasons) of "liberal *clichés*," the obvious failure of Marxism, and the prospect that it provides a different kind of comprehensive and simple key to the universe. In essence the attraction suggests a loss of nerve in the face of contemporary chaos, for this is when simple keys become the most attractive.

Unfortunately this particular key is even less relevant than the Marxist to understanding our world and its dilemmas. It is little wonder that while students of Strauss have found it so easy to criticize that naive combination of "Jacobinism" and positivism so characteristic of an earlier generation of political scientists (a task accomplished at least as effectively by events as well as by many "non-Straussian" political scientists), they have contributed little or nothing to the empirical work so necessary for understanding contemporary society. This is no accident, for they lack the conceptual tools adequate to this latter task. One cannot understand real men in a real environment with simple keys.

It is understandable that many intellectuals should feel that modernity has led to a blind alley. It does seem as if, having mastered the basic forces of the universe, we may use them to destroy ourselves. Further, it does seem that, having been able to bend nature to our purposes, we can find no rational basis for guiding these purposes. But, assuming all of this to be true, the problems will not be solved by wishing.

And even if the problems are insoluble, even if the world is really absurd, the great adventure which led us to our present predicament may still seem to have been worthwhile. Despite his concern with identifying the "true nature of man," Strauss' definition of the human, his longing for the "closed society" of Plato's ideal, is rather less than human. To me at least the essence of man (if we may speak of an essence) lies not in omphaloskepsis, but in his efforts to bend the universe to his will.

I stand with Prometheus against the gods.

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[64] *WPP*, pp. 221–233.

[65] *WPP*, p. 36.

[66] *Republic*, VIII, 557.

[67] *Republic*, VI, 448–497.

[68] For example, *NRH*, p. 1; *TM*, p. 13, and *WPP*, pp. 85–6. See also Harry V. Jaffa, *Crisis of the House Divided* (New York, 1959), p. 409.

[69] For Strauss, see *NRH*, pp. 181–2, 245, and *WPP*, pp. 47 and 49. See also Jaffa, *op. cit.*, pp. 75 and 314, and W. Berns, *Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment* (Baton Rouge, 1957), p. 45.

A REPLY TO ROTHMAN

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Readers of Stanley Rothman's article "The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A Critique" will be aware that the title he has chosen does not indicate the full scope of his endeavor. He has in fact attempted to state and criticize the grounds of classical political and natural philosophy, and to state and in a certain measure defend the grounds of modern social and natural science. Exceptional resources of scholarship and analytic power would be needed to dispose of those tremendous themes, which I believe Rothman has not succeeded in doing. A prominent purpose of Rothman's paper is to criticize the work of Professor Leo Strauss and of some of his students, on the view that he, and after his instruction they, are the animators of the attempted revival of classical doctrines concerning natural right. The attempt to revive natural right is presented as complementary with a belief in the weakness of social science as now understood by the majority of academic and other professionals. The purpose of the present reflections on Rothman's article is to see how far he has made a valid criticism of the classics and of the men he regards as their attempted restorers; and to consider the soundness of his views on the received sciences.

Rothman's essay consists of five main parts, organized about the distinction between Mr. Strauss's writing on contemporary social science and his writing on classical and early modern political philosophy. In the former division are two main parts: a summary (pages 341–343) of Mr. Strauss's position on the question of contemporary social science; and a counter-statement (pages 343–346) in defense of social science, maintaining its consistency and validity on what is best known as the question of facts and values, including the "values" of the social scientists. In the latter division there is again an attempt to summarize (pp. 346–348) a long development of Mr. Strauss's, in this case on classical political philosophy and the early modern position that comprised the rebellion against antiquity. Then there is a counter-statement (pp. 348–351) arguing the superiority of modern over ancient natural science, and inferring therefrom the superiority of modern social science over the ancient. There is also an argument that Mr. Strauss at one time asserted and at a later time denied that classical political philosophy depended on classical natural philosophy. Finally there is a conclusion of a miscellaneous character.

The thesis of Rothman's paper could be said to be this: on the premise of modern scientific method it can be shown that there can and must be clear a distinction between "description" and "evaluation" in both social and natural science; and the denial or ignorance of this proposition is at the core both of classical philosophy and of the attempt to revive natural right on the foundation of a discredited teleologism. Unless this misrepresents Rothman's position, it follows that if natural right does not suppose, nor teleology imply, that description and evaluation are "fused" in Rothman's sense of the term, then this criticism of natural right would prove invalid and Rothman's thesis would have to be rejected. And if Mr. Strauss does not argue, and if it should not be true irrespective of Mr. Strauss's argument, that natural science determines political science, then not only would Rothman's statement of Mr. Strauss's self-contradiction prove incorrect but the basis of Rothman's argument in general would be falsified: for his paper as a whole stands or falls on the validity of adopting the premises and method of modern natural science for vindicating modern social science and for rejecting classical political philosophy as well as natural philosophy. Also rejected would be the vindication of modern natural science by the premises of modern natural science.

In taking up Rothman's argument, I will not discuss thematically his two summaries of Mr. Strauss's statements (in what I have described as the first and third divisions of his article). Rothman, in his second footnote, names *Natural Right and History*, *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, and *What Is Political Philosophy?* as the main sources of Mr. Strauss's views, adding "An Epilogue" from *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics*, ed. H. J. Storing (incorrectly cited) in footnote 4. Rothman's references to *What Is Political Philosophy?* are heavily concentrated in the first 27 pages, but extend to page 94 of that volume. His references to *Natural Right and History* are extensive but not always precise (*e.g.*, "pp. 88–164," "pp. 77–181"). *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, a difficult book of about 300 pages, is referred to twice, once in footnote 62 ("See *TM*") and again in footnote 68 ("*TM*, p. 13"). There is no evidence that Rothman's argument is affected by *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, although his claim that there has been a shift in Mr. Strauss's position would have to rest upon a close reading of that book. How thoroughly Rothman has studied his opponent is by no means an unimportant matter; but as far as possible I wish to leave that question open to the judgment of readers, believing that those who take the trouble to compare the original with the restatement will be struck by the disproportion between the solidity of the one and the looseness, if not unintelligible abbreviation of the other. Because Rothman's purpose is complex—not merely the criticism of natural right proper but the criticism of it in its revived form, under the influence of a scholar who has, as the ancients did not have, experience of modern circumstances—it will not be possible entirely to ignore the question of the accuracy of Rothman's representation of classical thought *as revived.*

Let us turn to Rothman's attack on natural right in the form of a defense of social science. Broadly, Rothman must refute this doctrine: that positivism and historicism are vitiated, positivism by its untenable position on values, and both historicism and positivism by the application of each to itself. The part of the question that pertains to historicism is not examined by Rothman. He does assert that "Strauss' analysis of the historicist implications of positivism (as he defines it) is not very convincing." (p. 6) This remark is supported by a footnote which does not mention the issue, but which contains, among other things, the reference: "See, for example, Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*. . . . " The Feigl and Brodbeck volume consists of 52 essays and almost 800 pages, and there is no direct manner of knowing in what way Rothman considers it to bear on the question. Let us, with Rothman, drop the problem of natural right and history and take up the question of whether positivistic social science is self-contradictory.

The position that Rothman contests may be taken to begin with this sentence on page 21 of *What Is Political Philosophy?:* "It is impossible to study social phenomena, *i.e.*, *all important social phenomena*, without making value judgments." (My italics) The argument of Mr. Strauss proceeds generally in this way: Social science which attempts to assimilate itself to natural science denies that there can be judgments of goodness or excellence, *i.e.*, of "value," exceeding bare preferences in cognitive standing. To the extent to which positivistic social science makes or implies such judgments, it contradicts its precept by its practice. It must contradict itself thus if it wishes to consider important questions; but it can avoid contradicting itself thus if it confines itself, for example, to purely technical questions *qua* technical, or to subordinate tasks of mere enumeration, correlation, and so on. The untenability or the inutility of positivistic social science proceeds from its premise that judgments of value are not as intelligible or rational as are judgments of fact. Positivistic social science grants that men's preferences or values are themselves facts deducible from men's behavior, and may as such be described, enumerated, and so on; but it insists that there is no way of verifying, *i.e.*, establishing the truth of, a value judgment: only the existence but not the truth of value judgments is matter of fact.

Nothing in this characterization of positivistic social science can be taken as implying that there are no judgments as to fact which are not also judgments as to value. The point is rather that judgments as to value are not to be excluded from the class of judgments as to fact, and that such judgments as to value cannot be excised from social science without sterilizing it in more senses than the one intended. I am not now trying to argue the truth of this doctrine but only to establish what the position at issue is. The first part of the position can be stated thus, with bare brevity: values are factual, but not all facts are values (*e.g.*, "the cube root of 64 is less than half of 10" contains no element of discretion or judgment in the proper sense).[1]

Rothman, however, makes it clear that he takes the natural right position to imply the "fusion" of facts and values. On page 491 of *The Structure of Science*,[2] Ernest Nagel, discussing a passage by Mr. Strauss, denies that "fact and value are fused beyond the possibility of distinguishing them." Rothman has evidently taken up the understanding of natural right implicit in that denial, and made it fundamental to his own view. In the part of his article dealing thematically with social science, he builds up to the assertion (p. 345) that "one *can* describe without at the same time evaluating." (My italics) In the subsequent part of his article which could be said to have natural science as the theme, he asserts that "In the classical view *all* descriptions are evaluations and all evaluations are moral evaluations." (p. 348)

No evidence brought by Rothman supports the view that, according to Mr. Strauss or to anyone, all description is evaluation and all evaluation is moral evaluation. The *Statistical Abstract of the United States* could be regarded as a kind of description of this country, without moral judgements of any sort being expressed in its pages. No one could deny the importance of some or many of the undoubted facts contained in it. Also, buildings may be approved for their durability, horses for their swiftness, women for their beauty and men for their intelligence without any trace of moral evaluation entering. There is assuredly a difference between a broken-winded nag of great age and a vigorous plow horse in the prime of life, and as a difference which is essential to the nature of the horse it could be said to rest upon a norm of "natural right;" but what does that difference have to do with morality? Why should a man be said to make a moral evaluation when he judges a hound to have a good nose? Rothman's misrepresentation of the view he attempts to criticize must emanate from a failure to reflect on the difference between "right" and "moral."

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[1] The reader should consult Walter Berns' Communication in this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (September, 1958), entitled "On Robert Dahl's 'Important Questions.' "

[2] See Rothman's footnote 26.

The classical doctrine is that each thing is excellent in the degree to which it can do the things for which its species is naturally equipped. Later on, in footnote 46, Rothman will ask, why is the natural good? The answer is that there is neither a way nor a reason to prevent ourselves from distinguishing between useless and serviceable beasts, for example, and that the most empirical and also obvious, as well as rational standard of the serviceable, or the limit of the thing's activity, is set by its nature. We do not judge elephants to be good because they are natural; or because nature is morally good—whatever that would mean. We judge a particular elephant to be good by the light of what elephant nature makes it possible for elephants to do and to be. As long as we continue to base our judgments of beings on their natures, we will be preserved, for example, from expecting all men to become philosophers at the same time that we are preserved from being unable to distinguish good citizens from parasites and criminals. The common notion of natural right is that it is not empirical. Rothman distinguishes the men of the empirical tradition from those he criticizes. Like all understanding, that provided by the light of nature is of course not simply empirical. But it should be clear that greater scope can hardly be given to observation than to allow it to be the basis for our recognition of the species of things and their faculties. Whether teleology or some other principle lies behind the phenomena is a question that can be deferred for a while. For the present it suffices that Rothman's main argument in his rejoinder to the natural right argument against positivistic social science is made against a point that his opponent does not make.

A further argument thought by Rothman to be necessary for his case against natural right and for social science is this: it is not legitimate to object against social science that "the objects of investigation and even the very formulation of the problems are shaped by personal interests or commitments. . . . " (p. 344) I do not know (but will in a moment attempt to guess) what point of classical doctrine Rothman is attempting to refute with this argument, but its bearing can be determined in a general way. In his footnote 26, he draws attention to pages 485–502 of Ernest Nagel's *The Structure of Science*. Those pages comprise a section of a chapter on Methodological Problems of the Social Sciences. The section in question is entitled "The Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry." In it, Professor Nagel takes up, under four headings, "the alleged role of value judgments," *i.e.*, of the social scientists' value judgments, in influencing the work of the social scientists. His first heading is, the alleged role of value judgments in the selection of problems. The position he brings under critical review is this: the possible field of interest of social scientists is determined by their culture and values, and therefore a strictly objective or scientific social science is impossible. We may note that he rejects the conclusion, arguing that investigation of value-indicated objects can still be perfectly scientific. Of interest to us is the fact that the writer who advanced the view that Nagel rejects is Max Weber. The situation is as follows. Weber is a powerful advocate of value-free social science, and is defended as such by Rothman against the criticisms of Mr. Strauss (pp. 345–346). But Weber believes that the possibility of value-free social science is unavoidably limited by the value-directedness of the social scientists' choice of subjects. Mr. Strauss denies both the possibility and the desirability of value-free social science and would certainly deny that an intelligent man's investigations are determined by his cultural values. Rothman here takes up Nagel's rebuttal against Weber, but mistakes the arguments against Weber for arguments against Mr. Strauss. This is especially damaging to Rothman for the reason that there is perhaps one point on which Mr. Strauss's position is more congenial to the claim of social science than is Max Weber's: Weber affirms and Mr. Strauss denies that the scientist is in principle culture-bound in the choice of topics. It is precisely on this point that Rothman imagines the refutation of Weber to be a refutation of Mr. Strauss; and, as it happens, he presents it as a refutation of an argument which Mr. Strauss did not make (namely, that there are no important value-free facts) and to which the supposed refutation would in any case be unrelated, as is evident. The obscurity of Rothman's position is increased by the fact that the position of Weber, to which he takes unwitting exception, is Rothman's own position expressed in other words. Rothman argues the impossibility of reducing interest and commitment to anything else: they simply are what they are. Weber, as Mr. Strauss remarks on page 46 of *Natural Right and History*, admits this and even gives it a respectability which Rothman does not try to do: "Excellence now means devotion to a cause, be it good or evil, and baseness means indifference to all causes."

If we try to reconstruct Rothman's reason for including his passage on "commitments," (p. 344) we may conjecture (he does not say it) that this is his argument against Mr. Strauss's view that positivistic social science is self-depreciatory to the point of being self-contradictory. In other words, value-free social science denies the objectivity or truth of the value-judgment that pronounces science itself to be more worthy than other pursuits. The highest wisdom about value judgments includes the judgment that there is no objective superiority in the pursuit of that highest wisdom, without which men would err concerning judgment itself. If Rothman's passage on page 344 is intended to be the rejoinder to this part of the natural right position, then it must be said that the rejoinder is a confirmation of the view it seeks to refute: he tells us that men's interests and commitments simply are what they are. That is to say, he admits precisely what he would have to refute in order to meet the argument against which he is contending. If Rothman's passage is not intended as I have supposed it, then it must be regarded as not to the point. The reader's attention should be drawn in passing to Rothman's use of "interests" in conjunction with "commitments." "Interests" is an ambiguous word; and it becomes clear later in his article that Rothman must be held to mean that investigators are directed not only by their interests in the sense of "what excites curiosity" but also by their interests as the word appears in the phrase "interested or selfish motives." The purification of science is inseparable from the incrimination of the scientists. It is an open question whether social scientists, of whatever opinion, will find this doctrine more contradictory than derogatory or *vice versa*. In any case, it is not an effective refutation of the charge that positivistic social science infects its own being with a fundamental weakness.

Rothman proceeds with a reference to Mr. Strauss's position on Weber's thesis concerning the rise of capitalism. If what has been said above is correct, Rothman's remarks are not to the point, for he is still arguing that, according to the natural right position, "purely descriptive propositions are not merely wrong but rather . . . they are meaningless." (p. 345) In any case, the reader might wish to know that a fuller statement on the Weber thesis can be found in *Church History*, March, 1961: "The Weber Thesis Reexamined (W. S. Hudson) with Comment by Leo Strauss," against which Rothman's remarks can be checked.

Rothman prepares to bring this section of his article to a close by asserting "that Strauss seems to have shifted his position after completing *Natural Right and History*." This is one of the points we shall have to consider, as we turn to the part of his paper that Rothman describes as dealing with Mr. Strauss's "restatement of the implications of classical thought and the modern break with that thought," (p. 346), but which in effect contains Rothman's treatment of the problem of natural science.

The primary subject in part II of Rothman's paper is natural science and its relation to social science. The argument falls into divisions which are determined by the fact that Rothman is contending partly against classical philosophy and partly against the revival of classical philosophy. The difference between the two is produced by the intervention of modern natural science. Rothman's method is to adopt as his premise the decisive supersession of ancient physics by modern physics and then to argue (1) that both ancient and revived natural right, which depend upon the teleological view of nature, are invalid as ancient physics is because ancient physics depends upon the teleological view of nature; and (2) that Mr. Strauss in his earlier writings conceded the victory of modern natural science and with it, in effect, the victory of modern social science; but in his later writings denies that the victory of the former implies the victory of the latter. I shall try to show that there is no merit in the argument that natural right falls with ancient physics because both are teleological; and that Mr. Strauss did not assert what Rothman alleges him to have asserted, and therefore that the change of view which Rothman speaks of never occurred. The majority of Rothman's detailed points I shall have to leave to each reader's scrutiny, with the suggestion that they be tested by the rule, are they comprehensible if read very literally?

The point numbered (1) above would be valid if it were true not only that modern natural science has simply superseded ancient natural science, but also that in the decisive respect, *i.e.*, on the ground of that supersession, natural right was simultaneously overthrown. What is the ground on which that supersession is thought, or is specifically thought by Rothman, to rest? It is that modern natural science is, whereas classical natural science is not, guided or dominated by the verification principle.[3] What is the verification principle? Rothman gives one form of it: "that all propositions be stated in such form as to be capable of being validated by empirical procedures, and that propositions which form part of a system not contradict each other." (p. 360) As to the latter condition, it is clear that the need to avoid self-contradiction is as much an element of ancient as of modern method, and consciously so.

The novelty of the ground of modern science is the condition, apparently, that propositions must be capable of empirical verification in order to be regarded as meaningful. As is well known, the acceptance of the empirical test for verification rests upon this belief: that the evidence of the senses is the most fundamental or most genuine evidence accessible to man; and that in turn is true because what is, is sensible and what is sensible, is. I do not wish to emphasize what is common knowledge, namely, that there is no empirical basis for the metaphysical doctrine that to be is to be sensible. I mean only to point out that this metaphysical principle does not overthrow (for it does not meet) the metaphysical principle "to be is to be intelligible"; it merely draws men's minds in a different direction. Ruling out certain questions as meaningless because not empirically verifiable, does no more than any abstention from an inquiry can do: it leaves the question open, in the minds of those who do not mistake the negative of a blank for a negation by refutation. It might be true that the order of nature, and the necessary culmination of that order in some principle that originates motion without itself being in motion, cannot be made a matter of empirical demonstration (if that expression is not a self-contradiction). But it might also be true, for anything the verification principle can adduce to the contrary, that an infinite regress of sources of motion in the universe is a contradiction of the profoundest sort; and that, therefore, to insist upon empirical verification and consistency of the system is meaningless. I am far from wishing to maintain that ancient physics is superior to modern physics. I wish only to suggest that the case against teleology is not made out by Rothman.

What of the collapse of natural right because of its association with teleological physics? In order to consider this question, I will merge the remainder of point (1) with point (2) as they were numbered above. How closely are physics and moral philosophy linked? Rothman believes that they are inseparable. He writes, " . . . unless Strauss can demonstrate the superiority of classical over modern and contemporary science, his whole case collapses. . . . " (p. 349) Why should this be so? Rothman does not say, but he gives the impression that if the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (not both the velocity and the position of the small quanta are determinate) and the second law of thermodynamics (on the irreversibility of energy transfers in the universe as a whole) are somehow true, then there are consequences for the possibility that man's end is related to his nature. But Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has precisely as much to do with the goodness of man's rational activity, for example, as the law of gravity has to do with the question, ought you to knock down an old lady in order to get a seat on the subway—neither more nor less. The principles of physics are relevant to the problems of human life to the extent that human life can be reduced to the motion of matter. This is true according to the self-understanding of modern science, at any rate, which, so far as it adopts the verification principle, adopts simple empiricism and with it materialism. On this score, Rothman's argument consists exclusively of his unsupported assertions.

But he claims that on this issue of the relation between natural science and natural right, it is Mr. Strauss who is inconsistent, having changed his views fundamentally. Rothman, summarizing Mr. Strauss's position, says, " . . . the separation of man and nature, and the attempt to apply different modes of analysis to each, was inconceivable to classical political philosophy, and is a product of the break with that philosophy." (p. 346) We leave altogether out of the account Spinoza's famous remark against the writers (by which he meant the traditional writers) who "conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom."[4] Let us turn to the presentation of the case in *Natural Right and History*, accepting it as at the same time a statement of the classical and revived natural right position:

> Socrates was forced to raise the question as to what the human things as such are, or what the *ratio rerum humanarum* is. But it is impossible to grasp the distinctive character of human things as such without grasping the essential difference between

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[3] Pp. 348, 349, 350 for example.

[4] *Ethics,* III, introduction.

human things and the things which are not human, *i.e.*, the divine or natural things. . . .

Contrary to appearances, Socrates' turn to the study of human things was based, not upon disregard of the divine or natural things, but upon a new approach to the understanding of all things. That approach was indeed of such a character that it permitted, and favored, the study of human things as such, i.e., of the human things in so far as they are not reducible to the divine or natural things. Socrates deviated from his predecessors by identifying the science of the whole, or of everything that is, with the understanding of "what each of the beings is." For "to be" means "to be something" and hence to be different from things which are "something else"; "to be" means therefore "to be a part." Hence the whole cannot "be" in the same sense in which everything that is "something" "is"; the whole must be "beyond being."[5]

It simply is not true that the classics compromised their teaching concerning human things with a teaching concerning the non-human things—saying nothing further about the possible merit of that latter teaching. What then is the basis of Rothman's allegation that Mr. Strauss has shifted his position in an impossible way? It is this: early in *Natural Right and History* (pp. 7–8), Mr. Strauss refers to a "dilemma" that confronts modern men as a result of the great successes (*i.e.*, technological successes) of non-teleological science. Men believe either that they must accept non-teleological moral doctrine because of the success of non-teleological physical science; or that they can escape by arguing that the human things are intelligible teleologically and the non-human things non-teleologically. The former are positivists (and would include Rothman), the latter are Thomists and others who have broken with Aristotle, *i.e.*, with the classical tradition of natural right. Since it is perfectly obvious that Mr. Strauss is not in the course of associating himself with either party, it is equally clear that he means literally what he says toward the end of the Introduction to *Natural Right and History:* the book "will have to be limited to that aspect of the problem of natural right which can be clarified within the confines of the social sciences." Rothman's misinterpretation consists in this: he believed Mr. Strauss, or the natural right position (in fact both) to be themselves confined to the two horns of the dilemma. He did not realize that what follows, both in *Natural Right and History* and in the later works, is a statement that refuses the dilemma because what follows does not concede that the issue between ancient and modern natural science is simply disposed of by arguing from the premises of modern natural science. Rothman's argument thus does not bear weight.

I deeply deplore the need to notice the concluding section of Rothman's paper. In it he continues in the tone he sets very early when he refers to Mr. Strauss's students as "disciples," a term of gratuitous offense that insinuates a combination of self-satisfied sectarianism and hypnotic influence. In the conclusion he permits himself to speculate on the basis of that influence, and easily satisfies himself that it is founded upon a susceptibility to "simple keys," and a lust for power. He does himself little credit by describing as simple the oldest and deepest philosophic tradition known to man, one which he shows no sign of having grasped. And as for the desire to seize power, what more does that half-serious allegation rest upon than a mixture of levity and the near-malevolence of hostile brooding upon motives? That same conjunction of levity and ill-temper could as well impute to Rothman an appetite to be known as climbing Jack in search of giants to slay; but the man who would write so of him would deserve the censure of scholars, for the charge would be mere speculation, and irrelevant to every genuine issue.

Rothman writes that Mr. Strauss "has made a fetish of the esoteric content of the writings of political philosophers." Mr. Strauss has not made a fetish of anything. He has done no more than to act on the principle that, when one reads the writings of great men, one should as long as possible abstain from concluding that what appears obscure or contradictory, *i.e.*, unintelligible, is really so. Any other approach to the great literature is sheerly presumptuous. Rothman does not refer to *Persecution and the Art of Writing*. Readers might be interested in consulting that statement of the issue by Mr. Strauss, in order to ascertain whether there are any traces of fetishism in it.

Rothman makes a particularly offensive and unjust insinuation when he depreciates the sincerity of the adherence of Mr. Strauss and his students to the principles of democracy and of the United States. The quality of Rothman's method of scholarship, and the wholesomeness of his intention can best be exposed by quoting the passage from *What Is Political Philosophy?* that he alludes to as he distorts it (see his footnote 65):

> To speak first of the classics' attitude towards democracy, the premises: "the classics are good," and "democracy is good" do not validate the con-

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[5] P. 122.

clusion "hence the classics were good democrats." It would be silly to deny that the classics rejected democracy as an inferior kind of regime. They were not blind to its advantages. The severest indictment of democracy that ever was written occurs in the eighth book of Plato's *Republic*. But even there, and precisely there, Plato makes it clear—by coordinating his arrangement of regimes with Hesiod's arrangement of the ages of the world—that democracy is, in a very important respect, equal to the best regime, which corresponds to Hesiod's golden age: since the principle of democracy is freedom, all human types can develop freely in a democracy, and hence in particular the best human type. . . .

Rothman hints at a sinister purpose underlying Mr. Strauss's "contradictory" attribution of American political institutions to "Machiavellian" and "anti-Machiavellian" sources. Rothman does not appear to realize that the tradition of modern political philosophy is not a seamless web, but a complicated structure consisting of parts which are to some extent antagonistic. He might be expected to know that this is, at least, the view of Mr. Strauss, for the sixth chapter of *Natural Right and History* is called "The Crisis of Modern Natural Right," and begins with the remark that "The *first* crisis of modernity occurred in the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau." (My italics) Readers may conclude for themselves whether Rothman's presentation of the case was fair or well-informed.

The contest between ancients and moderns is bound to continue. It draws our attention to the deepest and grandest questions, in the presence of which there is no proper frame of mind but modesty and concentration upon the issues. To proceed in any other spirit is to show disrespect for scholarship and for the sovereign questions, and is altogether deplorable.

THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ENGLISH PARTY ACTIVISTS*

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If a democracy is to function successfully, the great mass of the population need instruments for communicating their views to political leaders. The chief channels for communication are parties and pressure groups. English politics provides much scope for study of these conduits, because both parties and pressure groups are highly organized and well articulated. Although the part played by party activists in policy formulation is only one small aspect of this network, the study of that part throws considerable light upon the interplay of parties and pressure groups, and challenges as well some prevailing notions about the policy demands of party activists.

Party activists in Britain have only comparatively recently been regarded as potentially capable of participating in discussions of public policy. Both the Conservatives and Liberals originated as small coteries of parliamentary notables who controlled, or were independent of rank-and-file party workers. Writing in 1908, A. Lawrence Lowell characterized the two party organizations as shams—the Liberals, with their formal devices for rank-and-file policy-making as an opaque sham, and the Conservatives as transparent shams.[1] He noted that in 1903 Conservative Party members were so deferential that when the Cabinet was split on tariff reform the annual membership conference "shrank from saying what it thought." Both Conservative and Liberal parties have maintained this aloofness from activists in matters of policy discussion up to the present day. The official report on Conservative Party re-organization prepared after the 1945 *debacle* noted that the size of the annual party conference made it "a demonstration of strength and enthusiasm" and made impossible "the more intimate circumstances necessary to thoughtful debate."[2] Since the farcical intervention of activists in policy-making at the 1958 Liberal Assembly, Jo Grimond has successfully emphasized the need to keep Liberal policy-making in the hands of a small circle.

The Labour Party, in theory and to some extent in practice, has always stood for participation by rank-and-file party members in policy-making. A current party pamphlet states: "The right to a voice in determining policy is important to any member . . . The individual member has a chance to use the machinery of the party to secure support for ideas on every aspect of party policy."[3] In recent years a harassed Labour leadership has begun to stress Robert T. McKenzie's thesis that it is unconstitutional for party members to make policy to which MPs are bound, because MPs must be responsible to those who elect them and not to that allegedly unrepresentative fraction who constitute active party members. The Labour leadership is reverting to the Burkean position maintained by many Conservatives, that an MP owes his constituency party supporters nothing more than his informed and independent judgement.[4] Except for Ralph Miliband, who has argued that the influence of the active Labour minority should not be reduced because of the apathy of the majority,[5] there is a consensus among students of British politics that party activists cannot and should not make party policy, or even influence it greatly.

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[1] A. L. Lowell, *The Government of England* (London, 1921 edition) Vol. I, pp. 578, 584. See also M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (London, 1902), Vol. I, p. 161 ff; J. L. Garvin, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London, 1932), Vol. I, ch. 14; W. S. Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill* (London, 1906), esp. chs. 6–8.

[2] *Final Report of the Committee on Party Organization* (National Union, London, 1949), p. 27.

[3] S. Barker, *How the Labour Party Works* (London, 1955), p. 6.

[4] See R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London, 1955), esp. chs. 1, 10; *Report of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (London, 1960), p. 159 ff, and Morgan Phillips' *Memorandum on the Constitution of the Labour Party* (London, 1960).

[5] "Party Democracy and Parliamentary Government," *Political Studies*, Vol. 6 (1958), pp. 170–74. Wilfrid Fienburgh, then research secretary of the Labour Party, implicitly took this position in "Put Policy on the Agenda," *Fabian Journal*, No. 6 (1952), pp. 25–7.

It does not follow, however, that the views of party activists are of no interest. There are several reasons for analyzing them. First, activists may be mobilized to support a faction within the elite when there occurs what Michels treated as "The Struggle Among the Leadership Themselves."[6] Sometimes, a section of the counter-elite and of the activists appear to work together and respond to a common stimulus. Second, activists are a major channel of communication between MPs and party leaders and the electorate at large. Third, they are presumed to be the last stronghold of ideologues within the party system. Last but hardly least, there has never been any systematic study of the policy views of activists in Britain, although there has been no lack of generalizing on this subject.

Many students of political parties, most notably Duverger, have claimed that the views of activists differ significantly from those of most party voters; hence, the description of an activist as a militant.[7] (American experience would suggest that many active party workers are far from being ideologically militant, but this has not until recently been thought relevant to European politics.) Such leading writers on British politics as Bagehot, Lowell and McKenzie have also argued this with reference to Britain.[8] Leon Epstein has explained the alleged extremist views of these activists as follows:

> The voluntary and amateur nature of these associations ensures that they attract zealots in the party cause, and particularly so at the local leadership level, where there are many routine political chores which only the devoted are likely to perform. Principles, not professional careers, are what matter here.[9]

Nigel Nicolson, the victim while a Conservative MP of a constituency association which disowned him because of his centrist views, has argued that the extremist outlook of activists threatens to endanger parliamentary government, because Parliament is losing power to Cabinet and Cabinet is dominated by party. Nicolson claims that parliamentary leaders rightly see problems in terms of "the intrusive grey," whereas activists see things in black and white terms. Political activity only intensifies their militant beliefs. Hence, in the constituencies, warfare between the parties is "a grim reality."[10]

To use the terminology of Martin Lipset in *Political Man*, the influence of activists in party policy-making is said to give heavy emphasis to ideological cleavage without a compensating statement of consensus, whereas both the theory and practice of British government value consensus much more than cleavage. It is theoretically possible that constituency parties may act as a safety valve through which extremist pressures escape, but this argument has not been advanced. It is the crux of Nicolson's case that the steam being generated by extreme-minded activists threatens to scald the engine drivers of democracy and endanger all the passengers.

I

Party activists have the same formal method of influencing policy in both parties—sending resolutions to the annual party conferences.[11] This is not sufficient proof of policy concern, but it is almost certainly a necessary condition which activists must meet if they wish their views to be considered by the national party leadership. The other major channel—lobbying one's MP—is informal and indirect. Furthermore, half the constituencies have an MP from the opposition party. There are no inhibitions surrounding conference resolutions. If anything, there is an expectation that resolutions will be used by extremists to voice complaints to and about leaders.

The circumstances in which policy resolutions are drafted, debated and approved differ widely from constituency to constituency. Resolutions are likely to originate in committee meetings of local parties; alternatively, suggestions or amendments may be made at party meetings, where attendance will invariably be only a small fraction of a constituency party's membership, and an extremely small fraction of the party vote in the constituency.[12] Thus, the method and setting facilitate domination by a small group determined to foster a particular set of ideas. The extent to which policy is discussed in local parties appears to vary considerably.[13] Motives for tabling resolutions may be mixed and several. Expressions of opinion may spontaneously originate within the local caucus from concern with an immediate event in the news. MPs or candidates may stimulate resolutions favouring views they wish to advance. Sometimes resolutions are presented in efforts to gain publicity, either for the local party or for the person who may be chosen to move it in an auditorium crowded with delegates.

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[6] *Political Parties* (Dover edition, New York, 1959), p. 164 ff. McKenzie ignores this phenomenon.

[7] *Political Parties* (London, 1954), p. 101 ff. *Cf.* A. Leiserson, *Parties and Politics* (New York, 1958), pp. 191, 274.

[8] Bagehot, quoted in N. Nicolson, *People and Parliament* (London, 1958), p. 166; A. L. Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, 1914), p. 92; R. T. McKenzie, *op. cit.*, pp. 196–7, p. 506. See also T. E. M. McKitterick, "The Membership of the [Labour] Party," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 31 (1960), p. 316 ff.

[9] "British MPs and their Local Parties: The Suez Case," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (1960), p. 385. Epstein wrongly suggests that rank-and-file extremism strengthens the position of party leaders. This is because he generalizes from the extremist position of the leadership on Suez; the instance is, however, exceptional.

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 169. His fear is not new. *Cf.* Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 493 ff.

[11] See S. Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 7 ff; *Party Organization* (Conservative & Unionist Central Office, London, 1961), p. 23 ff; R. T. McKenzie, *op. cit.*; pp. 231–58, 532–46.

The resolutions analyzed herein are those submitted to Conservative and Labour annual party conferences from 1955 to 1960 inclusive. No list of resolutions was published for the cancelled 1959 Conservative conference. The omission of one year's total from the sample is offset by the fact that there is no limit on the number of resolutions which a Conservative constituency may forward. In the Labour Party, a constituency normally may send only one resolution, and occasionally an amendment. Because of alterations to constituency boundaries prior to the 1955 election, the analysis could not be accurately carried further back in time.

Each resolution has been assigned to one of four categories—Right, Left, Partisan or Non-Partisan. Resolutions in the first three categories contain a distinctive element of partisan ideology; those in the last tend to reflect pressure group concerns or general cultural values not integrally a part of party ideology. The definitions follow, with examples taken from conference programs.

> *Partisan:* Enunciation of an agreed party policy which is opposed to that of the other party and which has an ideological basis.

Conservative example: "That this Conference congratulates the Government on its economic policy, which has resulted in full employment, stable prices and the highest standard of living in our history, but urges the removal of the many impediments still hindering the spread of ownership throughout the community." (No. 177, 1960)

Other favored Conservative themes include: requests for maximum economy in public expenditure, denunciation of further nationalization, protection of property rights in land compulsorily acquired by the state, support for the Commonwealth, and approval of the tripartite division of secondary education.

Labour example: "This Conference believes that a substantial measure of public ownership is essential for the nation's well-being. It therefore instructs the NEC to prepare for presentation to the 1961 Annual Conference a practical programme of public ownership for the next Labour Government, based on the needs of the economy, workers and consumers' interests." (No. 203, 1960)

Labour resolutions in this category often deal with: world disarmament through the United Nations, support for colonial freedom and attacks upon the Conservative colonial policy, attacks upon advertising, the need for economic planning and controls, demands for an end to profiteering in land prices, and support for a comprehensive secondary education system.

> *Non-partisan:* Enunciation of a policy which is not the subject of controversy along party lines, either because it reflects the views of pressure groups working within both parties or because it is generally regarded as desirable within the culture. A non-partisan resolution is not necessarily non-political.

Conservative example: "That this Conference is of the opinion that in view of the statement made at the time of the General Election that old age pensioners were to share in the prosperity of the country, an increase in their pensions should now be made." (No. 126, 1960)

Other popular themes for non-party resolutions at Conservative conferences include: assistance for particular industries or for agriculture, calls for more teachers and smaller class sizes, demands for more roads and safer roads, tax relief for homeowners, changes to strengthen local government in its work, changes in electoral law to simplify the job of party workers, and improvements in party organization.[14]

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[12] *Cf.* reports of low participation by trade unionists in discussions of union policy, in B. C. Roberts, *Trade Union Government and Administration in Great Britain* (London, 1956), p. 95 ff; M. Harrison, *Trade Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945* (London, 1960), ch. 3.

[13] *Cf.* D. V. Donnison and D. E. G. Plowman, "The Functions of Local Labour Parties," *Political Studies*, Vol. 2 (1954), p. 156 ff; A. H. Birch, *Small-Town Politics* (Oxford, 1959), p. 44 ff.

Labour example: "This Conference urges the Government to grant an immediate increase for old age pensioners." (No. 344, 1960)

Among a welter of Labour themes that were basically non-ideological were: assistance for shipbuilding, coal, other industries and for agriculture, calls for more teachers and smaller class sizes, requests for more hospitals and removal of alleged anomalies in welfare services, changes to strengthen local government in its work, more roads and safer roads, better railway services, and relief of the housing shortage and need for slum clearance.

Right-wing Conservative: A policy statement which calls for widening the gap between the two parties through adoption of a reactionary variant of party policy.

Example: "That in the opinion of this Conference the monopoly of omnibus transport in large cities and towns should be abolished and that responsible operators be allowed to compete, thereby giving the public a better service." (No. 48, 1960)

Right-wing Conservatives concentrate upon: pleas for weakening taxes which tend to redistribute income, requests for laws to curb trade unions and strikers, demands for a return to flogging and heavy reliance upon capital punishment to fight crime, the absolute reduction of government spending and services, the denationalization of various industries, and reducing benefits available through welfare services.

Left-wing Labour: A statement calling for a radical transformation of the domestic mixed economy welfare state, or of the existing system of international relations, in order to make the breakthrough to a Socialist society. Such statements are usually out of harmony with the declared policy of the leadership.

Example: "This Conference instructs the National Executive Committee to appoint a subcommittee to investigate and report to the 1961 Annual Conference the most practical way in which all the means of production, distribution and exchange can be brought under public ownership, ensuring that the workers and consumers alike can participate in the management of each industry." (No. 206, 1960)

Under this heading come resolutions: asking for unilateral nuclear disarmament, demanding large-scale extension of nationalization and/or workers' control, reaffirming Socialist principles in terms of root-and-branch rejection of a capitalist-influenced society, and those calling for compulsory closure of the public boarding schools.

Left-wing Conservative/Right-wing Labour: Statements of policy which deviate so markedly from conference policy that they tend to be in harmony with the policies of the opposing party.

Conservative example: "That this Conference requests the Minister of Housing and Local Government to examine the position of the tenants of furnished accommodation with a view to introducing legislation to guarantee an adequate standard of furnishings and fittings, and a reasonable security of tenure." (No. 331, 1960)

Labour example: "This Conference moves that the Labour Party, being a social and democratic movement, seeks to determine by means of a social-political survey, such questions as the image of the party in the minds of the electorate, their social habits and background, and their wishes concerning the fundamental issues of the day, with the aim of studying the results of such an enquiry and deciding to what extent they should influence future party policy." (No. 424, 1960)

The number of these resolutions is so few that one cannot generalize much. In the Conservative Party, left-wing resolutions seemed to come either from constituency parties in working-class areas, which voiced Labour-inclined views on social services and economic policy, or from constituencies where progressive Conservatives had some sympathies with Labour's overseas policy. Labour deviation seemed largely motivated by a desire to repudiate traditional Socialist ideology, with an occasional repudiation resulting in virtual alignment with Conservative positions.

Any system of categorizing data is open to criticism. The headings here employed have been designed to group together views which signify, either explicitly or by their nuance, association with one or another faction within the two parties. This is the standard used by many speakers on resolutions at party conferences, who discuss them in terms of left/right tendencies, and the same standard is characteristically employed in descriptions of conference debates by journalists.

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[14] Resolutions dealing with the mechanics of party organization have been scored non-partisan because they show bureaucratic rather than ideological concerns. Interestingly, a number of resolutions ostensibly dealing with party principles are also non-ideological. They simply stress the need for unity on principle, or promoting principles, without any indication of which particular principles (if any) should be emphasized.

II

The analysis immediately reveals that the description of local parties as a force constantly pressing extremist views upon national party leaders is false. The total proportion of ideological (*i.e.*, left-wing, right-wing and partisan) resolutions is 54 per cent; those which are non-ideological constitute 46 per cent of the total (Table IA). In other words, constituency parties are nearly as apt to be voicing views derived from general cultural values or from interest group links as they are to voice those clearly associated with a partisan ideology.

When the scores are analyzed according to parties, one finds that the Conservatives are more inclined to press non-partisan resolutions on their leaders than are Labour constituencies. But the differences are not great and Labour parties do not show strong partisanship; 42 per cent of their resolutions are non-partisan, compared with 50 per cent of Conservative ones (Table IB, IC). The variation in the number and orientation of resolutions from year to year appears to reflect the temper of the times. A party's adversity would seem to stimulate extremist views.

An analysis of the number of resolutions submitted by individual constituency parties reveals the existence of wide variations in concern with policy. Approximately one-third of Conservative constituency parties did not present a single resolution in the five-year period studied; only 26 per cent forwarded an average of one resolution or more a year (Table IIA). This disinterest in pressing policy views cannot be attributed to poor party organization, because virtually all English Conservative constituencies are sufficiently well organized to have a full-time party agent. It may well be related to the deferential relationship which exists, socially as well as politically, between party leaders and members. Balfour is reported to have said that he would as soon take orders from his valet as from a Conservative Party annual conference.[15] Perhaps some party members would equally regard it as wrong to depart from the obligations of their station in life.

TABLE IA. TOTAL SCORES FOR ALL CONSTITUENCY RESOLUTIONS

Type	No.	%
Extremist (Rt, Con; Left, Lab)	1398	30
Partisan (Con and Lab)	1013	22
Misplaced partisanship (Left, Con; Rt, Lab)	97	2
Non-partisan (Con and Lab)	2090	46
Totals	4598	100

TABLE IB. TOTAL SCORES OF CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUENCY RESOLUTIONS*

Year	Right	Partisan	Left	Non-Partisan	Total
1955	50	52	17	173	292
1956	137	109	10	137	393
1957	130	60	6	216	412
1958	90	141	12	204	447
1959	(No resolutions published)				
1960	98	41	17	259	415
Totals No.	505	403	62	989	1959
Per Cent	26	21	3	50	100

* This table, like IA and VA, includes resolutions filed by Welsh constituency parties and minor federated bodies, as well as those from English parties. Welsh resolutions are omitted from all other calculations because the party system there is not quite the same as in England; minor parties are twice as strong. The federated bodies are omitted because they are not comparable to Labour ones. Omitted groups have similar scores to those fully analysed. Scotland and Northern Ireland are not included in any Conservative tabulations, because these parties are separate and have their own conferences.

In the Labour Party, concern with matters of policy is more widely diffused, as one might expect from a party which has always boasted of its ideological basis. The gap between individual constituency parties is not so great, because of the limit of one resolution and one amendment for each party at each conference. (Table IIB) Although the Labour Party has more constituencies which will sometimes file a resolution, there is little difference in terms of

TABLE IC. TOTAL SCORES OF LABOUR CONSTITUENCY RESOLUTIONS*

Year	Left	Partisan	Right	Non-Partisan	Total
1955	123	98	5	198	424
1956	109	119	5	169	402
1957	127	140	4	172	443
1958	173	89	6	160	428
1959	152	73	3	186	414
1960	209	91	12	216	528
Totals No.	893	610	35	1101	2639
Per Cent	34	23	1	42	100

* This table, like IA and VB, includes resolutions from Welsh and Scottish constituency parties, and from trade unions and other affiliated bodies. There is no significant variation in scores as between those groups fully analyzed and those omitted elsewhere.

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[15] Quoted in McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 82. See also Earl Balfour, *Chapters of Autobiography* (London, 1930), p. 158 ff.

heavy activity, insofar as different regulations permit of comparison. Among Conservative constituencies, 74 per cent file resolutions less than once a year on average; in the Labour Party, the proportion is 79 per cent.

Concern with questions of policy is not the same as partisanship. In order to isolate those constituencies which reflected particularly strong partisanship, the groups were divided into four categories, according to the extent to which they varied from the average party score. In the Conservative table, partisan views are those scored right or partisan; in the Labour table, those scored left or partisan. From this we find (Tables IIIA, IIIB) that the proportion of constituency parties which regularly press partisan views is less than one-quarter in each party. There is a skewed distribution among the Conservatives, for 59 per cent of the constituencies show less than average partisanship. Absence of partisanship does not, of course, mean absence of ideological commitments; it is evidence that parties so labeled are little interested in advocating ideological views. There is more interest in proclaiming partisan views in the Labour parties.

TABLE IIA. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESOLUTIONS FILED BY CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Number of resolutions	No. of parties*	% of all parties	Cumulative percentage†
0	165	32	32
1	90	18	50
2	49	10	60
3	42	8	68
4	29	6	74
5	23	5	79
6	22	4	83
7	14	3	86
8	15	3	89
9	12	2	91
10	7	1	92
11–20	33	6	98
21–30	4	0.8	98.8
31–40	3	0.6	99.4
46	1	0.2	99.6

* Bolton West and Huddersfield West are omitted from this and subsequent calculations because they do not nominate parliamentary candidates, standing aside in favour of the Liberals.

† Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

TABLE IIB. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESOLUTIONS FILED BY LABOUR CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Number of resolutions	No. of parties	% of all parties	Cumulative percentage*
0	28	6	6
1	48	9	15
2	62	12	27
3	72	14	41
4	94	18	59
5	102	20	79
6	96	19	98
7	7	1.4	99.4
8	2	0.4	99.8

* Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

TABLE IIIA. PARTISANSHIP IN CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUENCY PARTIES*

Category	No.	Per cent
No partisan resolutions	164	35
Low (1–34%) partisanship	113	24
Average (35–64%) partisanship	120	26
High (65% or more) partisanship	71	15

* Constituencies which submitted only one resolution in the period, and that one partisan, have been omitted, because this was regarded as insufficient evidence for categorization.

TABLE IIIB. PARTISANSHIP IN LABOUR CONSTITUENCY PARTIES*

Category	No.	Per cent
No partisan resolutions	88	18
Low (12.5–40%) partisanship	83	17
Average (41–75%) partisanship†	208	42
High (above 75%) partisanship	113	23

* Constituencies presenting only one resolution, and that partisan, have been omitted from this table.

† This category is not as large as it appears, for only seven parties could have scored between 41–49.9%.

The incidence of ideological partisanship is certainly no cause for concern; few could criticize party activists for pressing party policy upon their leaders, when the leaders ac-

TABLE IVA. EXTREMISM IN CONSERVATIVE PARTIES*

Category	No.	Per-Cent
No extremist resolutions	314	66
Low (1–16.5%) extremism	20	4
Average (16.6–37.4%) extremism	92	19
High extremism (37.5% or more)	52†	11

* Those constituencies submitting one extremist resolution and filing only one or two in the period are omitted.

† Consists of 24 parties submitting up to 5 resolutions each in the period and 28 parties submitting more than 5 resolutions each in the period.

cept the ideas, as well as many voters. Ideological extremism is a far greater force for social cleavage, but it is extremely limited in both parties. (Tables IVA, IVB) Even though the definition of high extremism in the Conservative Party does not require a constituency to express extremist views as much as half the time, only 11 per cent qualify for that appellation—and only 6 per cent are both extremist and quite active in pressing views. Although more Labour constituencies are extremist than Conservative, they form only 18 per cent of the total. The median Labour constituency will only forward one extremist resolution in a six-year period, and the median Conservative one will not even forward a single extremist resolution in a five-year period.

The foregoing tables indicate that party workers on opposite sides of the political fence are not so partisan as electoral contests suggest, and not so extremist as some theorists suggest. A breakdown of resolutions by subject matter and by policy orientation provides a list of areas of common agreement within both parties (Tables VA, VB). A notable feature of Conservative resolutions is concentration upon domestic issues, notwithstanding the importance of international affairs to the government and to the electorate. Only 3 per cent of resolutions concerned foreign policy and defence questions, compared to 29 per cent in the Labour Party. The latter devotes less attention to politically important domestic questions. The virtual absence in both parties of expressions on highly explosive racial, religious and constitutional questions should not be overlooked.

TABLE IVB. EXTREMISM IN LABOUR PARTIES*

Category	No.	Per-Cent
No extremist resolutions	191	38
Low extremism (20% or less)	47	9
Average (25–50%) extremism	172	35
High (above 50%) extremism	87	18

* Those constituencies submitting only one resolution, and that extremist, have not been categorized.

Analysis by topics suggests that the partisanship and extremism of party activists is not so strong in several fields as the pull of interest group or general cultural standards.[16] In four areas of public concern—education, welfare services, transport and pensions—partisan standards are applied less than half the time by activists in both parties. When facing these questions they may ask for 'more schools' or 'higher pensions'; this is a cry of beneficiaries and benefactors, not of ideologues. This non-party emphasis is the more striking because there are clear ideological differences between the parties on education, welfare and transport. For instance, although the method of organizing secondary education is a point of sharp difference between the parties and affects the whole electorate, 64 per cent of Labour resolutions and 56 per cent of Conservative ones steer clear of all partisan controversy on education. The proportion of ideological resolutions rises in areas of economic policy, where interest group and ideological standards are likely to be the same for most activists; partisan ideology is thus intensified. For instance, all of the 19 Labour resolutions on industrial relations were partisan, and only 12 per cent of the 133 Conservative resolutions on this topic were non-partisan.

Some activists appear more concerned with the mechanics of party organization than with party policy. This shows in Conservative resolutions on party structure and on election law, and in organizational resolutions in the Labour Party, and resolutions asking for party unity—without any sign of preference concerning the program upon which unity should be based.

III

Examination of conference resolutions has shown that constituency parties differ considerably in their political attitudes. The question is then raised: Do they differ in relation to other measurable social or political factors? Unfortunately, the data available for cross-

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[16] *Cf.* S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (1956), pp. 1–23.

TABLE VA. TOPICS FOR CONSERVATIVE RESOLUTIONS

Topic	Right	Partisan	Left	Non-Partisan	Total
Economic affairs	121	142	28	64	355
Housing	22	35	4	107	168
Industrial relations	73	37	7	16	133
Party organization	5	8	3	112	128
Education	33	18	2	72	125
Pensions	6	2	—	104	112
Taxes	56	17	—	29	102
Compulsory purchase	16	79	—	4	99
Crime	63	13	4	11	91
Transportation	5	1	—	82	88
Election law	—	—	—	85	85
Commonwealth, colonies	31	14	4	7	56
Local government	—	—	—	51	51
Welfare services	21	—	—	29	50
Agriculture	5	—	—	42	47
Foreign policy	6	16	5	5	32
Defence	1	18	2	7	28
Immigration	21	—	—	—	21
Party principles	9	2	—	6	17
Miscellaneous	11	1	3	156	171

tabulation is strictly limited,[17] but sufficient exists to test several important hypotheses.

One hypothesis concerns the relationship between party strength and attitudes of activists. It has been argued[18] that in areas where

TABLE VB. TOPICS FOR LABOUR RESOLUTIONS

Topic	Left	Partisan	Right	Non-Partisan	Total
Foreign policy, defence	594	145	14	20	773
Economic affairs	117	141	10	188	456
Housing and land	10	85	—	80	175
Party organization	14	4	1	130	148
Pensions	2	1	—	143	146
Welfare services	7	31	—	94	132
Education	17	19	—	64	100
Commonwealth & colonies	8	82	3	1	94
Local government	7	43	—	44	94
Socialist principles	57	15	2	5	79
Transportation	4	3	—	56	63
Party unity	18	2	1	31	52
Industrial relations	6	13	—	—	19
Miscellaneous	32	26	4	245	306

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[17] For instance, census data cannot be related to parliamentary constituencies because of boundary differences.

[18] *E.g.*, Sir Ivor Jennings, *The Queen's Government* (Harmondsworth, 1960), pp. 60–1.

the strength of both parties is nearly equal, policies will tend to converge. In safe seats, extremist policies may be more readily found. The most important index of party strength is the margin by which a constituency is won or lost at the general election. A safe seat may conveniently be defined as one in which the winner had a majority of more than 10 per cent; a marginal seat as one in which the majority is less than that; and a hopeless seat one as in which a candidate lost by more than 10 per cent[19] Nearly 85 per cent of English seats were either safe, marginal or hopeless at both the 1955 and 1959 elections. In what follows only these three major groups are discussed, because the numbers in the others are so small as to be of negligible significance. Safe Labour seats may be assumed to be heavily working-class; safe Conservative seats are likely to be disproportionately middleclass, though manual workers may still form a numerical majority in the constituency. It is probable that these differences in turn are reflected in the composition of party activists in different areas, although there is no conclusive evidence on this point.

The analysis shows no relation between partisanship in policy outlook and safety of seat in Conservative constituencies, and only a limited relationship in the Labour Party. (Tables VIA, VIB) In both parties there is a clear but strictly limited relationship between ideological extremism and electoral support. In the Conservative Party, safe seats display on average 9.1 per cent more extremist resolutions than hopeless seats. In the Labour Party, hopeless seats adopt 9.2 per cent more extremist resolutions than safe seats. A further check was made to test this finding because of its importance. Constituency parties were divided according to degrees of partisanship and extremism, as in Tables IIIA–B, IVA–B, to see whether each group had a fair cross-section of parties with strong, medium and weak electoral support. This was the case.

TABLE VIA. PARTISANSHIP, EXTREMISM AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Category	No. of seats	Total Resolutions	% Partisan	% Extreme
Safe	213	788	48.4	29.3
Marginal	123	512	49.8	25.0
Hopeless	110	193	49.7	20.2

TABLE VIB. PARTISANSHIP, EXTREMISM AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR LABOUR CONSTITUENCY PARTIES

Category	No. of seats	Total Resolutions	% Partisan	% Extreme
Safe	110	383	50.6	28.2
Marginal	123	462	55.2	32.7
Hopeless	217	829	60.0	37.4

In both parties the variation between these two factors was of the order of one resolution in ten. But it takes a Conservative constituency party on average about 14 years to submit ten resolutions, and a Labour party about 12 years. The major conclusion must be that policy views are randomly distributed among constituency parties without regard to their electoral strength, for the statistical differences are of negligible political significance. One may note but hardly stress that parties in the most markedly middle-class areas are slightly more extremist on both sides than in working-class areas.

The author began his investigation with the hypothesis that the smaller a constituency party's membership, the higher the incidence of extremism. This was based upon the assumption that the number of extremist party supporters is very small, and that they could more easily dominate a small party. This hypothesis could only be tested for the Labour Party. There are 140 English parties which affiliate to headquarters on the minimum membership of 800; the extremism score for this group averaged 36 per cent. For the 61 parties with above average memberships ranging from 2,000 to 3,000, the extremism score averaged 34 per cent; for the 35 parties reporting membership above 3,000, the figure was 30 per cent. Similarly, parties with high extremism scores average 22 party members for every 1,000 electors, compared to a figure of 26 for those with average scores, and 25 for those with no extremist resolutions. The differences are hardly of a size to lend much support to the hypothesis.

Constituency parties may also seek to influence policy by pressing MPs or prospective candidates to act as spokesmen for the local party caucus. Candidates are selected by small groups representing less than 1 per cent of the electorate, and these nominations cannot be effectively challenged. In a normal election, nomination is tantamount to election in at least three-quarters of the constituencies; nomination is virtually tantamount to election for life in upwards of half the constituencies. Most students of British politics have commented upon the failure of constituency parties to exercise their considerable potential powers over candidates in such a way as to produce MPs with views like their own.[20] This generalization needs testing by reference to extremism scores because these writers have usually assumed that constituency selection committees are dominated by extremists. The wide range of opinion within both parliamentary parties might reflect an absence of policy concern in the selection process—or it might reflect a tendency for constituency parties to adopt candidates with views compatible with their own.

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[19] On electoral swing and margins of victory, see D. E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1955* (London, 1955), p. 202 ff; D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London, 1960), p. 236.

The emergence of unilateral nuclear disarmament as a major factional issue within the Labour Party provides one test for the coincidence between extremism in candidates and in parties. We find that there is some relationship between extremism in a constituency party and a candidate who is extreme on this issue. Parties showing high extremism constitute 18 per cent of all local parties, but 29 per cent of those nominating unilateralist candidates. Unilateralist candidates are least likely to be found where extremism is low or non-existent (Table VII). Like many statistical findings, this one is only important if it is an indication of a trend. Further checks showed no tendency for unilateralist candidates to be nominated particularly for hopeless seats, nor were they especially favoured in the adoption of new candidates. Counterbalancing this absence of association was the tendency of constituencies with trade union sponsored candidates to score below average on extremism. Of 102 constituencies categorized, only 5 per cent were extremist, and 55 per cent had submitted no extremist resolutions in the period.

A similarly meaningful issue was not available for testing Conservative MPs. A rundown of the 16 Conservative MPs who took extremist positions on the Suez affair showed that two-thirds of their constituency parties scored below average on extremism. A check was made on Conservative parties which had Privy Councillors as MPs; it was assumed that the responsibility of these MPs, and their closer identification with generally moderate government policies, would damp down party extremism. In fact, the distribution of extremism scores among the 46 parties categorized was virtually identical with the distribution for all Conservative constituency parties. The most significant relationship found had on the face of it no connection with policy. It was that safe Conservative seats choose 84 per cent of their candidates from those with expensive public school educations, and only 31 per cent of the time take men with local connections. In hopeless seats, only 44 per cent have been at public schools, and 60 per cent of candidates have local connections. Marginal seats fall between these two groups. (No such pattern exists in the Labour Party.) One might speculate that the return of members of a national social-political elite by safe constituencies tends to increase the independence of MPs from constituency parties, for such persons are more likely to be independently minded, or influenced by a national peer group, than to submit to pressure from lower status activists.

TABLE VII. EXTREMISM AND THE NOMINATION OF UNILATERALIST CANDIDATES BY CONSTITUENCY LABOUR PARTIES

Category*	No. Candidates	No. Unilateralist	Per Cent Unilateralist
No extremism	191	14	7
Low extremism	47	5	11
Average extremism	172	31	18
High extremism	87	20	23
Totals	497	70	14

* Constituency parties submitting only one resolution, and that one extremist, have not been categorized.

IV

The fundamental conclusion which arises from this study is that attitudes on questions of policy are randomly distributed among constituency parties and, it may be tentatively assumed, among party activists as well. One cause of the diversity would appear to be the plurality of motives leading individuals to become active in party politics, together with the plurality of functions which local parties may perform.[21] The following list of motives is not exhaustive, nor is any particular one meant to exclude the operation of others within the same individual.

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[20] See especially John Biffen, "The Constituency Leaders," *Crossbow*, Vol. 4, No. 13 (1960), p. 30.

[21] A. Leiserson, *op. cit.*, is notable for the allowance he makes for diversity. See also Robert E.

Motives for volunteer political work

A. Overtly political
  - —Desire to advance party program
  - —Desire to modify party program to bring it more into line with one's own ideological beliefs
  - —Desire to modify party program to bring it more into line with the program of one's interest group
  - —Local government concerns
  - —Sense of civic duty
  - —*Ex officio* involvement—*e.g.*, as trade union official.

B. Non-political
  - —Occupational careerism
  - —Status seeking
  - —Gratification of desire for power
  - —Pleasure from group activities
  - —Pleasure from a 'sporting' contest
  - —Friendship with active party workers.

The functions which constituency parties fulfill are also numerous. Some have a bearing on national party policy, but others do not:

Functions of English constituency parties

- —Propagate national party policy
- —Advise upon national party policy
- —Organize and conduct election contests
- —Nominate parliamentary candidates
- —Manage local government affairs
- —Act as pressure group for local interests
- —Provide social facilities for the community
- —Finance and maintain local party office.

An immediate consequence of this diversity is the flexibility which it gives to party leaders. At annual party conferences leaders are not faced with a mass of extreme-minded activists, demanding the adoption of socially divisive policies as the price of continuing to do menial work.[22] Opposition comes from only a fraction of the rank-and-file. Another portion is likely to support the leadership and a significant group may have no clear views, or even interest, in questions of party policy. In such circumstances support of the rank-and-file assembly may be gained simply by giving a clear policy lead. Lacking firm anchorage in an ideological position, constituency parties may be willing to trust their leaders wherever they lead. The pressure from above, the effect as it were of the gardener's lawnmower upon the grass roots activists, is considerable. The classic illustration occurred when the Conservative government was able to keep the party virtually united behind it when it unexpectedly attacked Egypt, and again when it abruptly accepted a cease-fire there in 1956. This flexibility is less in the Labour Party; a small contributing factor is the greater attachment which activists have to ideological standards.

Robert T. McKenzie has suggested that representative democracy presupposes a near identity in views between persons at different levels in parties, and half-suggested that democratic parties should have views tending towards identity.[23] Hence, his polemics against the participation of alleged extreme-minded activists in party policy-making. But on the basis of their resolutions, constituency parties do not seem to be pulling the parties apart. While recognizing the simplifications involved, one might consider party differences as being ranked on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being extreme right-wing and 100 being left-wing extremism. Simple consensus based upon an identity of views within and between parties would occur if all opinion rested at 50; more realistically, consensus would result if the center of gravity of opinion[24] within both parties was at 50. But a situation of balanced disagreement would operate if one of the parties centered at 60 and the other at 40, assuming a normal distribution frequency. An imbalance would result only if one party tended towards the center while the other balanced near an extreme. Balance, of course, is not a good in itself. Theoretically, a balance would occur if one party rested at 90 and another at 10. Furthermore, balance could produce stagnation when a radical shift in one direction was required by objective social circumstances. If we distribute

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Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, 1959), for much evidence on motives for political participation.

[22] Some British politicians still regard local party organizations with the respect they received in the days of open voting and bribery. The Nuffield studies find no evidence to support this. See most recently D. E. Butler and R. Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London, 1960), pp. 143, 232 ff.

[23] See especially "Parties, Pressure Groups and the British Political Process," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 29. No. 1 (1958), p. 12 f; and "The 'Political Activists' and Some Problems of 'Inner Party' Democracy in Britain" (mimeo, International Political Science Association, Paris, 1961), p. 5 ff.

[24] *Cf.* D. E. Butler "The Paradox of Party Difference" *American Behavioral Scientist*, IV: 3 (1960), pp. 3–5, where the concept of centers of party gravity is developed.

resolutions along such an axis, we see that much of the weight of constituency views is closer to the center than to the extremes. The leftward bias is largely the result of the greater frequency of Labour resolutions. When a correction is made for differences in expressing views as between the parties, the point of balance turns out to be three per cent to the left of center.

TABLE VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POLICY VIEWS OF ACTIVISTS*

Scale:	0 Rt. Con.	25 Partisan Con.	50 Nonpartisan	75 Partisan Lab.	100 Left Lab.
No. of resolutions	505	438	2090	672	893
Per Cent of resolutions	11	10	45	15	19

* Resolutions showing misplaced partisanship are assigned to the partisanship category for the other party.

There has been no systematic investigation of political attitudes in an effort to find out what differences, if any, exist between voters, activists, MPs, and leaders in parties. There is evidence to indicate that the spread of opinion is wide at all levels of both parties. For instance, a 1959 national survey found that 45 per cent of Conservative sympathizers accepted the *status quo* in the nationalized industries, and 40 per cent wished to denationalize one or more industries. In addition, 42 per cent of Labour sympathizers were opposed to further nationalization, whereas 36 per cent supported it.[25] In 1960, when 34 per cent of constituency party resolutions were extremist, 33 per cent of Labour MPs voted against Hugh Gaitskell in a contested election for the parliamentary party leadership. During the past decade the resignations of such leading Cabinet ministers as Aneurin Bevan, Lord Salisbury and Peter Thorneycroft have provided public evidence of the frequent suspicions of sharp divisions within a theoretically united Cabinet. Thus, it appears that the dilemma which David Butler has posed for party leaders—"their most loyal and devoted followers tend to have more extreme views than they have themselves, and to be still farther removed from the mass of those who actually provide the vote"[26]—does not really exist. Differences in policy exist within parties, and conflict is sometimes great, but this is not conflict between a monolithic bloc of activists and a monolithic leadership. Rather, it would seem that factional disputes divide parties vertically, joining some Privy Councillors, MPs, lobbyists, activists and voters into a faction which is in conflict with another which also contains members drawn from all ranks of the party.

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[25] See D. E. Butler and R. Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 244, and also p. 71. The opinion surveys regularly reported in the monthly *Gallup Political Index* (London) by the British Institute of Public Opinion, and by Mark Abrams, in M. Abrams and R. Rose, *Must Labour Lose?* (Harmondsworth, 1960) also bear out the point that party sympathizers are divided into partisans, extremists, deviants and indifferents on almost all issues. Cf. also S. E. Finer, H. Berrington and D. Bartholomew, *Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons 1955–59* (London, 1961).

[26] D. E. Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 5

THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY: A CASE STUDY IN FACTIONAL CONFLICT*

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The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) is one of the three major groupings—the Social Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists—that have cultivated the ground to the left of center (*i.e.*, to the left of the ruling Christian Democrats) in Italian politics since World War II. As recently as 1951, the PSI appeared to be inextricably linked with the Communists; but the Socialists have gradually worked themselves around to the position, early in 1962, of openly supporting a Left-Center coalition government still headed by the Christian Democrats. This drastic alteration in the Italian political spectrum has created new possibilities for Italy's political development. It has already permitted the long-awaited "opening to the Left"—as a basic alternative to governments dependent on the Center-Right—under which Italy will be ruled by a coalition of Christian Democrats, Republicans, and Social Democrats, with the PSI offering its support in Parliament in exchange for a bold program of economic planning and social reform. But some Socialists see a further possibility: the so-called "Socialist alternative." They hope for the possible development of the PSI into a second major party in a two-party system which would absorb the great bulk of the Italian electorate, with the exception of minor extremist fringes to the right and left.[1] To be sure, the success of the "opening to the Left" and the eventual emergence of a "Socialist alternative" both depend on the continued supremacy of the more progressive factions within the ranks of the Christian Democratic Party.

The decade-long process of change in the Socialist position results from influences both external and internal to the party. Such factors as Italy's close alignment with the West, and its entry into NATO and the Common Market; the rapid economic growth and relative prosperity of the country; the evident danger that Socialist intransigence might provoke the Christian Democratic Party (which lacks an absolute majority in Parliament) into forming an alliance with Rightist parties; the changes in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin; and growing disillusionment engendered among Italian Socialists by the Hungarian intervention and by the subservience of the Italian Communist Party to the dictates of its Soviet senior partner—these and other considerations have had their impact on Socialist ideology and strategy. And within the PSI, a three-way factional split has gradually developed. Pietro Nenni, leader of the PSI throughout most of the postwar period, heads the dominant faction which has steered the party's course away from the original alliance with the Communists to the current *entente* with the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. But his freedom of action has been narrowed by the persisting influence of two left-wing factions that have steadily held out for maintaining the Communist link.

The strength of these intra-party Socialist factions varies considerably in the several geographic regions of Italy and is noticeably affected by the historical traditions, demographic and economic characteristics, and political coloration of each region. The party's strategy, in consequence, reflects these variations: for instance, the Communist tie may be affirmed in some areas, rejected in others.

Since Socialist parties the world over have been undergoing an agonizing reappraisal of their beliefs and roles in the postwar scheme of things, and since American political scientists have become increasingly concerned with the dynamics of intra-party politics, more than a parochial interest attaches to a study of the intricacies of the Socialist evolution in recent Italian politics. That evolution is traced in the pages that follow. It is a case study with two major themes: the movement away from the Communist alliance and the interplay of factional conflict within the Italian Socialist Party. But we are also concerned with using our data on PSI factions as a point of departure for investigating some more general questions regarding the dynamics of intra-party factional conflict, and for formulating hypotheses which may be tested in other contexts.

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[1] For a brief discussion of the two doctrines of "opening to the Left" and "Socialist alternative," see Tristano Codignola, "Il PSI davanti al Paese," *Il Ponte*, Vol. 13 (January, 1957), p. 27; Angelo Macchi, "Il XXXIII Congresso del PSI," *Aggiornamenti Sociali*, Vol. 10 (March, 1959), pp. 162–170; and "Editoriale," *Nord e Sud*, Vol. 6 (February, 1959), pp. 3–9.

I. THE PSI ON THE ROAD TO AUTONOMY

The PSI—the larger of the two Socialist parties in Italy today—emerged from the secession of Palazzo Barberini in 1947, when Giuseppe Saragat and his Social Democratic followers deserted the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) in protest against the pro-Communist tendencies of some of its leaders and against the allegedly authoritarian methods being employed by the dominant Nenni group.[2] Saragat founded the Italian Socialist Workers' Party (PSLI), the forerunner of the present Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI). The rump of the PSIUP, remaining under the control of the Nenni leadership, adopted the briefer—and more accurate—title of Italian Socialist Party (PSI), which it retains to this day.[3]

After the Saragat secession, the PSI came under the domination of its Left-wing faction. The party secretary from 1947 to mid-1948 was Lelio Basso—a brilliant political theorist and exponent of a rather esoteric type of Marxism with Trotzkyite and Titoist overtones. In Basso's opinion, a well organized and vigorous PSI would have nothing to fear from an alliance with the Communists but would, on the contrary, be able to seize the leadership in such an alliance. He therefore continued to maintain close unity of action with the Communist Party, and created an "apparatus"—a salaried party bureaucracy—with a view to augmenting the bargaining power of the PSI in this risky partnership. Under pressure from extreme pro-Communists ("fusionists") in the PSI and under the influence of his own ideological preconceptions, Basso was induced to advocate the formation of a People's Democratic Front for the general elections of 1948. The Front was essentially an electoral bloc in which Communists, Socialists, and assorted splinter movements formed combined lists of candidates in each of Italy's 30 electoral circumscriptions. The result of this venture was catastrophic. Not only did the FDP go down to defeat in 1948, but also the hapless Socialist candidates on the FDP lists suffered especially heavy casualties as a result of the tendency of the more numerous and more disciplined Communist voters to concentrate their preference votes on a few names designated by their party leaders. Thus, the PSI, whose voters tended to scatter their preference votes among numerous candidates, failed to receive its proportionate share of FDP seats in Parliament. The FDP had, in effect, served as a device for cutting down the number of Socialist deputies within the Leftist bloc.

On the heels of the electoral defeat of 1948, it became evident that the Social Democratic secession of 1947 had by no means drawn all moderate elements out of the PSI. The failure of the People's Front policy resulted in a rank-and-file revolt against Basso's leadership. This insurrection was led by two leaders of a self-styled Centrist faction—Alberto Jacometti and Riccardo Lombardi—and by Giuseppe Romita, who headed a small group of Autonomists. Romita and his followers were interested primarily in achieving a *rapprochement* with Saragat and a reunification of the two Socialist parties, whereas the Centrists of *Riscossa Socialista* (Socialist Rally) were skeptical as to the prospects for reunification but insisted on a policy of greater autonomy for the PSI *vis-à-vis* its powerful Communist ally. These two factions, pooling their respective strength and taking advantage of grass-roots disillusionment, won control of the PSI at the Genoa Congress in June, 1948. Basso resigned as party secretary and was succeeded by Jacometti, whose faction dominated both the Party Directorate (a sort of party cabinet with from 15 to 21 members) and the larger Central Committee.

But the triumph of the moderates was short-lived. While Saragat's collaboration in a predominantly Christian Democratic Cabinet seemed to discredit the Social Democrats and to weaken the case for Socialist reunification, the impact of the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations on traditionally neutralist Socialist opinion seemed to lend an aura of justification to the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists and thus strengthened the Leftist faction in the PSI. This faction was now led by a triumvirate composed of Pietro Nenni (leader of the PSIUP from 1945 to 1947 and the idol of the Socialist masses), Lelio Basso, and Rodolfo Morandi. Morandi, an able organizer and intransigent Leftist, used the superior financial resources of the Leftist faction to obtain control of the party "apparatus," which the vacillating Centrists had failed to purge. With the aid of a network of provincial secretaries who took their orders from Morandi rather than from the Directorate, the Leftist faction won a striking victory at the Florence Congress of 1949.[4] Failure to agree on a truly autonomous policy, and fear of offending the Communists, had prevented the Centrists from offering effective resistance to the Leftist counter-attack. After the Florence Congress, Nenni was elected party secretary and a majority of seats in the Directorate and Central Committee were assigned to his faction. The Centrists bowed to the majority decision, but Romita led his group out of the PSI in a new secession.

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[2] On the Saragat secession and the internal conflicts in the PSI between 1947 and 1951, see Raphael Zariski, "Problems and Prospects of Democratic Socialism in France and Italy," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (May, 1956), pp. 256–257 and 269–270; Raphael Zariski, "Socialism in Postwar Italy," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1952; Francesco D'Arcais, "Lineamenti Storici del socialismo italiano," *Civitas*, Vol. 8 (August-September, 1957), pp. 52–104, but especially pp. 80–91; Giuseappe Pera, "L'alternativa socialista del PSI, "*Il Ponte*, Vol 9, (May, 1953), pp. 579–598; Angelo Macchi, "Il XXXIV Congresso del PSI," *Aggiornamenti Sociali*, Vol. 12 (May, 1961), pp. 295–297; Georgio Galli, *La Sinistra Italiana nel dopoguerra* (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1958), chs. 1 and 5; and Paolo Emiliani, *Dieci anni perduti* (Pisa, Nistri-Lischi, 1953).

[3] The PSI is about three times as strong as the PSDI in terms of electoral strength. In the general elections of 1958, it polled 4,206,777 votes, as against 1,345,334 received by the PSDI. Voting figures are drawn from the general elections to the Chamber of Deputies; see Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Elezione della Camera dei Deputati, 25 Maggio 1958*, Vol. 1 (Roma, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1960), pp. 50–51.

After the Leftist victory in 1949, the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists, never repudiated even by the Centrists, was stoutly reaffirmed. Morandi was now in charge of the party organization, and was regarded as second only to Nenni in the party hierarchy. In this capacity, he went so far as to declare the PSI's adherence to Leninist doctrine.[5] And in order to enforce the new Leftist line, he streamlined and expanded the "apparatus." The party machine, as we shall see, was never the all-powerful instrument that so many observers viewed with alarm in the 1950's. But it *did* enable the central party leadership to mobilize rapidly against isolated local rebellions. In a party characterized by widespread apathy among the bulk of its dues-paying members, a few hundred trained officials on regular salary could wield considerable influence.

So effective were Nenni and Morandi (Basso, for personal and doctrinal reasons, had been dropped from the Directorate and Central Committee at Morandi's behest) in suppressing autonomist tendencies that the Congress of Bologna in 1951 was marked by the absence of any organized opposition to the Leftist Directorate. The atmosphere, in fact, was one of near-unanimity. Firmly aligned with the Communist Party on both internal and foreign policy, the PSI seemed to have become little more than a Communist-front organization.

Yet the PSI has recovered from the nadir of the Bologna Congress and has moved toward ever greater autonomy since 1953. This gradual but steady progression toward the democratic camp was encouraged by several factors: the respectable showing made by the PSI in the 1953 elections; the more independent line adopted by Saragat toward the Christian Democratic regime thereafter; the easing of East-West tension after Stalin's death; and above all, the drop in Communist prestige resulting from both the exposure of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Paradoxically enough, Morandi's "apparatus" played an unwitting role: by increasing the PSI's organizational strength and efficiency, it rendered an autonomous posture toward the Communists pragmatically feasible.[6] The heavy losses of the CGIL (the Communist-dominated labor confederation, which enjoyed PSI support) in various trade-union elections, and the corresponding gains by the democratic trade unions, also played an influential part, especially after 1955.[7] Italy's remarkable economic progress and increasingly close integration into a prosperous Western European economic community was causing many Socialists to question their long-established patterns of action, and to cast about for a more imaginative set of policies, geared to the realities of the mid-50's. And finally, there was still a strong minority of autonomists in the PSI—men who had supported the ill-starred Jacometti Directorate of 1948–49. These former Centrists had accepted the unfavorable verdict of the Florence Congress of 1949 but were finding it increasingly difficult to repress their feelings of dissatisfaction with the outspokenly pro-Communist policies proclaimed by the leaders of the Leftist faction. By 1953, this autonomist minority had found an unexpected ally and leader in Pietro Nenni, who began to modify his political strategy in the direction of greater autonomy and a more democratic orientation for the PSI.

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[4] The pre-Congress campaign of 1949 is ably described by Pera, *loc. cit.*, and by Emiliani, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–123.

[5] See Pera, *ibid.*, p. 590.

[6] For comments on the role of the "apparatus" in strengthening the PSI, see Pera, *ibid.*, p. 591, and Umberto Segre, "La stagione dei congressi," *Il Ponte*, Vol. 14 (November, 1958), pp. 1373–1374.

[7] On losses by the CGIL in various grievance committee elections, see Murray Edelman, "Causes of Fluctuations in Popular Support for the Italian Communist Party since 1946," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 20 (August, 1958), pp. 542–544; Antonio Toldo, "Situazione Sindacale Italiana," *Aggiornamenti Sociali*, Vol. 8 (February, 1957), pp. 113–122; Maurice F. Neufeld, "Appunti sul funzionamento delle commissioni interne," *Il Diritto del Lavoro* (Roma, Edizioni del Diritto del Lavoro, 1956), no. 6, pp. 1–8; and Joseph LaPalombara, *The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects* (Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 110–118.

At the pre-election Socialist Congress of Milan in January, 1953, Nenni launched the slogan of "a Socialist alternative."[8] This minor ideological shift—at the time it seemed to be little more than a temporary electoral expedient—was accompanied by the PSI's presentation of separate slates of candidates in the general elections of 1953 and marked the first stage in Nenni's cautious campaign for a reappraisal of the PSI's objectives, methods, and alliances.

After the 1953 elections, Nenni began to take further steps along an autonomist course.[9] At the PSI Congress of Turin in April, 1955, he demanded—even while reconfirming the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists—a "dialogue" with the Christian Democratic Left with a view to forming an alliance between the Socialist and Catholic masses. This thesis encountered a cool reception from the delegates; and consequently Nenni did not press for a vote on his new doctrine but consented to the usual unanimous resolution acceptable to the Leftist faction. It is significant to note, however, that Nenni's prestige as party leader, and his popularity with both the rank-and-file members and the Socialist electorate, protected him from any open repudiation of his leadership by the Congress.

After the shattering revelations which leaked out of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February, 1956, the sequence of events began to accelerate.[10] Nenni reacted to the destruction of the Stalin myth by rejecting the Stalinist concepts of the vanguard party (the CPSU) and the vanguard nation (the Soviet Union), and by insisting on the "democratic road" to Socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat, he asserted, was not a suitable concept for a Western European context, and the democratic way of life had to be regarded as an irreplaceable fundamental value, not a mere way-station on the road to Socialism. In a similarly heretical vein, the PSI daily *Avanti!* urged Communist defectors to join the PSI. After the municipal and provincial elections of 1956, which resulted in noticeable Socialist gains at the expense of the Communists, there were increasingly frequent references, by Nenni and others, to the possibility of a *rapprochement* and possible reunification with the Social Democrats. Contacts between these two parties at the local level began to develop and multiply. And finally, in a dramatic and seemingly portentous breakthrough, Nenni and Saragat held their famous summit meeting in August, 1956, at Pralognan in the French Alps. During this conference the two leaders agreed to press for the reunification of their two parties on a platform of democratic Socialism.

Pralognan was regarded by most observers as constituting a turning point in the troubled history of postwar Italian Socialism, and as paving the way for that "great, united, democratic Socialist movement" which has a virtually chiliastic appeal for Italian progressives. But the obstacles to PSI autonomy and Socialist reunification soon became manifest. Togliatti, the Communist leader, issued sharp warnings against undermining working-class unity, and actually threatened to provoke a split in the PSI if Nenni should prove too willing to capitulate to Social Democratic demands.[11] The PSI rank-and-file had been insufficiently prepared for the new approach Nenni was initiating. And the Social Democrats were demanding a complete break between the PSI and the Communist Party, and acceptance by the PSI of the North Atlantic Treaty, as prerequisites to Socialist reunification. Nenni, for his part, was willing to jettison the Unity of Action Pact with the Communists and to accept the North Atlantic Treaty in a strictly defensive sense. But he was still deeply influenced by traditional Socialist values of pacifism and working-class unity, and was also acutely aware of the dangers of a party split which might be precipitated by excessive concessions to the Social Democrats. Therefore, he advocated that Italy play a mediating role between East and West, suggested that close contacts be established with the uncommitted countries, and insisted that collaboration with the Communists in the CGIL and in hundreds of local governments could not be abandoned too precipitously.

In view of the traditional attitudes of many

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[8] On the Milan Congress, see D'Arcais, *loc. cit.*, pp. 91–92.

[9] On the movement of the PSI in an autonomist direction from 1953 to 1956, see D'Arcais, *ibid.*, pp. 91–103, and U. Alfassio Grimaldi, "Nuovo capitolo," *Il Mondo*, February 12, 1957, pp. 1–2.

[10] On developments between the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the PSI Venice Congress, see D'Arcais, *ibid.*, pp. 95–103, and Grimaldi, *ibid.*, pp. 1–2.

[11] *La Nuova Stampa*, January 22, 1957.

PSI members—attitudes shaped by the Maximalist tradition of the early 20th Century, with its largely verbal revolutionary fervor, its intransigence toward bourgeois parties, its intense pacifism, its proletarian bias, and its rejection of gradualism[12]—Nenni's negotiations with Saragat and his increasing coolness toward the Communists were bound to provoke rebellion. Several opposition groups began to form behind the illusory façade of party unity which had been maintained with considerable success since 1951.[13] One faction was led by Lelio Basso, who had returned to a position of prominence after the death of his rival Morandi, and who hoped to replace Nenni as party secretary. Another group was made up of avowed pro-Communists who went so far as to defend the Soviet intervention in Hungary: these were the so-called *carristi* or "armored troops." In a curious juxtaposition, this faction included not only orthodox Stalinists but also some former autonomists and Resistance heroes—notably Sandro Pertini and Emilio Lussu—men who, for sentimental reasons, could not bear the thought of ending the longstanding friendship with the Communist Party. And finally, there was the party bureaucracy, the Morandian "apparatus," led by such young disciples of the late Rodolfo Morandi as Dario Valori and Vincenzo Gatto.

By combining their efforts, these three factions, which controlled a majority of the seats on the Directorate and the Central Committee, were able to place effective checks on Nenni's power to implement the policy goals he had formulated. And at the Venice Congress in February, 1957, Nenni's efforts to reverse this situation proved to be unavailing. To be sure, the Secretary's report was accepted unanimously and all but the *carristi* joined in criticizing the earlier policy of close cooperation with the Communists. Totalitarian methods were denounced by virtually all speakers. But in the secret balloting for the 81-member Central Committee, Nenni and his Autonomists obtained only 27 seats, while 10 seats went to the *carristi*, 14 to Basso, and 30 to the Morandian bureaucrats. The Central Committee in turn elected a 21-member Directorate, composed of 10 Nenni supporters and 11 members of the three Leftist factions, and a 5-member Secretariat in which Nenni had a 3–2 majority. Thus, Nenni (who was reconfirmed as party secretary) retained control over day-to-day policy-making in the Secretariat, but could be curbed on broader policy questions by Leftist majorities in the Directorate and the Central Committee.[14]

Nenni's defeat was unexpected but probably inevitable in view of the tactics he had employed. He had been so uncertain regarding his actual strength within the party that he had not dared to force a showdown at the provincial congresses where delegates to the Venice Congress were chosen.[15] In order to secure as high a degree of party harmony as possible, Nenni's supporters at many of these Congresses agreed to the passage of ambiguously worded, strongly qualified resolutions in favor of Socialist reunification—resolutions to which the Basso faction and the Morandians were willing to subscribe. At many provincial congresses, there were two competing slates of delegates to be voted on: one presented by a makeshift Nenni-Basso-Morandian coalition and the other by the outnumbered and isolated *carristi*. In exchange for their willingness to refrain from open opposition, the Basso and Morandian factions were rewarded with a quota of delegates on the winning slate. Thus, many a provincial federation whose membership was mostly of moderate sympathies found itself sending Leftist delegates to the National Congress. Fear of a clamorous defeat, or of a bruising and highly publicized intra-party conflict, prevented Nenni from conducting an all-out offensive against the opposition and helped bring about a serious setback for the cause of democratic Socialism. Socialist reunification was postponed indefinitely.

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[12] On the attitude of the revolutionaries (later known as Maximalists) in the PSI in the early 20th Century see Roberto Michels, *Storia critica del movimento socialista italiano* (Firenze, La Voce, 1926), Part V, ch. 2, and Wayland Hilton-Young, *The Italian Left* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1949), *passim*. For accounts of factional struggle at pre-1922 Socialist congresses, see Franco Pedone, *Partito Socialista Italiano nei suoi Congressi*, Vol. II (Milano, Edizioni Avanti, 1961); and Spartaco Cannarsa, *Il Socialismo e i XXVIII Congressi del Partito Socialista Italiano* (Milano, Edizioni Avanti, 1950), pp. 104–244.

[13] On the various contending factions in the PSI at the Venice Congress, see *Corriere d'Informazione*, February 5–6, 1957.

[14] On the Venice Congress and its outcome, see Umberto Segre, "Luci e ombre di un Congresso," *Il Ponte*, Vol. 13 (February 1957), pp. 185–192. See also *La Nuova Stampa*, February 7–10, 12 and 13, 1957, and *La Giustizia*, February 12, 13, 1957.

[15] On the intra-party contest at the provincial level just prior to the Venice Congress, see *La Nuova Stampa*, January 29, 1957, and F. Paolo Glorioso, "Nenni 60%," *L'Espresso*, January 11, 1959, p. 8.

After the Venice Congress, the most effective remaining weapon at Nenni's command was his immense popularity with the ordinary members and voters of the PSI. By threatening to resign as party secretary, Nenni was able to obtain some significant concessions—a majority on the Secretariat, appointment of a Nenni supporter to supervise the party organization—and to achieve a delicately balanced stalemate in place of the unconditional surrender the balloting at Venice had seemed to foreshadow.[16]

Thanks to his prestige as party leader, Nenni was able to press for more PSI autonomy even after the Venice debacle. The three Leftist factions failed to coordinate their efforts adequately, and in fact Basso sometimes threw his support to Nenni on certain policy issues.[17] Consequently, the PSI was able to abrogate the Unity of Action Pact and withdraw from several Communist-led mass organizations.[18] Only in the CGIL and in local government did cooperation with the Communists continue: Nenni himself opposed any basic departures from earlier commitments in these two sectors.

Another token of autonomy was the PSI's decision to welcome secessionists from the Communist Party into its ranks. This policy came up for a vote in the PSI Parliamentary Group in 1957 when Antonio Giolitti, an ex-Communist Deputy from Cuneo, applied for admission. On this matter, Nenni obtained the support of Basso and the Morandians, with only the *carristi* remaining in opposition.[19] The admission of the popular Deputy from Cuneo was followed by the entry of other ex-Communists into the PSI, where they usually joined the ranks of Nenni's Autonomists.

Moreover, Nenni also used the threat of resignation to induce his party to vote in favor of the European Atomic Agreements and to abstain from voting on the European Common Market when these two issues arose in Parliament.[20] On these two points, the intransigent *carristi* stood alone in defying Nenni. And, it should be added, on both these issues the Communists voted nay. The PSI, then, was diverging abruptly from the Communist line. The prospect of finding broader European outlets for Italian products and surplus manpower was far too tempting to be ignored for the sake of timeworn Maximalist shibboleths.

Shortly before the 1958 elections, the Popular Unity Party, a splinter group led by Florentine and Milanese intellectuals, merged with the PSI. These new recruits were mostly former members of the defunct Action Party, favored a synthesis of liberalism and socialism, and tended to support the Autonomist faction in the PSI.[21]

In the 1958 elections, the PSI temporarily submerged its internal differences and presented a reasonably united front to the electorate. In a few electoral circumscriptions, to be sure, provincial party federations removed the names of some prominent members of minority factions from the lists of candidates. A handful of incumbent Deputies—both Autonomists and members of the Left faction—were denied renomination by their provincial organizations.[22] But in most instances, the PSI lists included the names of both Leftists and Autonomists. One case in point was the Autonomist stronghold of Milan-Pavia where several incumbents hostile to Nenni's policies were renominated, and two (Basso and Malagugini) were re-elected.[23]

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[16] See *La Nuova Stampa*, February 13–15, 1957.

[17] For example, Basso supported Nenni in his refusal to admit the two leaders of the *carristi*, Lussu and Pertini, to the Directorate. *La Nuova Stampa*, November 12, 1957.

[18] For example, the PSI withdrew from the organization of Peace Partisans. See *La Nuova Stampa*, May 24, 1957. And a prominent Nenni lieutenant, Francesco De Martino, withdrew from his hitherto active role in the Communist-sponsored Movement for the Rebirth of the South. See Giovanni Cervigni e Giuseppe Galasso, "Il Mezzogiorno e il Partito Socialista," *Nord e Sud*, Vol. 4 (May, 1957), pp. 24–25, 37–38.

[19] *La Nuova Stampa*, October 4, 1957.

[20] *Stampa-Serà*, July 20–21, 1957.

[21] Two of the former top leaders of the Popular Unity Party, Codignola and Vittorelli, were among the members of the Nenni faction elected to the Central Committee at the Naples Congress of January, 1959. See *Corriere d'Informazione*, January 20, 1959.

[22] This was the case with the Autonomist Deputies Sampietro of Vercelli and Lopardi of L'Aquila, dropped from the PSI slates in Torino-Novara-Vercelli and L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo respectively. Similarly, the Forlì Federation refused to approve the renomination of a prominent Leftist Deputy (Lami) in Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forlì, and the Venice Federation attempted unsuccessfully to remove the name of Tonetti (another Leftist) from the PSI list in Venice-Treviso. See *La Nuova Stampa*, March 27, April 3, May 18, 1958; *Il Messaggero*, May 10, 1958; *Il Corriere della Sera*, May 16, 1958; and *Il Resto del Carlino*, May 10, 13, 1958.

[23] Albizzati and Malagugini are identified as Leftists by Roberto Serpieri, "Nella misura in cui. . . " , *Critica Sociale*, Vol. 50 (October 5, 1958),

The PSI emerged from the 1958 elections in a considerably strengthened posture. It had gained some 750,000 votes since 1953 and risen from 12.7 per cent to 14.2 per cent of the total vote. When all the returns were in, the PSI had increased its number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 75 to 84, as compared to a loss of 3 seats for the Communist Party.[24]

In the struggle for preference votes among the various factions, Nenni and his Autonomists had fared quite well. According to one observer—and later evidence tended to confirm this estimate—slightly more than half of the 84 Deputies were Autonomists.[25] While this outcome could hardly be described as a conclusive mandate for Nenni's policies, it represented a moral victory for a leader who had so little control over his own party machinery.

With the elections safely concluded, Nenni opened a major offensive against his opponents in the PSI. This time, the errors committed before the Venice Congress were avoided.[26] At every provincial congress, Nenni's followers presented an unequivocally Autonomist motion, which the Leftist factions could not underwrite without betraying their avowed principles. Consequently, an open pre-congress campaign ensued between three major factions: Nenni and his Autonomists, Basso and his followers, and the Left faction, formed as the result of a merger between *carristi* and Morandians, and led by Tullio Vecchietti. For the first time since 1949, the rank and file was presented with clear alternatives embodied in three separate motions and three distinct slates of delegates.

Efforts by the Left and Basso to discredit Nenni by accusing him of opportunism only served to advance the Autonomist cause. In fact, some provincial congresses were aroused against the Left by such personal slurs, for Nenni had been leader of the PSI almost uninterruptedly since the Liberation and to attack him was to attack the party. Seizing the advantage presented him by his opponents, Nenni made his own leadership the central issue. After a contest marked by regrettable but apparently customary non-participation by a majority of dues-paying members,[27] Nenni prevailed at the Congress of Naples in January, 1959. The Autonomist motion received 58.3 per cent of the votes, with 32.6 per cent going to the Left motion, and a mere 8.7 per cent to the Basso motion. The Autonomists won an absolute majority on the Central Committee, and an all-Autonomist Directorate was chosen.[28]

But the Autonomist victory had been slightly diluted in the course of the Naples Congress. In his speech to the delegates, Nenni had ruled out PSI support for a Christian Democratic Cabinet or a Left-Center coalition Cabinet ("the opening to the Left") and had declared that Socialist reunification could only be achieved within the PSI. He had then proceeded to base his autonomist line on "the Socialist alternative": the hope of building a Socialist Party strong enough to take full responsibility for governing Italy, or at any rate strong enough to precipitate a crisis in the ranks of Christian Democracy.[29] By taking this tack, Nenni effectively defended himself against the Leftist charge of opportunism and stole the issues his opponents had raised. The Congress, then, had certain face-saving features for the minority factions, and Nenni's astute tactics may well have prevented a party split.

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p. 456. Both were renominated and Malagugini was re-elected. For the election results in Milan-Pavia, and the preference votes pooled by the various candidates, see *I Deputati e Senatori del Terzo Parlamento Repubblicano* (Roma, La Navicella, 1960), pp. 629–634.

[24] Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51. See also *I Deputati e Senatori del Terzo Parlamento Repubblicano*, *op. cit.*, p. XL for number of seats captured by PSI in 1958, and p. LXVII for comparison with 1953. The PSI Group in the Chamber was, soon after the elections, reinforced by 4 secessionist Deputies from the PSDI and totalled 88 members by 1959.

[25] See Paolo Pavolini, "I sette socialismi," *Il Mondo* (August 26, 1958), p. 3.

[26] On the pre-Congress campaign of 1958–59, see Glorioso, *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

[27] At the Naples Congress of 1959, Basso charged that there had been widespread absenteeism at pre-Congress sectional assemblies. See Alessandro Pizzorno, "The Italian Socialist Party and Political Participation," *Prod*, Vol. 3 (December, 1959), pp. 25–31. Pizzorno confirms the validity of this charge as applied to Milan, and ventures the assumption that Basso was substantially correct with regard to other parts of Italy as well. Babbini estimates that attendance at sectional assemblies averaged 30–35 per cent of total membership. See Paolo Babbini, "Anatomia del PSI," *Il Mulino*, Vol. 10 (March, 1961), p. 128.

[28] For the final results of the Naples Congress, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *33° Congresso Nazionale* (Milano-Roma, Edizioni Avanti, 1959), pp. 422–428.

[29] For Nenni's speeches at the Naples Congress, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *ibid.*, pp. 10–41, and 395–403. His opening speech is commented on in *La Stampa*, January 16, 1959.

Since the Naples Congress, Nenni has moved more boldly along the road to collaboration with other democratic forces, thus revealing the purely tactical nature of his isolationist stand at Naples: By September, 1959, he had modified his "Socialist alternative" doctrine and had indicated his willingness to support a Left-Center Cabinet on an *ad hoc* basis (*i.e.*, support for those government measures which would promote social and technical progress and aid the development of a democratic life for the masses).[30] At a Central Committee meeting in May, 1960, he went so far as to declare that the Soviet Union shared the responsibility for the failure of the Summit Conference. More significantly, he announced that the PSI, no longer content with mere autonomy, was about to enter a new phase of open competition with the Communists.[31] Another sharp break with precedent came in August, 1960 on the vote of confidence for the Fanfani Cabinet: the PSI abstained from voting and thus in effect helped Fanfani win his required majority of those voting on the issue of confidence.[32] And finally, in the Spring of 1961, the PSI agreed to participate in Left-Center juntas (composed of Christian Democrats, Republicans, Social Democrats, and Socialists) in numerous communal and provincial governments—Milan, Florence, and Genoa were among the Italian cities which witnessed this re-entry of the PSI into the democratic camp locally.[33] In many other communal and provincial governments, to be sure, the PSI continued to participate in Communist-led juntas.

The PSI had come a long way from the days of the People's Democratic Front, but the internal struggle was by no means over. Defeated at Naples, the PSI Left and the Basso faction still posed an active threat to the aspirations of the PSI's present leaders. Open manifestations of rebellion have not been lacking. After the Central Committee meeting of May, 1960, for instance, 28 PSI Deputies and 16 PSI Senators belonging to the Left faction signed an open letter, printed in the official Communist daily *Unità*, protesting against the attitude of Nenni and his Directorate in regard to the failure of the Summit Conference.[34] Fifteen Basso Senators and Deputies were reported as sympathizing with the 44 signatories. The second gesture of rebellion took place when the PSI abstained on the vote of confidence in Fanfani. This decision, taken by the PSI Directorate, was so bitterly criticized by so many members of the PSI Parliamentary Group that Nenni refused to call for a vote by the Group on the issue, but simply insisted that the Group must conform to the decisions of the party executive organ.[35] In protest against this decision, which entailed indirect PSI collaboration with the Center parties, 41 PSI Deputies belonging to both the Basso and Left factions signed an open letter to the official party daily *Avanti!*, indicating their dissent and asserting that they were submitting to the authority of the Directorate only out of regard for party discipline.[36] It was evident, at this time, that Nenni's control over his own Parliamentary Group verged on the precarious.

The clearest and most disturbing evidence of the continued strength of the opposition factions was furnished by the Milan Congress of March, 1961.[37] Despite the fact that Nenni had enjoyed full control of the central party organs since 1959, the followers of Vecchietti and Basso were able to hold their ground, and even gain slightly, at the provincial level. At the Milan Congress, the Autonomists received 55.1 per cent of the total votes (a drop of 3.2 percentage points since 1959), while Basso obtained 6.9 per cent (a drop of 1.8 points), and the Left showed some improvement with 35.1 per cent (a rise of 2.5 points). A minor Leftist motion sponsored by Sandro Pertini received about 1.1 per cent of the votes. Disillusionment over the results of the local and provincial elections of November, 1960, resentment against a

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[30] *La Stampa*, September 8, 1959.

[31] *La Stampa*, May 31, 1960.

[32] *Il Corriere della Sera*, August 4, 6, 1960. The Communists had voted against Fanfani on this occasion. For the first time in over a decade, the PSI was abandoning its policy of all-out opposition.

[33] The PSI entered Left-Center municipal juntas in the following provincial capitals: Milan, Genoa, Florence, Piacenza, Pavia, La Spezia, Forlì, Rieti. Similar Left-Center experiments were initiated in 25 other communes and in four provinces: Pavia, La Spezia, Avellino, Rieti. See Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale* (Milano, Edizioni Avanti, 1961), p. 34 (Nenni's report). More recently, the PSI has entered the Sicilian regional government in collaboration with the Christian Democrats, and has agreed to support a Left-Center cabinet in the national government.

[34] *Unità*, May 31, 1960.

[35] *Il Corriere della Sera*, August 3, 1960.

[36] *Ibid.*, August 7, 1960. Their names appear in *Avanti!*, August 6, 1960.

[37] See Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.* Results of the Congress are summarized on pp. 264–270. See also *La Nazione*, March 21, 1961.

Christian Democratic Party which seemed to be unable to come to a firm decision regarding a future alliance with the PSI, and a deterioration of the international climate since the failure of the Summit Conference—these factors tended to bolster the opposition. The unity of the Autonomists was somewhat weakened (though the unity of the party may have been furthered) by the crystallization of an Autonomist sub-faction headed by Riccardo Lombardi.[38] Lombardi seemed to take a milder, more conciliatory approach to the Leftist opposition and insisted on representation of the minority factions in the Directorate. In the Directorate which emerged from the Milan Congress, all factions were represented. The Autonomists had a majority, but many conservative reporters held that Lombardi's sub-faction (whose objectives and consistency are not quite clear at this point) could, at any time, combine with the Left and Basso to deprive Nenni of his majority.[39] The outcome of the intra-party power struggle in the PSI still remained a bit uncertain.

Finally, it should be observed that the PSI is still associated with the Communist Party in the trade-union movement and in many local and provincial governments. Partly because of the need to prevent a party split, partly because Socialist withdrawal from the CGIL and from Communist-led local juntas would cost the PSI many thousands of jobs and some lucrative sources of financial support, partly because he does not want coalitions with Centrist parties in areas where the Left is traditionally dominant, Nenni has thus far been reluctant to take the final decisive steps toward repudiating all ties with the Communists.

Thus, as we have seen, the march toward autonomy has been a long and difficult one, and has entailed the resurgence of intense factional conflict. The factions which have emerged from this period of strife are organized almost like miniature parties. Each has its own periodical (*Mondo Operaio* for the Autonomist Directorate, *Problemi del Socialismo* for the Basso group, and *Mondo Nuovo* for the Left), and the Left faction has its own press agency in Rome. Whenever a faction does not control the official party organization in a given province, it will often create its own machine, paralleling and—to some degree—competing with the provincial party organs. Also, some provincial federations openly flout national directives; and factions, on their own authority and with the use of their own funds, will sometimes transfer party bureaucrats from one province to another in an effort to promote factional interest.[40] Finally, we should take note of the high degree of cohesion and continuity displayed within PSI factions: in the period from 1959 to 1961, although the Autonomist faction monopolized the national executive organs of the party, the control of only 10 out of 102 federations changed hands.[41]

The preceding account of the PSI's arduous return to an autonomous status reveals the importance of a great national leader, who can personify the movement and appear indispensable to the great mass of party members. Most party members are apathetic, immune to ideological appeals, unable to understand the subtle dialectics of the party congresses. For many of these soldiers in the ranks, the party is little more than a symbol, a traditional object of loyalty. A national party leader who can obtain the affection and reverence of the masses, and who can become, in the public mind, the living embodiment of the party, has an enormous advantage over his less prominent associates, no matter how deeply entrenched the latter may be in the various executive and administrative organs of the party.[42] The threat to resign, mentioned by Michels,[43] is an especially potent weapon when wielded by a venerated leader like Nenni—though it might prove quite inadequate in the hands of his successor, who would not personify the heroic period of the anti-Fascist struggle as Nenni does. Possessing an influence which borders on the charismatic, a revered party leader can prevail over a hostile party "apparatus," especially when the "apparatus" cannot remain united. In fact, one might go so far as to suggest that, in a democratic mass party, a party bureaucracy, united only by common function, can never successfully resist the mystical appeal of the recognized party leader who has either founded the party or has led it during one of the crucial periods of its history. As we shall see, a party bureaucracy, under such circumstances, is unlikely to maintain its cohesion.

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[38] Many commentators, of diverse political shadings, speculated about the Lombardi subgroup. See *La Nazione* (an independent conservative paper), March 21, 31, 1961; *Il Corriere della Sera* (independent conservative), March 19, 1961; *Il Paese* (independent pro-Communist), March 31, 1961; and Antonio Gambino, "Hanno ricominciato a discutere tra loro," *L'Espresso* (independent Radical and anti-clerical), March 26, 1961, p. 3.

[39] The Autonomists had 14 seats on the Directorate, while 6 were allotted to the Left and 1 to Basso. But according to *La Nazione*, March 31, 1961, 6 of the 14 Autonomists are supporters of Lombardi.

[40] See article by Giacomo Mancini in *Avanti!*, February 12, 1961. See also Babbini, *loc. cit.*, pp. 12–13. These generalizations apply primarily to the two largest factions.

[41] See Partito Socialista Italiano, *33° Congresso Nationale*, *op. cit.*, pp. 542–545, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, pp. 443–448, for provincial breakdowns of factional strength.

[42] For an account of the influence of the Nenni myth on local discussion and decisions, see the article by Cesare Bassi in *Avanti!*, January 10, 1959.

[43] See Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York, Dover Publications, 1959), pp. 45–48.

II. FACTIONS IN THE PSI—SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS

Closer investigation of the three major PSI factions permits us to formulate certain general statements which may be tested for their relevance in other political environments. We may begin by noting the astounding fluidity of intra-party politics even in a branch-type party like the PSI, where factions possess a relatively high degree of cohesion and continuity and have their own highly articulated organizational structures. For each faction is merely a temporary coalition among various more or less cohesive sub-groups. The Left faction, for instance, included the *carristi*, open supporters of a permanent alliance with the Communist Party; veteran Maximalists of pre-Fascist vintage, who were animated primarily by the traditional Maximalist fear of the contaminating effects of collaboration with bourgeois parties; the young intellectuals of *Mondo Operaio*, who professed Leninist ideals but insisted on a thoroughgoing revision of Stalinist doctrines and methods; and the Morandians—young party bureaucrats who had risen to power in the party "apparatus" during the period of close collaboration with the Communist Party and who were seeking to protect their acquired positions in the PSI bureaucracy and their habitual routines of close partnership with their Communist allies. The Autonomist faction presented an even more heterogeneous appearance: former members of the Action Party, including the aforementioned Riccardo Lombardi; ex-Communists, who had seceded from the Communist Party after the Hungarian Revolution; an assortment of young intellectuals of miscellaneous origins, including contributors to *Il Ponte* and *Critica Sociale;* a large nucleus of party bureaucrats and former followers of Morandi—men similar in background and function to the Morandians who backed the Left; and a motley collection of local "clientele" leaders (especially numerous in Central and Southern Italy), whose standing in the PSI depended on their vote-getting talents.[44]

Given the heterogeneity of each of the major intra-party factions, victory on the part of a single faction only opens a new phase of the intra-party process—for the component sub-groups are promptly subjected to a powerful centrifugal force: the divisions which decision-making responsibility must inevitably entail. And this same centrifugal force, offset somewhat by the common goal of overthrowing the faction in power, affects the minority factions as well.

Illustrations of this centrifugal tendency come readily to mind. If we go back to the early 20th Century, we may observe how the Reformist faction, victorious in the 1910 Congress by a wide margin, split in 1911 over the issue of the Libyan War, and lost control of the PSI in 1912.[45] And in 1961, the sudden and perhaps short-lived emergence of a new Lombardian sub-group within the Autonomist faction—a sub-group whose goals appeared to be the maintenance of party unity, the conciliation of the Left faction, and the adoption of preventive measures against a possible opportunistic degeneration of the autonomist policy—constituted another example.[46] Behind the relative stability of inter-party power relations in a multi-party system, there exists a more volatile situation of intra-party struggle, in which sub-groups are continuously clustering around parent factions and breaking off to form new factions or to join a new parent body.

We may also observe the limited utility of certain traditional categories in analyzing intra-party factional conflict. The party bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, the trade-union officials, the old guard, the new generation of leaders, are all examples of the type of functional or occupational explanation which can prove particularly beguiling for an observer who is attempting to interpret factional conflicts. Michels' discussion of intra-party politics is a case in point.[47] But if we descend from the lofty vantage point of the national stage and begin to investigate and compare regional and local situations, and to subject our factions to closer scrutiny, we find that it is not quite so easy to force our data into these convenient pigeon-holes. There were, for instance, sizeable nuclei of young intellectuals in each of the three major PSI factions in 1961.[48] And a recent study of Parliamentary personnel reveals that Autonomist PSI Deputies and Left PSI Deputies yielded approximately similar percentages of university graduates. Nor did the two groups of Deputies differ to any very significant degree in the percentage of career party officials they contained: 25.9 per cent of the Left Deputies were classed as political activists as against 19.6 per cent of the Autonomists.[49] Morandian *apparatchiks* like Dario Valori and Vincenzo Gatto supported the Left faction, but other Morandians like Venerio Cattani and Luciano Paolicchi backed Nenni's Autonomists.[50] Even the party bureaucracy, then, with its alleged *esprit de corps*, fails us.

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[44] On the sub-groups in the PSI, see Pavolini *loc. cit.*, pp. 3–4; Umberto Segre, "Un partito moderno?", *Comunità*, Vol. 13 (February, 1959), pp. 3–7; and Gambino, *loc. cit.*, p. 3. A forthcoming article by Antonio Landolfi, to be published soon in *Tempi Moderni*, should provide us with a more extensive treatment of this subject. It should be noted in passing that, since *Mondo Operaio* is presently controlled by the Autonomist faction, its former collaborators now contribute articles to the Left organ, *Mondo Nuovo*.

[45] See Pedone, *op. cit.*, pp. 123–214.

[46] On Lombardi and his views, see Segre, "Un partito moderno?", *loc. cit.*, p. 6; Gambino, *loc. cit.;* and Lombardi's speech at the Milan Congress, Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161–168.

It would be interesting to determine what factors were responsible for the varying choices made by provincial party bureaucrats who—in a party characterized by a large measure of provincial autonomy—did not usually need to fear retaliation on the part of the central party leadership. Studies of the attitudes and behavior of local political elites would seem to promise richer harvests than the more familiar voting behavior studies; in this connection, the work of Cervigni and Galasso on the PSI in Southern Italy represents an invaluable pioneering venture which has dispelled many illusions regarding the alleged character of the PSI as a "party of the masses."[51] Unfortunately, their investigation was completed in 1956, when factional conflict in the PSI was just beginning to come into the open.

An investigation of the *raison d'être* of the three major factions in the PSI reveals a multiplicity of overlapping motivations which serve to promote the division of a national party into warring factions. Shared values (the issue of individual liberty, the old Maximalist-Reformist schism) played a role. And yet, by 1961, there were very few avowed anti-libertarians in the Leftist group. Moreover, all factions appeared to attract men of widely diverse ideological pedigrees, as well as many Southern "clientele" leaders who seemed to be primarily concerned with winning elections.

Strategic considerations also served to differentiate the major factions. Such questions as the alliance with the Communists, the possibility of reunification with the Social Democrats, and the desirability of early collaboration with the Christian Democrats all served to differentiate Nenni on the one hand from Basso and the Left on the other. Basso, who shared the Left's distrust of the Center parties and its nostalgia for the old Communist alliance, seemed to be trying to achieve a synthesis between the two largest contending factions, avoiding the excesses of each (Social Democratic opportunism or slavish pro-Communism), and thus safeguard party unity and mitigate factional strife.[52]

The factor of affinity based on common interests, origins, or functions appears to be rather difficult to isolate. As we have already observed, the "apparatus" did not maintain a united front. Experience in the Resistance was a dominant motif for some sentimental pro-Communist *carristi*, but many other ex-members of the anti-Fascist underground did not allow sentiment and ancient memories to affect their vision of the political situation. Former members of the Action Party (which had itself been a rather motley organization with a plethora of internal currents) were active in roughly equal proportions in all factions. But we *do* note that, among Autonomist Deputies, there was a much higher percentage of former members of other parties (47.8 per cent) than was the case with the Left (32.2 per cent).[53]

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[47] See Michels, *Political Parties*, *op. cit.*, especially Part Two, ch. 6, and Part Four, chs. 2–6. Michels was, however, aware of the possibility that conflicts may arise for ideological or personal reasons. See *ibid.*, pp. 167–168.

[48] See Pavolini, *loc. cit.*

[49] Giovanni Sartori has completed an exhaustive and penetrating comparative survey of Italian Deputies and their educational, social, and professional backgrounds. This analysis has been published in the Winter, 1961, issue of the *International Social Science Journal.* My computations are based on the raw data which Professor Sartori was kind enough to let me consult.

[50] See Pavolini, *loc. cit.* On Cattani, see Umberto Segre, "Il duello dei prossimi due anni," *L'Illustrazione Italiana*, Vol. 86 (February, 1959), p. 19.

[51] See Giovanni Cervigni and Giuseppe Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *Nord e Sud*, Vol. 3 (March, 1956); the entire issue is devoted to a study of the PSI.

[52] On positions taken by the various PSI factions, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, *passim*, but especially pp. 32–44, 64–66, 69–73, 107–109, 116–122, 220–221, 244–245. Basso's statement of his purposes is best summarized on pp. 220–221.

Intimate ties with the Communists in Communist-dominated agricultural cooperatives have occasionally been pointed out as constituting a possible explanation for the Leftist tendencies of the PSI in the Emilian provinces of Reggio Emilia and Ravenna.[54] But this hypothesis appears less plausible when we observe the strongly autonomist character of the PSI in the Emilian provinces of Bologna and Ferrara, where Communist-led cooperatives were also numerous and economically potent.[55] Nor did the CGIL as an interest group present a façade of factional unity. Many of its leaders backed Basso in 1957, but some of these (Santi and Brodolini) defected to Nenni at the Naples Congress of 1959, while others (Foà) joined the Left, and still others (Avolio) remained faithful to their leader.[56] It would appear, then, that affinity based on common interests, origins, or functions played a relatively secondary role in determining factional alignments in the PSI; or, in any event, while material and functional motivations undoubtedly existed, they did not crystallize into readily indentifiable patterns.

The survival of local cliques in a branch-type party like the PSI was especially marked in the agricultural areas of Central and Southern Italy. The leaders of many of these clienteles backed Nenni because his faction seemed likely to prevail and because he enjoyed the support of the party electorate. Such Deputies as Andò, Mayor of Giarrè (Catania Province), seemed to be primarily concerned with retaining the support of the town, province, or interest group to whose preference votes they owed their election.[57] And yet some clientele leaders did not run true to form: Deputy Paolucci of Chieti—described by Cervigni and Galasso as being a clientele leader with autonomist leanings—later signed the aforementioned open letter of protest against Nenni's failure to take a clear anti-Western stand with regard to the collapse of the Summit Conference.[58] Here again, the motivation of local elites stands out as a fundamental problem whose exploration might open many doors.

As we can see, then, shared values, shared strategic conceptions, affinity based on common interests or functions, the instinct for survival of purely personal local cliques, and the charismatic appeal of a great national leader were all instrumental in dividing the PSI. But any assignment of relative weight to these various factors would seem to be a virtually hopeless task at the national level. On the regional or local level, on the other hand, a study of factional motivations may yield interesting insights into the effect of environment on the formation of intra-party groupings. In any heterogeneous society, with a variety of political traditions and contexts, an understanding of intra-party politics cannot be achieved except by plunging into the complex diversity of provincial and local political situations.

In an earlier article, we inquired whether any relationship existed between the political coloration, economic character, or social structure of a given area, and the relative strength of different factions within a party in that area.[59] For instance, we asked, does the intransigent (or the moderate) wing of a Socialist party tend to flourish most successfully in a certain specific type of political environment? Empirical research has yielded some suggestive indications of this sort—indications which must be qualified by citing ubiquitous exceptions—but no water-tight conclusions.

It has been noted, for example, that the Autonomists were stronger in the larger, wealthier, more powerful PSI provincial federations boasting the most numerous membership.[60] Thus, the seven biggest federations

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[53] Computations are based on raw data collected by Professor Sartori for his article, *loc. cit.*

[54] See *La Nuova Stampa,* May 3, 1958, and *Il Corriere della Sera,* April 29, May 3, 1958. For data on factional coloration of the several provinces, see Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale, op. cit.,* pp. 443–448.

[55] See *Il Messaggero,* May 17, 1958, and *Il Corriere della Sera,* April 29, 1958.

[56] See "Speciale," *L'Espresso,* January 11, 1959, p. 2.

[57] On Southern and Central Italian clienteles, see Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *loc. cit., passim,* but especially pp. 6–12, 38–39, 102, 147–152; and Pera, *loc. cit., passim.*

[58] See above, note 34, and Cervigni and Galasso, *ibid.,* pp. 26–27.

[59] See Raphael Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 4 (February 1960), pp. 46–51.

[60] Pavolini, *loc. cit.* See also Sigfrido Ciccotti, "Nenni's Party at the Crossroads," *New Leader,* Vol. 41 (December 1, 1958), pp. 9–10.

(Milan, Mantua, Bologna, Ferrara, Florence, Rome, and Naples)—each having over 10,000 PSI members—were all under Autonomist control. One observer has attributed this phenomenon to the alleged fact that small and medium-sized federations were more likely to need outside assistance, in the form of activists and financial subsidies, and were therefore (in 1958–59) more likely to be amenable to guidance on the part of the "apparatus" and of the Communists.[61] This suggestion, which implies a close connection between organizational strength and political moderation in a provincial subdivision of a Socialist party, probably contains a kernel of truth and deserves further exploration. But there is some strong negative evidence which we cannot afford to overlook: the very large number of small Autonomist federations, of which 15 had less than 2500 members.

Some link also appears to exist between the strength of political Catholicism in a given area and the predominance of opposition factions in the PSI. Thus, while the anti-Nenni elements in the PSI controlled only 39 of the 92 provinces of Italy, they held a majority in 10 of the 19 provinces in which the Christian Democrats had succeeded in obtaining an absolute majority of the popular vote in 1958.[62] And if we confine our analysis to Northern and Central Italy, omitting five Southern provinces where DC strength had been swelled by an influx of Rightist votes and where political Catholicism had not made much progress before the advent of Fascism,[63] we are left with 14 provinces of which 8 were governed by opposition factions. These eight provinces were all concentrated in the Veneto and in North Lombardy, the two "white" regions *par excellence*, whose devout masses had boycotted Italian general elections in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries in obedience to the Papal doctrine of *non expedit*.[64] Catholicism here tended to be conservative but paternalistic, quick to respond to social grievances but insistent on obedience to clerical directives. The strong vein of popular support for the clergy was further strengthened in the early 20th Century by the creation of a dense network of Catholic unions, peasant leagues, and cooperatives. In this type of environment, the Marxist parties had always been at a disadvantage.[65] Extremism and intransigence in the PSI could well be a reaction against PSI weakness, against the party's inability to challenge clerical hegemony. Another possible explanation, but one which lacks any empirical confirmation, might be the absorption into the "white" organizations of many local cadres who, in a less Catholic context, would have swelled the ranks of the Reformist faction in the PSI.

There appear, then, to be some indications of a connection between intransigence in a working-class movement and electoral weakness *vis-à-vis* a traditionally dominant Catholic party. Here again we must emphasize the existence of notable exceptions to the tendency we have just described: Bergamo, one of the classic "white" provinces of Northern Italy, is in the Autonomist camp, as is Trento, the home province of the late Alcide DeGasperi. In a situation characterized by a multiplicity of social and economic environments and by sharply divergent historical experiences (the Veneto and Lombardy had once been under Austrian rule), we must learn to live with multiple causality and forgo premature insistence on precise evaluation of the significance of various factors. The common strand which Key was able to employ to unravel the tangled reality of Southern politics eludes us here.

Socialist unwillingness to break away from an alliance with the Communists is sometimes attributed to an inferiority complex resulting from the superior strength of the Communist Party and the consequent Socialist fear of losing contact with the bulk of the working class. Yet when we examine the 30 provinces in which the Communist Party outpolled the PSI by more than a 2–1 margin, we find that the Left faction controlled the PSI in only 14 of those provinces—46.7% of the 30 provinces, as compared to 42.3% of all Italian provinces in the hands of the Left. And, again, if we observe the 16 provinces in which the PSI outpolled the Communists in 1958, and in which by rearranging our hypothesis we would expect to find a sturdily independent variety of Socialism, we note that 8 of those 16 provinces were also controlled by the Left faction in 1961. To be sure, these eight Left provinces were all located in the "white" regions of the Veneto and North Lombardy, where an outnumbered PSI might regard a still weaker Communist Party not as a dangerous competitor, but as an indispensable ally against a Catholic mass party with deep roots in the countryside.

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[61] See Pavolini, *ibid.*

[62] For voting percentages, province by province, for the 1958 elections, see "Italia. Elezioni 1956–58–60: confronti percentuali per provincie," *Tempi Moderni*, Vol. 4 (January–March, 1961), pp. 127–134.

[63] See Francesco Compagna and Vittorio De Caprariis, *Studi di geografia elettorale* (*1946–1958*), (Napoli, Centro Studi "Nord e Sud," 1959), p. 25 and Tables VII and VIII. I am using Braga's sociological classification of Italian provinces. He includes several Central Italian provinces (Lucca, Massa, Ferrara, Parma, Piacenza) in Northwest Italy on socio-economic grounds, and also includes two Southern Italian provinces (Pescara, Teramo) in Central Italy, and three Central Italian provinces (Roma, Latina, Frosinone) in Southern Italy. See Giorgio Braga, *Il Comunismo fra gli italiani* (Milano, Comunità, 1956), ch. 3.

[64] See Roberto Michels, *Il Proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano* (Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1908), pp. 217–218.

[65] See *Il Messaggero*, May 8, 1958. See also Luigi Preti, *Le lotte agrarie nella Valle Padana* (Torino, Einaudi, 1955), pp. 92, 120, 141, 223–224, 226–227, 240, 323–324, 356–358.

Thus far, our investigation fails to yield significant results. But if we break up our sample into component regions, discarding the South with its personal clienteles, we are left with 12 provinces in Central Italy—the vast sharecropping region which includes Northern Abruzzi, Northern Latium, Tuscany, Umbria, the Marches, and most of Emilia—in which the Communists outpolled the PSI by a margin of over 2–1.[66] And here we observe that, while the Left faction controlled the PSI in only half of the provinces of Central Italy, it managed to dominate three-fourths of those 12 Central Italian provinces where the power relationship between the Communist Party and the PSI was particularly unbalanced in favor of the former. Also, there were only five provinces (all in Central Italy) in which the Communists polled over 40 per cent of the votes—and the PSI in all but one of these was controlled by the Left faction.

Also in this instance, then, a position of weakness apparently favored the intransigent wing. In Central Italy, where a major proportion of the municipal and provincial governments were run by Communist-Socialist coalitions, support of Nenni's policies in provinces where the PSI was heavily outnumbered might lead to a unilateral rupture of the Communist-Socialist alliance, ouster of the Socialists from the local government, and loss of much patronage. Socialists were perhaps more likely to affect an independent stance in provinces where they commanded more than one-third of the Leftist votes and could regard themselves as equal partners, rather than as tolerated guests, in the local and provincial administrations. In the South, where the Socialists and Communists together were nowhere near an absolute majority of the total vote, the relative strength of the two Leftist parties was less relevant. And even in Central Italy, the tendency we have just traced was by no means universal.

In Southern Italy, where Christian Democracy is prone to ally itself with the extreme Right,[67] there appears to be a significant relationship between the total strength of the Left-of-Center parties in a given province and the ability of the Autonomist faction to dominate the PSI in that province. Thus, in 12 Southern provinces, the four Left-of-Center parties combined (Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Republicans) received less than 35 per cent of the vote in 1958. The PSI in no less than seven of these provinces was dominated by the Left in 1961. In short, Left opposition factions, which controlled the PSI in only about 40 per cent of the provinces in Southern Italy, held the upper hand in nearly 60 per cent of those provinces where the Left-of-Center parties were especially weak. And conversely, of those nine provinces where the Left-of-Center parties had polled over 40 per cent of the votes in 1958, only one had a Left-dominated PSI in 1961. The frustration experienced by Socialists in provinces firmly controlled by clerical and authoritarian clienteles may well have strengthened the forces of intransigence, whereas more moderate elements may have been encouraged by the more competitive situation in another group of Southern provinces.

In Northwest Italy, we may note that the Autonomists tended to prevail in provinces where the Socialist peasant leagues had been particularly strong and well organized before World War I. Of the eight provinces in Northwest Italy where rural Socialism had gained a firm foothold before 1914, by organizing the *braccianti* (farm laborers hired on a day-by-day basis),[68] all but one were held by the Autonomists in 1961. In Central Italy, the Left faction was more successful in controlling provinces with long Socialist traditions; but here, as we have seen, the predominance of the Communists was especially marked. Where Socialism has been long established, has created a network of economic and social organizations, has not been completely overshadowed by a dominant Communist Party, and has trained a generation of local and provincial cadres accustomed to exercising power at the local level, there is more likelihood that moderation and compromise will prevail in Socialist ranks. Contrariwise, where the Socialist movement has been established relatively recently, and has not yet had the time or the means to permeate the local power structure (as, for example, in Sardinia and parts of the Veneto), intransigence is likely to be the product of impotence and inexperience.

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[66] Again, I am using Braga's sociological classification. See note 63 above.

[67] See Giovanni Cervigni, "La frana meridionale," *Il Mondo*, February 16, 1960, p. 1.

[68] These provinces (Ferrara, Parma, Piacenza, Pavia, Novara, Vercelli, Mantova, Cremona) are referred to by Preti in *op. cit.*, pp. 219–220.

We must not, of course, jump to the conclusion that there is always an unbroken line of continuity between pre-Fascist Reformist Socialism and present-day Autonomism. Provinces like Parma and Ferrara—both Autonomist in 1961—were ruled by the extremist Syndicalist faction before World War I, while the Left won out in 1961 in the province of Reggio Emilia, once the Reformist fief of Camillo Prampolini and his cooperative movement.[69] We are isolating possibly influential factors, not stating invariable relationships.

Metropolitan areas, where the most powerful Socialist federations were often located, also tended to be especially Autonomist in their leanings. Of 12 provinces containing cities with populations in excess of 250,000, the PSI was under Autonomist rule in 10 in 1961—Turin and Palermo being the two exceptions. Thus, moderate Socialism also seemed to flourish in great metropolitan centers where the rising importance of the tertiary (service) sector of the economy tended to blur the distinction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and masses of white-collar workers had to be reckoned with by the various political parties.

Does industrialization have a moderating effect on Socialism, as some Italian observers suggest? It has been asserted, in this connection, that the great industrial centers (with the exception of Turin, where the CGIL has been thrown on the defensive by its own internal divisions and by unusually ruthless discriminatory policies on the part of the FIAT management), were virtually all in Autonomist hands.[70] And in fact, of 9 provinces in Northwest Italy which had over 30 per cent of the labor force employed in manufacturing industries, 7 were under Autonomist control: the other exception, Como, was located in "white" North Lombardy.[71] In the rest of Italy only three provinces had over 30 per cent of their labor force engaged in manufacturing: two (Vicenza and Gorizia) were located in the "white" Venetian zone and were both characterized by Leftist domination of the PSI provincial organization; the other (Florence) was solidly Autonomist. Our evidence is only suggestive, to be sure; but there does appear to be some relationship between degree of industrialization (and, as a corollary, extent of labor organization)[72] and moderation in a Socialist movement.

It should be added, however, as a healthy antidote to the heavy dose of environmental determinism implicit in the analysis thus far, that in many cases the prestige and influence of a provincial or regional leader would set the tone for the federation and would overcome traditional attitudes and other historical or social factors. Although the party "apparatus" was ineffective and incohesive as a national force, its members could be very influential in their respective bailiwicks. For example in Calabria, Cosenza Province had an essentially Maximalist tradition, whereas pre-1922 Socialism in Reggio Calabria Province had been Reformist in orientation. But the unquestioned leader of the PSI in Cosenza after World War II was Giacomo Mancini, whose father had founded the Socialist Party in that province. Mancini, strongly pro-Communist during the immediate postwar period, gradually became converted to an Autonomist viewpoint, and he led his provincial federation into the Nenni fold. On the other hand, Reggio Calabria, despite its Reformist background, came under the control of a group of young Leftists after the 1948 electoral defeat of the PSI. The leader of this coterie, a lawyer named Rocco Minasi, was able to oust what remained of the Reformist Old Guard and turn Reggio Calabria into a stronghold of the Leftist faction.[73]

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[69] *Ibid.*, pp. 136–138, 294–298, 425.

[70] On Turin see "Problemi della Società Italiana—I Socialisti a Torino," *Il Mulino*, Vol. 8 (August, 1959), pp. 104–107, and Eugenio Scalfari, "La sconfitta degli operai," *L'Espresso*, July 2, 1961, pp. 8–9. During an interview with a close student of PSI affairs, I was informed that the PSI in Turin had lost contact with the working class, as a result of its refusal to allow PSI union leaders in the FIAT works to secede from the CGIL without facing expulsion from their party.

[71] Statistics on percentage of industrial workers were computed from data compiled in Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Annuario di Statistiche Provinciali, 1959* (Roma, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1959), pp. 24–25, 28–29. The provinces in question were Milan, Turin, Genoa, Como, Varese, Novara, Vercelli, Bergamo, Pavia.

[72] Another interesting datum in this connection is provided by a study of trade-union elections in plants employing over 1,000 workers. Of the 14 provinces in which the CGIL polled its highest percentages, 11 were provinces in which the PSI was autonomist in character. See "Le Commissioni interne in Italia nelle 310 aziende con piu di 1,000 dipendenti: risultati elettorali dal 1956 al 1959," *Tempi Moderni*, Vol. 3 (October-December, 1960), p. 13.

Similar cases occurred elsewhere in Italy. The Naples Federation was strongly Leftist until its leader, Francesco De Martino, was won over to the Autonomist cause by Nenni early in 1957. The same was true of Brindisi and its leader, Marino Guadalupi, whose shift to an Autonomist stand was barely under way in 1956.[74] Nor was this phenomenon of personal initiative limited to Southern Italy, habitat of the local clique. In politically mature Emilia, in North Central Italy, Bologna and Ferrara had been two of the most strongly pro-Communist provinces in the PSI organization during the 1951 Congress and for some years thereafter. Yet when their respective provincial secretaries, Armaroli and Cattani, finally swung their support to Nenni, these two provinces became overwhelmingly Autonomist. And similar examples could be cited in Tuscany.[75]

We might also inquire into the hypothesis, posed in an earlier study, that a multiparty system may *per se* encourage multifactionalism within a party, since the party is usually faced with three strategic choices: to choose its allies on the Left, or on the Right, or to renounce all alliances.[76] The PSI certainly had to confront these alternatives after World War II; but before the Communist secession of 1921, there was no party to the Left of the PSI on the political spectrum—and yet, at most party congresses, there were at least three PSI factions.[77] Besides, even after World War II, factions in the PSI did not always correspond to these three alternatives. In fact, at both the 1959 and the 1961 party congresses, the Left and Basso factions were in substantial accord on the need for maintaining a permanent system of cooperation with the Communist Party, while Nenni advocated strict neutrality in 1959, and an eventual alliance with Christian Democracy—based on ironclad agreements regarding a reform program—in 1961.

While Italian Socialists have on occasion divided neatly into three factions on the issue of the choice of allies (this was certainly the case in 1921 and in 1948–49), a more typical tri-factional situation has been based on a Maximalist-Reformist split with an intermediate faction attempting to create a synthesis in the name of party unity. In this pattern Nenni's Autonomists would correspond to the Reformists of the pre-Fascist era; the Left faction is a direct descendant of the Syndicalists of 1906 (though many of these later joined the Fascist movement), the Revolutionaries of 1908–1914, and the Maximalists of 1919–1922; and finally, the Basso faction plays the same role as the Integralists of 1906–1908, the Dissident Reformists of 1910, and the Intermediate motion of 1912.[78]

The primary issue in most cases has been between compromise, accommodation, and gradualism on the one hand, and intransigence on the other. The question of alliances, while present at times, has been of secondary importance as compared to the basic cause of Maximalist-Reformist tension. And the intermediate faction, before 1914 and from 1959 to 1961, has attempted to play the role of *tertium gaudens*, seeking its supporters on the Right at one Congress and on the Left at the next. The major source of Maximalist-Reformist discord, to be sure, could have existed also under a two-party system, where the question of alliances would not arise. And other causes of factional division in the PSI—the Libyan War which split the Reformist faction in 1911, the anti-Mason issue of 1914[79]—have borne little or no relationship to the question of alliances, and have not been peculiar to a multi-party system.

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[73] See Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *loc. cit.*, pp. 79–86, 90–95, and Cervigni and Galasso, "Il Mezzogiorno e il Partito Socialista," *loc. cit.*, p. 33. See also Glorioso, *loc. cit.*

[74] See Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *loc. cit.*, pp. 42, 68–73, and Cervigni and Galasso, "Il Mezzogiorno e il Partito Socialista," *loc. cit.*, pp. 31–32. See also Glorioso, *ibid.*

[75] On Emilia, see Segre, "Il duello dei prossimi due anni," *loc. cit.*, pp. 19–20. On Emilia and Tuscany, see Pera, *loc. cit.*; party officials and students of PSI problems whom I interviewed all concurred in stressing the role of the provincial apparatus in determining the outcome of the intra-party struggle in the various Tuscan provinces.

[76] Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations," *loc. cit.*, pp. 41–43.

[77] See Pavone, *op. cit.*, and Cannarsa, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[78] See Pavone, *ibid.*, pp. 40–249, Cannarsa, *ibid.*, pp. 205–252.

[79] See Pavone, *ibid.*, pp. 169–179, 194–206, 227–234.

There may be numerous reasons for the prevalence of multifactionalism in the PSI. Italian political attitudes, which view secessionists with indulgence and consequently increase the ever-present danger of a party split, may help to explain the Integralist-Basso phenomenon. Then, too, given the traditional autonomy enjoyed by PSI provincial federations, dissident leaders may fortify themselves at the grass roots without feeling compelled to join forces for mutual self-protection against the majority faction. And finally, the great prevalence of intellectuals and university graduates in the directive organs and party congresses of the PSI tends to encourage continuous differentiation of conceptual schemes and strategic approaches.[80] To be sure, the multi-party system increases the number of alternatives and, by so doing, creates an added potential for multi-factionalism. But it appears to be less the multi-party system itself than the political culture in which that system thrives, which tends to encourage multi-factionalism. For instance, a certain disdain for "vulgar" empiricism is, among many Italian intellectuals, a subconscious by-product of Croceian idealism and may militate against the process of bargaining and mutual accommodation which is indispensable for a reconciliation of conflicting factional stands. In any event, it is fairly obvious that no single factor, such as the triple set of alternatives posed by the question of alliances, should be given undue weight.

The study of the PSI throws some additional light on questions connected with party structure. For instance, it becomes apparent from our examination of intra-party processes that in many parts of Italy the PSI failed to live up to Duverger's model of a branch-type party.[81] It had, to be sure, a highly articulated structure, complete with local sections and shop nuclei, provincial federations, national representative, executive and disciplinary organs, a party bureaucracy, and a party statute which spelled out disciplinary procedures and defined the relationship between the various organs. It had about 500,000 dues-paying members.[82] Moreover, it published two daily newspapers and several periodicals, maintained auxiliary feminine and youth organizations, and purported to require the participation of all members in party affairs.[83] It appeared in these respects, then, to correspond to Duverger's definition of a branch-type party, which seeks not only to win elections but also to attract and educate a mass membership.

But the PSI also possessed some characteristics reminiscent of a caucus-type party. The dominant role played by local notables was quite striking: doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, shopkeepers, and union officials often dominated party affairs at the local level on the basis of personal popularity.[84] Many party functions and organs existed largely on paper. And the party rank-and-file revealed an amazing lack of interest in party affairs. Before the crucial Naples Congress of 1959, at a time when sharp factional conflict added an element of drama to party business, less than 35 per cent of the party membership took part in the election of delegates to the provincial congresses.[85] Nor was this apathy confined to the backward rural South; in the large Milan Federation, only 7,500 out of approximately 30,000 registered members showed any active interest in the most important and hotly contested pre-Congress campaign the PSI had faced in a decade.[86] To be sure, there was a higher degree of participation in the pre-convention campaign which led to the Milan Congress of 1961. But our point is, that classifications based on formal party structure may, in the absence of continual observation and analysis of intra-party processes, produce serious distortions in our view of empirical reality.

The vaunted party "apparatus" is another case in point. The term itself conjures up visions of ruthless monolithic power. Yet, when Italian observers finally subjected the PSI bureaucracy to closer examination, it turned out to be little more than a bare skeleton composed of 500 salaried officials. Many of its alleged functions—international relations, legislative reference, research—were apparently being performed in a remarkably sporadic and haphazard fashion, or in some instances were not being performed at all.[87] The "apparatus" had been able to defeat the Centrists in 1948–49, when local Autonomist forces lacked imaginative leadership at the national level and when the international and domestic situations tended to favor extremist elements. But in 1959, confronted with the personal opposition of the party's traditional leader, heading a coalition of local and provincial notables allied with ex-Action Party intellectuals, the "apparatus" proved incapable of maintaining its own cohesion, let alone blocking Nenni. One wonders whether the party "apparatus" is ever as cohesive a body as the term might imply.

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[80] For the pre-1910 period, see Michels, *Il Proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano*, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–114. My assessment of the current situation is based on Cervigni and Galasso, "Inchiesta sul Partito Socialista Italiano nelle provincie meridionali," *loc. cit.*, pp. 14–17, and on my talks with Antonio Landolfi, whose forthcoming article in *Tempi Moderni* will presumably touch on this point.

[81] For his discussion of caucus-type and branch-type parties, see Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York, 1954), pp. 1–3, 17–27, 120, 152–154.

[82] See Partito Socialista Italiano, *34° Congresso Nazionale*, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

[83] The PSI Stature requires active participation in party affairs as a duty of every party member. See Article 2 of the PSI Statute reproduced in Mario D'Antonio and Guglielmo Negri, *Raccolta degli Statuti dei partiti politici in Italia* (Milano, Giuffrè, 1958), pp. 152–153.

[84] Pavolini, *loc. cit.*, and Pera, *loc. cit.*, *passim.*

[85] Babbini, *loc. cit.*, p. 128.

[86] See Pizzorno, *loc. cit.*, pp. 25–26.

The development of general structural categories for the study of intra-party politics has been an extremely desirable contribution to comparative politics, particularly because it has presented us with suggestive models for the comparison and evaluation of empirical data. But Duverger's categories must be employed as he intended them to be used: as testing devices, not as restrictive channel markers or substitutes for further empirical findings. It would be very unfortunate if reactions against "mere data-gathering" should lead us to remain too close to the summit and to theorize about politics at the national level without giving adequate attention to regional, local, and interest-group situations which may complicate our conceptual schemes. Further progress in the field of comparative politics will depend, in part, on our ability to break down national political systems and national parties into suitable component elements for closer investigation and more meaningful comparison.

We conclude our study with the following hypotheses, which may be applied, modified, or invalidated by further empirical research.

(1) In general, Socialist weakness appears to be associated with Left-wing intransigence within a Socialist party. More specifically, the following factors will encourage, but not necessarily insure, the prevalence of intransigent tendencies within a Socialist Party in a given area:

(a) The existence, in that area, of a dominant Communist Party, which exceeds the Socialist Party in electoral strength by a margin of over two-to-one.

(b) The existence, in that area, of a dominant Catholic Party supported by a long Catholic tradition, by a dense network of Catholic social and economic organizations, and by widespread popular acceptance of paternalism and clerical influence.

(c) The existence, in that area, of a dominant alliance of clerical, conservative, and reactionary parties—an alliance which includes Right-wing extremist parties and which greatly outnumbers the Left-of-Center bloc.

(2) The following factors will encourage, but not necessarily insure, the prevalence of moderate, gradualist tendencies within a Socialist Party in a given area:

(a) The existence there of a strong party organization, backed by a numerous membership and by sufficient financial resources to obviate the need for outside assistance.

(b) The existence there of a highly competitive electoral situation between Left-wing and Right-wing parties.

(c) The existence there of a Socialist tradition of long standing, reinforced by a dense network of Socialist labor organizations and peasant leagues; but this factor can be vitiated if there is a dominant Communist Party in the area in question.

(d) The existence there of a high degree of industrialization (with over 35 per cent of the labor force engaged in manufacturing) and a strong non-Catholic trade union movement.

(e) The existence in the area of a great urban center with a population of over 250,000.

(3) Local or provincial party leaders often can play a decisive role in inter-factional struggles, even in a branch-type Socialist Party. This influence frequently appears to outweigh the pressure of the environmental factors cited in (1) and (2).

(4) In a branch-type party, a charismatic leader, who has either founded the party or has led it through a crucial period of its history, will usually prevail in any struggle with the party bureaucracy. In any such conflict, the party

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[87] See Segre, "Un Partito moderno?", *loc. cit.*, p. 5. See also Piero Ardenti, "L'organizzazione del PSI da Napoli ad oggi," *Problemi del Socialismo*, Vol. 4 (January, 1961), pp. 15–26, but esp. pp. 15–18. Ardenti claims the "apparatus" never formed a united faction, and that the real problem is not to dethrone the "apparatus" but to provide the PSI with a more efficient organization.

bureaucracy will, in all likelihood, be unable to maintain its cohesion: a large proportion of its members will support the charismatic leader.
(5) Large intra-party factions are usually clusters of various subgroups animated by a variety of motives, and these clusters are subject to powerful centrifugal forces.
(6) In a multi-party system, a multi-factional situation within a given party may be the result of one or more of the following factors:

- (a) The existence, for the party in question, of more than two choices regarding the acceptance or rejection of alliances with neighboring parties on the political spectrum.
- (b) A historical background of multi-factionalism going back to the formative decades of the party.
- (c) A strong intra-party tradition (usually embodied in formal statutory provisions) of autonomy for local and provincial party organizations.
- (d) Domination of the party organization, and of all major factions, by intellectuals trained in a tradition of disputation regarding the logical and philosophical validity of ideal categories—in a non-empirical tradition, that is.

(7) Branch-type political parties often possess many characteristics of caucus-type parties, especially in their formal intra-party processes at the local level.
(8) There is no clear evidence that affinity of function alone (as in the case of the party "apparatus") can ever produce a cohesive party faction with a high degree of continuity.

THE SOURCES OF PROTEST IN JAPAN

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The massive demonstrations of May and June 1960, which forced the resignation of the Kishi Cabinet and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Japan, alarmed Americans as much as they elated the Chinese Communists. The complacent American view of Japan as a sturdy conservative force loyally allied to the United States through a wise and benevolent Occupation and generous economic aid was rudely shattered. Coming at a time when student unrest precipitated the overthrow of governments in South Korea and Turkey—also allies—it was natural that many Americans saw communist plots and a Japan in the grip of a "revolutionary situation." But if they were wrong—and it has taken a great deal of soul-searching for informed opinion to understand fully what happened[1]—they were no less wrong than the Chinese Communists, who read the situation in much the same way. After a two-week trip to Japan in August 1960, Liu Ning-i, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, reported jubilantly that the revolutionary situation in Japan was well advanced. "The Japanese people's future is full of brightness and hope," he wrote.

But even if we discount the over-pessimism of naive American opinion and the over-optimism of the Chinese Communists, it is apparent that there are powerful and disturbing forces on the loose in Japan. To say this, however, is far from saying that Japan is on the verge of a revolution. The existence of revolutionary sentiment alone is not sufficient to bring about a revolution. This depends very much on the ability of the sentiment to crystallize itself in appropriate organizational form and around appropriate issues and on the extent to which moderate and conservative forces are able to maintain their own self-confidence and vigor. In Japan, the revolutionary forces are still far from having won over or neutralized the majority of public sentiment, and the conservative forces still show every sign of vitality, ability, determination, and confidence. But the incidents surrounding the May-June events have revealed several important things. First, that disaffection and alienation with the *status quo* are widespread, particularly among students, the labor movement, and intellectuals. Second, that the fabric of consensus is seriously torn, that politics is sharply polarized. Third, that American policy is deeply implicated in internal political issues, and that this deep involvement intensifies Japan's susceptibility to the polarization of the cold war.

I

The external signs of the "radicalization" of Japan are quite clear. Since the end of the war there has been a steady increase in the "progressive" vote. Moreover, within the "progressive" vote, the balance has shifted steadily towards the left. In 1952 and 1953, the right socialists within the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) were able to command a bare majority of the total socialist vote.[2] But in the elections of autumn 1960, the Japan Socialist Party, which is predominantly "left" today,[3] alone won 27 percent of the national vote, while the right socialists, who split from the JSP in late 1959 to form their own Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), received only 8.7 percent.[4] At the present time, the total "progressive" vote (including the communists, socialists, and democratic socialists) tallies about 39 percent.

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[1] See, *e.g.*, E. O. Reischauer: "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1960; Reischauer: "Some Thoughts on Japanese Democracy," *Japan Quarterly*, January–March 1961; "Japanese Intellectuals Discuss American-Japanese Relations" (Introduction by Robert Scalapino), special issue of *Far Eastern Survey*, October 1960; "Japan Today" (Introduction by Ivan Morris), *New Leader*, Section II, November 28, 1960.

[2] In 1952, of the total socialist vote, which tallied 21.3 percent of the national vote, the Right accounted for 11.5 percent, and the Left for 9.8 percent; with this proportion, the Right won 57 seats in the Diet to the Left's 54. In 1953, the total socialist vote rose to 26 percent, the Right accounting for about 14 percent and the Left for about 13; however, in 1960 the Left, with a slightly smaller vote, won 72 seats to the Right's 66.

[3] The Party has undergone two major right-left splits since the end of the war. The 1952 split was finally repaired in 1955, in time for the national elections of that year, but another split took place in late 1959. This one, however, has divided the right wing: the Nishio faction left the Party to form the Democratic Socialist Party and the Kawakami faction remained within the Party, with Mr. Kawakami himself, in an evident effort to prevent his followers from joining the Nishio exodus, elected Party Chairman. A good account of these developments will be found in David C. S. Sissons: "Recent Developments in Japan's Socialist Movement," (in two parts), *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 29 (March and June 1960).

The composition of the vote seems to point in the same direction. The progressives base themselves primarily on the urban youth, the educated classes, and the organized working class. Public opinion polls and voting surveys show a consistently higher "progressive" vote: in urban areas than in the countryside (and also in the larger cities than in the small cities and towns); in lower age groups than in higher age groups; in higher educational levels than in lower; and among workers than among nonworkers (and also among organized workers than among unorganized workers, and among big-city workers than among small city and town workers). The conservative vote is characteristically strongest in the countryside, among older age groups, and among farmers and small business elements.

Many qualifications need to be placed on the significance of this vote. Certainly not all of it, even for the left socialists, is "revolutionary" in character. Much of it is more correctly a "protest" vote that reflects support for the socialists on particular issues—especially of foreign policy—and distrust of the professional conservative politicians. But it certainly shows that the arena of discontent, within which revolutionary ideas have their play, has been growing.

If these trends continue in a straight line for the next decade or so, it is clear that at some point in the foreseeable future, the progressive vote, now almost 40 percent, should pass the 50 percent mark, and so bring the socialists to power. Projections of the inner trends lead to similar conclusions. The rural population is declining rapidly, the urban population rising. The level of education continues to rise year by year. The majority of youth entering the voting ranks for the first time vote left; as they move up the age scale, and as the older age groups retire from the scene, there should be an increasingly "radicalization" of each age group.

The question, then, is whether these trends will in fact continue to their apparent conclusion, or whether there might not be other forces or new developments in the making that would cut them short. It has often happened that a protest movement waxes at the very moment the conditions that brought it into being disappear. This, I suspect, may very well be what is happening in Japan today. In a more general way, the question is: how much revolutionary discontent can a modern industrial society accommodate, under what conditions? In early 1946, a Cabinet Minister, scheduled to be purged within a few days offered me the following prediction: "We will become, I think, a country like France or Italy. Our left will go to one-fourth or even one-third of the population. As long as it remains at that level, I think we shall be able to live with it, just as France and Italy can." "And if it goes beyond?" I asked. "That," he said "is what I don't know." Fifteen years later, Japan has reached the Minister's peril point, the so-called "one-third barrier," as the socialists themselves characterize it. Whether we judge it to have penetrated significantly beyond depends upon how we evaluate the right socialist vote of 13.2 percent, made up of the 8.7 percent who voted for the Democratic Socialist Party as well as the 4.5 percent who voted for the right-wing Kawakami faction of the JSP.[5] The suspicion

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[4] Since the Kawakami faction of the JSP shares approximately the same ideological position as the newly formed DSP, a more accurate picture of the "right socialist" vote in the country would include the votes cast for the Kawakami faction, which come to approximately 4.5 percent of the national vote (about 17 percent of the JSP vote). This would suggest a little over 13 percent of the electorate voting a right socialist position, and about 22.5 percent voting left socialist (the total JSP vote minus the Kawakami votes).

At the time of the Party split late in 1959 the distribution of Diet seats was as follows: JSP, 128 (of which the Kawakami faction held 35) and DSP, 37. After the 1960 elections the distribution was: JSP, 145 (of which the Kawakami faction held 28) and DSP, 17.

[5] In the 1960 elections, the "progressive vote," which tallies 38.8 percent, was distributed as follows:

Party (and Faction)	*% of national vote*	
Japan Socialist Party		27.2
Left factions*	22.7	
Kawakami faction	4.5	
Democratic Socialist Party		8.7
Japan Communist Party		2.9
Total		38.8

* Including the Suzuki, Nomizo, Wada, Rono, and Matsumoto factions, plus a small number of uncommitted Diet members.

If the DSP vote is considered firmly part of the progressive vote, then the progressives have in-that the "one-third barrier" may be a natural limit has haunted the socialists for some time, and it underlies the debates between right and left over whether the Party is to be a "class party" or a "mass" or "people's" party, capable of appealing to elements outside the working class. In the perennial debates over this issue, the experiences of European socialist parties, such as the British Labour Party and the German Social-Democratic Party, weigh heavily in the minds of the moderates. The most recent version of this dispute revolves around the concept, most strongly identified with the new General Secretary, Mr. Eda Saburo, the successor to the assassinated Mr. Asanuma, of the "structural revolution." Although the term has been taken from some debates within the Italian Communist Party—which makes it more palatable to the extreme left—it seems to represent a search for a pragmatic, subtle and yet responsible opposition to replace the negative politics of all-out opposition. It is a politics of "continuing the dialogue." The party may not be able to hold to this policy, under pressure from its own left, but it is a significant experiment.

II

Whatever the ultimate fate of this experiment, Japanese politics today remains sharply polarized. The gap between right and left is deep and principled, and the area of consensus is extremely limited. As in any country where politics is so ideological, compromise is difficult, and all issues tend to take on a total character. Unions strike for higher wages with the slogans of "Down With the Government," "Yankees Go Home," "Protect the Constitution," "Recognize Communist China," "Hands Off Cuba," and "Reject the Japanese-American Security Treaty." Whatever the starting point of the protest—higher prices or the encroachment of American bases on farmland or the building of experimental rocket bases—it quickly trips off the same range of issues, as if they formed a seamless web. No issue stands alone, to be dealt with piecemeal and *ad hoc*, but as part of a matrix of issues, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Each "struggle," then, as the Japanese progressives term it, quickly becomes generalized into a major confrontation of very much the same elements: intellectuals, students, and unionists on the one side, and whatever combination of *status quo* forces happens to emerge on the other side. Peasant demonstrations against, say, the extension of American airbase runways or the installation of Japanese rocket testing bases, are often joined by students—not always to the peasants' liking, it may be added. Striking workers find themselves joined by student pickets, or even by other "progressive" elements, such as intellectuals, "defenders of peace," and "defenders of the Constitution," offering physical, financial, and moral support, Similarly, the May-June 1960 demonstrations began with the students, but were soon joined by unionists and intellectuals.

This quality of all-out, uncompromising struggle is the most disturbing feature of the political climate of Japan today. "If you think the dialogue between Japan and America is in danger," one of Japan's leading public figures recently said to me, "let me tell you that the dialogue between left and right here in Japan is in even more danger. It is becoming harder every day to bring them into the same room, much less to have a real discussion." Therefore, although the normal procedures of parliamentary government prevail in the great bulk of ordinary matters, they are increasingly abandoned when the great issues, over which public opinion divides sharply, come up. The tactics of "struggle," of "direct action," and extra-parliamentary pressure begin to replace those of negotiation, compromise, and discussion. Not only is the work of the Diet seriously impeded, but the refusal to accept its authority and the resort to mass pressure and violent parliamentary filibustering bring the institution of parliamentary democracy itself into disrepute.

No doubt many Japanese people, worried by this growing polarization of national politics, would favor a politics of the center. But their continuing failure is itself a mark of the profundity of the polarization. The main attempt, the Socialist-Democratic coalition governments of 1947–48, first under Socialist Katayama and then under conservative Democrat Ashida, collapsed so ignominiously as to bring the very notion of a centralist government into dis-

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deed gone well beyond one-third. However, if the DSP vote is considered largely a "centrist" vote, then the "progressive" vote falls to 30.1 percent. If, in addition, we consider the 4.5 per cent of the votes cast for Kawakami-faction candidates as, by and large, also "centrist," then the hard-core "progressive" votes—of left socialists and communists—falls to 25.6 percent, and the "right socialist" vote (for the DSP and the Kawakami faction) rises to 13.2 percent. This figure shows a remarkable stability for the right socialist sentiment in the country: in 1952, it was about 12 percent; in 1953 and 1955, about 14 percent. The big growth in the socialist vote has been on the left, from 10 percent in 1952 to about 23 percent in 1960.

repute. In the very next elections in 1949, the Communists went from their previous 3 percent to 10 percent of the national vote and 35 seats in the Diet.[6] Since then there has been, particularly on the left, a steady weakening of the moderate forces, if not absolutely then at least relatively. In five years, the organized right socialists have declined from a high point of about 14 percent of the national vote (a slight majority of the combined socialist vote of 27 percent) and 66 members of the Diet in 1955, to under 9 percent of the national vote (as against over 27 percent[7] for the left socialists) and only 17 seats in 1960. On the conservative side, the factions favorable to a politics of the center have so far been constrained by the requirements of party unity.

What we find, therefore, is that the mainstream of Japan is divided sharply into two social-political combinations: the progressives, based largely on organized workers, intellectuals,[8] and students; and the conservatives, based largely on business, the middle classes, and the peasantry.

Many observers would add a third, the ultra-right; but I myself, for the time being, prefer to see it on the periphery, rather than in the center. The traditional sources of right-wing strength—the military and peasant discontent, especially as it was refracted through the Army—no longer exist. And the virulent ultra-nationalism which fed it has been too thoroughly discredited as a comprehensive ideology; the patriotic component, even in its extreme form, has been to a large extent absorbed by the neo-nationalism of the progressives. In the light of Japanese history it would be foolhardy to argue that the ultra-right presents no menace at all, but this is still on the margins of society. The crackpots and toughs of the ultra-right can create trouble through direct action and terrorism, and they can help create a mood of general willingness to resort to violence and extra-parliamentary methods. The unleashing of terrorism on the right can also stimulate a reactive terrorism and violence on the left, a cycle already visible during the May-June riots. So far, however, a large moderate public, which remembers the terrorism of the late 1930s all too well, has reacted so strongly against violence, whether of the left or of the right, that this cycle has not yet been able to run a full course.[9] What is much more serious at this stage is that the presence of an ultra-right, however insignificant, stirs historical memories, still very much alive, which may very well interfere with the normalization of Japanese politics. A left that sees ultra-rightism behind every conservative move is much less inclined to compromise and accept the adjustive mechanisms of parliamentary democracy than one that takes conservative measures at face value and opposes them on their inherent merits. Under certain conditions a genuine revival of an ultra-right, although certainly not of the massive proportions of the prewar period, is no doubt conceivable; but this is not Japan's immediate problem.

The social-political combinations I have suggested also require certain qualifications as well as perhaps a more dynamic estimate of the potential of each group. Not all workers, nor even all organized workers, support the progressive side. Moreover, although the peasantry, transformed by the American land reforms and buoyed up both by a continuing high level of prosperity and a stable improvement of its economic and political position in relation to the urban sector, is certainly in no revolutionary mood, one can conceive of many conditions in which this might change, For the moment, however, the peasantry gives its main support to the conservatives, and the government and the conservatives, in their turn, cultivate it carefully by devoted attention to its problems.

III

The modern forms of protest and alienation in Japan appear to derive from four principal strata of national experience. The first of these is the "reactive nationalism"—to use Rostow's useful term—that lay at the heart of much of the Meiji Restoration movement. The need to "prove" herself to and against the West, the struggle for recognition and equality, the constant tension of tradition and modernity, the search for a stable identity capable of synthesizing the conflicting elements, are problems essentially similar to those of the new states today. The second is the class-conflict stage of modern industrial society, classically described by Engels in his *Conditions of the Working Classes in England in 1844*. With the maturing industrialization of Japan and the formation of a modern working class, the same kinds of revolutionary protest developed as in Western Europe and the United States, of say, the 1930s. The third element derives from the humiliation of Japan's defeat and the complete destruction of the authority of the old order. The consequence has been a deep secular movement, strongly reminiscent of the tensions of the Meiji Era, to restore national self-respect and the sense of national self-direction—what a colleague and I have elsewhere called "the search for identity."[10] Therefore, although Japan was herself a powerful and ruthless empire, it has been possible for many Japanese to indulge themselves in an orgy of self-pity as victims of imperialism, as a colonial or "semi-colonial" dependent people struggling for independence and liberation. The fourth layer is the typical modern discontent with the mass society, the protest against aimlessness, rootlessness, vulgarity, commercialism, declining standards, and boredom.

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[6] But in the following elections in 1952, the Communist vote plummeted once again to 2.7 percent and no seats in the Diet. It is clear that a great part of the left socialist vote, discontented with the politics of coalition, had gone to the Communists in 1949 and returned "home" when the danger of coalition was over.

[7] But see the qualification of this figure, above, note 5.

[8] By this term, I would include—following a recent suggestion by Prof. T. Takahashi of Tokyo University—the "minor intellectuals"—school teachers, higher technicians, higher civil servants, and white-collar workers.

[9] The sharp decline of the communist vote in 1952 resulted, at least in part, from strong public revulsion against the Party's "fire-bottle" tactics in the early part of the year. Since that time the Party has carried on a systematic campaign to transform itself into a "peaceful" and "lovable" Party.

One would expect that such diverse layers would normally have their own different styles and directions. Before the war, for example, the class-struggle sentiment was strongly anti-nationalist, and the nationalist sentiment normally went to the support of the militarists. Today, however, we find all these roots strongly intertwined and reinforcing each other. The postwar socialist movement has fallen heir to a nationalist resurgence with which it cannot always be entirely at ease, particularly in the case of the prewar leaders. The rationalization is offered, to be sure, that nationalism is "progressive" and "revolutionary" in the period of struggle for national independence, but a Suzuki Mosaburo cannot intone the slogans of "racial" or "national" unity with the same conviction as an old-style fire-eating nationalist of prewar days. The intellectual's contempt for the "mambo-boy," which he may formulate in terms of "American influence" or of "capitalist decadence," echoes the prewar ultra-nationalist's complaints and the late Meiji "Japanist's" laments that Japan is "losing her soul." And we can surely detect the echo of the *samurai* contempt for the merchant classes and private egotism in the intellectual's anti-capitalism and anti-commercialism.

Two things bring the different elements together: first, the complete destruction of the prestige and moral authority of the old order—of the military, the war leaders, the weak and corrupt politicians, the compliant businessmen, the police, and the official ideologists; second, the continuing presence of the United States, which provides a convenient focus for the polarization of all discontent.

The modern protest in Japan consequently has a dual character: in part it is similar to types of protest well known in the Western advanced countries—anti-capitalism, the workers' struggle, anti-traditionalism, liberalism, etc., from an earlier phase, and the tensions of the mass society at a later stage; in part it has the tone of an under-developed country—assertive nationalism and occasionally even racialism, the feeling of a struggle for "true" national independence, and great hyper-sensitivity.

IV

Before we examine the historical stratigraphy of protest in Japan, let us look at the problem from a slightly different angle. Every protest movement, whether it develops into a full revolutionary movement or not, is a protest against a particular *status quo*. This *status quo* includes the dominant social consensus, the ruling political coalition, and the dominant ideology. In a country like Japan, we would also have to add: the prevailing balance of modernity and tradition. Each combination—each formula, as it were—includes some forces and excludes others; represents some and excludes others; satisfies some and arouses protest in others. It will be useful to identify in a general way just what combination a particular form of protest, rebelliousness, or revolutionary mood is directed against.

Meiji Japan's first coalition of triumphant junior *samurai* and court nobles started out in the 1870s and 1880s with several enormous advantages: the *élan* of revolutionary victory and powerful support of the legitimacy conferred upon it by the Imperial Throne. Yet it quickly evoked a protest from two sides. The conservative *samurai* protest, symbolized by Saigo Takamori, against over-Westernization and insufficient nationalism, was finally subdued only by large-scale military action. On the other hand, the excluded *samurai* and the small rural industrialists and landlords, who had no share in the new government, mounted a protest movement around the slogans of "people's rights" (*minken*) and "representative government" that eventually forced a reluctant regime to adopt a constitution and to establish a representative assembly. It was, to be sure, a strictly controlled system, and the autocratic oligarchy still held the power cards, but it was nevertheless the entering wedge for a line of development not anticipated by the Meiji leaders.

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[10] J. W. Bennett, H. Passin, and R. McKnight: *In Search of Identity* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958).

The new power balance of the oligarchy, at the center of power, and the military, a potential competitor, in the wings, still gave only minimal concessions to the upper-class rural and urban elements represented by the political parties, and certainly none at all to the mass of the peasantry and to the just-emerging working classes. Yet firm and forehanded as the oligarchy tried to be, it had not fully reckoned with the power of the new forces it had itself created by modernization and education. The new middle class—businessmen, and educated classes brought up in the new schools and exposed to a strong dose of Western ideas—were not content to be permanently excluded from a share in government. Expressing themselves mainly through the political parties, they pushed constantly for an enlargement of the franchise and greater power for the representative as against the autocratic element in the state. Their ultimate goal, if clearly formulated, would have been a fully responsible system of cabinet government, *i.e.*, a cabinet formed by the majority party of the elected assembly and responsible to it. Lower-class protest was, of course, firmly repressed.

The end of the First World War found a vastly changed Japan with a new central coalition. For the first time, business was accepted as a full partner with the political parties and the bureaucracy, the heir of the oligarchy of 40 years before. But enlarged as this coalition was, it still aroused the bitter and violent protest both of the new progressive element—the working class, which was enfranchised only in 1925, the Westernized liberals, the students, and the intellectuals—and of the conservative traditionalists, now represented primarily by the armed forces. In the struggle, which was a bitter one indeed, the party-business-bureaucracy regime was able to restrain the progressive forces; but with the incidents of May 15, 1932 and February 26, 1936, it fell before the forces of militant nationalism. From this time on a new power coalition dominated the Japanese scene, with the military as its center and the support of a fully compliant bureaucracy and a now chastened business class. Only defeat in the war finally destroyed it.

Reactive Nationalism. It is sometimes forgotten, now that Japan is such an old "new state," that she too began her modern career under the strong fear of Western domination. The earliest Western treaties with Japan imposed humiliating conditions, such as extraterritoriality and tariff control, that were completely thrown off only after Japan had proved that she was "worthy" of equal treatment by defeating China and Russia in war. Therefore, although Japan was never a colony, she shared the same feeling of inferiority toward the West as the colonial countries. A sensitive Japanese could not but feel the disparity between Western power and Japanese weakness. However he might regard his own traditional values and institutions as superior, this meant, in an effective sense, inferiority, at least in those matters that enter into the balance-sheet of national strength. What was necessary was to overcome this inferiority as quickly as possible and to draw level with the West.

The leading elements of the anti-Tokugawa coalition, the younger *samurai* of the western and southern fiefs, were motivated therefore not so much by abstract ideological considerations as by the practical need for Japan to strengthen herself against Western pressure. This entailed above all two things: the creation of a strong, efficient, centralized modern state apparatus, and the building of industrial-military power. All the reforms flowed from these two requirements: the ending of feudalism and its class system, industrialization and modern economic methods, a modern conscript army, and a modern educational system. In developing its new institutions, Japan looked to the West for suitable models. In other words, she had to Westernize herself in order to resist the West.

But this created a dilemma, which still remains to plague the Japanese, perhaps even as much today, now that Japan has gone through another "colonial" period of Occupation by a foreign power, as ever before: how to be Western and yet remain Japanese. The problem was already adumbrated as early as the late 18th and early 19th century by the so-called "Dutch scholars" (the students of Western learning through the medium of the Dutch language). Laboriously piecing out their picture of Western power, they arrived at the formula "Western science, but Eastern morals." With suitable modifications for geography, this formula has continued to echo down through the years as each new nation enters the orbit of modernization—in the form of the Indian spirit, or of pan-Arabism, or of the African personality. The extreme alternatives were: to retain the traditional structure intact, but simply to beef it up with Western arms and power—if it could have been conceived in the late 19th century, perhaps to give every *samurai* an atom bomb; or to replace the traditional system completely by some version of a generic Western society, even to the replacement of the Japanese language by English and the introduction of Christianity. No conceivable balance therefore was capable of satisfying all internal opinion. Even the minimal adjustments of the central Meiji leadership brought the conservative *samurai,* as early as the 1870s, into violent protest and finally into the climactic revolt of Saigo Takamori, which required the full military weight of the new regime to put down.

How fragile any consequent balance was may be seen in the rapid alternations of Westernization and reaction. Since 1868, Japan has gone through three such cycles. The early "Western fever" of the 1860s and 1870s was followed by the conservative reaction of the late 1880s which continued right down to the First World War. This period saw the formulation of the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor's Rescript on Education, the development of the Emperor myth, and the rise of "Japanism." The new wave of Westernism and liberalism after the First World War was followed in its turn by the victory of ultra-nationalist militarism. And the latest Western fever, or perhaps more accurately the "American fever," of the early Occupation period has been followed by a strong nationalist reaction, this time under the leadership of the left and the "progressive" forces.

The Working Class[11] *and Modern Industrial Society:* (1) *The Left.* The rapid industrialization of Japan created both a working class and its typical discontents. It also created a powerful tradition of working-class alienation from "the system." In spite of certain unique elements arising from special historical conditions and Japan's cultural background, the essential features in the picture are familiar to us from the experience of the working classes in the West. The Japanese working class, torn from the sustaining warmth of the organic peasant communities of the countryside, was severely exploited by a particularly arrogant and narrow-minded management, well aware of the trade advantages of a low-paid labor force in a modern industrial economy. From their very first appearance on the scene, the workers were kept under strict control, either by paternalism or outright repression.

Moreover, the working class was politically disfranchised for the first 60 years of the New Japan. Its acceptance into full citizenship in political society has been a grudging process. The liberal Kato-Shidehara Cabinet enacted full manhood suffrage, free of tax qualifications, in 1925. Characteristically it balanced this liberal measure by immediately passing a strengthened Peace Preservation Law to prevent the "overthrow of the Emperor system" and of the system of private property.

The workers' movements therefore found themselves, from the very start, ranged against the *status quo,* and anti-*status quo* ideologies, from anarchism to socialism and even Christian socialism, made their appearance as early as the beginning of the 20th century.[12] When the labor movement began to reveal its modern shape after the First World War, neither of the two central power coalitions of the 1920s and 1930s—neither the businessman-bureaucrat-politician combination of the early period nor the military-bureaucrat combination of the end of the period—could accommodate it. The working-class movement, therefore, particularly after the First World War, could not help but be anti-*status quo* and revolutionary. The Peace Preservation Law, thought control, and the growing suppression of radicalism, liberalism, and nonconformism drove it further to the left. Although the repression was largely effective while it lasted, and particularly in the late 1930s, once it was lifted after the war by the American Occupation, the power of this tradition became immediately apparent. The postwar leadership and ideologies brought to the fore were those most strongly opposed to the prewar regime—*i.e.*, leftists, socialists, and Marxists. From that time on a vastly expanded labor movement has maintained this strong leftist and class-struggle bias, with its corollary orientation towards political, rather than purely economic, action.

To some extent the rigors of control and repression were moderated by the projection of traditional paternalistic concepts into modern industry.[13] But this has always been a two-edged sword. Insofar as this paternalism gave genuine benefits, particularly to workers of limited horizons fresh from rural backgrounds, working in small enterprises, it did create a version of the happy family working harmoniously for the common interest. But once these three essential conditions no longer obtain, the system of paternalism simply becomes irksome to the workers, a further restraint on their full development. As the benefits, such as sick care, job guarantees, unemployment insurance, pensions, etc., become increasingly available through the impersonal mechanisms of the state, the need for the traditional system declines. The personal relation of employer and worker in a small enterprise is replaced by the impersonal imperatives of modern large-scale enterprise. At the same time, the increase in educational level, growing individuation, and the "demonstration effect" of the way of life of the upper classes, have altered the workers' willingness to continue in the position of a dependent and filial child of a benevolent father-boss.[14]

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[11] For a good account of the labor movement see the writings of Solomon Levine, particularly his *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1958); of James Abegglen, particularly his *The Japanese Factory* (Glencoe, 1958); and of Benjamin Martin.

[12] See Cecil Uehara: *Leftwing Social Movements in Japan: An Annotated Bibliography* (Tokyo, Tuttle, 1959).

The high class-consciousness, which characterizes much of the organized labor movement, is no new thing in Japan. It was, to be sure, stimulated by the course of the struggle and by the ideological outlook of the leadership. But it was already present in ample measure throughout society as a whole. Although Japan had left feudalism behind, it carried over the strong class bias of Tokugawa society, the disposition to see people in terms of class, and the sense of strong hierarchical barriers between superiors and inferiors. This class consciousness, along with the sense of alienation from the *status quo*, particularly among the leftist-dominated organized workers, has led to what I should like to call the "institutionalization" of the trade-union movement as a part of working class life. The workers have never been particularly responsive to the "proletarian literature" of the 1920s and 1930s, nor to their far less numerous postwar counterparts; but the unions have succeeded since the war in creating, to some extent, an area of "working-class culture." A wide range of social and cultural activities of organized workers are channelled through the union movement, in parallel, as it were, to similar activities in the non-trade-union world. The enormous variety of sports associations, singing clubs, women's auxiliaries, outings, and educational activities can take up much of the worker's leisure time. An interesting example is the Workers' Musical League (*Ro-on*), which provides music at low cost to workers. Through its large-scale booking of concert halls, musical organizations, and musicians, it has by now become an important factor in concert management and in musical life. The alliance of left intellectuals with organized workers, already in evidence in the 1920s, is similarly strengthened by union educational activities, which provide an outlet—as well as sometimes a source of income—to many professors, writers, and journalists. And, since "power goes with money" even in proletarian organizations, the dependence of the Japan Socialist Party on the financial support of the unions makes it more responsive to political pressures from the leftist unions than *vice versa*.

Apart from ideology and politics, one structural feature of the labor movement strongly reinforces its political orientation: its large proportion of government workers. The Japan Teachers' Union, with about 600,000 members, is both the largest union in Japan and one of the most political. In *Sohyo* (General Council of Trade Unions), the largest and most left of Japan's labor bodies (claimed membership about 3,400,000), approximately two-thirds of the members are government workers, either "public employees" or employees of government corporations, such as the national railways and communications. This means that in an important sense their "class enemy" is government itself, rather than private individuals or corporations, so that labor-management issues can only be negotiated with the political authority. Their interest in the composition of government, the orientation of the Cabinet, and the allocation of priorities in the national budget makes them very political.

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[13] A good account of the institutions of paternalism may be found in several articles by Iwao Ishino and John Bennett as well as in Levine, *op. cit.*, and Abegglen, *op. cit.* and particularly in Bennett and Ishino: *The Social Anthropology of Paternalism in Japan* (forthcoming—Minneapolis, University of Wisconsin Press).

[14] Benjamin Martin, "Japanese Mining Labor: The Miike Strike," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 30 (February 1961), p. 27, gives an extremely interesting example: "In the years immediately following the war the newly established Miike union was relatively docile and made little trouble for the management. The changing times did not seem to have outwardly affected labor-management relations but the customary arrogance of the mine executives, previously never challenged by the semi-literate miners of the old days, created an increasing sense of irritation among workers who were often as well educated as their superiors."

If I have emphasized the forces making for organized dissent in the working class, I do not wish to leave the impression that this is the whole picture. Certainly the organized working class is largely dominated by a leftist anti-*status quo* leadership and ideology. But the organized labor movement, numbering some 6.5 to 7 million members, is only about 25 percent of the total non-agricultural labor force of over 26 millions. Moreover, the most leftist of the unions, *Sohyo,* constitutes slightly less than half of the total union membership, and not all of this can be counted upon as absolutely obedient to the initiatives of the leadership. The leadership of the rival federation, the *Zenro,* along with the smaller associated *Sodemei,* is much more moderate.[14a]

(2) *The Right.* But there was in the interwar years a powerful rightist dissent from the liberal capitalist version of industrial society as well. For the fanatic partisans of the "Showa Restoration," intent on a new version of "Western science and Eastern morals," the balance of tradition and modernity was tilted the wrong way. The true national polity (*kokutai*) they wished to see established was not conceivable in the corruption, divisiveness, and egotism of the existing order. Their targets therefore became the corrupt political parties, with their unseemly squabbling, partisan spirit, bribery, and indifference to the national interest; the selfish capitalists, who had already earned their undying hatred by a greater concern for profits and low taxes than for the needs of the military; liberalism; Western influence; and internationalism. The military contempt for capitalism was reinforced by an important structural feature of the Japanese army. The majority of recruits were from the peasantry, and many of the junior officers were themselves of peasant or small landowner stock. The normal conservative peasant distrust of the corrupt Westernized cities was exacerbated by the agrarian depression; and since the peasants had virtually no other channels of protest, it was the junior officers, extremely sensitive to the problems of the countryside and the worries of their troops, who undertook to express them.

Lt. Col. Aizawa Saburo, for example, on trial for the murder in 1935 of Gen. Nagata, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, explained his motive as follows: "When I thought of these things [the sad state of the country, the impoverishment of the peasants, the official scandals, and the weakness of foreign policy], I could not merely pass the time giving military training to my regiment." In like manner, the junior officer Goto Akinori explained his part in the May 15, 1932, incident in similar terms:

> . . . The impoverishment of the agricultural villages is the cause of grave concern for thoughtful persons. It is extremely dangerous that while soldiers from the villages expose themselves to death at the front they should have to worry about their starving families. . . . In utter disregard of the poverty-stricken farmers the fabulously rich continue their pursuit of private gain. Meanwhile the children of the farmers are so poor that they must go to school in the morning without breakfast. . . . To let a day go by without doing something is to endanger the army one day longer, was my thought.[15]

Thus, while the working class and liberal protest was coming increasingly under Marxist, socialist, and liberal influence, the rightist anticapitalist protest was finding its ideologists in Kita Ikki,[16] Gondo Seikyo, and Okawa Shumei with their notions of "socialism under the Emperor," "agrarian socialism," and "revolutionary imperial socialism." It is therefore not surprising that the militarist and ultra-nationalist terrorists of the 1930s invariably numbered the representatives of the "plutocracy" among their victims, along with the politicians and the other "evil advisers" who were "misleading the Emperor."

Defeat and Occupation. Japan's crushing defeat in the war has been as traumatic an experience as the intrusion of the West in the late 19th century, and it has reopened many of the same dilemmas, however modern their dress. The difference is that now the balance of forces has changed. The authority and legitimacy of the old order were destroyed, and the hitherto suppressed progressive forces were released into the mainstream of national life.

The collapse of the old order implicated not only the military and the ultra-nationalists, but everything that appeared to be associated with it: the older generation, the compliant politicians and businessmen, the family system, and "Japanese tradition" itself.[17] The result was, in the words of Takeyama Michio, that "the Japanese jumped to the conclusion that historic Japan in its entirety was wrong, and there followed a period of bitter self-rejection and self-indictment."[18] Moreover, bad as the old system may have been, it had given meaning and purpose to life, a way of seeing the world, and an opportunity for service and sacrifice to a larger cause. The search for a new ideology and a new synthesis inevitably brought many people to Marxism, which had already been a powerful force among the progressives of the '20s and the '30s, since it was the only fully elaborated system of thought that was both comprehensive and also not discredited by the past. It appealed to the purely intellectual need for systematic understanding, and it appealed to the need for purpose and self-sacrifice. Western liberalism was too tepid, neither comprehensive nor demanding enough; and later, as we shall see, it was compromised by its association with "capitalism" and with the United States. For many people searching for something pure, uncontaminated by the war and the hated past, the communists had a special appeal; as the principal victims and opponents of the militarists, they were virtually the only uncompromised political force, if only for the reason that all of their leaders were either in jail or in exile. Tsurumi Shunsuke, a leading young intellectual, himself American-educated, has explained this very brilliantly in a fascinating account of why he supports the Japan Communist Party even though he is not a Marxist. The recent revival of religious sects, which have mushroomed all over Japan, undoubtedly represents another form of search for synthesis. Significantly the religious resurgence has not gone into the traditional channels of Shintoism, Buddhism, or even Christianity, but into deviant and newly established messianic religions.

[14a] On April 26, 1962, these two unions plus several other independents joined together in a new federation called the General Council of Japan Labor Organizations (*Domei Kaigi*) with a claimed membership of 1.4 millions.

[15] Translated from materials made available by Mr. Tokuyama Jiro.

[16] See in particular his *Nihon Kaizō Hōan Taikō* (Outline Plan for the Reconstruction of Japan), his most important work.

[17] Indicative of this outlook is the title of a study by one of Japan's leading sociologists,

At the same time that the discredited conservative forces were being held back by purges and the disfavor of the Occupation, the progressive forces were being given their head. A tremendous outburst of "democratic" energies, along with the continuing American reforms, touched almost every sector of Japanese life. In the first period of the Occupation, this force was strongly identified with the United States, and the ensuing Americanization of Japan began to take on epidemic proportions. But the early enthusiasm, particularly of the intellectuals, soon gave way to an inevitable reaction. Unfortunately this wholly expectable nationalist reaction coincided with an apparently new direction in American policy, to some extent a result of the cold war. The liberals felt deeply betrayed; America's reactionary "reverse course," as they termed it, was forcing them to defend the American reforms not only against the conservatives, but against the Americans themselves.

Another important development has been the emergence of a powerful streak of nihilism, particularly among the youth. The rapid changes, the confusions, the "transvaluation of values," and the discrediting of the old authority without its replacement by a new, have created what the Japanese themselves refer to as a "spiritual void." Nor is this entirely new. Nihilism has long had a deep appeal to modern Japanese, as we can see in the undiminished popularity of Dostoievsky,[19] for example, or in such important Japanese novelists as Akutagawa Ryunosuke and Dazai Osamu. Characteristically it has been non-political and anti-traditional, asserting the priority of individual judgment over social convention and judgment. Therefore eroticism, both as pure, primary experience and as a form of Sade's criticism of civil society, plays an important role. The "*ero-gro*" (erotic and grotesque) literature of the 1920s has been succeeded by the postwar eroticism and hedonism of Tamura Taijiro, whose *Nikutai no Mon* (*The Gates of the Flesh*) opened the movement, and Ishihara Shinichiro, its greatest hero. Ishihara's *Taiyozoku* (*Tribe of the Sun*), which rapidly became a runaway best-seller, gave the movement its form and even its name. Japan's *taiyozoku* now take their place as the counterpart of the angry young men, the *stilyagi*, and the beatniks of other countries.

But although it considers itself non-political, its anti-conventional hedonism cannot fail to be implicitly political. As an all-out rejection of "the system," it implies its own politics of dissent against tradition, custom, authority, political leadership, and the *status quo*. Nor should this be too surprising when we reflect that England's angry young men are probably well represented in the unilateralist movement and

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Prof. Kawashima Takeyoshi, *The Family System as Ideology*.

[18] Takeyama Michio, "Tradition and Japanese Youth," *Japan Quarterly*, July–September 1960.

[19] Russian literature has had, in some ways, a greater appeal to modern Japanese intellectuals than that of any other country. Already in the early and middle Meiji period, the great Russians of the 19th century were well known, and the nihilism of Vera Zasulich, Bakunin and Dostoievsky were as popular as the idealistic anarchism of Kropotkin and Tolstoy.

that America's beatniks seemed for a while to find in Fidel Castro their own "existentialist hero." The nihilism will therefore lead either to an unresolved despair, which will continuously corrode authority, or to the search for a resolution, which under present conditions is most likely to mean the acceptance of a "revolutionary"—that is, an anti-*status quo*—authority. This streak is found among the leaders of the student Zengakuren, particularly among those who are so revolutionary that they cannot even accept the authority of the Japanese Communist Party and must regard the Soviet Union and Communist China as already too reactionary for them.[20]

The complicating element in the postwar situation is the position of the United States. The United States has managed, by its massive presence, to become bound up with the profoundest divisions within the country on both internal and external questions. It is identified with the anti-progressive side on virtually all the important and symbolic issues in the country: rearmament, the revival of the power of the military, the restoration of the police power, the revision of the Constitution, the strengthening of the conservative elements, the reversal of the Occupation reforms, and the absence of formal diplomatic relations with Communist China. Its presence is a continuing affront to a reviving nationalist sentiment. If we were to formulate the standard view of the Japanese progressives, it would run somewhat as follows: "fascist and imperialist United States, the home of monopoly capitalism, is supporting Japan's conservatives, backed by Japan's own monopoly capitalists, in power in order to keep the country in a state of economic and political dependence so that she can continue to use the military bases as a springboard for aggression." The maintenance of American bases, the Japanese-American Security Treaty, and continued economic dependence upon the United States reinstate deep memories of the "unequal treaties" of Meiji times. In the words of Asanuma Inejiro, the recently assassinated General Secretary of the Japan Socialist Party:

> . . . we must struggle for peace and independence, and carry on the struggle for the return of Okinawa to Japan, the struggle for restoration of normal relations with Communist China and the struggle against nuclear bombs. We must combine all these struggles into one struggle for revision of the unequal Security Pact and connect this struggle with the struggle for the people's welfare.[21]

The *status quo*, then, against which Japanese discontent directs itself, is, symbolically, the Japanese-American alliance. This may, I think, explain something about the intensity of the May–June demonstrations against the Security Treaty as well as about the peculiar intensity of Japanese feelings on the recognition of Communist China, now one of the central issues in Japanese politics. For many, China has become the symbol of "true national independence" and of Japan's right to self-direction. Since America has been the principal obstacle to the restoration of normal relations, the assertion of friendship to China offers the added thrill of thumbing one's nose at America. That successive conservative governments, regularly re-elected by almost two-thirds of the voters, continue a policy of non-recognition is put down to mere supine obedience to America. The result is that the "China Boom," which swept the country from 1953 onwards, has taken on the character of an emotional crusade, and Japanese visitors to the mainland now outnumber those of any other nationality. Not all, even among the progressives, would be prepared to agree with the extreme proposition, frequently formulated by Japanese visitors to China in joint statements with their Chinese hosts, that "the United States is the common enemy of the Chinese and the Japanese people," but the logic of it is hard to resist.

In the new version of the old game of "how can I be both Japanese and Western," the cards are cut in a different way. Before the war, to be anti-traditional meant to be somehow "un-Japanese." But today, thanks to the United States and to the contempt for the old order, one can be both anti-traditional and 100-per cent Japanese. It is the conservatives, America's allies, who have to prove that they are not the "catspaw of foreign imperialism"—even if only "objectively." Raymond Aron has somewhere commented on the "Americanized Japanese who detest their American teachers."

The "Mass Society." Let us now return to the question, whether the political trend will continue long enough to bring the progressives into office. Sixteen years after the end of the war, the kind of internal situation assumed by this extrapolation can probably no longer be accepted. Japan's spectacular and sustained rate of economic growth,[22] perhaps the highest in the world, has brought her a long way into the era of mass abundance, mass society, and mass culture. It is true that the Japanese economy still remains extremely vulnerable, but so far the continuing prosperity has brought about far-reaching changes. The standard of living has been rising continuously, the surplus rural population is being absorbed so rapidly that a farm and small-town labor shortage is beginning to make its appearance, agricultural production has been increasing despite the predictions of experts that this was impossible, the wage gap between large and small enterprise has been narrowing, and—*mirabile dictu*—even mechanization has been growing on the tiny farms the experts adjudged too small for mechanization.[23] The outward consequences of these changes are all too evident. My own personal impression on visiting Japan early in 1960 after an absence of some two-and-a-half years was that everybody I knew had gained one inch in girth. The rate of ownership of the standard attractions of the mass consumption society—television, radio, washing machines, refrigerators, transistor radios, cameras, modern kitchen equipment—now compares favorably with that of Western Europe. Automobile ownership has already reached the middle classes solidly, and there seems no reason to doubt that within a measurable period it will be as common among the working classes as in Western Europe. In short, Japan is now beginning to savor the mixed blessings of advanced industrial society in its high-consumption phase: economic abundance and the insoluble traffic jams of Ginza and Marunouchi; universal literacy along with soap operas and comic books; air-conditioning and suburbia. It is still too early to assess all of the consequences of these structural changes: the *embourgeoisement* of the working classes, particularly of the organized workers; the growth of the "*sarariman*" (salaryman), Japan's version of the middle class salariate and white-collar element; the absolute decline of the labor force in the primary production sectors (farming, fishery, and forestry), along with stability in the secondary sectors (manufacturing) and a vast increase in the tertiary sectors; a general narrowing of the gap in outlook and standards among the classes; the terrible overcrowding of the cities; a growing shift in agriculture to mechanization and capital-intensive production (dairying, poultry, meat, and specialty crops).

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[20] See the extremely illuminating article by Lewis Feuer, "A Talk With Zengakuren," *The New Leader*, May 1, 1961.

[21] Preface to "Decisions at the Regular Convention of the Japan Socialist Party, 1957," quoted in Nakamura Kikuo, "Party Politics," *New*

There are still other changes in the offing whose effects we are not yet in a position to estimate. Educated unemployment, for example, has been an endemic feature of Japanese life since the 1920s. Although the supply-demand situation has fluctuated, Japanese university graduates retain a sharp memory of the fear of joblessness. The Occupation-sponsored reform of the educational system, which raised the university population almost 10 times to its present high of over 700,000 students, only intensified the insecurity, coming as it did in the midst of the postwar economic confusion. But the last few years have seen a radical change; in some categories, available jobs now far exceed the number of candidates. What will happen to student radicalism after several years without fear of unemployment? And what happens to the radical student, even today, we might ask, once he has found a job with a steady future and with some scope for advancement? In some cases there is a rapid subsidence of radical feelings, perhaps even a growing identification with the "establishment"; in others, a new form of dissatisfaction, not unknown in the West, a groping for meaning, adventure, and purpose. The generation of students educated entirely in the schools reformed by the American Occupation is just beginning to enter the universities. They come with a completely different background and outlook from the "*après-guerre*" students who have until now dominated the scene. With no personal experience of the war, free of the traditional ethics of subservience and self-effacement, encouraged to express their individuality, they are bound to be different from the embittered, disillusioned postwar students who could still their self-doubts, self-hatred, and insecurity only with radicalism and Marxism. Many of them may still see in Marxism the synthesis of their needs for meaning, purpose, and self-definition; others may start out on new paths in their new, affluent society.

Leader, Section II (Supplement entitled "Japan Today"), November 28, 1960.

[22] Betwen 1947 and 1952 the average annual GNP growth rate was 11.5 per cent; between 1953 and 1959, 8.3 per cent. From April 1959 to March 1960, the growth rate reached the extraordinary figure of 17 per cent, while mining and manufacturing production increased 29 per cent over fiscal year 1958.

[23] To cite two examples: between 1933 and 1958, the number of hand tractors in use went up from 1,000 to 337,800; threshing machines from 67,000 to 2,343,400. The current figures would undoubtedly show another important increase. See Fukushima Yoichi: "Agricultural Technology," *Japan Quarterly*, July–September 1960.

Suffice it to say, in some respects recent Western experience will be a better guide to what is happening than the immediate Japanese past.

The observer cannot fail to be struck by the enormous gap between these new developments—the "objective situation," as the socialists would call it—and the awareness of it, particularly on the left. The leftist slogans, which seem much more appropriate to the depressed 1930s, or even, in certain ways, to the extreme nationalist phase of some colonial movement, strike one as strangely out of tune with the developing reality. Many leftists have had the greatest difficulty in accepting the evidence of growth before their very eyes. As late as six years ago, a leading academic economist offered the challenging thesis that Japan needed a crash program to achieve a sustained growth of 4 per cent; that very year, the actual growth rate was over 8 per cent. Japan's most distinguished and senior agricultural economist recently acknowledged to me that even in his wildest moments he could not have anticipated the changes. "In fact," he said, "I can still hardly believe them. If anybody tells you that five years ago he could have predicted this, then he is lying." The implications of the new situation are just beginning to percolate into the consciousness of Japanese intellectual life. Increasingly we find discussions of the "new middle class," or even of the "new intellectuals"; and the problem of "*rei-ja*" (the Japanese pronunciation of the English "leisure"—a new and very popular word in the Japanese vocabulary) has become a major issue in the mass media, eliciting much the same range of comments on mass society and mass culture that we are so familiar with in Europe and America. In a sense, what we are seeing is a race between the trend line, based upon an earlier set of conditions, and the new situation: which will arrive first, the projection of the trend to 50 per cent plus one, or a full awareness of the new situation?

THE LIMITS OF SELF-DETERMINATION: THE CASE OF THE KATANGA SECESSION

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Not the least paradoxical aspect of the United Nations mandate in the Congo, as described in the three-power resolution adopted by the Security Council on November 24, 1961, is that it was designed to prevent the exercise of a right which is explicitly recognized by the Charter. In effect, by "completely rejecting the claim of the Katanga as a sovereign independent Nation" and "recognizing the government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo," the authors of the resolution clearly denied the provincial authorities of the Katanga the right to self-determination.[1] Similarly, the support given by the United States government to the resolution, reaffirmed in several official statements, seems hardly compatible with our long-standing moral commitment to the Wilsonian principle that "the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity that the great and powerful states expect and insist upon."[2] Actually, what may at first sight appear to be a sign of inconsistency is rather a reflection of the fundamental ambiguity in the concept of self-determination.

It is generally admitted that the principle of self-determination refers to the right of a people to determine their own political destiny; but beyond this very broad definition, no legal criteria determine which groups may legitimately claim this right in particular cases. No universally accepted standards mark the measure of freedom a group of people must presumably enjoy before they can exercise it. Nothing approaching a consensus of opinion exists regarding the feasibility of the principle itself. As a concept it cannot be stated in terms applicable to any given context. As a result, it has been both a factor of cohesion and a source of disunity depending on the circumstances in which the question has arisen.[3]

The record of civil wars and partitions that have blocked the formation of larger territories, or caused the collapse of an original consensus, shows how self-determination has frequently been invoked to justify secession. In the second half of the last century, the American Civil War, and the Sonderbund in Switzerland, nearly destroyed two of today's most successful federal experiments. During the post-World War II period, under the pressure of anticolonial sentiment, and as a result of the polarization of international power politics, the process of territorial fragmentation initiated in the heyday of the Wilsonian era reached its peak. In Germany, Korea and Viet-Nam, fundamental differences of opinion over the way in which self-determination ought to be carried out have divided these states along lines which demarcate the spheres of influence of the two major blocs; in each case ideological and power barriers cut across otherwise homogeneous communities. On the other hand, where one finds plural societies, as in many countries of Asia and Africa, the elimination of colonial rule has decisively encouraged demands for secession on the part of ethnically or religiously distinct communities. In India, for example, the tensions between Moslem and Hindu eventually provoked a three-way split between India proper, West Pakistan, speaking Urdu and Punjabi, and East Pakistan, speaking Bengali. Similarly, in many of the emergent states of Africa, and in the Congo more than in any other territory, the fear of domination of one ethnic or tribal group by another has tended to accelerate the trend toward the "balkanization" of the continent. In practice therefore, and despite the efforts of the participants in the San Francisco Conference to rule out the possibility of secession, self-determination has either legitimized or encouraged territorial divisions.[4]

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[1] See UN document S/5002 (S/4985/Rev. 1, as amended); *cf.* UN Charter, Articles 1 and 55.

[2] Cited by former Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy in "The Principle of Self-Determination in International Relations," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 33, No. 857 (November 28, 1955), p. 889. The official viewpoint of the administration on the Katanga secession was clearly stated in the address delivered in Los Angeles on December 19, 1961, by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, reproduced in *Africa Report* (January 1962), p. 17.

[3] As one authority remarked, "[self-determination] might mean incorporation into a state, or some measure of autonomy within a state, or a somewhat larger degree of freedom in a federation or commonwealth or union, or it might mean complete independence," Clyde Eagleton, "The Excesses of Self-Determination," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 14 (July 1953), p. 594. For an interesting discussion of the problems raised in its application, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), esp. chs. 16 and 17. See also Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (London, New York, Toronto, 1945), and Benjamin Rivlin, *Self-Determination and Dependent Areas*, International Conciliation, No. 501 (January 1955).

The purpose of this paper is not to present a a case "for" or "against" the secession of the Katanga, although the reader will not be left in doubt about the author's stand on this issue. Nor is it to relate in any detailed fashion the sequence of events leading to it. The main concern is to examine the factors underlying the secession of the Katanga as they bear upon the more general problems posed by the "excesses of self-determination." More specifically, the analysis focuses on those factors which seem particularly relevant to an understanding of two central issues raised by partition: when does partition become inevitable? When does it become desirable?

I. PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Among the background elements of the Katanga secession, special attention must be paid to at least two underlying factors of disunity: (1) regional differences in the scale of economic development, and (2) areal disparities in the numerical importance and economic status of the settler population. These have been the major determinants of the recurrent conflicts between the Katanga provincial authorities and the central government on the one hand, and among the provincial leaders on the other. This section examines the way in which economic factors have influenced the political options of the Katanga leaders.

With a population of 1,709,659—approximately 13 per cent of the total population of the country—the Katanga was in 1960 one of the most sparsely populated of all the Congo provinces. Thanks to the diversity and sheer abundance of its subsoil resources it underwent a rapid and spectacular development in postwar years. Between 1950 and 1957 the total value of its mineral output increased by 57 per cent, jumping from 5,569.3 to 8,764.5 million Belgian francs; this was estimated to be approximately 80 per cent of the total value of the minerals extracted in the Congo in 1957. Its main source of revenue came from the exploitation of its copper deposits, so vast and easy of access that they have been called a "geological scandal." Moreover some 60 per cent of the world's cobalt and an appreciable, though undisclosed, percentage of its uranium came from the Katanga. It also held a virtual monopoly in the Congo's production of tin, silver, platinum, lead, palladium and zinc.[5]

This wealth is sometimes identified with one of the Congo's largest operating companies, the *Union Miniere du Haut Katanga* (UMHK), founded in 1906 to prospect the mineral resources of an area some 20,000 square kilometers in extent.[6] UMHK ranked as one of the free world's first producers of cobalt and uranium, and the world's third producer of copper; this is a rough indicator of its part in developing the economic potential of the province. In 1955 the company had gross profits of 125 million dollars, of which 54 million were distributed in dividends after taxes and other prior changes. Furthermore, it produced for its own consumption or for sale a variety of industrial by-products, and held a substantial share of the *Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga* (*Beceka*). Ultimate control over the UMHK, however, was exercized by the *Société Générale de Belgique*, unquestionably the most powerful of the five corporate groups which, until recently, dominated the Congo economy.

This overwhelming concentration of economic resources within the boundaries of the Katanga, and of capital in the hands of a single expatriate enterprise, has obvious political implications. For one thing, the dependence of the Katanga on Belgian technicians and investments tends to suggest that the chances of success of a secession depended, to a considerable extent, on the external support of Belgian interests. But this limitation on its feasibility did not make secession less desirable in the minds of the provincial authorities. In fact, as already noted, the position of the Katanga in relation to the other provinces has always been the source of profound economic grievances on the part of its resident population. Like the Ivory Coast in relation to the other states of French West Africa, the Katanga was viewed in some quarters as "the cow that the other territories never tired of milking."[7] This feeling, however, was not uniformly shared by the African population, nor was it sufficiently strong to supersede all tensions among ethnic groups.

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[4] The delegates to the San Francisco Conference were not unaware of these divisive implications. One Committee Report for example emphasized that "the principle [of self-determination] conformed to the Charter insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession," *UN Conference on International Organization* (New York, 1945) Vol. 6, p. 226, cited in Benjamin Rivlin, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

[5] See *Bulletin de la Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*, No. 12 (December 1958), p. 462 ff.; and *La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi en 1957*, Ministère des Colonies (Bruxelles, 1958), p. 49.

[6] For a global appraisal of the economic activities of the UMHK see Pierre Joye, *Les Trusts en Belgique* (Bruxelles, 1960), p. 121 ff. and Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin, *Les Trusts au Congo* (Bruxelles, 1961). *Cf.* "The Colonial Big Five," *Fortune* (November 1952), p. 113 ff.

The persistence of ethnic particularisms has been reinforced by two salient features of the Katanga. One is the heavy concentration of industrial activities in the southern part of the province—in the Lualaba and Haut Katanga districts, particularly, where the three major mining centers of Elizabethville, Jadotville and Kolwezi are located. This unevenness of industrial development, also reflected in areal differences in the distribution of social overhead capital—commercial centers, communication facilities, schools, hospitals, etc.—has meant in effect that an important segment of the population of the northern region, the Baluba, has remained largely insulated from the unsettling influences generated by the spread of urbanization.

Secondly, given the paucity of the Katangan labor resources and the exigencies of its various industrial activities, the UMHK has tended to recruit a substantial part of its labor force from the populations of the Kasai Province. In 1956, for example, it was estimated that 35 per cent of the population of the *centre extra-coutumier* of Elizabethville, and 53 per cent of the workers employed by the UMHK at the Lubumbashi mine originated from the Kasai.[8] The presence of "alien" elements whose language, customs and traditions differed considerably from those of the resident tribes has made them all the more conscious of their mutual differences. The Baluba of the Kasai, for example, who constitute the bulk of the workers employed by the UMHK, although ethnically related to the Baluba of the Katanga, nevertheless form a distinct cultural group. Important cultural, linguistic and historical factors have also marked them off from the Lunda, the Bayeke, the Tshokwe and other tribes of the Haut Katanga. Moreover, the fact that they were physically removed from their customary areas and permanently exposed to an industrial environment probably accounts for their greater receptivity to "national" symbols.

Qualifications must therefore be attached to the proposition that the Katanga represents, in terms of its economic development, a distinct geographical entity. In point of fact, the impact of urbanization and industrialization has largely been confined to the southern districts. And insofar as it has affected specific tribes to the exclusion of others, it has not only produced striking contrasts in the ecology of the province but profound social and political tensions among its native populations.

II. ORGANIZATION, GOALS AND TACTICS OF SETTLER INTERESTS

If, as noted earlier, the Katanga is the most thinly populated area of the Congo, with a density of 3.44 per square kilometers, it was nevertheless in 1958 the province where European settlers were the most numerous. With a non-African population of 34,047 the Katanga claimed in 1956 about 31 per cent of the total European population of the Congo and a ratio of Europeans to Africans approximating 20.8 per thousand, as against 10.3 for the Leopoldville Province.[9]

The influx of European elements into the Katanga is a relatively recent phenomenon, motivated by the sudden opening of apparently unlimited economic opportunities. The province counted 4,824 Europeans in 1924 and 11,341 in 1947.[10] By 1958 some 31,847 Europeans lived in the Katanga, yet only 2,310 of these could be regarded as *bona fide* settlers, the rest consisting of temporarily employed or assigned civil servants, industrialists, technicians and missionaries. Moreover, only 52 per cent of Katangese settlers could claim Belgian nationality. Finally, the occupational distribution of the settler population, though indicating a heavy proportion of merchants and industrialists as well as a generous sprinkling of professional jobs, remained highly diversified.

The absence of a numerous, homogeneous and permanently settled non-African population, which was in a large measure the result of a conscious attempt on the part of the Belgian government to retain unfettered control over the affairs of its former colony,[11] admittedly weakened the prospects of European dominance in the Katanga. Similarly, the recency of European settlement as well as the lack of a strong cultural cohesion among the *colons* has probably limited the latter's capacity to identify their future with that of the province. Yet, despite these potential handicaps, the European population of the Katanga has been at the forefront of pro-settler activities.

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[7] See Elliot J. Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (June 1960), pp. 391–405.

[8] See E. Toussaint, "L'Avenir de la Population Bantoue du Haut Katanga Industriel," *Congrès Scientifique d'Elizabethville,* Vol. 6 (Elizabethville, 1956), p. 45.

[9] *La Situation Economique du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi en 1958,* Ministère des Colonies (Bruxelles, 1959), p. 22.

[10] *Rapport Annuel sur la Colonie du Congo Belge en 1924,* p. 83; *ibid,* 1947, p. 258.

One of the earliest settler organizations to appear on the Congolese scene was the *Union pour la Colonisation* (*Ucol*), founded in May 1944 for the purpose of "deploying all efforts to obtain for the white population of the Congo the liberties granted by the Belgian Constitution to its nationals, and to promote by all available means the growth of European colonization."[12] The organization had representatives in each of the provinces and in Ruanda-Urundi, but its seat was in Elizabethville and most of its 400 dues-paying members registered in 1947 were drawn from the Katanga. An effort was made to reach a measure of social cohesion through periodic meetings and the diffusion of an official organ, the monthly *Ucol*; but there was in fact little or no coordination among its several branches.

The awareness of increasing threats to their respective interests induced the *colons* to close their ranks behind a new organization, the *Fédération des Associations de Colons du Congo Congo et du Ruandu-Urundi*, in short the *Fedacol*. This roof-organization, set up in 1950, constituted the settlers' response to the introduction of a draft-decree on the "assimilation and immatriculation of civilized natives," on the floor of the *Conseil de Gouvernement*.[13] Its explicit aims were "the defense of the *colonat* and colonization" and "a rapid and harmonious development of European settlement in the Congo."[14] While the chairmanship of the organization was assigned, on a rotating basis, to a different provincial delegate every year, the organizational structure of the *Fedacol* made allowance for a Permanent Executive Committee and a delegate in Brussels. The appointment of representatives to metropolitan agencies, such as the *Société du Crédit au Colonat et à l'Industrie*, and the organization of lobbying activities designed to enlist the support of Belgian deputies, contributed to transform the *colonat* into a powerful pressure group.[15] Its spokesmen also availed themselves of the communications net offered by the colonial press to make their voices heard. Moreover, its representatives in the *Conseil de Gouvernement* were fully conscious of their "pressure-group" functions, as evidenced by the number of settler-sponsored *voeux* introduced at its yearly sessions.

Yet, for all its efforts to achieve some measure of solidarity among the *colons*, the *Fedacol* only earned the effective support of a small fraction of the settler population of the Congo. The figures in Table I indicate that only one-fourth of the *bona fide* settler population of the colony belonged to the *Fedacol* in 1959. But the

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[11] Drawing a distinction between the *colonie de peuplement* where "immigrants bring along with themselves their own laws and institutions, exercize political rights and control over the local institutions," and the *colonie d'encadrement* "where the metropole has established its sovereignty over a numerous native population and [where] local government merely exercizes delegated powers," the late Professor Marzorati unambiguously identified the former Belgian Congo with the latter type of dependency. See M. A. Marzorati, "L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Congo," *Compte Rendu des Journées Universitaires d'Etudes Coloniales* (Bruxelles, 1952), p. 8.

This distinction reinforced the Belgian government's determination to withhold political rights from both Africans and Europeans. It also provided a rationale for allowing admission into the colony only to those elements that seemed sufficiently capable or resourceful not to become "public burdens" or embittered agitators.

[12] Article 2 of the statutes of the Ucol; *Ucol* (Elizabethville), February 1947.

[13] Their reaction was expressed by the Chairman of the *Fedacol* in the following terms: "The European community is too much aware of the excellency of Western civilization to let it run the slightest risk of being submerged under the flood of a hydrid combination of civilization and barbary," *L'Opinion Publique devant l'Assimilation des Indigènes* (Bruxelles, 1951), p. 3.

[14] See "La Fédération des Classes Moyennes," CRISP, *Courrier Africain*, No. 25 (July 1959), p. 19 ff.

[15] The record suggests that the Belgian Liberal Party (PLB) displayed the most emphatic support for the views and aspirations of the *colonat*. See in particular the declarations made before the Chamber of Representatives by the Liberal deputy Lahaye, *Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants*, April 21, 1959, p. 13 ff. Similarly, the conservative daily *La Libre Belgique*, whose views tend to reflect the opinions of the Social Christian Party (PSC), has at times expressed an overt sympathy towards settler interests.

TABLE I. PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE FEDACOL MEMBERSHIP, 1959

Province	Non-African Population	Settler Population	Membership Fedacol	
			Affiliated Members	Per Cent of Settler Pop.
Leopoldville	32,143	1,966	148	7.5
Equateur	6,501	599	110	18.3
Orientale	15,473	1,850	607	32.8
Kivu	12,788	1,397	470	29.4
Katanga	33,918	3,065	975	31.8
Kasai	8,634	544	174	31.9
Total	109,457	9,621	2,484	25.8

Source: "La Fédération des Classes Moyennes," *CRISP, Courrier Africain,* No. 25 (July 1959), p. 3.

Katanga, significantly enough, made the heaviest contribution. Furthermore, and this is symptomatic of regional disparities in settler solidarity, only 7.5 per cent of the total settler population of the Leopoldville Province was affiliated to the *Fedacol,* as against 31.8 per cent in the Katanga.

In their quest for a *modus vivendi* the *colons* relentlessly emphasized their wish to obtain a meaningful share of authority in the conduct of colonial affairs. This aim, viewed as a corollary of the social and economic transformation of the colony, and as a prerequisite for the establishment of mutually satisfactory relations between the African and the European communities, had already found expression in the statutes of the *Ucol.* It was upheld in several statements made by the spokesmen of the *colonat* before the *Commission du Colonat* and the *Conseil Colonial National,* as well as in a number of motions presented to the advisory organs of the colony.[16] In fact, it had earlier provided a basis for the draft proposal of administrative reorganization presented to the Belgian government in 1920 on behalf of the European population of the Katanga by Monseigneur de Hemptinne, former bishop of the Katanga, M. de Meulemeester, president of the Court of Appeals of Elizabethville, General Wangermée, former Vice Governor General of the Katanga who was at the time representing the UMHK, and several other prominent personalities.[17]

By 1956 it had become obvious to all but the settlers that the Durham formula did not hold much attraction for the Belgian government as a solution to the dilemmas posed by the first manifestations of nationalist assertions. Indeed, in the Katanga and elsewhere in the colony it appeared unlikely that the establishment of settler-controlled institutions would ever become a reality. Yet, in spite of the seemingly indifferent attitude of metropolitan authorities, the *colons* of the Katanga became increasingly committed to the idea of dominion status for the Province. Thus, in an article entitled "Pour un Statut de Dominion au Katanga," an anonymous defender of settler interests wrote in the issue of October 26, 1956 of *L'Essor du Congo:*

> The Katanga should form immediately a distinct political entity administered by a Vice Governor General appointed by the King and assisted in his functions by a council whose members would be chosen among the personalities proposed by the various economic corporations which partake in the economic activities of the country.

This, however, was envisaged as the first step towards "the accession of the Katanga to dominion status."

Far from reflecting an isolated or eccentric viewpoint, this conception of the future character of the Katangese polity was typical of the opinions shared by the vast majority of settlers. The propinquity of the Rhodesias and South Africa has of course helped to accelerate to movement for dominion status under white domination in the years preceding independence.[18] But there are also important historical reasons for this parochial outlook.

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[16] As early as 1925 the *Association des Colons Belges* introduced a motion to the *Comité Regional du Katanga* in which they urged the "competent authorities" "to examine the way in which they could facilitate the exercise of their political rights"; *Comité Régional, Katanga,* 1926, p. 159. In 1946, speaking on behalf of the *Ucol* before the *Commission du Colonat,* a prominent spokesman of the *colonat* stated: "The Belgian *colon* does not want to be regarded as a foreigner in a country which is now his. The Congo must therefore remain a Belgian entity, perhaps in the form of a British dominion"; *Commission du Colonat, Procès Verbaux* (Bruxelles, 1946), p. 30. And in 1953, the delegate of the *Ucol* to the *Conseil Colonial National* declared that "the establishment of legislative, executive and judicial authorities in the the Congo" was "the immediate objective of the settler population"; *Congrès Colonial National, 9ème session* (Bruxelles, 1953), p. 140.

[17] See *Le Gouvernement du Congo Belge: Projet de Réorganisation Administrative* (Elizabethville, 1920); *cf.* Jean Sépulchre, *Propos sur le Congo Politique de Demain: Autonomie et Féderalisme* (Elizabethville, 1958), p. 48.

[18] The influence exerted by the Union of South

It must be remembered, first of all, that settlement processes in the Katanga were initiated and carried out under the auspices of a quasi-independent agency, the *Comité Special du Katanga* (CSK). It was responsible not only for the granting of freehold property and mining concessions but also for the administration of a Colonization Department whose principal function was to promote, in every possible way, the development of an agricultural *colonat.* To serve this purpose, a *Syndicat Foncier du Katanga* had been set up in 1920, thanks to the financial backing of the UMHK, the *Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie* (CCCI) and several other large-scale capitalist enterprises. It proved to be a valuable source of financial assistance for prospective settlers, and performed as well an important aggregative function insofar as it served as a connecting link between industrial and agricultural settler interests.[19]

Secondly, one must bear in mind that from 1910 to 1933 the province enjoyed a special administrative status. Partly because of the lack of adequate communications between the capital (then in Boma) and the interior of the colony, and also because the industrial development of the province necessitated a large measure of decentralization,[20] the administration of the Katanga was entrusted during that period to a Vice Governor General who enjoyed full executive powers. A decree of July 1914 extended this organization to each of the four provinces then in existence. But in 1933, under the governorship of General Tilkens, a new administrative set-up was introduced which eliminated the posts of Vice Governors and transferred their prerogatives to the Governor General. In spite of vehement protests by the European population of the Katanga against this measure, the administrative structure established in 1933 remained basically unchanged in subsequent years.[21]

Thirdly, the desire of the settlers to retain a separate and autonomous status was also prompted by the feelings of hostility they consistently harbored towards Leopoldville. This hostility became more intense with the economic growth of the province and stemmed from the fact that the proportion of public expenditures devoted to the Katanga appeared minute when compared with the over-all contribution of its taxpayers to colonial revenues. As a result they felt that they alone supported the debt charges of the other Provinces as well as the operating costs of the colonial bureaucracy of Kalina. These complaints deserve consideration not only because they have been a source of solidarity among settlers, but also because they throw a revealing light on the subsequent political options of organized settler interests.

Africa on the settler community of the Katanga is evidenced by the following statement, which appeared in the issue of November 17, 1911, of the *Etoile du Congo,* one of the first newspapers to be published in Elizabethville: "If Katanga is to become a credit to South Africa a very different state of affairs than at present exists must be inaugurated in the country. . . . If our new Governor is to be a success he will not consult any man holding an official position; he must put aside officialdom altogether and must call together real businessmen who understand the true inwardness of affairs." It is also reflected in the suggestion made by the *Comité Régional du Katanga* in 1924 that a system of native reserves, "similar to that which prevails in South Africa," be adopted in order to satisfy the demands of the *colons; Comité Régional,* Katanga, 1925, p. 15.

[19] See *Le Comité Spécial du Katanga, 1900–1925* (Bruxelles, 1927), esp. Annexe III, pp. 119–120.

[20] As M. Renkin, then Minister of Colonies, declared before the Chambers: "La mesure la plus importante prise au cours de l'exercice 1910 est la création du Vice Gouvernement Général du Katanga. C'est une mesure essentiellement décentralisatrice, dont le but est de favoriser le développement de la région en lui assurant le plus d'autonomie possible. Y aura-t-il d'autres Vice Gouvernements Généraux comme celui du Katanga? C'est peu probable; l'organisation d'une administration autonome se justifiait au Katanga, district minier où l'industrie s'implantera facilement. Elle ne se justifierait pas ailleurs pour le moment." *Annales Parlementaires,* 1 Feb. 1911, p. 9.

[21] The resentment caused by the administrative reorganization of 1933 found a graphic expression in an article entitled "Entreprise de Démolition," which appeared in *L'Essor du Congo,* July 3, 1933. Referring to "le dictateur Tilkens," the author of the article stated: "Le grand destructeur de Kalina, qui n'a lui à son actif qu'une incompétence notoire et une incompréhensible suffisance, n'a pas hésité à sacrifier ces remarquables serviteurs de l'oeuvre coloniale pour le seul motif que leur valeur le gênait. Un homme de petite taille n'aime pas s'entourer d'athlètes. Lorsqu'on examine ces fameuses mesures de réorganisation, l'on s'aperçoit en effet que le seul, le vrai but de ce renversement n'a été que d'écarter de l'entourage du Gouverneur General les hommes de valeur qui le surplombaient"; cited in Jean Sépulchre, *op. cit.,* p. 38.

III. POLITICAL PRESSURES AND CLEAVAGES

The catalytic agent behind the emergence of political parties in the Katanga, as elsewhere in the Congo, was the constitutional reform introduced in 1957 by the so-called *statut des villes*.[22] The communal elections of December 1957 brought to light and reinforced the solidarity of distinctive tribal groupings. In Elizabethville, for example, three *bourgmestre* posts out of four fell into the hands of Baluba from the Kasai. Electoral processes, on the other hand, stimulated the growth of competing parties also organized on the basis of ethnic or regional criteria.

As noted earlier, this tendency to identify ethnic loyalties with political choices is due in part to the inter-group tensions generated by the uneven impact of economic and social forces. It was also aggravated by two characteristic features of the Katangese scene: (1) the presence of a politically conscious settler community, and (2) the relatively high concentration of Kasaian immigrants in the industrial areas of the Katanga. Quite obviously, these communities affected the balance of political forces in different ways and through different means. But their respective roles cannot be fully understood independently of each other, for the presence of "alien" tribes provided the *raison d'être* of the alliance of European vested interests with those natives of the Katanga who claimed to be "genuine" Katangese.

In late 1957, shortly before the polling date, a Belgian lawyer, Antoine Rubbens, had taken the initiative in organizing the *Union Congolaise*, a party in which, according to its progenitor's own terms, "Congolese nationalism and Christian Social doctrines were intermingled with Socialist ideas."[23] But this program, despite or because of its novelty, held little attraction for the native tribes of the Katanga; their efforts were primarily aimed at checking the control of Kasaian immigrants over the municipal institutions of Elizabethville. So, in order to resist the inroads of "alien" tribes, the leaders of several tribal associations of the Katanga decided in November 1958 to form a coalition behind the *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga*, better known as the *Conakat*.[24] It included in its membership a host of minor tribal groupings, but derived most of its active support from the principal ethnic group of the Haut Katanga, the Lunda. In September of the same year, the Baluba of the Kasai who were previously affiliated to the *Fédération des Baluba Centraux du Katanga* (*Fegebaceka*) founded, under the leadership of Isaac Kalondji, the *Fédération Kasaienne* (*Fedeka*).

In the meantime, a group of white settlers had set up the *Union Katangaise*, a multi-racial party which, as the name suggests, aimed at the construction of a "genuine Katangese community."[25] It was in fact the political expression of the Katangese section of the *Fedacol*, the *Ucol-Katanga*. It will be recalled at this point that the Belgian government's declaration of January 1959 had made it quite plain that Belgium recognized the claims of the Congo to self-government. Equally plain was the assumption that the entire Congo was destined to remain a distinct geographical and political unit. Thus, promptly realizing the potential advantage that would result from an alliance with "genuine" Katangese, the *Union Katangaise* decided in the early part of 1959 to join forces with the *Conakat*.

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[22] The decree of March 23, 1957, provided for the election of municipal councillors in the European and African communes of those urban centers which had been officially recognized as *villes*, namely Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Jadotville. Similar elections were held in December 1958 in Stanleyville, Bukavu, Coquilhatville and Luluabourg. The text of the decree will be found in P. Piron and J. Devos, *Codes et Lois du Congo Belge*, Tome D, 1957 (Bruxelles, 1958), pp. 39–53.

[23] "Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo," *Civilisations*, Vol. X, No. 1 (1960), p. 66.

[24] The *Conakat* incorporated in its membership the *Groupement des Associations Mutuelles de l'Empire Lunda*, the *Association des Baluba du Katanga*, the *Fédération des Tribus du Haut Katanga*, the *Association des Basonge*, the *Association des Bena Marunga*, the *Association des Ressortissants Bahemba*, the *Association des Minungu*, and several other tribal associations. The most important of these numerically was the *Association des Baluba*, founded in 1957 by Jason Sendwe for the avowed purpose of "promoting the unity of the Baluba." It agreed to join the *Conakat* on February 5, 1959, on the condition that it would retain a large measure of autonomy. As specified by Sendwe in a letter sent to the *Conakat* leaders, "la Balubakat se réserve formellement le droit de garder son autonomie de direction et de gestion." The writer wishes to acknowledge his debt to the Department of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Interior of the Katanga for permission to consult some of its files.

[25] The program of the *Union Katangaise* will be found in *L'Essor du Congo*, May 28, 1958; *cf. Ucol: Doctrine Politique* (Elizabethville, n.d.). mimeographed document.

This move added to the ambitions and gave increased confidence to the aspirations of its leaders. In February 1959, Mr. Godefroid Munongo, then President of the *Conakat*, openly criticized the provincial Governor for allowing the Kasaian tribes to reside in the Katanga.[26] In May of the same year the leaders of the *Conakat* publicly announced the need to transform the Katanga into "an autonomous and federated state" with political control vested in the hands of "authentic Katangese."[27] Shortly thereafter, Moise Tshombe expressed his commitment to "a federal system uniting the Congolese Provinces and Belgium in the framework of a Belgo-Congolese Community with each of the constituent units preserving its internal autonomy."[28] Finally, on the inauguration of a *Conakat* section in Kolwezi, an eminent personality of the party, after paying lip service to the "legitimate rights of the inhabitants of this Province" went on to declare that all non-Katangese would be automatically excluded from the political and administrative posts of the province.[29] In fact, the parochial outlook of the *Conakat* developed into an increasingly xenophobic attitude.[30]

Partly as a result of the inflammatory statements made by party propagandists, and partly because of external pressures, the *Conakat* underwent serious internal stresses when, in November 1959, one of its most important constituent units, the *Association des Baluba du Katanga* (*Balubakat*), decided to bolt the party. The secession carried with it important consequences, for the *Balubakat*, led by Jason Sendwe, attracted the overwhelming support of the Baluba of the Katanga. Sendwe's move was of course symptomatic of personal rivalries in the leadership of the *Conakat*. But it is also indicative of the ethnic solidarity prevailing among the Baluba: if, as noted earlier, substantial cultural differences exist between the Kasaian tribes and those of the Katanga, they are at any rate not so fundamental as to leave each indifferent to the other's fate.[31] Another contributory factor lies in the alliance of settler interests with the *Conakat*.[32] In any event, the formation of the *Cartel Katangais*—which included, besides the *Fedeka* and the *Balubakat*, the *Association des Tshokwe du Congo, de l'Angola et de la Rhodesie* (*Atcar*)—drastically altered the previous lines of cleavage. No longer were divisions drawn between "genuine" Katangese and "immigrants," but between Baluba and Tshokwe on the one hand, and the remaining tribes on the other.

In assessing the relationships between European interests and political groups, one should stress at the outset that Europeans did not stand as a monolithic or undifferentiated bloc. In fact, the fusion of the short-lived *Union Katangaise* with the *Conakat* provoked the emergence of new identifications between metropolitan or colonial interest groups and parties. While close organic ties existed between the *Conakat* and the white settlers through the *Ucol-Katanga*, the connections between the *Balubakat* and Belgian liberals—often associated with the Belgian Socialist Party—were initially due to the presence of isolated personalities upon whom the party had devolved advisory functions. Some were drawn from the provincial cadres of the colonial administration; others from the administrative personnel of the Université Officielle of Elizabethville; most of them, however, had been appointed to official positions under the Liberal Ministry of Auguste Buisseret, who held office from 1954 to 1958.

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[26] On February 13, 1959, Mr. Munongo wrote a letter to the provincial Governor which stated, among other things: "Les Katangais d'origine se demandent avec raison si les autorités ne font pas exprès en accordant le séjour définitif aux gens du Kasai dans nos centres pour que les ressortissants de cette Province puissent, grâce à leur nombre toujours croissant, écraser ceux du pays. Ce fait pourrait faire déclencher dans un avenir plus ou moins proche des bagarres entre les habitants des deux Provinces. . . . Nous nous permettons de porter à votre connaissance que très nombreux sont les Katangais d'origine qui aimeraient travailler dans les grands centres de leur Province; impitoyablement on leur répond qu'il y a un arrêté interdisant l'accès vers ces centres. Et pourtant ce sont eux qui devraient avoir priorité."

[27] *L'Essor du Congo*, May 26, 1959.

[28] *L'Essor du Congo*, July 29, 1959.

[29] *Le Phare du Katanga*, June 3, 1959.

[30] As one competent observer noted: "Immigrants and their descendants would be thrown out of the Katanga; jobs made scarce by the recession would be left to the natives of the Proince; in any case, the foreign labor which the industries might need would not be part of the community and would not participate in polls—these would be reserved exclusively to genuine Katangese and their civilizers"; A. Rubbens, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[31] The alliance concluded by the *Balubakat* and the *Fedeka* on the eve of the Brussels Round Table Conference, in late 1959, also tends to confirm this fact. For further evidence see Mabika Kalanda, *Baluba et Lulua: Une Ethnie à la Recherche d'un Nouvel Equilibre* (Bruxelles, 1959); J. Vansina, "Migrations dans la Province du Kasai; Une Hypothèse," *Zaire* (January 1956), pp. 69–85; E. Verhulpen, *Baluba et Balubaisés du Katanga* (Antwerp, 1936).

[32] In a letter to Mr. Munongo, dated June 8, 1959, a group of Katangese *commercants* of various tribal origins declared: "Votre position vous a été dictée par l'*Union Katangaise* de colons pour nous imposer le fédéralisme qui sera après considèré comme l'apartheid et l'autonomie. . . . Nous vous demandons Munongo de rentrer à l'Uganda dont vous êtes ressortissant, et laissez-nous Congolais seuls à réclamer notre droit à l'independence immédiate . . . Nous sommes tous Kinois, Bukaviens, Kasaiens, Katangais, en un mot Congolais et Bantous."

Secondly, the means of pressure available to the *Conakat* were far more effective than those at the disposal of its rivals. They could count on the active support of several local pressure groups, such as the *Ucol-Katanga*, the daily newspaper *L'Essor du Congo* and the Zionist Association of Elizabethville, as well as on the financial backing of powerful corporate interests, including the UMHK. As one might expect in view of the magnitude of the stake held by the *Société Générale* in the mineral resources of the Katanga, it was to the utmost advantage of Belgian banking interests that the *Conakat* should score a decisive victory at the polls. This point, however, needs qualification.[33]

In the first place, the Board of Directors of the *Société Générale* held different opinions concerning both the degree to which they should intervene in local politics, and the manner in which any intervention should be carried out. Even sharper differences of opinion divided the colonial personnel of the *Société Générale* from its metropolitan executives, the former being far more outspoken in their preference for a separate political status for the Katanga. Secondly, at least until the convening of the Brussels Round Table the contributions of campaign funds made by the *Société Générale* were mainly channelled through semi-independent agents, a fact which contributed in no small way to increase the fragmentation of the Congolese political scene.[34] Finally, when it appeared that the balance of power was almost evenly shared between the *Conakat* and the *Balubakat*, the *Société Générale*, out of sheer opportunism, decided to dispense its financial aid to both of the two contenders, thus cancelling the potential advantage which it might have derived from a more discriminating disposition of its resources.

The net result of the involvement of European metropolitan interests in the politics of the Katanga is admittedly difficult to ascertain. But most informed observers would agree that the competition among parties served as an outlet for the expression of personal and ideological antagonisms between conservatives and liberals, or clericals and anticlericals. As a result, Katangese leaders have been led to adopt far more intransigeant stands on concrete issues than might otherwise have been the case. One may also wonder if the secessionist efforts of the Katanga leaders could have succeeded unless they had been sustained, morally and financially, by Belgian interests.

IV. THE POLITICS OF SECESSION

The chain of events which led to the secession comprised two distinct major phases. One, which immediately followed the general elections of May 1960, ended with the neutralization of the forces opposed to the ambitions of Tshombe and the *Conakat*. The other, triggered off by the mutiny of the *Force Publique* in the early days of July 1960, relates more specifically to the circumstances which brought about the erection of an independent state in the Katanga.

It will be recalled that the *Loi Fondamentale*, enacted by the Belgian Parliament in March 1960, stipulated that the legislative powers of the province would be exercised by a single chamber composed of sixty elected members. Nine additional members were to be subsequently coopted by the provincial deputies from a list of "customary chiefs and notables." A provincial executive would then be elected by an absolute majority of at least two-thirds of the membership of the provincial assembly.[35]

The electoral campaign which began in April 1960 accelerated competition among groups and led to bloodshed on numerous occasions. But the battle for ballots was espe-

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[33] The views contained in this paragraph and the next are based on oral and documentary evidence furnished by European and African personalities whose identity can not be disclosed.

[34] Commenting upon the financial aid extended to Katangese parties by Belgian "institutions with important moral and material stakes in the Katanga," Jules-Gérard Libois notes that "the paradox lies in the fact that the Belgian source remained the same" and that "only the channels were different"; *Etudes Congolaises*, No. 1 (March 1961), p. 38.

[35] The text of the *Loi Fondamentale* will be found in *Documents Parlementaires, Chambre des Representants*, No. 489, pp. 1–44.

TABLE II. PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE KATANGAN PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY

Districts	Conakat	Balubakat	Cartel Balubakat-MNCL	Atcar	MNCL	MNCK	Union Congolaise	Local Interests	Total
Elizabethville	3	2				1			6
Jadotville	1		2						3
Tanganika	3	6	1		1		1	4	16
Lualaba	6	1		2				3	12
Haut-Lomami	3	9						1	13
Haut-Katanga	9							1	10
Total	25	18	3	2	1	1	1	9	60

Source: *Congo 1960,* Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (Bruxelles, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 243.

cially tight between the *Conakat* and the *Balubakat,* the two principal *dramatis personae*: of the 160 lists which competed for seats in either the provincial or the federal assemblies, 24 had been introduced by the *Conakat* and 16 by the *Balubakat.*[36] In the end, however, neither of the two major contestants could claim a decisive victory over its opponent. As shown by the figures in Table II, the Provincial Assembly was almost evenly split between the *Conakat* and the *Balubakat,* with the former controlling 25 seats out of a total of 60. Thanks to its alliance with the *Mouvement National Congolais* of Lumumba and the *Atcar,* the *Balubakat* could presumably count on 23 seats in the assembly.

This precarious equilibrium was eventually upset to the advantage of the *Conakat* by two unforeseen developments. On May 27, the dissident wing of the *Mouvement National Congolais,* led by Albert Kalondji, drew away the support of two Baluba elected on a *Cartel* ticket.[37] Almost simultaneously, several deputies who had been elected on lists of "local interests" joined the *Conakat.* Thus, on June 1st, when the assembly held its inaugural session, the *Conakat* controlled 32 seats and the *Cartel* 22.

The electoral procedure adopted by the Belgian government also had important consequences on the outcome of the party struggle. As stipulated by the *loi electorale,* the elections to the provincial and federal assemblies were held concurrently; but the candidates were selected from different lists and in different constituencies.[38] Consequently, those parties which favored a unitary formula, such as the *Balubakat* and its coalition partners, tended to reserve their "safest" candidates for federal offices, while separatist parties, on the contrary, tended to orient their strategy along the opposite lines. This, in turn, considerably enhanced the position of the *Conakat* in the Provincial Assembly. Secondly, the odd results produced by the *scrutin de liste à un tour,* directly borrowed from the Belgian electoral system, led the members of the opposition to believe that the elections had been systematically "rigged" by the administration.[39] Whether there was any conclusive evidence of this is difficult to say. The crucial point here is that the members of the opposition were unanimously convinced that they were the victims of electoral fraud. Although 21 complaints seeking the quashing of the elections had been introduced by the *Cartel* in the period following the publication of the electoral returns, none were acknowledged. Thus on June 1 as a sign of protest against "the way in which electoral processes had been conducted," the members of the *Cartel* walked out of the Provincial Assembly.

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[36] See *Congo 1960,* Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, (Bruxelles, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 240. This work contains the most abundant source of documentation available to this date on the recent political evolution of the Congo.

[37] Gérard-Libois reports that this sudden defection was in part the result of a *quid pro quo* between Tshombe and Kalondji. The latter, anxious to obtain the support of the federal deputies of the *Conakat* for his candidacy for the post of federal Prime Minister, had apparently promised the leader of the *Conakat* to lend him the support of his own party in the provincial assembly on the condition that the Kasaian minority be given special guarantees. See *Congo 1960, op. cit.,* p. 244.

[38] See "Loi relative aux elections legislatives," *Moniteur Congolais,* No. 13, March 28, 1960, p. 863 ff.

[39] In the Elizabethville constituency for example, where the *Conakat* polled 8,617 votes—exactly 7 more than the *Balubakat*—3 seats went to the *Conakat,* 2 to the *Balubakat* and one to the MNC-Kalondji. In Dilolo the *Balubakat* received only as many seats as the *Conakat,* in spite of the fact that it obtained 2,947 more votes than its opponent; see *Congo 1960, op. cit.,* p. 243.

Realizing that a prolonged boycott of the Assembly would prevent the formation of a provisional government unless the two-thirds quorum prescribed by the *Loi Fondamentale* was reduced to a simple majority, the Provincial Governor, Mr. A. Schoeller, appealed to the Minister of the Congo in Brussels and urged him to promulgate an amendment to that effect.[40] At the same time Schoeller informed the leaders of the *Balubakat* that the amendment of the *Loi Fondamentale* would still allow them to get an "equitable share" of ministerial posts. Indifferent to the Governor's placatory statements, the leader of the *Balubakat*, Jason Sendwe, immediately cabled the Governor General and the King and prophetically warned them against the "promulgation of a law [which] would inevitably lead to civil war after June 30."[41] On June 15 the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, by a vote of 98 to 5, with 66 abstentions, and the Senate, by 66 votes with 33 abstentions, enacted the amendment; and the following day the provincial assembly elected a government in which all ministerial chairs but one were occupied by members of the *Conakat*.[42]

In yielding to the joint pressures of the *colonat* and "genuine" Katangese, the Belgian government had not only relieved the *Conakat* from the compromises on offices that would have been necessary if the two-thirds requirement had been retained; it had in effect deliberately played into the hands of the "separatists." If indeed ruthless repression was the only means available to the *Conakat* leaders to come to terms with the demands of the *Cartel* once the latter walked out of the parliamentary arena, secession became their only solution to escape the control of the central government.

On June 23, barely a week before independence and after a series of protracted negotiations, the Congolese Chambers had finally given their reluctant approval to Lumumba's cabinet. As could be expected, Tshombe received the news with a mixture of astonishment and indignation. In a statement to the Belga news agency, the President of the provincial government of the Katanga gave the following hint of his ultimate intentions:

> It is with astonishment that I have heard on the radio the final composition of the central government. I note that the Ministry of National Defense has been attributed to Mr. Lumumba and the Interior to a member of the MNC, although it had been decided that National Defense, in order to . . . avoid the control of a single party, would be administered by a college of all the ministers, with the Secretaryship of National Defense to a member of the *Conakat*. It had also been agreed that another key ministry, Interior, would be assigned to the *Abako* which shares the federalist ideas of the Katangese. The post of Head of the State had been formally promised to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and the Vice Presidency to Mr. Bolikango. It is only on these conditions that the *Conakat* accepted to lend its support to the government formed by Mr. Lumumba.[43]

That Tshombe intended to proclaim the independence of the Katanga on June 26, or shortly thereafter, is now a well established fact.[44] But the Belgian government was by this time too much aware of its responsibilities toward the central government, and of the consequences that would have resulted from its failure to meet them, to allow the secession to occur at this particular juncture. Belgian financial interests, moreover, were not unreservedly committed to Tshombe's views. Indeed, a Belgian writer who cannot be suspected of sympathies towards Belgian capitalist enterprises recognized that the UMHK favored other methods than secession. This possibility, according to him, was viewed rather as "a means of blackmail" or "an alternative linked to an eventual catastrophe."[45]

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[40] An instructive account of this intervention will be found in Jules Chome, *La Crise Congolaise* (Bruxelles, 1960).

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[42] *Congo 1960, op. cit.*, p. 253.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[44] On June 25 Tshombe and Munongo secretly appointed a former Belgian functionary, Franz Scheerlinck, to the rank of "special ambassador" and provided him with all necessary credentials, including an airplane ticket for New York, via Brussels. But the news leaked and the authorities of Leopoldville euchred Tshombe out of his "coup" by arresting his "special ambassador" before he had any chance to acquit himself of his mission. *Ibid.*, pp. 254–256.

[45] Ernest Glinne, "Le Pourquoi de l'Affaire Katangaise," *Presence Africaine* (June–September 1960), p. 56 ff.

The catastrophe occurred on July 5 with the mutiny of the Congolese National Army. Difficult though it may be, even at this time, to separate fact from rumor in recording the developments and implications of the mutiny, it is nevertheless beyond question that the revolt which exploded at the Camp Massart on July 9, threatened the entire province with violence and confusion. Order was finally restored after the intervention of the Belgian paratroopers stationed in Kamina and on July 11 the President of the provincial government officially proclaimed the independence of the Katanga. Shortly thereafter, the Belgian government, now regarding itself as freed of its obligations toward the central government of the Republic of the Congo, delegated d'Aspremont Lynden to the Katanga as "Chief of the Belgian Technical Mission." While the Belgian government refused to extend official recognition to the newly born Katangese Republic, it nevertheless "acknowledged" the independence of the province and the King paid a public homage to the "tribes which have conserved their amity with Belgium and ask her to help them remain independent."[46]

V. CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion tends to suggest, the secession of the Katanga was not made inevitable, although it may have been precipitated, by any single set of factors. The fact that Belgium shares a heavy responsibility in the secession does not make her alone responsible for it. Indeed, one could possibly argue that the reason why it did not take place before June 30, 1960 was precisely because the Belgian government was willing to recognize and honor its legal obligations toward the central government. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the amendment to the *Loi Fondamentale*, which made it legally possible for the leaders of the *Conakat* to set up a government unhampered by the forces of the opposition, and their conviction that Belgian interests would then support their claims, did encourage the Katanga authorities to proclaim the independence of the province after June 30. But neither of these factors is sufficient to explain the existence of strong separatist sentiments in the Katanga. Nor do they provide a basis for predicting the occurrence of similar situations in a colonial context.

Among the several factors which predisposed the Katanga leaders to claim self-determination, at least three deserve emphasis. One is the sense of economic grievance which permeates the attitude of the so-called "genuine" Katangese towards the inhabitants of the other provinces. As already noted, regional differences in the distribution of economic resources operated to aggravate latent tensions among ethnic groups, so that economic stratification tended to coincide with tribal divisions. In a sense, therefore, tribal antagonisms must be viewed as symptoms of economic grievances. The fact that the *Conakat* succeded in rallying the support of otherwise unrelated tribal entities (Bayeke, Lunda, Batabwa, etc.) suggests indeed that these grievances were an important source of solidarity among its members. A seond determinative factor was the part played by the white settlers in making the idea of secession both economically attractive and politically meaningful. The alliance between settler interests and "genuine" Katangese, prompted by the decision of the Belgian government to grant the Congo its independence, did not imply a fundamental change in their objectives. On the contrary, the tactics employed by the *colonat* consisted in communicating its political conceptions to the *Conakat* without in any way attempting to exercise a rigorous control over the activities of the party. By a process like osmosis the *Conakat* identified itself with the ideas and attitudes which gave the settler community of the Katanga its distinctive outlook. A third explanatory factor lies in the outside support accorded by Belgian metropolitan interests to the advocates of the secession. This by itself did not provoke the emergence of separatist claims. But it provided the external stimulus which made the prospects of a secession increasingly attractive. And in the event, this is what made it feasible.

Conceding that the combination of these factors rendered the secession of the Katanga virtually inevitable at a certain point, it does not necessarily follow that it was desirable.

Before a claim to self-determination can be recognized as legitimate, let alone desirable, certain minimum requirements must be met. Among those, "the freedom of the people of the territory to choose the form of government which they desire," and "freedom from interference by another government as to internal affairs" are essential.[47] Quite obviously, the Katanga authorities fail to measure up to either one of these standards. The minimum degree of internal freedom which would entitle them to speak for the whole province is completely lacking. As the United States Representative to the United Nations declared before the Security Council on November 16, 1961, "the Katanga Parliament is a rump organization formed of not more than 25 of the 60 legal members of the original assembly, and the ethnic groupings which support the present regime constitute . . . less than half of the province's inhabitants."[48] There is on the other hand sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges brought by the "Casablanca Powers" against the "clientele-sovereignty" of Tshombe's regime. The relation of dependence which, these "radicals" assert has been established by the metropolitan power "with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client state and controlling it effectively by means other than political,"[49] has been clearly evidenced in the more recent history of the Katanga.

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[47] These requirements were specifically mentioned, among several others, by the Committee on Factors established by the General Assembly in 1952 to report on the qualifications for self-government; see Clyde Eagleton, *op. cit.*, p. 599.

The next question arising at this point is—even if we assume that the Katanga authorities could legitimize their claims to speak for the entire province—would this justify the United Nations in recognizing its independence? In this connection, two other factors deserve consideration. One relates to the general welfare of the community from which the group claiming self-determination seeks to secede. When the economic deprivations entailed by the secession become so harsh that they threaten the very survival of this community, there is clearly no justification for such claims. Or else the practical implications of a secession might well force upon the United Nations a financial burden out of all proportion to its own available resources.

The second factor concerns the political consequences which may result from a full-scale application of the right of a people to self-determination. In this case the threat to international peace represented by the possible intervention of third parties largely accounts for the decision of the United Nations to condemn the secession. From the standpoint of the internal political situation in the Congo, the secession would have played directly into the hands of the Gizengists and perhaps have invited a much firmer "commitment" on their part than presently exists, thereby making the prospects of national unification all the more distant. For this reason it also ran counter to the long-range objectives of the United States in Africa. As Adlai Stevenson declared before the Security Council: "If Tshombe's unwillingness thus far to meet with the central government authorities has prevented the achievement of political unity, how much more dangerous are the defiant actions and declarations of the authorities of the Orientale Province."[50] True, in the minds of African "radicals" the danger of Soviet penetration was virtually nonexistent as long as the Congo remained partially controlled by "neo-colonialist" forces. The secession of the Katanga was viewed, rather, as the ultimate phase of the struggle of nationalist forces against the remnants of colonial rule. The crucial point here, however, is that in each case the decision to prevent the exercise of self-determination was based on political considerations. That there are important economic and political limitations to the right of self-determination, and that these will necessarily depend on the context and circumstances in which the question arises, is perhaps the most significant lesson to be learned from the secession of the Katanga.

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[48] *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 45, No. 1174 (December 25, 1961), p. 1062.

[49] The words are those of Ghana's President, Kwame Nkrumah; see Robert C. Good, "Four African Views of the Congo Crisis," *Africa Report* (June 1961), p. 3.

[50] *Department of State Bulletin, op. cit.*, p. 1063.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AS A DISCIPLINE

A STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF INSTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Political science is a basic discipline in the social sciences. Although it must necessarily maintain close scholarly association with the disciplines of history, economics, sociology, anthropology, geography, and social psychology, political science cannot be considered a part of any of these other social sciences. Political science has its own area of human experience to analyze, its own body of descriptive and factual data to gather, its own conceptual schemes to formulate and test for truth.

I

For many years in many American colleges and universities history and political science were united as disciplines. In an earlier time there may have been some justification for this relationship. Today, this particular combination of scholarship serves no useful academic purpose.

When history meant primarily political history, and when political science relied heavily upon historical analysis, the two disciplines might well be linked for reasons of administrative convenience and scholarly association. In the present time when historiography embraces economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological events as well as the political concerns of man, history no longer can be properly so tied to political science. And on the other hand, with history as an important but no longer the exclusive analytical technique of political inquiry, political science cannot properly be subsumed under the discipline of history.

Indeed, political science at the present time has developed its own internal specializations, even as most other disciplines. Less and less is a political scientist today a generalist in politics. He should have a broad background, it is true, in the general understanding of political power as a phenomenon of society, as a social institution, and as a structural and behavioral process. Yet the political scientist increasingly finds the body of political knowledge so great, and the tools of study so exacting, that he must specialize if he is to master and to communicate his subject matter.

In general, political science as a discipline is ordinarily divided into four broad areas of study. These are political theory, American political institutions and processes, comparative political institutions and processes, and international relations, organization and law. In practice, these four major subdivisions of attention constitute great categories of political knowledge. Within each subdivision there are further specializations. The scholar in political theory may specialize in the thought of particular historical periods: ancient, medieval, renaissance, contemporary; or he may specialize in types of political doctrine such as aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian, or Marxian. The scholar of American government may specialize in constitutional law, political institutions including public administration, or political structure and behavior. The scholar in comparative government may concentrate upon the political systems of certain areas of the world: Western Europe, Latin America, the Far East, Africa, the Communist bloc; or he may of necessity devote his attention to specific nations: the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, French Equatorial Africa. The scholar of international relations and law may give primary attention to diplomatic or legal relations among nations, to the relations among two or more particular nations, or to particular subjects of international negotiation such as the promotion of trade, the pursuit of collective security, the control of arms.

Some universities have on occasion sought other arrangements than the one just outlined in the development of specialized categories of political knowledge. One system of specialization as against another is not our concern here. The fact of specialization within the body of knowledge labelled political science is of primary importance. There is also a growing specialization of methodology. In this respect the history of our discipline is similar to that of other disciplines.

Only in a large and wealthy university can a department of political science hope to bring together a company of scholars conversant with all or even most of these fields of specialized knowledge. Within many of our graduate schools there is a tendency to develop particular specialties, leaving other specialties to political science departments in other universities. For the most part agreements among political science departments to cooperate in the distribution of specializations are informal. Foundations by their grant programs have done much to encourage a distribution of specialization. There is a need for exploration of further desirable forms of inter-university cooperation in developing specialized fields of political science. As in many other areas of scholarship and human endeavor, however, political science must be aware of a tendency toward monopoly.

Today, as never before, a knowledge of political science is an essential part of the intellectual equipment of every educated person. At the same time, specialized competence in political science is indispensable for the further intellectual growth of man, and for the guidance of decision-making in a beleaguered world.

II

We are very much concerned about the implications of a recent survey of political science departments in four-year colleges and universities. This survey was undertaken by the headquarters staff of the American Political Science Association. The results of the survey give us reason for grave disquiet about the quality of the study of political science in American higher education today.

We appreciate the fact that our colleges and universities in the United States are proud of their variety and diversity. We realize that these institutions have somewhat different educational objectives, may serve somewhat different student interests and abilities, and may adopt somewhat different instructional procedures. We cannot accept the proposition, however, that political science as a discipline can be offered as a course of study in accredited colleges and universities without a definite concern for the quality and scope of such instruction.

In some circumstances the size of enrollment may be a restricting factor in curriculum offerings and instructional staffing. We are aware that some 615 private liberal arts colleges in the United States and some 67 state colleges had each an enrollment of under 1,000 students in 1960. In these circumstances we believe that political science should not be provided as a discipline unless the college has the resources to meet minimum acceptable standards of quality.

In our survey of degree granting colleges and universities, we have found 786 institutions offering courses under the heading of political science. We have found that only 466 of these institutions had a separate department of political science. In 162 instances political science was part of a joint department with history. In 129 instances political science was part of a department of social studies. In another 29 cases political science was joined with some other discipline, such as economics or sociology.

Of these 786 colleges and universities, we have found that in 564 instances, or 72 per cent of the total, political science was being offered by three or fewer persons. Indeed, we have found 15 departments offering the master's degree with only two or three instructors, and have even found two departments offering the Ph.D. degree, one with two instructors and the other with three instructors!

With staff resources of this limited number, we are appalled to discover that these departments are offering up to as many as 30 different courses. The average number of political science courses offered by a one-man department is 11, the average for a two-man department is 13, and the average for a three-man department is 15. Here is fragmentation run riot without adequate staff resources for such specialization. We have even found one instance where one man taught 20 different courses, five each semester over a four-semester cycle.

The data on educational preparation for instruction in political science are also not reassuring. In the 297 separate departments of political science having three or fewer instructors, the total number of persons teaching is 412. Of these, 236 held the Ph.D. degree and 138 held the master's degree. The proportion of individuals with the doctorate was 57 per cent. Quite a large number of persons are teaching political science who have not had any educational preparation in political science. Their background has been in law, history, economics, sociology, and philosophy.

In general, teaching loads appear to be quite heavy, especially in these small departments. We have found instances of individuals who teach as many as 21 to 25 hours a week; 18 hours is not uncommon. It must be remembered that all of the institutions we have referred to are four-year, degree granting colleges and universities, and all are regionally accredited.

We believe the small college has an educational contribution to make in our society, although this contribution in our judgment is often exaggerated. The small college is misguided in its efforts when it seeks to imitate a university in the scope and number of its course offerings.

We think that a wide variety and a large number of courses offered by a one- or two-man political science department endanger a desirable quality of instruction. We think that ordinarily a college providing a major in political science with fewer than three competent instructors is risking poor quality of instruction. We think that a college with a large department in one of the social science disciplines which adds on one or two political scientists for "balance" has not carefully considered the standards of instruction it desires to achieve.

The variety of specialization now required in political science, the extent of the scholarly endeavor in which the political scientist must continually engage, the importance of scholarly association—all of these have vital implications for the quality of instruction realized in a college or university. The political scientist must be properly prepared for his profession, must offer instruction in those areas of his individual competence, and must have time and opportunity for continued professional development and association.

We think these factors must be continually examined in every college and university providing instruction in political science.

III

Quality of instruction in political science in terms of organizational arrangements, load, educational preparation, scope of offerings, and scholarly association are not our only concerns. Adequate library materials are of equal importance.

It is hardly necessary to argue that library resources have a vital role in the teaching of political science. In a small college in particular, books can supplement limited resources in teachers. Yet the political scientist who is a specialist in American political institutions may often find himself at a loss to determine the most desirable library holdings in comparative government or international relations and law. Such a specialist in American political institutions may feel even more incompetent in deciding the desirable acquisitions in various sub-specialties, such as Russian government, arms control, or Sino-American relations.

We are confident that a minimum working undergraduate library in political science would involve at least 2,500 to 3,000 different volumes. We believe it would be desirable for the American Political Science Association to arrange the preparation of a list of volumes which would constitute such a minimum working undergraduate library.

IV

It seems unlikely that political scientists would necessarily agree that there is one best possible kind of undergraduate curriculum for the study of political science. We believe there would be a high degree of consensus, however, about the basic construction of such a curriculum.

First of all, there must be a general introductory course. For many students in a college or university this will be their only exposure to political science as a discipline. This course will usually satisfy such general education requirements in government or the social sciences as a college or university may prescribe. At the same time, this course must satisfy the need for a foundation to later and further study of political science by students with a particular interest in the field.

The introductory course may approach the study of political science in terms of political theory, of comparative government, or of American political institutions. Some admixture of all three may well be undertaken, as well as a consideration of American foreign policy.

It seems particularly desirable that the introductory course should avoid a mere repetition of descriptive and factual data about American government which the college student should have acquired in high school.

Secondly, beyond the introductory course there should be a desirable array of core courses in political science. Ordinarily, there should be at least four of these: one each in American political institutions, comparative government, international relations, and political theory. Such core courses must be carefully articulated with the introductory course to avoid repetition of content.

In the third place, there will be some specialized course offerings within the framework of the core courses. In general, we believe that such specialized courses should be kept within reasonable limits at the undergraduate level, and that the undergraduate major should be encouraged instead to study comparable core areas in related social science disciplines such as history, economics, and sociology.

There is a good deal of discussion about the extent of concentration to be required of the undergraduate political science major. This can only be resolved in terms of the undergraduate educational goals and procedures of an individual college or university as a whole. Education in depth and breadth are the equal objectives of undergraduate instruction in the United States.

V

We are also concerned about graduate instruction in political science. According to Berelson's recent study, about half of the political scientists on graduate faculties in American universities are dissatisfied with the state of graduate education in our discipline. This may reflect no more than a continuing restless discontent, a healthy state of affairs for our profession.

Many issues are involved. Perhaps they can all be summarized in the language of a colleague who remarked several years ago that we seek a concept of the doctorate which will provide a "valid indication of technical competence." Should research training or teaching ability be the primary goal of graduate education? Is breadth of knowledge about political science or a high degree of specialization desirable? What kinds of educational endeavor and experience will best realize our goals? How long a period of time should graduate education require?

These are all familiar issues, and they are not peculiar to political science. All of these problems require continuing attention.

The curriculum for graduate education will necessarily reflect the instructional philosophy of a graduate department of political science. At a minimum a graduate department will desire to carry the specialization of undergraduate study to a more intensive level of competence. We recognize that undergraduate and graduate education tend to overlap, but some arrangements should be possible to avoid duplicating course requirements for the individual student.

We believe it is necessary for all graduate students to have some specialized study in the field of political theory. If the graduate student has not had some introduction to the other major areas of political science, this also seems necessary. Beyond this, we think that the graduate student should be expected to develop a particular competence within one general area and within some subdivision of another general area.

When should a university contemplate offering a Ph.D. in political science? The answer must be general but emphatic. The department must have the necessary resources in number and quality of personnel, in library and research materials, and in instructional and research facilities to offer courses and student supervision in at least three of the broad areas of political science and in considerable depth of specialization within each of these areas.

Good graduate education requires good students as well. Standards of admission determine in large part the standards of graduate instruction. Moreover, the graduate student should be expected to have acquired a general background in political science and the liberal arts as an undergraduate student.

The extent to which the graduate student should be expected to master foreign languages, statistical techniques, or other special research methodology may perhaps be best resolved in each particular subject-matter area. Certainly some understanding of research methodology in general should be an integral part of all graduate instruction in political science.

In recent years there has been some discussion of requiring graduate students to learn something about the history and operations of higher education as an institution, and to acquire some experience and knowledge in teaching. We believe that this can be done without formal course work, but we urge that all graduate departments of political science give some attention to this matter.

There is no doubt in our minds about the need for a major piece of research as the capstone of the doctorate. A dissertation, however, need not be regarded in the strictest possible sense as a contribution to knowledge. Perhaps the best standard would be to insist that the dissertation evidence a capacity to do original, if not creative, work.

The future of political science instruction in the United States will depend in large measure upon the future graduate preparation of instructors in our discipline.

VI

In political science, as in other scholarly disciplines, there is tension between undergraduate and graduate instruction in our large universities. Prestige, status, and salary remuneration tend to be greater for the graduate professor than for the undergraduate teacher. The scholar at the graduate level is expected to be engaged actively in research, and hence is often given a reduced teaching load in comparison with his undergraduate colleagues.

Some scholars may prefer graduate instruction to undergraduate teaching because the quality and interest of their students are superior. Perhaps it is fair to say that graduate teaching may even be easier, since less effort may be expended in arousing the latent interest of students and in stimulating them to their own education. Moreover, the graduate teacher is often able to confine instruction to his own special interest; he may not conduct classes in the broader areas of knowledge about government.

In some of the larger universities it is said that lower division classes fall entirely into the hands of graduate assistants. We do not see this practice as necessarily unfortunate. The assistant nearing completion of his doctorate work will often bring a freshness of point of view and an enthusiasm to his instructional duties which others may lack. In some instances leading scholars of a political science department may lecture to large sections of undergraduate students. Here again there is nothing to criticize in this arrangement as such. Everything depends upon how well the lecturing is done, and upon the supplementary opportunities for discussion.

Universities have tried many organizational arrangements in order to lessen conflict between undergraduate and graduate instruction. Sometimes two separate departments have been created. Sometimes separate standards for academic rank have been established. Sometimes special efforts to increase the remuneration of those primarily engaged in undergraduate instruction have been made. In general, we feel that to divide a department of political science into exclusively graduate or exclusively undergraduate parts is unfortunate. While some faculty members should not teach graduate work, there should not be any faculty members who teach nothing else but graduate work. Both levels of effort present challenges to effective instruction which demand careful consideration by all members of a department.

There are also certain complexities in developing working relations between the discipline of political science and such professional fields of instruction as law, business administration, public administration, school administration, social work, and foreign affairs. The desirable relationship between the discipline and related professional fields deserves continuing attention. The discipline of political science has a major contribution to make in many different fields of professional education, and individuals with recognized scholarship in the discipline should be encouraged to participate in professional education.

VII

We have given some thought to establishing a procedure for the accreditation of departments of political science along the lines of that established by the American Chemical Society for departments of chemistry. After considerable discussion we are agreed that this type of action at this time would be premature.

The accreditation function for American colleges and universities is performed in general by six regional accrediting associations, supplemented by national accrediting agencies in fields of study preparing for different professions. Substantial effort is being expended to reduce rather than further to proliferate specialized accrediting bodies. This goal is certainly worthwhile. But it is acceptable only if regional accrediting associations perform their function with greater care and with more attention to the interests of various scholarly disciplines than has often been evidenced in the past.

We believe that needed standards of instruction will not be obtained just by a simple declaration of desirable principles. Some definite additional steps are required.

First, some effort at cooperation with the regional accrediting associations should be made to help ensure appropriate consideration of the factor of competence in political science. Copies of this statement should be provided the officers and members of the commissions responsible for accreditation of colleges and universities in each regional association. Our own regional political science groups should take action to make assistance available to accrediting bodies in evaluating present instructional resources and practice in political science at colleges and universities.

Secondly, the regional accrediting associations should be urged to establish review procedures which make full use of the disciplines. A committee of political scientists should be established in each accrediting region to participate in visits to colleges and universities offering instruction in political science. We believe that review and inspection groups of regional accrediting associations might include a member of such a committee.

Thirdly, the regional seminars sponsored by the American Political Science Association should give attention to this report and should consider additional desirable steps to advance the quality of instruction in political science.

In the fourth place, in those states where a state agency is authorized by law to evaluate instructional quality of colleges and universities, and where such authority is exercised in practice, we believe that these agencies should have the assistance of political scientists in performing their task. The political science departments in our leading universities might well offer their services in this activity.

Finally, we believe it is desirable for the American Political Science Association periodically to review the problems outlined herein, and in particular to re-examine such action as may have been taken by regional accrediting associations and others. If there is not some evidence of definite improvement in the next three or four years, additional steps must be given consideration.

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September, 1961

COMMUNICATIONS

ERRATA

To the Editor:

Through the advice of a friend who had read a mimeographed draft of the article, I have discovered computational errors involving two of the three rank correlation coefficients reported in Table VI of my article on the 1960 Term of the Supreme Court, in the March issue of this Review. These errors do not affect the substantive findings or interpretation or analysis, but they are wrong, and I shall be very grateful for their correction, as follows:

p. 105, Table VI: tau for E should be .817, and $p < .0012$; and tau for F should be .783, and $p < .0029$

p. 105, col. 2, 2nd para., line 3: tau should be .78

p. 106, col. 1, 2nd para., lines 15–16 should read: $< .0^{9}4$, or less than one chance in a hundred million.

Glendon Schubert

To the Editor:

My contributors and I are compelled to respond briefly to Alan Altshuler's review of our *Cases in State and Local Government,* in the March issue, p. 178. The book is a supplementary text, only a text, and nothing but a text. The flyer from the publisher says that the book "can help you, the professor, by supplementing your standard class text." It was conceived and produced with this limited need in mind. We felt that rather short, straight-forward descriptions of illustrative situations in the state and local area would be useful to teachers in that field. Those with even a few years experience in the state and local field have usually felt that the sector could use a little humanizing, and that the long and complicated cases found as small parts of other volumes were not always an answer to our troubles.

We certainly wished that each case could meet every professional standard by being "accurate, applicable, profound, perceptive, significant, vivid, colorful, persuasive, provocative, etc.," the criteria which appear in the review. Altshuler is right when he notes that "space limitation has precluded the development of relationships in detail." But long cases, wonderfully accomplished, such as Ylvisaker's "Battle of Blue Earth County" or Kaufman's "Gotham in the Air Age," both in the Stein case-book, do not have exactly the same teaching goals that most of ours do. We think that the specific, worthwhile need we had in mind was met better than the reviewer allowed.

Richard T. Frost

Reed College

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Manipulation of Human Behavior. EDITED BY ALBERT D. BIDERMAN AND HERBERT ZIMMER. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961. Pp. 323. $7.95.)

When the first reports reached the United States of gross misconduct among American prisoners-of-war in Korea, they occasioned a good deal of shock and indignation in both civilian and military circles. The reports indicated that of the 7,190 American soldiers captured by the Communists, only a mere handful, or approximately 5 per cent, consistently refused to cooperate with the Chinese. Some 15 per cent collaborated extensively with the enemy, while 80 per cent, according to an authoritative report on the subject, "collaborated occasionally and mildly and can be thought of as having maintained an essentially neutral position."[1] It also appeared that of the 3,000 soldiers who died or were murdered in the POW camps, a significant number perished as the direct result of the low morale prevailing in the ranks of the officers and enlisted men. In a large number of cases, of course, deaths could be attributed to starvation, extreme cold, and illness. But in other cases—no one will ever know exactly how many—the cause of death was referred to by repatriated POWs as "give-up-itis," or, in more formal terms, the loss of the will to live. "Give-up-itis," one returned prisoner later reported, often took the initial form of not caring about one's physical well-being: "Some men got so lazy and so negligent . . . that they wouldn't even kill their own lice. There were men with dysentery who, when they soiled their own clothes . . . they wouldn't even clean their own clothes out. They would just sit in their own waste."[2] In the final stages, a man suffering from "give-up-itis" would stop eating, but not all at once. "His appetite lagged, he began to give portions of his food away, within the next few days he became more and more withdrawn, would speak to his friends less, within the next day or so he would have his blanket or coat or whatever was available for his covering pulled up over his head, and would then sort of go into a cocoon and assume the foetal position, and in another twenty-four hours he'd be dead. This whole period of time was predictable—it took about ten days."[2]

In the years since the end of the Korean War, the behavior of our soldiers in the prison camps has been systematically investigated by a number of public and private agencies. Unfortunately, these explorations, while they have resulted in or inspired a considerable literature, have raised many more questions than answers, and the answers that have been suggested reflect a wide range of opinion. On one point, however, all of the investigators appear to be in agreement: the Communists did not produce collaborators and informers by the technique popularly known as "brain-washing." Instead, they used a variety of methods other than forced indoctrination, all of which had as their purpose the destruction of group cohesion and the undermining of individual morale. Natural leaders among the prisoners, for example, were isolated or otherwise cut off from the rank-and-file. No organized activity which the Chinese did not sponsor was permitted. Informers and active collaborators were rewarded with extra rations, cigarettes, and warm clothing—rewards of no little significance for survival in the starved and frozen atmosphere of the camps. Leading atomized existences, broken in body and frequently in mind as well, many of the POWs were inclined to take, in the context of the situation, one or more of the easier ways out: for some, death via "give-up-itis"; for others, collaboration; for most, a passive and docile attitude toward their captors, and willing attendance at the propaganda lectures that were a regular feature of camp life.

The book under review does not deal directly with the Korean War POW experience, but it is doubtful that it would have been written had that experience not shocked the sensibilities of professional and lay publics in the United States. Indeed, in their introduction the editors refer to the broader questions posed by the Korean affair, and the essays that follow are addressed to these questions. In essence, the editors insist, the "central question of fact" raised by Korea, apart from moral, philosophical, and I should add, political and cultural issues, is:

> whether all individuals, regardless of how strongly

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[1] Edgar H. Schein (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), "Social Disorganization, Belief Change, and Collaboration." Professor Schein's report was based on research sponsored by the Army and undertaken by him when he was a Captain on the staff of Walter Reed Hospital.

[2] Quoted from interviews with repatriated POW's broadcast over the CBS Radio Network, June 9, 1958. The program, "P.O.W.—A Study in Survival," was narrated by Edward R. Murrow.

> motivated to resist, could be made to comply with demands for information, "confessions," or other collaboration by methods employed by the Communists, provided that the intensity, duration, and quality of the pressures were sufficiently great.

Or in other words, ask the editors, is it true that "every man has his breaking point"? Noting that this proposition has served as a premise in policy formulation, the editors query whether any situation encountered by American POWs in Korea "approached those extremes of 'stress' that no individual could be expected to resist."

Since I am reviewing a 'what-dunnit' rather than a 'who-dunnit,' I don't think it is unfair to the editors and contributors to reveal that their book does not provide, and was not intended to provide, a reliable answer to this question—and perhaps none can be provided except by those who were themselves POWs in Korea. What we do learn from the seven essays that constitute the book is the extent to which human behavior can be changed, altered, or radically transformed by a variety of techniques including drugs, hypnosis, reduced environmental stimulation, and the manipulation of interpersonal relations. As may be expected, the essays draw much of their evidence from controlled experiments carried on under laboratory conditions. But that does not make their conclusions, in my view, any less impressive, or any less relevant to the everyday world. To be sure, the data cited frequently point in opposite directions; it is sometimes a case of 'on the one hand, this, and on the other hand, that.' Nevertheless, the book is an invaluable—I am tempted to say indispensable—summary of what is definitely or approximately known about the control of human behavior.

I want to emphasize, however, that neither the editors nor the contributors are particularly concerned with the moral and ethical questions involved in the experimental findings they report. Although most of the essays deal in part with techniques of counter-manipulation, only one, concerned with malingering, has counter-manipulation as its primary subject. None of the essays discusses the extent to which political, social, and cultural behavior in the United States is increasingly subject to manipulation.

These remarks are not intended as criticism of the book but as a pointer to areas of research that are going begging, so far as political science is concerned. Let me be bold, brash, and vulgar: I suggest that we either confer a Ph.D. degree on Vance Packard or do a better job than he is doing. And unless we do a better job than he has done the day is not far off when none of us will know, with or without a Ph.D., who is manipulating whom, how, and for what. The book I have been reviewing reveals that the manipulation of behavior is gradually moving from art to science, and from uncertainty to certainty. It seems reasonable to suggest that until research begins to focus on the moral and ethical problems involved, and devise counter-offensive strategies and techniques, those of us who are optimists, democrats, and believers in free will, must resign ourselves to whistling in the dark.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW

Stanford University

Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control. BY BERNHARD G. BECHHOEFER. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961. Pp. xiv, 641. $8.75.)

The Control of the Arms Race. BY HEDLEY BULL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. xiv, 215. $3.95.)

Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties. BY JAMES P. WARBURG. (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1961. Pp. 288, $4.50.)

When Dean Rusk was president of the Rockefeller Foundation, he once referred to his earlier days in the Department of State as being "a part of a rather artificial and sometimes dangerous game being played on the roof of a mansion in which the people of the world were very busy getting the job of the human race done." Perhaps no other segment of our postwar diplomatic history reads so much like an "artificial and sometimes dangerous game" as does the story of the hide-and-seek on international disarmament and arms control.

The story of efforts to find, or to block, a viable road to effective disarmament and arms control is well reviewed in each of these three books although the approach differs in each. Many children's games come to mind as one re-observes the primary participants in this perpetually improvised minuet of changing poses and positions called disarmament conferences and negotiations. Viewed from the perspective of some other planet this dreary story of the past sixteen years would perhaps seem comical, but for us who are still bound to this planet it is far from funny.

Mr. Warburg devotes about one hundred pages of his book to the review of post-war arguments over disarmament and some other relevant international issues which strongly influenced the arms talks. He includes, in seventeen appendices, a well-chosen assortment of documents on the arms controversy for the period from May 1956 to October 1960. These documents tend to repeat his earlier resume of arms negotiations but they are useful for their official quality. There is no bibliography (nor many footnote references), and there is no index.

Warburg ranges rather widely at times in his discussion, including the final chapter of the book in which he argues the imperative need for multinational aid to the disadvantaged peoples of the world. He believes that the United States should henceforth follow the path of multilateral foreign aid with new boldness and new generosity. This discussion on aid concludes a three-chapter analysis of the abatement of tensions, the economic feasibility of disarmament for America, and the "creation of conditions of life that the majority of mankind will find tolerable and reasonably just." Perhaps it is the ever-widening scope of Warburg's book which leaves a reader at the end feeling titillated with many problems and ideas but unsatisfied as to the evidence, logic, or persuasion of the author's answers to the "imperatives" he postulates.

Mr. Bechhoefer has drawn upon twelve years of responsible participation in armaments control negotiations in making his review of our peregrinations on what he calls the "highway without signs" in search of agreement on arms control. Bechhoefer devotes 550 pages of his book to a review of the important international disarmament discussions from 1943 (with some references to even earlier periods) to the breakup of the Ten-Power Conference at Geneva in the early summer of 1960. His review is quite detailed, and heavily documented with references to official sources. He makes many effective references to over-all U. S. foreign policy and also to the general international context of the arms negotiations.

Bechhoefer is often candid and blunt in his criticisms of United States policy and action in disarmament issues. He is most critical of those instances when U. S. policy failed to be militarily and technically sound and also politically attractive. He also makes some fully justified criticisms of the frequent United States practice of changing our official negotiator and policy formulators only a few months before major, and often crucial, international meetings.

In a concluding lengthy "appraisal" Bechhoefer gives considerable attention to the critical question of acceptable "first-stage" measures for any comprehensive disarmament and arms control program. He suggests five areas where negotiations for an acceptable first-stage plan might be achieved. All of these are certain to be discussed in the March 1962 conference and in subsequent meetings. His long historical review, therefore, ends on a note of preview of the continuing agenda for arms control.

Despite the lack of tangible success in arms control, Bechhoefer believes that the arms control negotiations may have been—and may continue to be—"a road toward peace and security." Twelves years of frustration seem not to have dimmed Bechhoefer's basic optimism that "arms control negotiations may be one of the roads, or even the main road, leading to East-West accords."

The book includes a useful ten-page bibliographical guide and a very good index.

The shortest of the three books here reviewed seemed to this reviewer the most satisfying treatment of the arms race. Mr. Bull had the cooperation and assistance of a very distinguished group of specialists meeting with him at Oxford. The Institute for Strategic Studies sponsored the book and also organized the study group. Two members of the study group, Mr. Richard Goold-Adams (chairman) and the Right Honorable John Strachey, M.P., take directly opposed views regarding Bull's book, Mr. Strachey's disagreement with many of Bull's observations being included as the last three pages of the book, offsetting Goold-Adams' warm endorsement of Bull's study.

Bull's approach to the long record of disarmament discussions is more by categories of problems than as a single chronological narrative. This approach involves some repetition of key meetings but it has the great advantage of concentrating successively on the major issues one at a time. Bull divides his analysis into four parts: "The Objectives and Conditions of Arms Control," "Arms Control Through Disarmament," "Arms Control Without Disarmament," and "The Problem of Continuous Innovation."

In the course of his very lucid, and unemotional review of the many problems and proposed solutions for international arms control, Bull does not seek ideal solutions but rather the more realistic measures which might provide some stability in an extremely dynamic and fluid arena of international politics and technology. He also gives more attention than Warburg and Bechhoefer to developments in the field of chemical, biological and radiological warfare.

Mr. Bull concludes his book with a stimulating and provocative chapter on "the problem of continuous innovation"; a problem which repeatedly undermines the shaky foundations of international arms control accords. As he puts it: "The uncertainty [especially technologically] of the future is a factor which strongly influences the present." He sees little prospect of an end being put upon military innovation and in this position he has most of human history on his side. He does see another alternative, however, in "basing arms control systems themselves on an innovating technology," and he argues persuasively that "arms control starts on the drawing boards" of new weapons.

Mr. Bull concludes his book with a plea for the serious study of modern military technology and arms control. Our hope for the future he believes lies in "the constant application of palliatives" rather than the "taking of a single dramatic step of sweeping present difficulties aside" by trying to create a whole new international political structure and order.

The leap-frog game of innovation and counter-innovation, controls and evasion of controls, is as predictable a course for the human future now as in the days when Ecclesiastes declaimed the theme of "a time for war, and a time for peace." It is equally predictable and politically necessary that the issue of disarmament will continue to be a major feature of international politics. As Secretary Rusk said in a radio interview on January 7, 1962, " . . . we must keep gnawing at it [the issue of disarmament], working at it, trying our best to find a practical and safe means [to] . . . reduced arms and to some limitation on the arms race."

The student who wants to join in the "gnawing at" and "working at" this problem will find a good ground for practice in any of these three books, especially the Bechhoefer and Bull studies.

JOHN GANGE

University of Oregon

The Supreme Court Review. EDITED BY PHILIP B. KURLAND. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp. 332. $6.50.)

This book is not as one might suspect from the title and the publisher's advertising a panoramic view of the Supreme Court's work in the 1960–61 Term. It is not in the genre of the annual survey featured in some of the law journals and so ably done for the *Review* by David Fellman. Rather, it is a collection of eight superb essays, six of which deal with selected important cases decided in the Term. The other two essays provide a delicious frosting to a cake which in and of itself would tickle the palates of even the gourmets in the Public Law and American Government fields. So much for generalities.

In the first of the essays, Professor Francis A. Allen deals with *Mapp v. Ohio*, the case in which the Court held that evidence obtained by state officers through an unreasonable search and seizure was inadmissible in state courts. Allen furnishes a succinct and lively account of previous pertinent decisions and an interesting discussion of the pros and cons of the exclusionary rule as well as an analysis of the issues and decision in *Mapp*. While doing so, Allen develops the interesting theme that the decision was a surprise. Some of his conclusions are especially provocative, consequently well worth scrutiny. He suggests, for example, that the *Mapp* decision: (1) leaves important questions unresolved; (2) "intrudes farther into areas of local policy and self-determination than earlier decisions of the Court affecting state criminal procedures"; (3) may not in the last analysis afford much protection to individual rights.

Against the backdrop of *Machinists v. Street*, the case in which the Supreme Court decided that the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act denies a union the power to use funds exacted from an employee to support political causes which he opposes and where he objects, Professor Harry H. Wellington treats with great skill and insight the arguments for and against the avoidance of constitutional issues by the Supreme Court. Later, with forceful argument and language, Wellington castigates the Court for avoiding the constitutional issue in this particular case. He concludes that "the Court had no legitimate alternative to constitutional decision," that a proper decision would have rejected "the contention that the validity of a union shop contract is to be tested by the requirements of the First Amendment" and that such a decision "would have spared us a slick but shallow performance in the delicate art of avoiding questions through statutory interpretation." Even those who, like the reviewer, disagree with these conclusions, will profit from and enjoy this hard-hitting essay.

Using as a jumping off point the covey of cases which bore heavily on the subject, David Fellman with characteristic thoroughness and skill explores the important aspects of the constitutional rights of association. He concludes that the "importance of the rights of association demands that the law should regard with great suspicions any attempt to denigrate them" that "doubts should be resolved in their favor, never against them." He goes on to add, however, that "there are vital public interests in the maintenance of law and order and in restraining criminal conspiracies, and where such interests exist the rights of association must yield." He then commiserates with the Court which in our system must draw the line, by writing that the Court "has a job of obviously formidable proportions on their hands." Those of us who look to guidance from Professor Fellman can only wish that he had spelled out precisely what his conclusions mean in terms of the cases dealing with Communists. On which side of the ledger do the Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Subversive Activities Control Act and the membership clause of the Smith Act go, David?

The fact that only brief mention is made of the other three essays dealing with specific cases is due to lack of space rather than any lack of merit. For law professors, Jo Lucas, Walter Blum and Derek Bok provide first-rate analyses of and interesting insights on the issues in *Gomillion v. Lightfoot, Knetsch v. United States,* and *Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Co.* respectively.

The frosting on the cake alluded to at the beginning of this review is the splendid pair of essays by Walter Murphy and Alexander Meiklejohn. Murphy describes how William Howard Taft as Chief Justice attempted with some success to influence the choice of appointments to the Supreme Court. His findings suggest that sitting justices of the Supreme Court may have had more to do with appointments to the bench than has previously been suspected.

One might well wonder what Alexander Meiklejohn can write about First Amendment freedoms which he had not written before. But even those familiar with his previous explications will find much worthwhile in his essay. Particularly interesting are his observations on Professor Leonard Levy's authoritative study which presented strong evidence that the Framers of the Constitution were not as absolute about protecting First Amendment freedoms as their language suggests.

In conclusion, kudos must go to the editor, Professor Philip B. Kurland. Surely, the high quality of scholarship and the literary craftsmanship manifested in the book reflect, at the very least, unusual skill in recruiting and marshalling extraordinary talent.

HAROLD W. CHASE

University of Minnesota

Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. BY PETER M. BLAU AND RICHARD W. SCOTT. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962. Pp. x, 312. $5.25.)

Blau and Scott make a remarkable integration of the literature of organizational behavior, in its informal as well as its formal aspects. Working as sociologists, they have developed a vivid array of partial theories about stable collective social entities which have been "deliberately established for specific ends." Their nine orderly chapters present typologies and propositions about the entire gamut of such organizations, from "business concerns" and "service organizations" (as hospitals and social-work agencies) to "mutual-benefit organizations" (as political parties and professional associations) and "commonweal organizations" through which local, state, and national governments function. The book makes careful articulation of the organization *per se* with its internal structure, as such exists in its informal work groups and its supervisory and managerial practices, and with its external social context, as the organization relates to its publics and to other organizations in its environment.

Students of bureaucracy will be aided by the careful conceptual development which Blau and Scott make of the nature of authority, with their clear delineation of the way in which informal processes reinforce the legitimacy of compliance stemming from cultural roots. The authors have significantly extended and clarified Weber's pioneering over-simplifications. Scholars also will appreciate their theoretical contribution in constructing a partial theory of organizational development, viewing tendencies toward bureaucratization and debureaucratization as processes of change and conflict. In this work they have gone beyond the original but loose formulations of Eisenstadt.

Students of public administration will be helped by the insightful ways in which Blau and Scott have transformed traditional problems of the executive branch, such as specialization and coordination, into quite fruitful inquiries about processes of communication and planning, especially those involving "impersonal control" mechanisms. Scholars will value their clarification of how an organization's formal structure is influenced by the characteristics of its leadership and informal group processes, and *vice versa.* Their most ground-breaking work is their delineation of how competing and cooperating counterpart organizations influence an organization's internal functioning.

Those who desire that our study of politics become more rigorous will admire the modesty and soundness with which Blau and Scott apply the scientific method. They use negative instances and contrasting findings to serve as springboards in the development of theories more closely related to empirical realities. These scholarly skills are exhibited well in their brilliant chapter on "Processes of Communication," in which they mesh the findings of experimental and field work into a theory of how formal hierarchical characteristics of an organization interact with informal social support processes in the facilitation and hindrance of problem-solving and coordination outputs of the organization.

In this reviewer's opinion, the clarity of the book as an amalgam of empirical studies completed through 1960 is blurred by the inclusion of overly detailed expositions of two unpublished studies of a city and a county welfare agency conducted by the two authors. Some readers may find in these interruptions refreshing contacts with raw data, which are difficult to maintain in a book primarily constructed from the findings of others. When dealing with their own more recent findings, however, the authors lose the cautious perspective which they demonstrated in handling the research findings of the field as a whole. Their own more recent data entice them into unwarranted speculation.

Now teachers of public administration have a pair of complemental books for the renovation of their teaching of advanced courses on organizational behavior. In March and Simon's *Organizations,* directors of seminars have a book which exhibits the structure of propositions about social psychological processes involved in decision-making in government. In Blau and Scott's *Formal Organizations,* they have a book of equal quality and creative penetration into group processes involved in the functioning of governmental units. Because both are based on extant empirical researches, master and doctoral candidates may become inspired to abandon the descriptive, single case and proceed without further delay to the building of a social science of administration. In the five years ahead, the findings displayed so advantageously in the Blau and Scott volume should have much impact on the revision and development of our many undergraduate texts in public administration.

At times the conceptual and resource difficulties that scholars face in developing politics as a social science rather than as polemic seem overwhelming. But this work by Blau and Scott will embolden all of us. Just as important strides have been taken in developing empirically grounded theory for party politics and voting behavior, so now we have significant achievement in our comprehension of organizational and executive activity. Within the next decade or so, our understanding of the legislative and judicial aspects of government may be underpinned more adequately with data. More and more tightly constructed political theories may result. Then finally we can bid farewell to the contentious autism which has been our heritage. Blau and Scott speed us on our way.

HAROLD GUETZKOW
Northwestern University

Africa: The Politics of Independence. By IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN. (New York: Vintage Books, 1961. Pp. vi, 174. $1.25.)

Most intellectually stimulating studies of African politics are limited in scope to a small number of geographical areas, *e.g.,* Apter's *The Political Kingdom in Uganda,* or to a small number of analytical dimensions, *e.g.,* Hodgkin's *Nationalism in Colonial Africa.* The few with broad scope have usually appeared in forms not suitable for mass distribution either among the laity or among students as a classroom text, *e.g.,* Coleman's section in *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* The book under review is intellectually stimulating, has broad scope, and is available in paperback. It therefore fills an important gap in the literature.

That broad scope is the aim, the author makes clear on the first page of his introduction. He describes the book as "an interpretative essay that seeks to place within an overall perspective the whole range of modern political developments on the African continent." The geographical and analytical scope of a prospective study is a problem which must be confronted by all comparative social analysts. Should we focus upon the political system or a part of it? Should we limit ourselves to peoples who have had relatively similar experiences or expand to include peoples with relatively dissimilar experiences? In what ways should our data collection, analysis, and presentation vary with scope?

The geographical scope decision most Africanists have made is to focus either upon North or sub-Saharan Africa (at most), on the grounds that within each of these areas the indigenous cultures, external contacts, and contemporary developments have been relatively similar and therefore amenable to generalization at lower levels of abstraction.

The continent of Africa as a whole contains considerably more variety in culture, contact, and development, necessitating higher levels of abstraction, more elaboration, *or* generalizations where deviant cases are often not considered. Wallerstein writes that many of the statements in his book are "generalizations, true of the large majority [of African territories]. Where there are important exceptions to the rule, they are usually indicated." He is reasonably successful at indicating "important" exceptions, but the task of covering African politics at a lower level of abstraction in less than two hundred small pages is enormous.

A new era of African history began when Europeans—motivated by "the lure of adventure, the search for personal freedom, the sense of mission . . . greed and vanity and lust for power"—imposed their rule upon the continent. The era is, in Wallerstein's well chosen words, "a story of how Africans reacted to their conquest by seeking to learn the secret of their weaknesses in order to reestablish the autonomous control of their own destiny."

This story can be viewed as two social processes, and these are the two main foci of the book: (1) the ways in which colonial administrations "generate within themselves social conflict, and under what conditions this social conflict results in a revolution which overthrows [the administrations]," and (2) the ways in which independent African states "hold themselves together, acquire the loyalty of their subjects in a complex economy where the interests of the citizens vary widely."

The social changes which led to revolution were, according to the author, largely by-products of European acts of self-interest. *Order* assured Europeans freedom of action, but it also provided the African with safe travel and the African deviant with an escape. "The dissenter, the misfit, the rebel could now defy the chief simply by moving out from under his control." *Education* supplied trained workers for the Europeans, but it also socialized Africans to western perspectives. *Transportation and communication* facilitated European administrative and economic goals, but it also increased the diversity of African contacts. *Commercialization* contributed to European wealth, but because of the need for African manpower, cash crops, and a money economy, it also interrupted traditional patterns. *Urbanization* created centers for the new infrastructure, but it also was the agent of modernity. *Bureaucratization of traditional authorities* facilitated European administration, but it also weakened the position of these authorities in the traditional society.

The most consequential effect of social change was the emergence of westernized Africans as a potential counter-elite. As vehicles to power they first organized voluntary associations and later mass nationalist movements. Finally, power in the form of territorial independence was gained.

Before turning to the independence period, I shall offer a proposition suggested by Wallerstein's materials. Many of the Europeans who came to Africa were deviants in the metropole society seeking deference. Similarly, many of the Africans who came into contact with the Europeans were deviants in the traditional society seeking deference. I believe that the selective recruitment of these two groups heightened the intensity of conflict between them.

The second focus of Wallerstein's book is the development of stability and integration in the new African states. Instability often, and disintegration sometimes, accompanies the transfer of power because of underdeveloped civility and frail authority. African political elites use a variety of strategies in order to develop the needed stability and integration. Among those mentioned by Wallerstein are (1) legitimation of the state through revival and glorification of the indigenous culture, (2) development of intra-territorial functional interdependence, (3) creation and dissemination of the national image, (4) emphasis upon the supportive "we" rather than the oppositional "they," (5) socialization to the new political symbols, and (6) creation of new political goals, *e.g.*, African unity and eradication of neo-colonialism to replace the goal of independence.

The two major instruments for attaining stability and integration, according to Wallerstein, are the nationalist party and the national hero. The party "is the emanation of the people . . . holds their loyalty and ties them to the state." The hero "legitimizes the state by ordaining obedience to its norms out of loyalty to his person." Thus "there is a correlation between the strength of party and hero and the degree of national integration and stability."

Wallerstein implies that the correlation bespeaks a causal relationship, *i.e.*, that stronger parties and heroes develop greater national integration and stability. Alternative possibilities should at least be considered, *viz.*, (1) greater national integration and stability develop stronger parties and heroes, and (2) other factors, *e.g.*, indigenous culture, are causal conditions for both parties-heroes and integration-stability.

The modal African political system, in the author's view, contains many non-democratic and democratic elements. Among the former are the single party, the national hero, party—dominated voluntary associations, manipulative electoral laws, preventive detention acts, and the non-independent judiciary. In general, several forms of opposition are not tolerated out of fear that the state is in jeopardy, a fear "not wholly without foundation."

The modal system also contains democratic elements. The single party is a broad coalition with mass membership in which interests are constantly being negotiated. The national hero is rigidly constrained by the party. Political participation and debate are encouraged so long as they are "kept within the framework of the party structure." Perhaps of greatest importance, a democratic atmosphere is supported by many of the indigenous political systems and by "the continued turmoil and movement of the African political scene." In sum, the modal political system represents a workable solution given the character of contemporary African society; the widespread civility and firm authority necessary for a mature democracy have not yet evolved.

In a chapter entitled "Africa and the World" Wallerstein adds to the domestic problems of the new African states those of the international arena. "Having emerged from colonial rule," he writes, "Africa is determined to be subject to no one but itself." This calls for a policy of neutralism, defined as "the determination to judge other countries by how they help solve African problems, the determination to be tied too closely to no one, and somewhat to everyone."

Domestic problems and international problems—but with determination, outside help, and a little bit of luck, Africa will succeed. "Africa has greatness in her past as well as her present. And probably her future too."

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International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. EDITED BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. xiv, 511. $8.50.)

The editor of this volume has brought together 55 readings (7 not previously published), under 5 headings, and has contributed about 14 pages of introductory and connecting comment. The editor's central thesis is that there is "a large and persistent gap" between the research "frontiersman" and the "classroom practitioner." The frontier is "alive with activity" that challenges the "traditional concepts" of the classroom. The primary purpose of his book is to "narrow" this gap.

There are indications that Mr. Rosenau is concerned primarily, though not exclusively, with the undergraduate "college classroom." It is unlikely that many undergraduates will be attracted to a book that crams about 1,200 words on each double-column page. It will be an even more rare undergraduate student who stays with the book any length of time, for the editor's avowed "eclecticism" results not in a dialogue between frontiersmen and classroom practitioners but rather in a cacophony on the frontier.

The fact that many of his "research frontiersmen" are also classroom teachers has implications for the "gap" which Mr. Rosenau seems to overlook. One wonders too whether it is good pedagogy to try to narrow the remaining gap in any other than the advanced graduate seminar room. The function of the undergraduate and beginning graduate classroom is to provide the student with a "map" of the terrain to help him find his way in the real political world as it manifests itself in history and current affairs. Once the student masters the map symbols and then seeks to find his way in the analysis of the real world, he will become acutely aware of the deficiencies of the map. It is then that he may profit from a knowledge that there are other symbols and other maps. But to immerse him initially in a mass of undifferentiated symbols, maps, and map fragments is to invite him to flee in utter confusion, especially if author and teacher refuse to share their own judgments as to which are most useful. Yet this is precisely what Mr. Rosenau does, claiming that since "present knowledge of international politics and foreign policy is too scanty to permit reliable estimates of the potential usefulness of any of the theories which have been developed," the student should "choose for himself the approach (or approaches) that seems most suitable."

Leaving aside matters of pedagogy, what does the book tell us about the state of theory and research in International Relations and Foreign Policy? For one thing it demonstrates quite adequately that there has been a lot of writing done. But there are strange gaps in the coverage provided by the volume. It offers no treatment of diplomacy, propaganda, alliances, subversion, economic or military action. The editor labels these "forms of state action" and eliminates them on the grounds that they "do not pose major theoretical or methodological problems." Both the label and the reasoning seem questionable. In the light of the great emphasis that the volume places upon the difference and the "linkage" (read "nexus") between international politics and foreign policy, it would appear to be a theoretical problem of some significance to consider whether diplomacy, alliances, war, etc., are better treated as modes or patterns of state interaction rather than as forms of state action. Certainly there is theoretically rich and methodologically suggestive recent literature dealing with typologies of alliances and of foreign aid, to say nothing of the conceptual gems that might be sifted out of the theoretical dust kicked up by the arms controllers.

There is another major omission that is related to a general fault that can be found with many of the readings in this volume. The general fault is a tendency to attack old concepts or embrace new ones without demonstrating either the inadequacy of the old or the superiority of the new. (It is impossible in this connection to avoid calling attention to Urban Whitaker's "Coarse-Screen Macro-Theory," which phrase, it turns out, can be freely but accurately translated as a general theory with large holes in it.) One suspects that newness is valued either for its own sake or, worse, because it confers upon its author a mark which identifies him as a pioneer. Thus supposedly responsible scholars construct straw men by distorting the concepts and formulations of their colleagues and then seek to build a reputation by tearing down the results of their own misinterpretation.

This general fault manifests itself in an interesting way in the eagerness with which the editor embraces the concept of system: "Of all the advances that have occurred in the study of international phenomena, perhaps none is more important than the ever-growing tendency to regard the world as *the international system.*" He goes on to extol the "systems perspective" since "a system is considered to exist in an environment and to be composed of parts which through interaction are in relation to each other." What he fails to acknowledge is that one of the "traditional concepts" of international relations is "the modern state *system.*" Indeed, it is a concept used in the article by John Herz which follows immediately on the heels of the editor's remarks. Furthermore, the editor never makes clear whether by international system he refers (broadly) to the international *social* system, or (narrowly) to the international *political* system. If the former, one would expect some consideration of international law, ethics, organization, and economics as component systems, along with international politics, of the international system. If the latter, one would expect those matters to be treated as important parts of the "environment" of the international (political) system. But the book offers neither a specific treatment of these matters nor an explanation of their omission. If these concepts are so traditional as to be pronounced dead they ought at least to have a decent burial.

This is not to say that the collection is without value: there are occasional flashes of insight, imaginative constructs, and feats of logical analysis. But in this reviewer's opinion the most valuable readings are those that set themselves the modest task of refining and building upon the "traditional concepts" rather than those that seek to wipe the slate clean and start anew. On the whole, one comes away from this volume somewhat dismayed by the state of theory and research, hopeful that it is in better shape than here demonstrated, and fearful that he has been more victimized by scholarly pretensions than enlightened by scholarly discourse.

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The Papers of Alexander Hamilton. Vol. I., 1768–1778. Vol. II., 1779–1781. EDITED BY HAROLD C. SYRETT; JACOB E. COOKE, *Associate Editor.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. 1337. Single vols. $12.50.)

Whether by chance or by contrivance, Alexander Hamilton managed to be present at the center of events which launched the American republic into the orbit of history. With the lengthening shadow of experience hard upon us, we have recently been spurred to explore more thoroughly the dimensions of world history and to probe more deeply the reaches of our own tradition for the relevance it may bear to contemporary issues. In an age of revolutionary upheaval which has spawned new nations at an unprecedented rate, it is sobering and instructive to review the searing adventures and sage observations of this neophyte statesman-in-the-making. What kind of a man was Hamilton? How did he come by the ideas that he expressed so incisively and the arguments he marshalled so persuasively in support of sundry causes? What native qualities of mind and heart did he bring to the demanding tasks which confronted him at one of the turning points of time? Answers to such questions begin to take shape as one ponders the fascinating account from Hamilton's own pen so attractively presented in this impressive product of American scholarship at its best.

The present two volumes are the first fruits of an imaginative project of collecting, editing and publishing the papers of Alexander Hamilton which may number as many as twenty volumes when completed. Grateful tribute should be paid to the vision and industry of Dr. John A. Krout, Vice President of Columbia University, Mr. Charles G. Proffitt, Director of the Columbia University Press and editors Harold C. Syrett and Jacob

E. Cooke and their associates. The documents include: 1) letters written by Hamilton or to him as well as those he wrote for someone else, notably George Washington; 2) certain published articles such as "The Continentalist," and the "Publius Letters;" 3) a number of poems; 4) financial and legal records. The notes and editorial comments are skillfully arranged and extremely helpful to the amateur reader and professional scholar.

The figure that emerges from these pages is a remarkably talented and many-sided young man, especially when one remembers that the record stops at his twenty-sixth year, in 1781. Intense, restless, ambitious, with a genius for the existential, Hamilton was never content to wait for the *event* to know what measure to take, but devised the requisite measures to produce the *event*. The basic pattern of his political thought was set early, in the familiar tradition of the eighteenth century which, in turn, grew out of the ancient heritage of Greece, Rome and the Middle Ages. Thus he espoused a natural rights philosophy, the free contract origin of the state, the dependence of civil enactment on the God-ordained natural law. He accepted the constitutional theory of the American revolution, alleging that "the pretensions of Parliament are contradictory to the law of nature, subversive of the British constitution, and destructive of the faith of the most solemn compacts."[1] To justify this opinion as prompted by sober reason and not prejudice, he admitted having once defended the opposite side, but insisted that his change of sentiment "proceeded from the superior force of the arguments, in favour of the American claims."[2]

His views on government were expressed cautiously in a pair of letters to Gouverneur Morris in 1777, with a comment on the New York State Constitution, which he found lacking in a vigorous executive. He pursued the same thing with a keen, incisive analysis of the shortcomings of the Confederation in a letter to James Duane, a New York member of Congress, written from Liberty Pole, New Jersey, in September, 1780.[3] The major defects, he pointed out, sprang from a want of power in Congress, and this for three reasons: "an excess of the spirit of liberty" which made the states jealous of their own power; "a want of sufficient means" at the disposal of Congress to answer the public exigencies, and "of vigor to draw forth those means;" an over-dependence on the states to fulfil their military commitments. The only feasible and adequate remedy, as he saw it, would be to summon a convention of the states with the aim of establishing "a solid, coercive union." Congress should have "complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance, and to the management of foreign affairs." There should be an integrated administrative structure for the whole country, a permanent army, a rational financial system pivoted on a national bank, and a measure of central economic planning.

Essentially the same charges and recommendations appeared again during July and August, 1781 and April and July, 1782 after Hamilton's departure from Washington's official family. This time, his ideas were disseminated in a series of papers entitled, "The Continentalist," and published in *The New York Packet and the American Advertiser*. Characteristically, he pushed hard for effective power in the central organs of government, which he considered indispensable to the maintenance of independence in the face of fragmenting tendencies from within the nation and threatening force from without. The natural reluctance to bestow power, attendant upon popular revolutions, must yield, he contended, to the exigencies of political stability and economic viability.

It is interesting to speculate where Hamilton would stand if he could look in on the eighty-seventh Congress as it debates controversial questions of increased governmental influence in economic, educational and social welfare fields. The tenor of his thought contained in the writings herein presented, suggests that he would probably go along with the prevailing trend to center more responsibility in the federal government. A protagonist of order and authority, though never a foe of freedom, he did not find in the philosophy of *laissez-faire* an adequate safeguard for their proper exercise. It is not likely that he would feel at home with the modern conservative, least of all with the radical fringe.

In a letter to Elizabeth Schuyler, who was soon to become his wife, Hamilton described himself as a "philosopher and a soldier."[4] It is precisely the virile, decisive qualities of the military man, complementing those of the intellectual, which give further testimony to the extraordinary range of his talents.

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[1] "A Full Vindication of the Measures of the Congress, from the Calumnies of their Enemies," etc., New York, Dec. 15, 1774, Vol. I, p. 47.

[2] "The Farmer Refuted, etc.," New York, Feb. 23, 1775, Vol. I, p. 82.

[3] "To James Duane," Liberty Pole, New Jersey, Sept. 3, 1780, Vol. II, pp. 400–418.

[4] "To Elizabeth Schuyler," Preakness, New Jersey, Oct. 13, 1780, Vol. II, p. 474.

The letters penned during the bleak and depressing months at Valley Forge and afterward, reveal the writer as a man of courage, ambition and vigor, a keen judge of character, a realist in appraising the strength and weakness of the British enemy as well as the French ally. Two circumstances indicate the strange combination of relentless persistence, on the one hand, and sensitive impetuosity, on the other, which seriously undermined Hamilton's powers of perseverance and sustained fidelity. The first is evident in the protracted correspondence which he carried on with Colonel John Brooke, Francis Dana and Reverend William Gordon. At issue was a statement falsely attributed to Hamilton, in which he was supposed to have urged "the people to rise, join General Washington, and turn Congress out of doors."[5] So disturbed was Hamilton at this odious charge, that he spared no effort to uncover the culprit and bring him to a reckoning on the field of honor. The tone of these letters inclines one to endorse the writer's own assessment of the affair which was contained in a final word to Washington: "I hope Your Excellency will excuse the asperity of my expressions, which my respect for you would induce me to suppress, did I not owe it to my sensibility, wounded by the most barbarous attack upon my reputation and principles, to speak without reserve."[6]

Paradoxically, this same hyper-sensitiveness sometimes precipitated Hamilton into modes of conduct which betrayed an emotional immaturity and want of self-discipline. Examples are the impulsive break with the Commander-in-Chief in 1781, over a trivial incident, and the acknowledged lapses from marital fidelity later on.

The ensemble of material in these volumes enhances the biographical work of Louis M. Hacker, Broadus Mitchell, Nathan Schachner and others who have labored to promote a better understanding and greater appreciation of the *whole* Hamilton. Perhaps the main thing that stands out in retrospect is the amazing diversity of the gifts, intellectual, practical, diplomatic, literary, which he devoted with rare skill to the master purpose of his short life—the building of a politically stable, economically prosperous and industrially strong United States of America.

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The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World. BY SAMUEL HUMES AND EILEEN M. MARTIN. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. Pp. 449. Guilders 36.)

Local government as an academic discipline has had a unique history. Unlike other fields of political science, it has failed, at least in recent decades, to develop a corresponding methodology and theory. The bulk of the journal articles—in fact the journals themselves—that treat the subject of local government are predominantly written or edited by practitioners, administrators, or professional research associates and staff members. This is not to say that the contributions of local government associations and practitioners have not been of value, for they certainly have added considerably to the empirical documentation of an area of study that understandably resembles its subject matter in variation, complexity and immensity.

Much is said today of the analytical utility of a multidisciplinary approach to the subject matter of the social sciences. Seldom-read articles of the 1930s and 1940s in journals of anthropology, sociology, and psychology are being combed and recombed by the current generation of political scientists as they seek decision-making or functional insights into international politics, comparative government, voting behavior, etc. Despite the work done in the other disciplines in the area of small group behavior, community analysis and locality culture, the political scientist has consistently shied away from a "multi-disciplinary," "cross-cultural" approach to the ancient and honorable field of local government. Is it any wonder that the latter has tended to become preempted by municipal research bureaus and local government associations?

Two somewhat contradictory major trends in the style of human political organization apparent in our time would seem to encourage a more academic and theoretical concern with local governance than has in fact occurred. On the one hand the realm of the supranational and regional association is growing. On the other hand, the attention of political scientists, as never before, is being drawn to those regions of the world (*e.g.*, Southeast Asia, Africa, Oceania), where the significance of non-nation-state political forms has long been apparent to the anthropologist if not to the political scientist.

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[5] "From Lieutenant Colonel John Brooks," West Point, July 4, 1779, Vol. II, p. 91.

[6] "To George Washington," Morris Town, New Jersey, May 2, 1780, Vol. II, p. 316.

Possibly the renaissance of local government, with its supporting column of theoretical and methodological sophistication, and hopefully also a revival of its contribution to the general realm of political philsophy and theory, must await the development of the field of comparative local government. This may be more than idle speculation, for not only will the relative importance of locality and local political organization in the newly developing states of Asia and Africa attract the systematic attention of more political science scholarship, but the internationalization of all political science in recent years is bringing to American scholars an awareness of the relative importance of the study of local government in the more developed states as well.

Therefore, the contribution of the International Union of Local Authorities generally, and of Samuel Humes and Eileen Martin specifically, is of particular import in this critical juncture in the study of local government. *The Structure of Local Government Throughout the World* is the culmination of a massive data collection effort undertaken by the IULA at the request of UNESCO. Detailed questionnaires, seeking legal and structural data of a descriptive nature, were obtained from forty-two of the seventy-four countries approached.

In the first half of the volume, Samuel Humes has sought to examine the data from the contributing countries and systematically to contrast the more important structural features. The comparative method employed contributes little to raising the low level of generalization that has so long characterized this subject area. However, this is in part attributable, as Humes himself notes, to the manner in which the data were gathered.

Although Humes, in contrast to Montague Harris (*Local Governments Around the World*) has developed a typology of local government structures, the presentation and comparative scheme is noticeably lacking in precision and rigorous definition.

In a world in which local governments are being created and designed to contribute to modernization and nation building, the orthodox statements of local government ventured by the John Stuart Mill school nearly a century ago are hardly appropriate. The most fascinating area of local government development and experimentation today is not in the Western nations, (whose structural descriptions make up the greater part of this work), but in the new countries of Asia and Africa. There John Stuart Mill is being stood on his head and local governments are deliberately being created to lessen local separatism and to further national development and conformity. The new purposes to which local government and other local political institutions are being put in the nation building process, in much of Africa and Asia, provide the most exciting field for a sophisticated scholarly study of this subject area that in turn might offer theoretical insights dealing with the general functions of local political organizations in addition to static descriptions of statutory local government institutions. The trouble with the legalistic, descriptive approach which characterizes this work, is that it approaches local government from the direction of the nation-state and thereby precludes a return to the richness of local politics and governance as an area of observation and analysis that can contribute in its own right to more general political understanding and theory.

Miss Martin has contributed a straightforward country-by-country description of local government as contrasted to Humes' presentation of comparative structures. The forty-two countries surveyed are treated in nine geographical groups. The nine area categories selected reflect the predominantly traditional and Western focus of not only the survey material, but of the nature of the analysis as well. Six of the nine geographical areas, for example, refer to one part or another of Europe or of the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Having said this, however, it must be added that this volume not only brings together for us much previously scattered data, but also contains a vast amount of empirical data invaluable to those who would pursue further the study of local government as either the "most local" aspect of the nation-state or as the "most fundamental" aspect of human political behavior and organization.

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The Cold War and Its Origins: The Eloquent and Indelible Record of The Great Conflict of Our Time. BY D. F. FLEMING. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1961. Two volumes. Pp. xx, 540, Vol. I. Pp. 615, Vol. II. $15.00.)

At last someone has attempted a comprehensive survey of the Cold War. The two weighty volumes under review are not properly a work of political science. As the subtitle implies, Professor Fleming has devoted himself to piecing together the chronological narrative of Soviet-Western relations since 1917 in order to demonstrate causal relationships. Like the revisionist historians of World War I, he proposes to assign responsibility for war by establishing who took the initiative in the diplomatic exchanges which led to hostilities. By showing that we of the West are as much to blame as the Soviets, if not more so, he hopes to halt the vicious spiral of recriminations and the arms race which point to a third World War.

His choice of an essentially historical approach lays him open to the historians' disdainful charge that political science is a mere journalistic recital of current events pending their own more scholarly, balanced judgment when the complete sources become available. Both Fleming and the historians are vulnerable to the criticism that their searches for first causes lead to an infinite regression.

The nearest the author comes to employing methods of analysis now associated with political science is a summary list of events, from which one might get a better sense of the interplay of policies than from the massively detailed text if the list were organized into synchronous columns, Soviet and Western. The rest of the work is at the historians' usual low level of generalization interspersed with apocalyptic moral judgments. There is no attempt to tie this potentially valuable mine of material in to a more general body of theory about international relations.

More controversial than Fleming's methods are his main themes: "The Cold War arose because the leaders of American public opinion could not accept the chief consequences of World War II . . . Communist control of East Europe and China." Most impartial scholars would probably now agree that Hitler could not have been stopped after Munich without Soviet military participation, the price for which was a Soviet sphere of influence in those areas she conquered from Germany. He is also undoubtedly correct that the American goal of free elections in Eastern Europe was incompatible with the legitimate Soviet demand for friendly governments in the power vacuum between Russia and Germany. It is harder for some people to accept after fifteen years of Cold War that the price was worth it because Nazism was intrinsically worse than Communism.

Most debatable of all is Fleming's further thesis that "the Russians' . . . first driving and continuing motive was, and is, security." Unlike Hitler, Stalin and his successors are pictured as cautious, conservative defenders of the *status quo*, interested only in recovering the lost border territories of the Czars as buffers against future German aggression plus the perennial Russian objective of warm water ports through the Straits, the Persian Gulf and Manchuria. These goals, Fleming asserts, did not arise out of Marxian dogma which he largely discounts as a determinant of day-to-day Soviet foreign policy.

From these postulates flow his policy conclusions: that American "containment" and "encircling" bases are wrong because provocative; that the support of unpopular governments just because they are anti-Communist is unnecessary; and that we should have shared our atomic secrets with the Russians from the beginning and should accept their conditions for disarmament now and take up their challenge to "peaceful coexistence," a race for improving living conditions everywhere.

Before we can endorse Fleming's postulates and conclusions, we must examine his evidence. Real Soviet motives are difficult to ascertain because of the secrecy and concentration of decision-making in totalitarian government and because of the self-admitted gap between the shifting, expediential public propaganda "line" and the actual intentions of the party leadership in the Communist system. Fleming shows no awareness of these problems but takes all Soviet public statements at face value. For instance, his principal source for Soviet policy in the 1934–38 period is Litvinov's speeches before the League of Nations. Throughout the two volumes he limits himself largely to Western sources and practically ignores the whole body of literature which has appeared in the last fifteen years which essays an analysis of Soviet motives and operating rules with the help of refugees, defectors and ex-Communists, interviews, captured Soviet documents and Lenin's and Stalin's own writings. For instance, the author cites Nathan Leites' pathbreaking *Study of Bolshevism* only to confirm the principle of caution in Soviet behavior. Nowhere does he refer to the works of Raymond Garthoff on Soviet military strategy. No doubt he would argue that the output of our Soviet area experts is itself a part of the Cold War, biased by the disillusioning experiences, prejudices and present employments of the writers, but that does not relieve him of the obligation to refute their hypotheses and prove his own with comparable inside evidence. Instead, he resorts frequently to authors whose prejudices in the opposite direction are at least equally notorious: Zilliacus, Coates, Rosinger, Snow, Strong, Smedley, Jaffe, Stone, Panikkar, Wechsler and Williams. In addition the author cites some of our more sensational columnists—Drew Pearson and the Alsops—without sufficient assessment of the reliability of their reporting. His method of quoting newspaper editorials about each development in the Cold War lengthens the narrative unnecessarily.

Fleming's own biases are strong and much in evidence. His personal heroes are Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt; he views the political influence of the Catholic church and its laymen with much suspicion, and the "feudal, reactionary, fascist, militarist, collaborationist landlords" of every country with undisguised hatred which may reflect a nineteenth century American agrarian radicalism more than any Socialist leanings. Governments on our side in the Cold War are invariably "corrupt, repressive and inefficient." The supreme sin of appeasement is always committed by the West and its allies, never by the U.S.S.R. as in 1939–41. On the positive side, Fleming has a romantic predilection for social revolution as both inevitable and just. One wonders if the beneficiaries of the *status quo* have no human rights and if the bloodshed and destruction involved in dispossessing them always produce greater net wealth, happiness and justice. Land reform is his panacea for the backward agrarian countries and it is always associated with Communist rule, but he glosses over the subsequent collectivization of agriculture which in effect deprives the peasant of his newly acquired acres.

The foregoing criticisms to the contrary notwithstanding, this is a book that needed to be written. Professor Fleming is to be congratulated for his courage in going against the tide and for his years of patient research. So much of journalism, popular writing and even scholarly research on American foreign policy is in justification of or pursuit of the Cold War that a certain amount of exaggeration, indignation and selectivity are pardonable and possibly necessary to put across the unpopular viewpoint. It is salutary to be reminded of analogies between the significance of the Straits, Suez and Panama to Russia, Britain and the United States respectively; to be confronted with the contradiction between the American revolutionary tradition and the Truman Doctrine; to recognize that we earned and enjoyed no more influence in the occupation of Eastern Europe than the Russians did in Japan; to perceive the logical inconsistency of defending South Korea and then invading North Korea; to admit that if Red China can't "shoot her way into the United Nations" then none of the original members are entitled to membership; and to smile at the reversal from American defense of neutral rights before World War I to Dulles' condemnation of neutrality as immoral. All these insights Professor Fleming offers the reader who is prepared to detach himself for awhile from the heat of battle.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Justice and Social Policy. EDITED BY FREDERICK A. OLAFSON, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961, Pp. viii, 150. $1.95, paper.)

Dean Pound was perhaps right when he said that the mansion of legal philosophy is a large one with room enough for all. The winds that have swept in and out of political science have not excluded jurisprudence. The contributions of legal realism and sociological jurisprudence are but two parts of a movement—perhaps a "revolution" in thought—that has swept through the entire mansion of legal thought. The rejection—at times total—of "metaphysical" conceptions of law, of broad formal conceptual schemes, has now begun to come full circle, and Professor Olafson's very useful volume is one index of a growing return to the discussion of legal ideals, including natural law.

This compact volume should not be confused with the veritable spate of readings books that cross a professor's desk nearly every week. It is in no sense a collection of amorphous materials, but is a calculated attempt to carefully and critically examine the concept of justice through the use of two portions of a book published by Henry Sidgwick (*The Methods of Ethics*, 1893 ed.) and five recent essays that Olafson regards as "fairly typical of the state of philosophical opinion at the present time." While this might sound rather vague and much too large a subject for critical analysis, the starting point is the utilitarian theory of justice, represented by Sidgwick's work. Sidgwick was chosen, rather than Bentham, because he seemed closer to current philosophical inquiry, particularly his respect for other points of view. Essays by J. D. Mabbott, Jonathan Harrison, and John Rawls are rather distinctive attempts at reformulation of the utilitarian thesis, although it might be questioned how much of the utilitarian thesis they still retain. Mabbott's essay on "Punishment" is a particularized attempt to isolate a part of the general problem of justice for microscopic scrutiny, a type of analysis that is all too rare and none too easy. It is obvious from the Mabbott essay, as well as the other two, that the rather sharp epistemological quarrels within contemporary jurisprudence over the meaning of words, the kinds of questions that can be raised, and the methods of inquiry that are germane to these questions, have borne fruit. Once again, philosophical speculation in the area of legal ideas is "respectable," and while we may still throw brickbats at the protagonists, at least the enterprise is very much alive again.

The final two essays by Richard Wollheim and Sir Isaiah Berlin on the concept of equality at first glance seem to be out of place, but they serve to emphasize the very important relation between justice and other social ideals. This collection of well written essays will offer a rich source of discussion in a variety of academic situations, including courses in modern political thought, jurisprudence, problems of democracy, and even in those philosophically-oriented areas of public administration.

The deaths of Morris R. Cohen and Felix S. Cohen left an enormous gap in American jurisprudence, but men on both sides of the Atlantic still maintain a lively interest in the history of legal ideas and the critical assessment of these ideas. The veritable axe of American legal realism has been tempered, and even natural law theory now merits a journal of its own (the *Natural Law Forum*), and writers like Hart, Wollheim, Williams, and Lloyd in England and Cahn, Bodenheimer, Cowan, Hall, Fuller and others in America are giving new life to the study of legal philosophy. The realist stress on *facts* and the sociological school's stress on *process* were certainly necessary in their own right. Perhaps Buckland was right in saying that Austin (and the command theory) could be regarded as a disease, in much the same sense that legal realism and sociological jurisprudence have been viewed by their opponents. But Pound's admonition was cogent. There is plenty of room for combat, and plenty of time for redefinition and reformulation. The empirical, pragmatic winds are still blowing strong—and their contributions legion—but we have learned the lesson that in order to have a legal system function within what A. D. Lindsay called "operative ideals," we must be able to define with some degree of precision and clarity the ideas that undergird that system. Facts and values may be miles apart, and a love tryst out of the question, but at least the effort can be made.—JULIUS PAUL, *Wayne State University*.

Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends. BY OTTO KIRCHHEIMER. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1961. Pp. xiv, 452. $8.50.)

This is an impressive work, almost encyclopedic in analytical framework, yet rich with illustration and judgment concerning the problems and effectiveness involved in the use of the agencies of criminal and civil justice for political ends. Nevertheless, Professor Kirchheimer's opening judgment is moot in view of the substance of his effort. In his preface he questions whether the application of the term "Political Justice" by European writers "to the most dubious segment of the administration of justice, that segment which uses the devices of justice to bolster or create new power positions" is "gross linguistic abuse and utter cynicism" in view of its usual sense, the Greek idea of a "search for an ideal order in which all members will communicate and interact with the body politic to assure its highest perfection." He answers "no," arguing that, "The Greek ideal grows sharper in profile precisely because justice in political matters is more tenuous than in any other field of jurisprudence, because it can so easily become a mere farce."

This answer is curious, since although he may have intended that his impartial language and power approach should indicate how farcical political justice is in view of the Greek ideal, they do not themselves explicate or defend the latter; a reader must already understand and accept the Greek view to see the farce.

True, at the end of the work he concludes that the process of political justice therein described is grotesque and not even very effective relative to its own ends except for creating an image, but he also thinks it is necessary and beneficial in making the power struggle less disorderly and tenacious. Such conclusions add little to the classical concept, nor do they further its acceptance, and the author ignores the argument that it is dubious and unverified that political order ever rests on the mental states of individuals, an assumption implied in the kind of political justice he describes.

Perhaps it is not without significance, therefore, that although Professor Kirchheimer appears generally to assume the positivist definition of law and remains faithful to his descriptive approach, delineating the material in terms of the assumptions, motives, techniques, and actions of practitioners of power, he now and then expresses judgments in "ideal" terms. For example, in discussing "The Sanction of the Legal Order," as a plea which defendants such as those in the Nuremberg trials used, he states, "Not every piece of legislation enacted by a government in conformity with its own rules acquires, by the mere fact of enactment, the quality of binding the lower echelons," *e.g.*, an enactment which "shows on its face the character of inhumanity, as did the decree concerning the administration of penal justice against Poles and Jews in the incorporated Eastern territories, . . . " Here, "the value of legal certainty is not strong enough against the principle that intentional violation of minimum standards deprives an enactment of the claim to legal validity." These are strange judgments for positivism to make. Who except the community elite, the power-holders of the state, may so conclude—assuming one adheres faithfully to this position? Is it not accepting "ideal" criteria to say (and this reviewer approves) that a state rule like the above "is the negation of the purpose of law, which even in the form of the shoddiest enactment must still offer a password: the ordering of human relations?"

However, such seeming contradictions do not significantly detract from this real contribution to jurisprudence. Thus, in Part One, Kirchheimer calls attention to changes in the practice of using legal technique for political ends from the Roman period to the present. Our era, he thinks, is a strange one of "transition as difficult for those in search of new durable attachments as for those charged with upholding fading traditional ones." Nevertheless, he concludes, "Whatever the state's pattern, its protective armor thickens and stiffens," and this he demonstrates during an incisive discussion of the political trial as differentiated from the purely criminal procedure, with illustrations drawn from homicide trials, trials for treason, and the show trials beyond usual constitutional protection. It is also indicated as he discusses the legal repression of political organizations and the forms of treatment applied by an established regime to hostile groups, such as repression by minority fiat in South Africa, or repression by majority rule in West Germany and the United States, in which case he analyzes the criteria used: the anticipation of remote consequences, the weight of specific acts, etc., concluding with a discussion of variation in attitudes toward an opposition of principle.

Part Two is a close analytical study of the work and effect of the judge, the defendant, and the latter's lawyer, under western constitutional regimes and also in East Germany or previously under the Nazis. This part likewise includes an excellent analysis of the trial by fiat of a successor regime, giving extensive attention to the Nuremberg trials.

The final part of the book, "Political Justice Modified," discusses asylum and clemency. The extensive footnotes not only enrich the book but indicate the wealth of materials used, many not available in English.—JOHN PAUL DUNCAN, *University of Oklahoma.*

Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel; with a translation of his essay on The Decomposition of Marxism. BY IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 264. $6.00.)

Georges Sorel, treated in this book as the symbol of pragmatic (irrational) socialism in "*fin de siècle* France," has not customarily been regarded by English-writing students of political philosophy as a thinker of the first or even second rank. Whether or not this assessment of Sorel has been accurate is, of course, a moot point, and may undergo revision as time carries researchers and analysts further from 1922, the year of the Frenchman's death. At any rate, Professor Horowitz, who is Chairman of the Department of Anthropology and Sociology of Hobart and William Smith Colleges, apparently thinks that it is time to take another look at Sorel.

In taking his psycho-sociological (or sociopsychological) glance into the past, Horowitz sees, and relates, the roles played by many men who affected the Sorelian perspective: Charles Péguy, Fernand Pelloutier, Gustave Le Bon, Henri Bergson, William James, and numerous others. Early in the book it becomes, and, throughout, remains obvious that myriad names can, in some fashion, be referred to Sorel's thought. On substantive grounds, the reader may object that the profusion of names often dims and sometimes eclipses the light which the author is trying to shed on an already obscure subject. A similar result occasionally is produced by faulty organization and presentation of the material, and by vague or ineffective terminology. In view of the undoubtedly great effort which Horowitz put into researching his subject, it is unfortunate that seemingly unnecessary obstacles to clear communication exist.

At his best when criticizing the illogical position of Sorel, Horowitz strikes several telling blows, one example being sufficient here. Having noted Sorel's vacillation concerning whether violent action or anarchistic socialism were the prime value, the author shows that Sorel could not have it both ways: " . . . If action were central, then the goals achieved by socialism were necessarily transitory and of secondary value. If socialism were the focal point, then action was simply an instrument for reaching the goal, intrinsically no more valuable than other means . . . " and more perilous than other techniques.

On the other hand, there are a few instances, usually relating to the concept of democracy, where Horowitz's arguments may leave the political philosopher unsatisfied. For example, there will be difficulty in agreeing that "the principles of economic and political democracy" must receive constant redefinition or die, unless one adopts the attitude of pragmatism and is prepared to have "democracy" mean anything which anyone desires, thereby depriving the term of communicative worth. Furthermore, the value of a concept which has general application may be lost because of provincialism: "Judicial review, constitutional amendment, parliamentary statute, executive veto and the like, are . . . activities of democracy. . . ". In this case, a partial list of standards, which are empirically verifiable, is indicated, but the roster seems to have been constructed almost exclusively from the American political experience, thus giving rise to the peril of a parochial definition—an outcome which Horowitz would probably want to avoid. Moreover, the chore of classifying states with respect to democracy remains about as difficult as it had been.

Sorel's lack of precision, his pragmatic irresolution, and mystical attitude in general have probably caused much of the criticism which his intellectual posture properly deserves. Political and other philosophers who criticize Sorel on these grounds would do well to remember that the same criteria may be used to judge their works.

This reviewer would be remiss in his responsibility if he did not call attention to the existence of many grammatical and related errors in the book. Some, perhaps many, of the mistakes may be typographical (spelling, the absence of quotation marks, missing apostrophes, etc.), but there are, unfortunately, errors in agreement between subject and verb and in sentence structure. Before an instructor puts this book in the hands of his students, if he does, he would doubtless want to be aware of the presence of such errors.—WILLIAM D. S. WITTE, *Bradley University*.

Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance. EDITED BY DWAINE MARVICK. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961. Pp. 347. $7.50.)

This volume is the second of the *International Yearbooks of Political Behavior Research* put out by the Free Press. Such volumes serve a useful purpose in bringing together representative current writings in significant fields of political behavior. The first volume was on community political systems, and we are told that others are to follow on civil-military relations, comparative party systems, and political ideologies.

In the present volume, edited by Dwaine Marvick, the papers, including two review articles, are of generally high interest and quality. Read together, they illustrate the richness and diversity of the possible approaches to the study of political elites—and political behavior in general.

There is, in the first place, a great variety in the methods used. Two of the studies—that by Marvick and Nixon on campaign workers in Los Angeles and that by Eulau and his associates on state legislators in four states—utilize systematic surveys. But these surveys differ from each other, and in turn both differ from most surveys, in the population studied. Neither study uses a cross-section sample. The Eulau study is of almost all

(91% to 100%) of the members of the four state legislatures, while Marvick and Nixon interviewed a sample of campaign activists weighted so as to secure a larger representation of those at the center of campaign activities. Such studies of significant political sub-groups represent an important application of the survey technique. Dogan, in his study of French deputies from 1870 to 1958, uses standard biographical data for an ingenious statistical analysis of the social origins and career patterns of the French legislative elite, while Guttsman bases his first-rate study of changes in British Labour Party leadership on similar material supplemented by memoir literature and Labour Party documents. Renate Mayntz spent eight months of intensive participant observation in a local district CDU organization in Berlin, observing the decisional process, repeatedly interviewing key participants, and studying the records of the organization. In addition a questionnaire was circulated to all members of the largest local of the district. And Edward Shils bases his essay on Indian intellectuals on long field experience in India and a large number of intensive discussions with Indian elites, as well as deep knowledge of the literature by and about Indians.

This catalogue of methods is presented here because it illustrates quite clearly how many approaches to political behavior are open to the scholar. The methods differ, but each has advantages and each appears quite appropriate for the particular subject matter. The statistical analysis of biographical data by Dogan and Guttsman tell us little directly of the attitudes and opinions of the political elites compared with the studies based on interviews. Yet unlike the survey studies by Eulau and his associates and by Marvick and Nixon that are conducted at one point of time, the use of biographical data allows the analysis of changes and trends. On the other hand, the use of standardized statistical techniques with either biographical or interview material would not have allowed the analysis Shils presents of the complex and rich intellectual tradition in India and its impact on political life. Nor does it seem likely that the decision-making process in an organization can be understood without some participant observation of the sort carried on by Mayntz in the CDU local district. Anyone who believes that the systematic study of political behavior involves a commitment to a particular method or technique will be disabused and enlightened by this volume. Such systematic study does, however, involve commitment to more general standards of evidence, inference, and analysis. Such standards are exhibited in this volume.

The substance of the volume is as diversified as the techniques of study and more difficult to summarize. The subjects include the social origins of decision-makers, their career perspectives, changes in outlook and style of political decision-makers, the effects of organizational structure on political careers, and the motivations of campaign activists. The subjects range from an analysis of the complex, deeply felt, and highly articulate belief systems of the intellectuals in the new states to the non-ideological, relatively professional career perspectives of American states legislators. Such diversity in subject-matter—the tendency to study one problem in one context and another problem in another—is perhaps not as fortunate as the diversity in method. It makes graphic the need for explicitly comparative studies in different political contexts. There are no such studies in this volume, but the book serves a purpose along these lines in bringing together in one place studies from a variety of political systems and allowing at least implicit comparisons. That one deals with ideologies when one studies Indian political elites and with career perspectives when one studies American legislative elites suggests a point of great comparative importance. Furthermore, the essay by Lasswell on an "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites" provides a number of perspectives from which such comparative study might begin.—Sidney Verba, *Princeton University.*

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. By James N. Rosenau. (New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. 118. Paper-bound, $1.35.)

This study by Professor Rosenau of Rutgers is a useful and well-written one, even though the title is much too broad. A more exact title would be: *The Opinion-Transmission Network of the Present-Day U.S.A.* Convinced by his reading of recent literature that it is scientifically "premature to chart the flow of influence in behavioral terms" without first re-conceptualizing the opinion process as a whole, Rosenau proposes to deal in this book with a small and relatively manageable part of this process. He charts, in effect, the circulating system within which transmission of opinions (including non-influential as well as influential opinions) takes place.

The better to focus upon the succession of steps in the circulation of opinions from given participants in the polity to other participants, he has deliberately excluded all statements about the motivational systems of the individual and collective actors who use the system, as well as about the symbolic or ideological or value contents of their communications. To use a bit of the more of less standard jargon of communication analysts (a language that Dr. Rosenau appears to avoid for some reason), what he presents is essentially a classification of components of the network of "channels," "gatekeepers," and "relay points" through which communicators occupying various roles transmit opinions to various "audiences" (publics) in the present-day United States.

He considers the United States as if it existed in a vacuum. The impacts of communications to the United States from other countries, the effects of the existence of other sorts of circulating systems abroad, and the varying "states of the world opinion-field" in which American opinion plays itself out—all these essential components of a generalized explanatory or predictive theory are left out of the discussion.

Such an analytic procedure is like making an anatomist's diagram of a cardiovascular system *per se*. The arteries and arterioles, veins and ventricles are named and their respective locations are shown, but we are told nothing about the effects of the system's contents (blood, drugs, toxins), or the effects of impinging systems, upon the organism's functioning.

Within this delimited area, Rosenau's line of argument is marshalled extremely well. When he must introduce new terminology, he makes a knowing case for it, and uses common sense and plain words. Thus, the generalized roles of participants in his system are those of "opinion-holders" (nearly all of us); "opinion-makers" (those who introduce opinions into the relatively "impersonal" communication channels); "local opinion leaders" (here he follows the usage of Lazarsfeld and Katz: these are persons who transmit opinions locally in face-to-face situations); and "opinion-submitters" (those who convey opinions to "decision-makers"). Each of these rôle-concepts is defined and sub-classified in precise and orderly terms. As he points out, each rôle-incumbent, of course, may be on occasion either a communicator or a communicatee or both. The media, likewise, are catalogued exhaustively.

Here, tantalizingly, the book ends. Just what has all this definition-chopping accomplished? I think Rosenau has added a number of useful specifications and caveats for the benefit of users of the communication models set up by Almond (*The American People and Foreign Policy*), Lazarsfeld and Katz (*Personal Influence*) and related writers who furnished Rosenau's points of take-off. We can see the rôles of the specified participants, and their points of interaction, more clearly now. But we are still left with the important theoretical problem of how to classify the communicators' values and motives and the contents of their transmitted opinions, and how to demonstrate the effects of the latter. The reviewer hopes that Professor Rosenau will next apply his passion and real talent for conceptualizing to some of these more elusive variables in the communication process.

As the behavioral sciences become more rigorous in dealing explicitly with such abstractions as "systems," "models" and "processes," it becomes increasingly useful to have these constructs lucidly diagrammed—as the physical sciences have already shown. In step with the times, Dr. Rosenau undertakes to draw a flow-chart of "the opinion-policy relation." The intent is commendable and the associated text reads well. At first glance, the diagram itself bears a reassuring resemblance to the economist's familiar charts of "flow of money in an economy." However, on second glance it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a drunken driver's apperception of a cloverleaf intersection on an eight-lane highway. Perhaps this is proof of the model's "empirical fit" to the facts of the American Way of arriving at opinions on foreign policy. However, it is just possible that the cartographer could benefit by taking one more lesson from such a master diagrammer as Kurt Lewin.—BRUCE LANNES SMITH, *Michigan State University*.

Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. BY ROBERT C. TUCKER. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961. Pp. 263. Cloth $5.50. Paper $1.75.)

A spectre is haunting Marxist scholarship—the spectre of Alienation. Some scholars, notably those of an existentialist or religious persuasion, have tried to show that a notion of "self-alienation" is pervasive and abiding in Marx's thought throughout; others, like Sidney Hook, have sought to exorcise the spectre by arguing that the notion of human alienation is actually foreign to Marx's conception of man. Professor Tucker's book is an important contribution to the literature which stems especially from the comparatively recent publication of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844. It is meant, in his own words, "to carry forward the still unfinished work of reinterpretation and basic critical analysis of the thought of Karl Marx." There need be no quarrel with many features of his interpretation, but his central thesis is open to challenge.

Tucker distinguishes the "original Marxism" of the 1844 manuscripts from "mature Marxism" as found in all the works after 1845. The "Philosophy" in what purported to be positive social science was chiefly Hegel's, but Tucker enriches this familiar insight by tracing carefully Marx's philosophical transposition of Hegelian terms into economics. In 1844, he argues, Marx suddenly had a colossal insight: Hegelianism is fundamentally about economics. Whereas Feuerbach had taken Hegelianism to be esoteric anthropology, Marx treated it as esoteric economics. The "Myth" in Marxism is, according to Tucker, Marx's vision of an inner moral drama of the self as something taking place in the outer world. The controlling concern of his thought was the structure of selfhood, and this applies not merely to the early writings which are explicitly dominated by the notion of "alienation," but also to the seemingly sociological thought of "mature Marxism." "Marx was not a social scientist whose theory was rendered obsolete by the further march of history, but a philosopher become myth-maker, who, having inverted Hegel, represented a subjective process as the social universe."

One could agree with Tucker that Marx was moralistic, utopian, and quasi-religious (as Max Eastman contended long ago), in the mature as well as in the early writings. One might wish to insist upon ambivalent tendencies in Marx. Moralism is mixed up with anti-moralistic doctrine. Marx's view of the communist future contains utopian elements but this is not to gainsay the force of his own critique of utopianism. And it is not really sound to talk of the religious "essence" of Marxism, as Tucker does. It is true that Marxism exhibits aspects of a secular religion which are superficially obscured by Marx's rejection of the traditional religions, but one might reject the notion of "essences" here as elsewhere: Marxism is not "essentially" a religion even though it has affinities with religious movements. Nevertheless, despite differences on matters of emphasis, one could accept many of Tucker's general arguments and specific points of detail as acute and illuminating.

A really questionable argument is Tucker's main thesis, expressed in a number of different ways, of which the following passage is a sample: "A system concerned with the generic human self in its hostile relations with itself turns into one that seems to have nothing to do with a dualized self and everything to do with a dualized society" (p. 176). Tucker's view about the nature of the shift between early and mature Marxism is thus opposed to all those interpretations which see a change from a psychological to a predominantly sociological position. Like any "interpretation," Tucker's reinterpretation involves an attempt to say what Marx "really" meant. As against G. D. H. Cole, for instance, Tucker says "it is not that Marx views social classes rather than individuals as possessing ultimate reality, but that his image of society is an image of a collective dual personality." This compels Tucker to lay a good deal of weight on such purely literary devices in *Capital* as "My Lord Capital" and the "Collective Worker." And it forces him to lay too little weight on the *Communist Manifesto's* attack on the German "true socialists." In a passage which Tucker quotes, Marx explicitly scoffs at the way in which these "true" socialists think not in terms of the interests of a social class, the proletariat, but "the interests of human nature, of man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, and subsists only in the misty realms of philosophical fantasy." It is true that Marx approached the subject of social class as a metaphysician and not as an empirical sociologist, and it seems clear that no coherent theory of social class can be extracted from Marx's writings. But the concept of social class has at least potential objectivity and empirical reference in a way that such obscure subjective categories as "the structure of selfhood" or "an image of a collective dual personality" do not have.

Tucker makes out an exceedingly plausible case by using the distinction between manifest and latent functions. In the structural history of Marx's ideas, the notion of the "division of labour" came to play a role that "self-alienation" had played in the early work. Obviously a man may think he has escaped early assumptions (as Marx thought himself more emancipated from Hegel than he "really" was), and yet they may continue to play a role in later work. But Tucker shows no more than that Marx's earlier concern with "the structure of selfhood" plays an occasional underlying role in later writings, as a "lapse" into earlier psychologistic modes of thought. He does not show that conceptions like "self" and "alienation" play a *systematic* role in mature Marxism. In any case these indefinite notions refer chiefly to the future communist society as a new "state of self" rather than to the attempted historical and sociological discussion of the capitalist present. The myth and melodrama in Marxism derive from the dialectical mumbo-jumbo rather than from a thoroughly spectral notion like the "self."

Professor Tucker's book is nonetheless a most valuable contribution to scholarly analysis and criticism of Marxism.—DOUGLAS MCCALLUM, *University of Sydney.*

Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812–1855. BY MARTIN MALIA. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. pp. 486. $10.00.)

Marxism, Lenin once said, has three components: German philosophy, French socialism, and English political economy. It is notable that the first two of these ingredients had been mixed into the Russian radical mind long before the advent of Marxism. The resultant blend—inspired by a conviction that Russia followed her own laws of development and could by-pass the capitalist stage of history—was Populism, *narodnichestvo* or Russian socialism, which dominated the scene in Russia before the appearance of Marxism in the mid-1880s. Populism was the work of many minds, but no thinker contributed more than Alexander Herzen (1812–1870); and Professor Malia has performed a considerable service for the historian of political philosophy in this masterful account of the younger Herzen and his thought.

The dates in the title are misleading, for the book is concerned principally with the period from 1832 or 1833, when Herzen first became acquainted with Saint-Simon, to 1847, when he left Russia never to return. Most previous studies of Herzen have attached great importance to his first shocked reaction to Europe in 1847 and 1848, and to his bitter disillusionment with the failure of the February revolution. But if Malia's conclusion is correct—and he has gathered impressive evidence to support it—the main outline of Herzen's thought had already taken shape before he left Russia. This is true even of Herzen's characteristic "rejection of the West," which was really a rejection of bourgeois Europe, and his conviction (an article of faith with the later Populists) that the younger and more vigorous Russia was destined to lead the way to socialism. The one new element in Herzen's writings after 1847, his faith in the Russian peasant commune as the embryo of a socialist society, was not of course an original idea but borrowed much from the thinking of the Slavophiles.

Thus the main contribution of the book is to explain why the young Herzen became a socialist, and perhaps more important, to examine what "socialism" must have meant to a Russian radical of the 1840s. Certainly for Herzen socialism did not mean reconstruction of the economic system, but rather total negation of the existing order in the name of a higher ideal of justice—without any specific reference to economic goals. Malia argues that socialism began not as a protest against industrial capitalism but as a protest against the old regime and a demand for political democracy against authoritarian government; Herzen's "socialism" was simply the most extreme and uncompromising form of a movement of protest which had seized the intelligentsia of the Forties. On this point Malia is profoundly right just as in his own way Stalin was right when he formulated the theory of the "weakest link": socialism is a phenomenon of under-development, a protest movement driven to revolutionary extremism by the failure of democratic (or "bourgeois") reform.

But although Malia has provided us with a penetrating account of Herzen's own thought, to which no brief review can do justice, he has been less successful in describing this general political movement of the Forties. He has tried to analyze the politics of the period exclusively according to the western spectrum of political ideas. The major tendencies of the time, Official Nationalism, Slavophilism, and Westernism are graded in the over-simplified and misleading terminology of "left" and "right." This is particularly unfortunate for the Slavophiles, who become the Right Center, "something like a Russian version of enlightened Tories" and "a rather typical aristocratic opposition to absolutism." The Slavophiles are hard to classify on any political scale, for the essence of their teaching was a flight from politics, a total rejection of government, and an insistence, to quote Konstantin Aksakov, that "the state, as a state, is a lie." Yet the Slavophiles were not anarchists, for they were willing to leave the evil and corrupting power of the state in the hands of the tsar-autocrat so long as he, in turn, left substantial autonomy to the nation. But if Russia did develop a typical aristocratic opposition to absolutism, then this designation belongs to the Westerners, and especially to such intellectuals from the lower nobility as Konstantin Kavelin and Timofei Granovskii, who were not as "rootless" as Malia suggests.

This criticism should not, however, detract from the overall value of the book, which is certain to be a standard work in the library of every student of the history of socialist thought.—Darrell P. Hammer, *Indiana University.*

Politics of Cultural Despair. By Fritz Stern. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. 367. $8.00.)

This book invokes the memory of three German ideologists who, from the days of the Wilhelminian Empire to the germinal period of Nazism, could boast of a strategic influence over the minds of considerable segments of the German middle class, including the members of the academic community. None of the "Germanic Ideologists" as the author of this absorbing and painstaking study has dubbed Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck (respectively authors of *Deutsche Schriften*, *Rembrandt als Erzieher* and *Das Dritte Reich*) had the power of analysis and the breadth of vision of the intellectual titan of their period, Friedrich Nietzsche. They stood out in their times because they articulated most penetratingly a mood of "cultural despair." Reacting as they did against the environment of their days they cried out their hatred of the combined features of authoritarianism, liberalism and materialism. They came to reject modernism, the sum total of Western values, in favor of the reestablishment of a spiritually united community of the German people. The detailed inquiry of the author brings out quite clearly the share which a warped personality structure had in the anti-modernist reaction by all three of them—the first, a philologist of repute, the second, an eternal bohemian, and only the third a direct participant in the rightist opinion-forming process of the early nineteen twenties. In theory, at least, their program was tied to the revitalization of a truly conservative heritage. But where would this projection of a conservatism which was a construct of their crisis-ridden minds rather than the evocation of a living past, lead them to?

Though belonging to different generations and concentrating on different, if overlapping, facets of communal deficiencies—Lagarde as critic of the staleness of 19th century Christianity and herald of a new national religion, Langbehn as rhapsodist of an irrationalism recreating true artistic feeling, and Moeller smashing outdated modes of political thinking and manufacturing a universally binding, community centered political style—they all were partners in an ambiguity which vitiated their thought processes: the failure to elucidate the relations between symbols and reality. To what extent does the ambivalence between symbols for a more meaningful life pattern and ever present concern for extremist political action only connote an expression of incapacity to arrive at a more all-embracing societal analysis and to what extent does it contain also an attempt at conscious manipulation? With all due safeguards against historical simplifications and *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* constructs, there are the syndrome of cultural antisemitism (in two of the three authors), the ostentatious lack of interest in analyzing the social basis of the society in which they were living, the facile effacement of class distinctions in the urge for national unity, the thoroughly imperialist program of expansionist action.

The significance of the men studied here, as intellectual progenitors of National Socialism, emerges clearly. Nazi ideology was not an *ad hoc* invention of Hitler, Rosenberg and their cohorts. Almost every specific Nazi tenet was circulated widely decades before Versailles. One of the merits of this book is that it demonstrates this fact exhaustively. Many National Socialist notions, concepts and slogans were part of that "pervasive mood" created by Lagarde, Langbehn and Moeller among the German educated and middle classes. This ideology "was one of the traditions that the German elite and the National Socialists shared." "Without this pervasive mood [they] would not have been able to succeed," for they would have lacked that rapport with the middle and upper echelons of German society which to a considerable degree explains the National Socialist victory. What the latter contributed was to transform the Germanic ideology and its mood of cultural despair into a dynamic political force. In this, to be sure, they were aided by economic and political conditions different from those in which the two older men, Largarde and Langbehn, lived. Nevertheless, because the "Germanic ideologists" transmitted both their rejections and their vistas to broad strata—noticeably, as the author justifiably remarks, to the world of the teachers—their predictions, though they rested on an "intellectually threadbare analysis," acquired many of the elements of a self-fulfilling prophesy.—OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University.*

Montesquieu: a Critical Biography. BY ROBERT SHACKLETON. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xv, 432. 45/-.)

Montesquieu has been undeservedly neglected by biographers and we are indebted to Mr. Shackleton, who had complete access to all the relevant manuscripts and family archives, for having filled this gap. He has produced a careful, balanced, and highly informative biography, based upon thorough research. With Montesquieu, the reader shuttles back and forth between Paris and his home territory of Guyenne, catching glimpses of him, too, on his travels in Italy and England. One gets enough of the flavor and texture of life in Paris and in the environs of Bordeaux to understand the *milieu* in which Montesquieu moved. The picture that emerges from these pages is that of a man who played a rather prominent role in the life of the Academy of Bordeaux and, for some years, as a "President" judge of the local Parlement, who was elected to the French Academy at the age of thirty-eight, who was intimate with Parisian society at various extended periods of his life, who was welcomed into and delighted by the Parisian intellectual salons from 1733 to the time of his death, and yet who remained intellectually somewhat aloof. Few people were aware of the fact that he was writing *The Persian Letters* until they were published; and the composition of *The Spirit of the Laws*, to which he devoted nearly twenty years, was surrounded by almost equal secrecy.

In Shackleton's pages, we follow Montesquieu's intellectual growth and changing ideas throughout all his writings, published and unpublished. We note the development of his regard for liberty, for which in his early years he had a rather low opinion. We can even trace, step by step, the changes in his essay on the English constitution, between the time when he wrote it, in 1733 after his return from England, and the date of its eventual publication, fifteen years later, as chapter 6 of Book XI of *The Spirit of the Laws.*

The account of Montesquieu's method of working on his *magnum opus* is interesting and impressive The notion that he was an elegant dilletante gains no support here. From the start he envisaged the project as one that would require him to put aside preconceptions and search for the broadest possible factual basis regarding all aspects of every known civilization. Beginning at the ripe age of forty-five, he labored assiduously for sixteen years, reading widely and prodigiously, and making careful abstracts of the books he read. Throughout his adult life he kept journals in which he noted and developed his ideas, sometimes elaborating them at considerable length. From these sourcebooks, as well as from the abstracts, he drew heavily in composing *The Spirit of the Laws*. If, by modern standards of scholarship, his evidence appears inadequate and even capriciously selected, one must remember the character of the available materials—often such unreliable sources as letters of missionaries and accounts of returned travellers.

On the actual composition he exerted the greatest care. The finished product, says Shackleton, "was the result of continued and deliberate transference of sentences from one place to another, of intentional polishing, of conscious pursuit of the epigram and the paradox, of the constant suppression of the redundant and of the intermediate link between two ideas, of the rearranging of a sequence of ideas so that the consequence precedes the cause."

A large part of the book is devoted to chapters on various aspects of his published works, especially *The Spirit of the Laws*. They deal, for instance, with "Montesquieu's Conception of Law," "The Theory of Governments," "The System of Liberty," "Climate and Causes," and "The History of Laws." The critical exposition set forth in these chapters is generally sound, although there are points to which one may take exception. Montesquieu's theory of natural law is made to seem less torn between rationalism and empiricism than in fact it is. Contrary to Shackleton's implication, Montesquieu was not the first to link a doctrine of the separation of powers with the theory of liberty, nor was Locke. Hence the evidence that Montesquieu had developed his theory before he had read Locke with care does not necessarily support the author's conclusion that Montesquieu's theory was based on his own observation.

The author concludes his study with the final sentence of Lord Chesterfield's published comment at the time of Montesquieu's death: "His work will illustrate his name, and survive him as long as right reason, moral obligation, and the true spirit of laws, shall be understood, respected and maintained." This reviewer puts down the volume with a feeling of greatly increased appreciation for the validity of Chesterfield's appraisal.—J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*.

Sociology: The Progress of a Decade. BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND NEIL J. SMELSER. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp xi, 635. $7.50.)

This is a collection of articles from the pages of the learned journals in the field of sociology, reflecting what the authors consider to be major trends in the literature during the decade of the 1950s. As such, it contains some that will be of little interest to many political scientists. But there are some sections that should prove to be valuable and enlightening to those who are attempting to relate political science to the other social sciences.

The first section, which deals with the discipline of sociology itself, provides a means for comparison between the two fields. A number of the problems are identical, a few are analogous and perhaps none completely irrelevant. The authors have not tried to comment on the major works in this area except as such works have become the basis for discussion in the journals. So those unfamiliar with such major contributions as those of Parsons and Shils, for example, may sometimes wonder what all the to-do is about. But if he reads the whole section, he may get some insights about these major works that will give him light on their shortcomings or induce him to read and see whether or not he agrees with the critics. What he will discover in any case is that there is emerging some systematic theory in sociology which is directly apropos to the findings of political scientists and may, in fact, serve well to throw light on some of their empirical findings. Gouldner's article on the Theory of Bureaucracy is a particular case in point.

The methods employed by sociologists and political scientists are at some points identical and at others it looks as if criticisms of research in one field are equally applicable to the other. At any event, it may be easier to see the validity of criticism when it is directed at workers in another field than one's own, and so, by reference, discover something of one's shortcomings.

Those political scientists who are concerned with the ecological and demographic aspects of political phenomena will find much of immediate interest in the section dealing with physical and biological boundaries of systems. The complaint that these factors have been neglected by the behaviorists is aired and rebutted, and some contributions to an understanding of political phenomena that might be made, using knowledge about these parameters, is indicated.

In another section dealing with the production and allocation of wealth, power, and prestige, the fields of sociology and political science are pretty well merged. It is interesting to note that two of the articles cited here are by authors primarily identified as political scientists. The articles by David Easton and Robert Dahl show something of what can be done when social phenomena and political phenomena are considered as one.

Of growing significance in political science, is knowledge about the class and status system of a state. The articles on these subjects deal with the primary controversies among students concentrating in this area. Some of the methods are such as might be directly used in political science, and the findings contribute to the substantive knowledge required for political analysis.

The sections on social change and social control will be of more peripheral interest but those interested particularly in urban government may find that the pathology of the city, as revealed by sociological analysis is the source of most of the political problems confronted by local governments.

The quality of the articles is, as is always the case in a collection, varied, but, in general, they represent a pretty good cross section of the work that was done in the '50s, and this volume provides the political scientist with an easy access to a field in which there is increasing interest.—FRED COTTRELL, *Miami University*.

Free Minds: A Venture in the Philosophy of Democracy. BY RALPH W. NELSON. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. xv, 291. $4.50.)

In this impressively entitled book, Dr. Ralph Waldo Nelson exhorts his fellow "grass-blade home folks" of the world to unite with him in rescuing democracy from the clutches of autocratic politicians, priests and professors "who have traditionally smothered the freedom of our minds by their paternalistic eagerness to do our thinking for us." To succeed in this venture the plain people need only to begin to think for themselves, seriously, deeply and hard. Then, freed by this "headwork" from the dictatorship of capitol, cathedral and campus, the home folks can proceed to apply to the solution of world problems that pragmatic philosophy of life they already employ for solving their personal problems. The author, a philosopher, credits John Dewey with formulating this method which operates, briefly, in the following manner: The ordinary citizen solves a small scale problem by (1) sensing it accurately, (2) locating and defining it clearly, (3) creatively seeking a possible solution, (4) reasoning soundly "as to what results or fruits to expect in the laboratory of life—when (5) he dares freely to seek truth in laboratory application of the best wisdom of his day to the continuing tasks of citizenship in the kingdom of God." The author's pioneering achievement, he frequently reminds the reader, is his discovery that this method, "already rooted and strongly growing in the sturdy hearts and clear heads of our plainest people," holds the key to the world's salvation.

Several times in what he calls his "adventurous book," Nelson criticizes the methods of social and political scientists. He advises them to abandon their outmoded approaches to their subject matter and adopt instead his "conception of human life as itself our scientific laboratory of supremest value [that] will provide philosophical ground essential to the techniques that will ultimately lift their sciences from the status of 'descriptive' to that of true laboratory sciences." The author's analysis of how he thinks the Founding Fathers solved their political problem by writing the Constitution illustrates both how Americans executed step four of the problem-solving process (the United States has been engaged in step five since 1787), and the marvelous insights to be gained by adopting his suggested technique.

> "What happened at Philadelphia . . . was that each individual thinker received stimuli from his fellows to which he responded as an individual thinker; and when he expressed his responding idea in language, this idea served as a further stimulus to all his fellows who understood it. So on, back and forth and round about, each response stimulating other responses until the gradually ripening reactions of individuals evolved into the united and composite, formulated response of the whole convention . . . the Constitution."

This passage illustrates not a new methodology for the social sciences but rather an unintended parody on a behavioral study of groups. It springs from the author's total unfamiliarity with the goals and methods of social scientists.

Not only does Nelson reveal no understanding of our methodology, but he fails to develop one of his own and apply it to this book. The result is a work that rambles in a pseudo-scholarly manner through "historical evidence" selected to buttress what are no more than the author's personal predilections. He constantly reasserts his primary proposition without demonstrating how that pioneering discovery can be put into action. In short, he never brings off steps one through four himself.—F. DONALD ZUCKER, *Ursinus College*.

Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages. BY WALTER ULLMANN. (New York: Barnes and Noble. 1961. Pp. 320. $6.00.)

Dr. Ullmann has written a very important book in the tradition of Gierke and McIlwain, one in spirit closer to the former. For this very definitely is a work of concepts and principles;

italicized nouns and phrases such as *gratia, publica utilitas, ordo rationis*, and *principatus* abound, and in effect the volume represents an attempt to order the political thought of some 1500 years in the light of several great themes. The non-specialist reader will be overwhelmed by an elaborate scheme which, in terms of beautifully clear and precise statements of the relationship of law and institutions to Christian theology or Aristotelian philosophy, explains why men of politics thought and acted the way they did before the Reformation. Beyond this, the specialist—and here one must include not only the historian of political ideas but also historians of the church and the several national monarchies—will find Ullmann's views on a multitude of issues over which there is learned debate. For example, he adds to the literature on *Magna Carta*, the English coronation oath of 1308, and the prohibition of Roman Law study in France. Nor is any authority safe: Stephan Kuttner's views on this last issue are characterized as "naive."

The book is divided into three sections, The Pope, The King, and The People, the three being preceded by an introduction which describes the ascending and descending themes of government that contested throughout the period, and that constitute the basic analytical conception of the study. In the descending conception of government and law, authority flows from God "in the shape of a pyramid," while in the opposing theory "law-creating power may be ascribed to the community or the *populus*." Those familiar with the author's two books on the medieval papacy will find here another brilliant statement of the development of the papal institution. The Bible, writings of the early popes, vocabulary and theories borrowed from the majesty of Roman Law, all these had contributed to the papal doctrine of the *principatus* by the fifth century. The pope, a fundamental distinction being made between the office and the person, was to direct all Christians in the affairs of this world. Within the Church, broadly conceived as the community of all Christians, ruled the temporal power. Given the theory of descending government, secular authority was transmitted by the pope to the ruler as an act of grace, *gratia*. Characteristically Dr. Ullmann here gives both a religious and juristic interpretation of the foundation of secular rule.

Having examined the dependent relationship between monarchy and the papal office, the author analyzes monarchy. Initially the theocratic kingship stood exalted: "there was no juristic line of communication running from the people to the king." Now the king too had *gratia;* like the pope he was an estate apart. But, if the theocratic king was above man's law he remained under God's law, and therefore under the interpreter of that law, the pope. At this point in his argument the author investigates the restraints that legal and institutional feudalism placed upon the theocratic king. He discusses both English and French constitutional history and shows how the king who stood unchallenged as theocratic monarch could be challenged as feudal lord. He emphasizes that responsibility to feudal law and custom was already a step in the direction of popular control. Finally we are treated to a discussion of medieval populism conceived in the broadest theoretical and institutional sense. Dr. Ullmann ranges from gilds and heretical groups as expressions of popular needs or discontents to careful analysis of Aristotelian naturalistic politics. He analyzes Marsilius of Padua and Bartolus' theory of popular sovereignty. Thus, having begun with the early papacy, he ends with the Renaissance. Having begun with God as the source of all authority, he ends with a theory of popular sovereignty worked out by theorists and legists in relation to the functioning institutions of their own day.

This brief summary omits the passion, scholarship, ingenuity, and vision that pervade Dr. Ullmann's book. One may argue against many of the author's strongly held views, or one may wish that he had not strained a given point of interpretation—and many will do both. But no one will close the book feeling uninformed or unchallenged.—PETER RIESENBERG, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

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JULIAN FELDMAN
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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Presidential Election and Transition 1960–1961. Edited by Paul T. David. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961. Pp. ix, 353. $3.75.)

This book is a useful addition to the series of studies of the electoral process that the Brookings Institution has published in recent years. The Institution is making a valuable contribution in devoting continuing attention to this particular field. Periodic studies afford a depth and a comparative dimension that in itself is the surest antidote to and safeguard against impressionistic interpretation in an area where that has been all too common.

In this volume particular attention is given to changes and trends in the apparatus, procedures and emphases of campaigning, the function of the convention, the process of platform construction. Although the format is not the same, the central concern of the first half of this book is not unlike the pioneer studies, *The 1928 Campaign* and *The 1932 Campaign* produced by Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly thirty years ago. In the intervening years the literature on voting causation, techniques of polling and election analysis has undergone marked change. Political vocabularies have been colored by the statistical and behavioral disciplines. The basic problems have not changed, however, and it is useful as well as interesting to note how little new there was in the 1960 campaign.

Since the present work also covers much the same ground as Theodore White's book, comparisons are inevitable. Both books have their particular assets: White's extensive reportorial man-on-the-spot access plus his "insider's" view versus Brookings' "team" resources. Both have the advantage of advance planning—the recording of politics in action, rather than the *post hoc* methods of recapturing already completed action. The White book comes off better as a literary product. It is better journalism and more dynamic political science, but the David volume is a worthy contribution.

Actually, the symposium (twelve chapters contributed by ten writers) comprises two monographs, one treating the 1960 campaign, the other the transition and transfer of the presidency in 1960–1961. The conception of the book emphasizes the interrelated character of our political processes—the continuity of all phases of the presidency. Yet, for all its recognition of the inseparability of election and administration, the present work has not gone all the way. It presents within a single volume the campaign and the transition—in tandem; it does not incorporate them into a single panoramic treatment of the period under scrutiny. Nor, indeed, does it treat them as interstitial parts of a single structure. The first six chapters, comprising approximately half the book, deal with various aspects of the 1960 campaign. The final six chapters are concerned primarily with the transition from one administration to its successor. There is little cross reference from one subject to the other. The inherent unity of the subject matter is not organically recognized in the execution of the work.

Nevertheless, the book will find a ready market because it fulfills a real need. What it may lack because of attempting to cover too much ground within a single volume is at least partially offset by its utility in making readily available in highly readable form a number of factual, authoritative and in some instances penetrating essays upon pertinent aspects of significant recent events.

It is impossible to treat individually all of the essays. Each has its own particular merits. Among the chapters relating to the election, it seems likely that the one on finance by Herbert E. Alexander and V. O. Key's interpretation of the election results will be most useful. The former is systematic, comprehensive, well documented yet highly compressed; it will be a standard source for some time to come. Key's sophisticated interpretation of the statistical data yielded by improved techniques of recording election results should give pause to analysts tempted to indulge in sweeping generalizations concerning voting causation.

The chapters on transition and transfer are chiefly narrative; they provide a compact yet adequately detailed review of the many-sided problem of changing the guard. Party and congressional interpretations are contributed by Senators Eugene McCarthy and Thruston Morton. John M. Hightower's essay on the impact of the campaign on foreign relations commands particular attention. For one thing, it is unique because it brings into a book about our election processes the external ramifications of what we have traditionally regarded as the most domestic—almost private—aspect of our political life.

Among the essays some repetition occurs but not enough to be objectionable; more serious is the range in thoroughness of treatment—from meticulous analysis to off-the-cuff commentary. Perhaps this is unavoidable in a symposium of this type.

One wishes for more detail at a number of places. In the campaign chapters: special uses of the vice-presidential candidates, changing organizational situations at the state and local levels, relationships with other party leaders. In the transition section, Eisenhower-Kennedy contrasts as they affected the transition adjustments are touched upon but only enough to tantalize, not to illuminate. Obviously, space limitations are to blame for these minor shortcomings.—LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN, *Columbia University*.

Freedom and Protection: The Bill of Rights. BY ANDREW D. WEINBERGER. (San Francisco: The Chandler Publishing Co., 1961. Pp. xix, 180. Paper $1.75, cloth $3.50.)

Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action. BY JOHN P. ROCHE. (New York: Random House, 1961. Pp. xiii, 117. $1.35.)

Freedom and Protection is essentially a book for nonspecialists on the Bill of Rights broadly defined. The bulk of the book is consumed by 14 chapters, each of which begins with a short introductory note citing the significant historical and political developments for the particular freedom or right being discussed. This is followed in each case by short excerpts from one to three relevant Supreme Court opinions. The opinions seem to have been chosen primarily to give the flavor or tone of Supreme Court attitudes rather than to state the holding or rule of the particular case.

Although 13 justices of the court are represented, approximately one-half of the contributions are from Frankfurter (5), Black (4), and Warren (3). On balance Weinberger's notes are dispassionate and seemingly unexceptionable, though an occasional imprecision in expression occurs. For example, the case of *Shelley v. Kraemer*, as Weinberger asserts, stands for the proposition that racial land convenants cannot be enforced. But to describe such covenants today as "entirely meaningless" is, at the least, a misleading emphasis.

John P. Roche has also written a short paperback in the Random House series—"Studies in Political Science." The book deals, as the author says, with the struggle for justice in the United States and the role of the judiciary in that struggle. Specifically, the volume treats such topics as the rule of law, the judicial process, and the rights of citizens. In a final chapter on the judiciary and the democratic process, the author adopts the view of Learned Hand that "the current policy power of the federal judiciary is an anomaly in our democratic system." This conclusion, however, comes as somewhat of a surprise since there is little in the preceding pages to suggest that the author is concerned about such matters.

Courts and Rights is written in a felicitous and readable style which some may find entertaining. Yet certain deficiencies may be mentioned. Viewed as a book for the specialist, there is nothing new here—fact or interpretation. Indeed, the initiated will probably be irritated by the oversimplifications, the cliches, and the "cute" asides which mar this work. Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, even in 1866, are not best described as "rebels and traitors" who "were fortunate to escape with their heads intact." The President and the Congress did not unite "to lock 75,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry in concentration camps for possessing enemy chromosomes." Professor Roche's penchant for clever and immoderate comment only serves to dilute the informative and thought-provoking functions that a work such as this might have.

Viewed as supplementary or textual material for undergraduate students, the book may be compared to previous studies in this series dealing with the same or similar subject matter. *Courts and Rights* is a cut below Victor Rosenblum's *Law as a Political Instrument* and Jack Peltason's *Federal Courts in the Political Process* in carefulness of statement, systematic coverage of relevant subject matter, and organization. Professor Roche's loose use of language has been noted. Since he does not identify his frame of reference or tell us why he has written his book, it is not clear why some materials are included and others left out; nor why some topics are discussed in depth and others ignored or given cursory consideration.

The author's treatment of the topics he chooses to discuss is not always adequate. In discussing "clear and present danger" Professor Roche is seemingly oblivious to the extent to which that concept has been undermined in recent years. His tendency to downgrade the libertarian heritage of the common law runs counter to the posture taken by J. A. C. Grant in *Our Common Law Constitution*—a book Professor Roche does not cite. The intentions behind the federal Bill of Rights, often a subject of controversy, present no problem for the author of *Courts and Rights*. Since civil liberties in the colonies meant noninterference in the American *status quo*, the Bill of

Rights merely reflected concern "for the federal principle and not any abstract American dedication to freedom of the press, a fair trial, or humane and usual punishment." The major contributors to the development of constitutional liberty in the United States, according to the author were not the founders of the republic but the abolitionists. The extent to which state constitutions paralleled the wording of the federal Bill of Rights, however, would seem to testify to a different concern. And the alien and sedition acts were, after all, of little consequence after 1801.

In sum, *Courts and Rights* is a nonsystematic and narrow treatment of an important subject matter area.—S. SYDNEY ULMER, *Michigan State University.*

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. BY DAVID N. FARNSWORTH. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961. Pp. vi, 189. $4.00, cloth. $3.00, paper.)

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is a useful study of an interesting and important element in foreign policy decision-making. Based on what appears to be a rather thorough review of the Committee's published hearings from the 80th through the 84th Congresses, 1947–1956, and using for background the standard works on Congress and foreign policy, Farnsworth's book has the merits of being adequately researched, carefully organized, and clearly written. The author himself is well aware of the limitations of published hearings as a source of research material. Such readers as have had direct contacts with members of the Committee and its staff may note omissions and small factual errors, but the book was well worth writing and publishing. It will contribute to further public understanding of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. If it will not be considered *the* definitive book on the Committee, it still deserves serious attention. So far as I know, there is no other current book on this topic, and an up-to-date analysis of the Committee was long over-due.

After a brief introduction, justifying the importance to decision-making of Congressional committees in general and the Foreign Relations Committee in particular, the author sets the limits of his study. A chapter on Committee membership, procedure, and staff serves primarily as background for a chapter-by-chapter analysis of the major types of hearings conducted: nominations; treaties; foreign aid; and investigations, debates, and the St. Lawrence Seaway. Some attention is given to the anti-internationalist—internationalist voting records of Committee members in the Senate, to whether the Committee is "representative" of the Senate on foreign policy questions, and to the impact of fluctuating degrees of bipartisanship upon the Committee's influence in the Senate. A final chapter, which draws general conclusions, is brief, somewhat provocative, but may offer useful insights.

Farnsworth notes a "unity of purpose among administrative witnesses" before the Committee and believes that during hearings "witnesses from the administration have a shared interest with the Committee." He is not alone in drawing the conclusion from a reading of the public hearings that such hearings are often held to justify the Committee's own position and that of the executive branch, that the procedures of the hearings minimize the effectiveness of any opposition. As he says, " . . . if an interest is to be effective, i.e., affect the basic objectives of the legislation, access to the Committee must be established before public hearings are held, not during the hearings."

Farnsworth implies that such hearings are rarely a critical decision-making procedure, but are more often declaratory of decisions already taken. Thus, their importance and purpose is largely to attract and justify support from the Senate as a whole and from the House (and in lesser degree from the attentive and mass publics), to identify the degree of opposition so that steps may be taken to overcome it, and to serve as an escape valve to release opposition tensions.

If this thesis is correct, and some knowledgeable sources will deny that it is, the elite publics have already been consulted or ignored by the executive branch and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee long before the Committee holds public hearings. It has been charged in years past that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sometimes paid little attention to his own planners and policy-makers in the Department of State. It has been observed by others that President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave low priority to consultation with members of the academic community. True, at the present time, the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State is in a stage of energetic revival, and policy-oriented research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research poses alternatives to present policies and even to policies recommended by task forces; but, this has not always been so. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognized this fact when it took steps in 1958 which led to the series of 13 contract studies on *United States Foreign Policy* by private research groups during 1959. At best, this was a stop-gap measure, with research sometimes hastily done.

In the State Department's Office of Personnel, a small, reflective Personnel Policy Council, set somewhat apart from daily operations, gives promise of providing sustained long range consideration to emerging personnel problems confronting State and other foreign affairs agencies. It gathers ideas from a wide variety of sources. In a rapidly changing world environment, is it not imperative that other such devices for ensuring regular executive and/or legislative consultation with Gabriel Almond's so-called elite publics be built-in to the overall government machinery of policy-making?

President John F. Kennedy has stimulated government consultation with the elite publics. He has energized the machinery of policy-making, eliminating the National Security Council Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board, in a sense elevating the role of the Department of State, while mobilizing on an *ad hoc* basis a veritable mushroom patch of groups, working groups, inter-agency committees, and task forces, utilizing both governmental and non-governmental personnel. But, is it not now time to regularize the emerging behavioral patterns of the Kennedy Administration? In the complex and competitive arena of policy-making for national security, where domestic and foreign policy issues are hopelessly intertwined, a creative restoration of order will assure proper coordination of efforts by the President and his chief advisers—not the least of which is the Secretary of State.—Robert E. Elder, *Colgate University*.

Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime. By Nathan D. Grundstein. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1961. Pp. 106. $1.60 paper.)

Professor Nathan D. Grundstein, of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Pittsburgh, has rendered a service to the profession by reprinting his monograph, *Presidential Delegation of Authority in Wartime*. These three essays first appeared in the *George Washington Law Review* in 1947 and 1948. The first covers the experience during World War I, and the other two are devoted to World War II.

Professor Grundstein utilizes a common pattern to discuss the comparative experiences of both wars, under the headings "The President's Power to Subdelegate," "Form and Precision of the Sub-delegation," "Presidential Control of the Hierarchy," "Sub-Subdelegation of Administrative Authority" (both the horizontal and vertical distribution of power), and "Top Administrative Co-ordination." The end of the essay dealing with World War II also includes a discussion of "The Power of an Officer to Redelegate His Authority to the Officers of Another Agency."

The major lesson to be drawn from this descriptive analysis is that the President, during wartime, will delegate authority to agencies and subordinates whenever it is convenient for him to do so in order successfully to prosecute the war. Congress, if it takes action at all on this question, will authorize such a delegation, oftentimes retroactively. When an administrative order or regulation is challenged in the courts, alleging an improper delegation of presidential authority, the plaintiff will lose his case.

In both wars, "wartime administration revolved about the President and it exhibited the triple characteristics of a maximum of executive discretion with respect to administration, legislative concentration of administrative authority in the Chief Executive, and Presidential subdelegation of administrative authority to a multitude of subordinate officials and agencies. . . . Essentially the differences in administration in the two wars spring from the practically unfettered choice of means possessed by the President in wartime," although some differences can be attributed to other factors, such as "the partnership between the executive and legislature" in World War II, the "amazing growth of the profession of public administration and the pervasive influence of the trained administrator," and the precedents left by President Wilson. Two fundamental problems during World War II, both unresolved at the end of the war, were (a) "the need for clarifying principles regarding the locus of determinative administrative power and discretion, both as between agencies and within an agency," and (b) "systematizing the exercise of administrative power, especially by subordinate officials."

While it is useful to have these essays available in this convenient form, and while the reprinting of them is a tribute to Professor Grundstein, it is unfortunate that no attempt was made to bring the discussion up to date. Two areas where this might have been done are the experiences during the Korean War and, with respect to national defense, the precedents for and the practices of the current neither-war-nor-peace situation. This reviewer would have liked to have seen Professor Grundstein extend his study to an examination of the delegation of Presidential authority during peace that grew out of the precedents established during war—but this may well be another book in itself. It would have been most helpful to have added both a general conclusion and an index, in the light of the scores of statutes, executive orders, court decisions, and personalities covered in the text.—Felix Rackow, *Western Reserve University*.

Outlawing The Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement 1865–1883. By Ari Hoogenboom. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1961. Pp. xi, 306. $6.50.)

In the post-Civil War decades civil service reform was a decisive factor in American politics. It shaped party strategy, won and lost elections, made and broke presidents. It claimed the social and intellectual leaders of the time, men like Henry Adams, Carl Schurz, George William Curtis, E. L. Godkin, and Henry Villard. And the final success of the movement created major problems of political organization and administrative responsibility which remain unsolved.

Professor Hoogenboom has made a detailed, carefully documented, study of the civil service reform movement from 1865 to 1883. Beginning with the first proposals of Sumner and Jenckes, he traces the reform movement through the Grant and Hayes administrations, the formation of the National Civil Service Reform League, the assassination of Garfield, and the passage of the Pendleton Act. In so doing he casts new light on such complex and difficult questions as the relations of civil service reform to Radical Reconstruction, the failure of reform during the Grant administration, the virtual collapse of the reform movement after the election of 1872, the Hayes-Conkling fight for control of the New York Customhouse, and the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Pendleton Act.

Professor Hoogenboom also seeks to develop a "theory of reform." He sees the civil service reform movement primarily as a struggle of the "outs" against the "ins." Most of the reformers were professional men, editors and businessmen with commercial and financial interests. The typical reformer came from a well established New England family. He inherited wealth and deplored the materialism of the new industrial rich whose prominence, based on still greater wealth, surpassed his own. He was typically an Episcopalian or a Unitarian and a Harvard graduate.

These reformers were the "best people" of America and many of them had joined the Republican party during the antislavery crusade and held positions of power and authority in the Lincoln administration. During the post-Civil War years they were forced out of public life; they saw their political aspirations frustrated first by Johnson and then by Grant. "Blaming the professional politician for their political impotence, reformers struck at his source of strength, the spoils system. As a weapon they used civil service reform, which would convert the public service from partisanship to political neutrality."

Hoogenboom's "outs" versus "ins" theory is a provocative one, but it raises certain questions. For one thing it does not very well explain why the civil service reform movement began when it did and ended when it did. The "best people" had after all been "outs" since the time of Jackson and were still "outs" when the reform movement declined. Then too, it may be that Hoogenboom in his emphasis on "outs" and "ins" minimizes the importance of ethical considerations. It is doubtless true that the reformers were motivated at least in part by political self interest. But it is also true, as others have argued, that the reformers were outraged by the gross corruption of the spoils system and sought on moral grounds to purify the body politic. One final comment of a different order. Hoogenboom assumes the validity and desirability of civil service reform; yet, while many criticisms of reform were obviously based on partisan considerations, some of them were nonetheless valid. Civil service reform and the merit system have created serious problems of political organization and administrative responsibility and these problems were clearly anticipated in the early debates. But these brief comments aside, we are indebted to Professor Hoogenboom for extending our understanding of the civil service reform movement and its relation to the political, social, and intellectual events of the time.—ROBERT J. MCNEILL, *Purdue University.*

United States Fiscal Policy 1945–1959. BY A. E. HOLMANS. (New York. Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xiv, 342. $6.40.)

At the close of World War II, there was general concern over the ability of the United States to avoid serious economic depression. The Employment Act of 1946 was enacted to provide a policy to avert such a catastrophe. Dr. A. E. Holmans of the University of Glasgow in *United States Fiscal Policy, 1945–1959* assesses the effectiveness of U. S. fiscal policy as a stabilizing device. His conclusions are mixed, that the United States has "lucked out" of each post-war recession, but with the help of capable management, that countercyclical fiscal policy has in fact become a part of the American consensus by 1960.

His analysis makes clear that fiscal policy is formulated in the context of broader political ideologies. For example, in the first post-war congresses, tax policy was heavily influenced by the fact that a primary objective of conservatives was to return to a *status quo ante* Roosevelt, rather than to pursue goals of economic stability. Republicans and conservatives generally shy away from the use of compensatory fiscal policy because of their preferences for private rather than public solutions. Even today the conventional wisdom of the balanced budget is important in fiscal policy formulation.

Dr. Holmans raises well stated reasons for mild pessimism about the willingness and ability to use compensatory public finance effectively. However, by focusing on fiscal policy he tends to understate the importance of the weapons in the credit and monetary fields. The study and experience has been with minor recessions and moderate war-caused inflation, while the more serious concern is over a major depression. It is not clear that the institutional and ideological barriers to the subtle uses of fiscal policy in minor disturbances would also hold in the case of a depression. The additional strictures placed upon economic policy makers by the United States' international trade balances and the gold flow became prominent after this study was made and have received little discussion in it.

Throughout United States history economic policy has been a vehicle for fundamental political controversies. This book is a study of economic policy in terms of its political context. Moreover, the author raises, but does not explore, political and institutional problems arising in the use of compensatory fiscal policy. He points to difficulties of the separation of powers and the organization of Congress which make prompt action in compensatory fiscal policy difficult. He describes, for example, the failure of the device of an omnibus appropriation bill. On another subject, it is noted that state and local governments, which account for over one third of government spending, are largely beyond the reach of a federal fiscal policy.

The accounts of debate on tax bills and budgets make clear that there is much claptrap about economics in Congress. Some of the quotations must seem embarrassing in retrospect to Republicans and Democrats alike. There is a great deal of detail in the author's discussion of revenue and appropriations bills which seem to move by in unending succession. Perhaps the emphasis on detail is in part due to the origin of this study in a dissertation. As a European, Dr. Holmans provides considerable insight into United States economic policy and politics with a minimum of the difficulty that an outsider might expect to have over nuances of meaning.—ORVILLE F. POLAND, *University of California* (Berkeley).

Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail. BY JAMES C. N. PAUL AND MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961. Pp. 368. $7.50.)

In the *Areopagitica* Milton warns of censorship which will bring about the suppression of "a flowery crop of knowledge" and consequent famine of the mind. The noxiousness of the crop and the permissible content of the literary diet of Americans has received the attention of many zealous citizens and not a few governmental officials. Until the publication of this study by Professors Paul and Schwartz, however, a systematic study of the powers of the Federal government in this area of civil liberties was lacking. The authors trace the growth of one aspect of civil guardianship over popular taste and morality, the suppression of "obscene" publications by postal and customs interdiction. The authors conclude that the amount of pornographic material distributed in this country is rapidly increasing; furthermore, because of this pressure and changing standards, the law of obscenity, both as administered by the Federal government and promulgated by the courts, is in a state of flux. For these reasons alone, the publication of this excellent survey is timely.

The major emphasis of the study concerns current practices of the Post Office and Customs Bureau and recent decisions of the Supreme Court (including *Roth, Butler, Alberts*) and significant lower court decisions. There is a detailed analysis of Federal legislation, the rise and fall of "the most obscene man" test of *Queen* v. *Hicklin* together with a deservedly acid indictment of the legislative and administrative history of the Comstock Act and adequate illustrations of the misuse of discretion by the Federal executive. While the authors give ample evidence of the literary ignorance of the censors they do not fail to recognize the need for some official net to catch the commercial purveyors of pornography. Their willingness to face up to this difficult task constructively is as convincing as their indictment of the superficiality of the "community conscience" test of *Roth* v. *United States*.

The preferences for changes in the law, and the administration of the law evolve from the wealth of data the authors have gathered. Their arguments are adequately supported by the facts. Having assumed that blatant pornography does not deserve the protection of society, they appear to favor evolution toward the test foreshadowed in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in the *Roth* case, that is, that "the conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or picture." Irresponsible commercial exploitation of certain materials is taken to be a form of anti-social conduct and must be proscribed. In other words, where obscenity, not a book, is sold, the government should be authorized to step in. Ultimately, the authors favor an end to censorship by the Federal administrative branch. Short of this utopian reform, however, they propose the modification of the government's power to revoke the second class mailing privilege, and an end to the arbitrary use of the mail-block sanction. Above all, they emphasize that criminal and civil procedures in a court of law should supersede the unchecked imposition of bureaucratic literary taste. The standards of administrative censorship, in sum, should conform to judicial standards. The Post Office may be permitted the power to investigate and screen materials but it should be enabled to apply further sanctions only when it has proved its case in court.

This volume more than adequately fills a need for a comprehensive study of a complex problem. It is readable, well documented, and the result of careful evaluation of written sources and interview material. There is an exhaustive and definitive bibliography. It is to be hoped that postal and customs officials will be able to include it in their scheduled list of readings.—RICHARD P. LONGAKER, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

The Structure of American Federalism. BY M. J. C. VILE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 206. $4.00.)

This book examines the working of American federalism. "Structure" in the title is used to mean the interrelation of parts as dominated by the character of the whole. A re-appraisal is justified on the grounds that no current study is available which sets out to present the American federal structure as a single system of government, combining both constitutional and political elements. Vile's aim is to produce an integrated picture; he is dissatisfied with the textbook practice of treating separately the federal and state systems. Finding other definitions of federalism too restrictive, the author comes up with his own. A new definition is required in order to cover both the early period of dual federalism and the modern era of co-operative federalism. Although he writes almost entirely on the American experience, Vile proclaims a universal definition of federalism. It is a 150-word definition, so loose that even the author admits it cannot serve as an infallible test to differentiate federal and unitary states!

At best we may say that Vile has traversed well-trod territory and synthesized a great amount of material. The book is obviously designed for British or other non-American readers who are not too familiar with U. S. government and politics. Political scientists in the United States will not find much that is new.

Vile's presentation portrays the combination of independence and interdependence as the hallmark of the federal state; mutual respect, compromise, and co-operation characterize American federalism. Early in the book he claims to have a thesis: namely, conflicts between and among the Supreme Court, Congress, and the States rarely become serious because political integration and the mechanisms within the system quickly operate to resolve such conflicts, and, further, that on the very rare occasions when such conflicts do become serious the system operates to provide delay and discussion at the end of which a compromise solution emerges. This is a good workaday generalization. However, it overlooks the Civil War and will not be acceptable to those Americans who have deep feelings of urgency, seriousness, or principle on persistent public problems.—DAVID G. FARRELLY, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

The Government of Kansas. BY JAMES W. DRURY AND ASSOCIATES. (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 1961. Pp. 393. $7.50.)

The title of this book is to be taken literally: this is almost exclusively a study of the *government* of Kansas and not of its politics. For this reason it should prove most useful to those in the state who are interested mainly in the formal and institutional aspects of Kansas government. There is a short introductory chapter on the state and its people and another on the state constitution. Only two of the twenty-six chapters are devoted specifically to local government, but another deals with intergovernmental relations and many of the rest treat various other problems confronted by the cities, townships, and counties. At the state level two chapters are devoted to the legislature, another to the governor, and a fourth to the court system. Most of the rest are concerned with various aspects of public administration—administrative organization, financial administration, the revenue system, personnel administration, law enforcement and correction, highways and the regulation of motor vehicles, and the regulation and protection of labor, business, and the licensed professions. Public education, health, and welfare are taken up in separate chapters, and so are agriculture, conservation of natural resources, and state planning. In the thoroughness with which it deals with each of these subjects, the book could hardly be improved upon. It is also notable for the candor with which it discusses the defects as well as the virtues of Kansas government. There is practically none of the puff and boosterism which sometimes characterize studies of this kind particularly when they are undertaken, as in this case, by an agency of the state.

For all of its merits as a textbook and reference tool, the book is not as useful to those interested in the study of comparative state government as its authors had intended. Institutionally, the whole of Kansas government is laid out, carefully and judiciously, for the reader to examine, but unless he is already familiar with state and local government generally, he is not likely to appreciate how typical or atypical the government of Kansas may be. Of the three coordinate branches, only the court system is related to that in other states: it is characterized as following a "pattern familiar to many American states"—"a hierarchy of tribunals, a proliferation of local courts established to make justice widely available, and the popular election of judges." No attempt was made to compare Kansas with other states as to the size and composition of the legislature, the extent to which the governor must share control over the administrative branch with other independently elected officials, and the vigor (or rather the lack thereof) of the two-party competition. For the most part it is only when some feature is unique to Kansas government—or nearly so—that reference is made to the practice in other states. It is pointed out, for example, that the state printer is popularly elected in only one other state (Nevada), that the governor must seek the advice of a "legislatively oriented" Finance Council in the preparation of the "executive" budget, and that the State Board of Agriculture which administers the laws regulating and assisting the farmer is "elected by and responsible to various private farm organizations in the state rather than to the governor or the general electorate." But this, perhaps, is to criticize the authors for a book they did not write. For the first-rate study which they did write, James W. Drury and his colleagues have placed the people of Kansas greatly in their debt.—ROBERT B. DISHMAN, *University of New Hampshire.*

Texas: Its Government and Politics. BY WILBOURN E. BENTON. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp. ix, 662. $5.95.)

Texans apparently not only like to think "big" but also tend to think "double." Texas has a dual system of nominations for public office since it uses not only a system of nominating conventions but also a primary system. In addition, it has a dual budget system using both an executive budget and a legislative budget. This duality extends also to the highest court of Texas where we find a Supreme Court which handles only civil cases and the Court of Criminal Appeals which is the highest appellate court for criminal cases. These points, and others of equal interest, are presented in *Texas: Its Government and Politics* by Wilbourn E. Benton who is an Associate Professor of Government at Texas A. and M. College.

Professor Benton's book is somewhat hard to assess as a scholarly contribution since neither the preface nor the jacket material gives the reader any clue as to the purpose of the book. Consequently, the reviewer must set his own frame of reference. Apparently, the book is designed as a college level text. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legislature has provided that a study of the state's government is compulsory in Texas colleges and it may be assumed that the book is designed primarily for this market.

Judged as a text the book has considerable merit although it does not quite live up to its subtitle. While there is a thorough description and considerable analysis of Texas "government," there are some significant gaps in the analysis of what many students would consider Texas "politics." For example, there is no discussion of Texas presidential politics, no analysis of gubernatorial politics nor any comment on the significant developments in the last several years in congressional politics in the Lone Star State.

On the other hand, there is a very good section on "The Politics of Legislation." In addition, this aspect of Texas politics is implicit in the discussion of the many substantive problems of government such as management-labor relations or the control of oil production. The study does not fall heir to the criticism most often made of textbooks that the work is "entirely descriptive." On the whole, the writer must be commended for a thorough presentation that shows evidence of a broad understanding of the Texas governmental machinery and major state programs.—COLEMAN B. RANSONE, JR., *University of Alabama.*

Decisions in Syracuse. BY ROSCOE C. MARTIN, FRANK J. MUNGER AND OTHERS. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961. Pp. xvi, 368. $6.95.)

Not too many years ago one critic deplored "the lost world of local government." That world has been "rediscovered" with a vengeance since then as political scientists, sociologists and economists have increasingly directed research on the community. Analyses of community power structures, community decision-making patterns, and the social, economic and governmental problems of metropolitan growth have tended to replace the purely institutional and legal studies that once claimed scholarly attention. The growing literature flowing from local and community research has taken several forms. There have been fairly discrete case studies of local decisions. Community power structures and community leadership have increasingly drawn research interest. Intergovernmental cooperation and conflict have provided the raw materials for numerous studies, particularly within the conceptual scheme of metropolitan as distinguished from purely municipal action. Local and regional economic development has found growing favor as the object of inquiry. Seldom, however, have these closely related themes been woven into a single study. This is what Professors Martin and Munger and their collaborators have successfully attempted in *Decisions in Syracuse.*

Much of the research directed at defining, understanding and explaining the processes of community power and decision-making has left the impression of decisive, purposeful, if not monolithic action. The twenty-two case studies contained in this volume, however, constitute a persuasive rebuttal, at least so far as the Syracuse-Onondaga County area of New York State is concerned. The issues examined in these cases affected, at one time or another, most of the people often suspected of possessing and exercising final authority in community decisions. Seldom, however, did such people appear to wield that power.

What does emerge from these studies is a complex mosaic of decision-making. The industrial, economic and professional leadership of the area rarely initiated action calling for decision and when it did, the one cohesive agent that could, on occasion, carry through was the dominant Republican political organization and not the "hidden men of power" behind the scenes. Throughout these cases, only two men were able to make or force major governmental decisions for the area; each was chairman of the county Republican organization. In many instances the prime instigators of events leading to decisions were either agents external to the area—state government and irresistible social and economic trends—or professional government officials responding to such external pressures. In other cases, decisions were the product not of purposeful human inspiration but rather of "inadvertence" or the natural sequence of earlier decisions.

In general, it is more accurate to refer to clusters of power wielders who were activated to influence decisions that affected them but who remained largely inert when their interests were not directly at issue. The cases support the conclusion that there perhaps are "as many decision centers as there are important decision areas." Further, the authors conclude that community power is not a personal possession but a process. It is more appropriate to consider power as a process having "value and substance only as it is used for something. . . . Community power is a network of action, not a locus of residence."

Equally arresting about these studies is the light shed upon metropolitan action and intergovernmental relations. Despite the growing urbanization of the study area, conflict between the central city of Syracuse and its periphery tended to become more intense. In part this followed the relative disintegration of cohesion within the Republican county organization, although even today major area-wide decisions are reached, postponed or neglected through the agency of the party structure. Ironically, while it has become increasingly difficult to obtain agreement between Syracuse and the rest of the county on regional programs and services, the county has emerged as the most likely center of metropolitan action. The County Board of Supervisors, responsive to the towns rather than to the city, highly sensitive to non-urban values in a highly urban setting, views with growing suspicion efforts aimed at formal intergovernmental cooperation and governmental reform at the county level.

It is impossible to distill the rich detail, the lucid analysis and insight that flow through this tightly organized, well-written volume. It is much more than a "casebook" in community power or metropolitan decision-making. Its cases, ranging from attempts to provide area-wide sewage and water services to the development of the Syracuse Industrial Park, and the excellent analytical chapters, are directed at the central theme of understanding "the structure and exercise of community power in a metropolitan context." This is the first in a series of Metropolitan Action Studies; we can look forward hopefully to its companion works and suggest that other research efforts consider seriously the direction taken by this series.—WILLIAM R. MONAT, *The Pennsylvania State University.*

The Man in the Middle—The Inside Story of the Hot and Cold Wars Between Labor and Management. BY NATHAN W. SHEFFERMAN, WITH DALE KRAMER. (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961. Pp. xi, 292. $4.50.)

In this volume, the author purports to bring "the whole conflict between labor and management into focus." While inevitably a portion of the American labor relations scene is brought into some sort of focus here, the resulting picture is neither complete nor clear. But failing this overly ambitious, self-assigned goal, the book does serve other purposes.

Nathan W. Shefferman is an experienced and knowledgeable, but less than objective, observer. For, though he was in the midst of labor-management strife for several decades, seldom was he, as the book title would suggest, in the middle between management and labor. Always (save for a stint with the National Labor Board in 1934–35) he was working with or for management: as efficiency expert, personnel consultant, employee relations specialist, and, finally, as director of one of the largest labor relations firms in the Nation. At the time the McClellan ("Senate Labor-Management Rackets") Committee was established, Shefferman's organization, Labor Relations Associates, was doing a million-dollar-a-year business with hundreds of employers, large and small.

After seven months of investigations and hearings by the McClellan Committee in 1957, Shefferman was a TV "bad guy," his business was ruined, and his reputation and health seriously damaged. "Shefferman tactics" became a new term in the American lexicon, referring to such operations by management labor relations consultants as union countering activities, covert side deals with labor leaders, "soft" working agreements selling out the rank and file workers, and questionable gratuitous services. In *The Enemy Within,* Robert Kennedy credits Shefferman's testimony with unlocking for the Committee

Dave Beck's "empire of crookedness," and in Kennedy's book references to Shefferman's activities rival those of Beck or Hoffa.

Considering these disastrous personal developments for Shefferman, a surprisingly small amount of space in the present volume (pp. 205–221) is spent by him in discussing his relations with the Committee. But this brief statement raises serious questions concerning procedures of that Committee. If remedial legislation were to result from the series of Committee hearings on management consultants, then it can be argued that less than a broad sample was taken when the investigation was restricted to Shefferman and his firm, while thousands of labor-management consultants and other thousands of specialized labor-relations lawyers serving employers in similar fashion existed unexplored. The leaking and printing in full of a list of Shefferman's clients, past and present, resulted in extensive "guilt-by-association" repercussions. Robert Kennedy's assertion that any Committee witness was permitted to make a detailed statement answering charges made against him is countered by Shefferman's assertion that rarely was such a statement read in open hearing, but instead usually went to the inert files. Moreover, civil libertarians should be (and, historically, were) offended by the telecasting and broadcasting, coast to coast, of the grand-jury-like testimony of unproved charges without opportunity for reply or cross-examination.

Although Shefferman was usually in the pay of employers, by far the greater proportion of his book deals with labor leaders, unions, and union activities. In a personal, breezy style that reads easily, he traces the history of the Teamsters Union from Daniel Tobin through Dave Beck to James Hoffa. Shefferman tells how unions are organized and (with more enthusiasm and first-hand knowledge) how unions are disorganized. He gives a running glossary of union slang and reviews a rogues gallery of minor labor hoodlums bearing hilarious nicknames. He presents a brief history of organized labor in America from 1827 to date, complete with a thumbnail biography of Gompers, Lewis, Green, Tobin, Woll, Hutcheson, Murray, Hillman, Dubinsky, Meany, and Reuther. The concluding chapters include decided, but less than novel or profound, observations concerning the Landrum-Griffin Act, automation, and the unionizing of white-collar and Negro workers.—C. Edwin Gilmour, *Grinnell College.*

Religion, Government, and Education. Edited by William W. Brickman and Stanley Lehrer. (New York: Society for the Advancement of Education, 1961. Pp. 292. $5.25.)

Whenever a political issue pokes its way into public attention, there follows inevitably the symposium designed to enlighten the general debate. Such is the intent of *Religion, Government, and Education,* edited by William W. Brickman and Stanley Lehrer, both editors of the magazine, *School and Society.* The book contains ten original essays by nine different authors, all of them primarily educators, except for one political scientist. The diversity in the format is somewhat misleading since more than sixty percent of the book is written by Mr. Brickman.

Despite the comprehensive title, the focal point of the book is the current debate over public support of religious schools. The essays, which represent, in a vague way, "mainline" Protestant, Lutheran, Catholic, Jewish and humanistic thought on the issue, are very uneven in their contributions. One of the essays "Public Function of the Lutheran School" by William Kramer, Secretary of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, unwittingly gives a false impression of that denomination's position. Lutherans have flatly rejected the public service argument or any other argument for public support of their schools. The only case study in the book is a description by William W. Boyer of inter-faith tension over a baccalaureate ceremony in a rural Wisconsin high school. The study is a striking vignette of a religious minority (Catholic) perceiving and using the symbols of a separation of church and state in order to preserve its independence. In similar circumstances in New England, these same rhetorical defenses are being used against a Catholic majority. Although the essays add some new facts and interpretative materials, the major positions on the issue are best stated in reprints of official statements of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and Civil Liberties organizations in the appendix. A chronological outline of American church and state relations in education also in the appendix is helpful.

The major defect in the book is that some of the educators, particularly Mr. Brickman, attempt to deal with the complex legal and political questions of the school issue in a superficial way. This factor together with the tendency toward polemicism of many who write on this religious issue make for some bizarre interpretations of law and history. For example, Brickman, an ardent supporter of public aid for parochial schools, finds that parochial schools are an establishment of religion (apparently in the way that a business is called an establishment) and that the First Amendment prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of religion" should be read as barring the states from requiring parochial schools to obey fire regulations and curriculum requirements. Brickman thinks that if the state has the right to make these minimum regulations it is then legally obligated to support parochial schools. Arguments like this do little to clarify the complex legal problems surrounding the issue.

In the second half of the book, Brickman takes the reader on a world tour of church-state educational relations. Potentially a valuable undertaking, this section suffers from the same defects mentioned above. The author is so determined to prove "that governmental bodies should give support to religious schools" that his use of resources is selectively one-sided. Although the new educational law of May 1959 aiding religious education in Belgium caused weeks of rioting and still is a divisive issue, Brickman finds that the Belgian situation "is illustrative of how a consensus may alleviate a serious question in a country devoted to the doctrines of democracy." Passing over the generations of strife in French politics over the church-state educational question, Brickman concludes, "It is possible to observe that the French people as a whole do not take a doctrinaire, rigid and one-sided view of private (parochial) education. . . . " Since the Netherlands decided to support sectarian schools in 1921, public schools have decreased from 56% of the total to 32%. The only Dutch opinion Brickman quotes is that of an educator who regards this system as "a consequence of democracy." In a country considered to be one of the most religiously divided in Europe, with one Catholic and two Protestant parties, there are surely some who would disagree with that evaluation. There is much to be gained by looking at the compromises on church schools worked out by other countries, and Brickman's study contains many useful references and facts. However, without examining the political costs involved, uncritical acceptance of endorsements of church-state relations by members of the standing order is a dangerous method of policy formation. The American tradition on church and state and our diverse religious population are almost unique in the world.

Most political scientists, unless they have special interest in church-state educational problems, will find little to interest them in *Religion, Government and Education*. The significant work in case studies or in comparative law and administration on church and state questions has only just begun.—GEORGE R. LANOUE, *Yale University*.

Conscience in Politics: Adlai E. Stevenson in the 1950's. BY STUART GERRY BROWN. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961. Pp. xi, 313. $4.50.)

This book is considerably more than a partisan tract friendly to Adlai Stevenson, although it is much less than the full treatment of the Eisenhower administration and its critics which our times call for.

Mr. Brown has chosen to deal less with the events of the period from 1952 to 1960 than with the statements which Stevenson and President Eisenhower made about them at the time. The form is that of a debate, an exciting dialogue which deals in turn with issues ranging from McCarthyism to desegregation to a whole range of foreign affairs problems from Korea to Quemoy and the U-2 incident.

The method itself is somewhat unfair to Eisenhower; an old and cruel Democratic jest was that he would never have won a television debate with Stevenson because of "the language barrier." The effect of parallel quotations from the two men, which is heightened by Brown's low-key presentation, is rather devastating to the General. A comparison of this book with, for example, Sherman Adams' recent memoirs indicates that if Eisenhower is to be judged favorably by history it will have to be on the basis of his actions, not his public statements.

Certainly the record of President Eisenhower's statements about Senator McCarthy, especially in regard to the latter's attacks on General Marshall, is hardly flattering; Adams would suggest that the President should be judged rather on the soundness of his efforts to blur over a major ideological conflict in American life rather than to sharpen it. Similarly, one's opinion of the Eisenhower civil rights record will have to be based on whether one feels that his degree of caution in both word and deed was wiser during those years than the position of strong moral and political intervention which Stevenson urged.

Brown's book, granted its limitations as a "debate" between a man who loved the written and spoken word and another who preferred to move in quite different ways to achieve his ends, is nevertheless a fascinating history of the period. It may be of special value in meeting that perennial need of the political science teacher—background information for undergraduates who were only seven or eight years old in 1952.

The book has certain other limitations. Brown appears to assume too easily, it seems to this writer, the degree of Stevenson's actual influence in affecting a good many policy changes in the nineteen-fifties. It is doubtful, for example—in the light of available electoral data and polling returns, which Brown does not make use of—whether Stevenson "led his party back to power" in Congress in 1954 as a result of his stands on McCarthyism or other issues. It might also be questioned how much his personal influence affected the 1957 civil rights bill or some of the debates over foreign policy of the period. In the realm of ideas, however, Brown makes a strong case that Stevenson's views, even in the short run of those eight years, were closer by far than Eisenhower's to the direction that the United States would take.

Brown does not deal very extensively with the long-debated question of whether Adlai E. Stevenson was a "viable" politician in rough-and-tumble democratic politics. But he makes a most persuasive argument that Stevenson did indeed represent conscience in politics, an authentic personal vision in the complacency of the fifties, and that he left a permanent mark on the Democratic Party and the American people.—JOHN P. MALLAN, *Smith College*.

The Robe and the Sword: The Methodist Church and the Rise of American Imperialism. BY KENNETH M. MACKENZIE. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. v, 128. $3.25.)

A piece of ancient wisdom teaches that a book never should be judged by its cover. A gloss might be added to the effect that neither should it be judged by its foreword. The reader is promised, in the foreword, a study that is characterized by "a facile style of writing" and "a penetrating, critical power of analysis." The anticipations thereby raised, however, are not satisfied in the text. The handling of the subject is mechanical rather than "penetrating" and there are more accurate words than "facile" for writing that needs a stern editorial hand to enforce greater respect for the ordinary rules of grammar, sentence structure and syntax.

The essence of *The Cross and the Sword* can be distilled into a few sentences. Between 1865 and 1900 the interest of Methodists in foreign missions grew. This interest flowed into a larger concern about American imperialistic ventures in Asia, Oceania, and the Caribbean which the Methodist leadership generally supported and helped to make palatable to its constituency. These conclusions are not likely to provoke a quarrel since they are almost as commonplace as the way in which they are reached. Literal summaries of the opinions of Methodist spokesmen are strung together to produce conclusions about a particular denomination that correspond to those already held to be valid for the larger company of Protestants.

There are questions about imperialism, missions and American churches, however, which the book does not answer. In fact, it does not even ask them. Nowhere are Methodist thought and action examined in the context of the tensions and stresses in American society. To have fitted the jingoism of the church into its nineteenth century social setting would have suggested some tantalizing lines of investigation. Did the enthusiasm for missions and imperialism bear any relation to the erosion of Protestant orthodoxy, the growth of Catholicism, the advance of urbanization and the rise of new forms of association which competed with the church for the loyalties of Americans? Was foreign missionary activity a kind of compensation for the church's losses of influence and prestige at home? Did the championship of imperialism enable the church to find support which it could no longer attract through its conventional message? Were the returns from mission work an antidote to a gnawing suspicion that what the church had to say was not relevant to the interests and needs of late 19th century America? Admittedly, these are not problems that are easily solved but they are very important ones. One puts down this book with the feeling that it ends where it should have begun. The subject of organized religion and foreign policy is a worthy one. It deserves, in any of its phases, more thorough study than it has received here.—RALPH E. MORROW, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1961. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961. Pp. 1853. $11.75.)

There are now some fifteen editions of the comprehensive biographical directory of the United States Congress, beginning with that of Charles Lanman in 1859. The present one prepared by Clifford P. Reynolds of the staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing follows closely the pattern set in the one of 1927 by Ansel Wold, long-time clerk of the Joint Committee, and continued in the one of 1949 prepared by James L. Harrison of the staff of the Joint Committee. The 10,400 odd biographies vary in length from the exceptional one of two lines to about two-thirds of a column of the large two-column pages. Emphasis is almost exclusively placed on the details of Congressional service, political and public career, and even includes wherever possible for those not still living, such a detail as the place of interment. The idiosyncrasy of the late Arkansas senator T. H. Caraway in limiting biographical details in the current *Official Congressional directory* to the laconic statement "Democrat, Jonesboro" has given way to a paragraph of 18 lines. For the details, according to the pattern which is nowhere explained, ceaseless effort seems to have been made to secure a reasonable minimum, even pursuing an early member to the Wabash country without being able to determine when and where he had died.

Family relationships are given only when linked to others in the work. No effort has been made to cover literary and other activity or to indicate special legislative or other Congressional service for which the member may have become known such as the Volstead Act and Cannon's *Precedents of the House of Representatives*. The *Biographical Directory* does include many who are not treated elsewhere in standard biographical sources, or whose Congressional service and political activity are not too clearly pinpointed in such sources.

In no other country of the world has there apparently been such continuing effort to establish a minimum biographical record of the members of the national legislative body from the beginning. For those members of the American Congress for whom the minimum information desired has not been procurable, the venerable Senator Carl Hayden, chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing, states that "The Committee will be especially indebted to those sufficiently interested in furnishing additional information which would add to the value of future editions."—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

Select list of publications issued by Senate and House committees. Committee prints, staff studies, reports, and documents, 80th–86th Congresses (1947–60, inclusive). PREPARED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961. Pp. 427.)

Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the authorization for professional staff assistants to Congressional committees has inevitably been accompanied by the appearance of many reports, committee prints, staff studies, etc., of value to the various committees, but usually much too little known and often much too little circulated outside the committees. An effort has been made in the *Select list* (issued as a committee print) to indicate under the committees so far as possible, both Senate and House, the principal topics on which hearings have been held and on which staff studies, committee prints and other reports have been made during the intervening 14 year period. Bibliographical record of such in the *Monthly catalog of United States government publications* tends to become obscured in the multitude of month by month listings. Some studies of interest issued in rather small printings seem to escape recording in the *Monthly catalog.* Not only does the *Select list* pinpoint areas of investigation, but helps in the location of special studies and in avoiding duplication of staff work. Although reference to the number of pages, parts, or volumes in each item is not indicated, the overall picture seems to be helpful for students of legislative work. Even the Bureau of the Budget has furnished a very useful nine-page list of selected reports and studies from the Executive Branch during the same period. There is a detailed index to the whole *Select list.*

The appearance of the volume reminds us of the inadequacy of such materials prior to the 80th Congress and of the need to rectify the situation. The nine-part *Checklist of hearings before congressional committees through the Sixty-seventh Congress*, by Harold O. Thomen, completed in 1958 and issued by the Library of Congress, made a very substantial contribution that should be followed up and amplified as a service to effective national legislation as well as to effective scholarship. The *Select list* points to the fact that both the legislator and the scholar need to keep in mind the requirement for an absolute minimum of bibliographical control over materials very difficult to keep under such control.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

ARTICLES AND BOOKLETS

National Government

Clark, Joseph S. The Hesitant Senate. *Atlantic.* March, 1962.

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Parliamentary Reform 1933–1960. By The Hansard Society. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 193. $4.00.)

In contrast to the nineteenth century, the reforms discussed here will not move men to demonstrate in the streets of Manchester or Bristol. Darby jail will not be sacked nor will Nottingham castle burn. Rather these reforms represent the tinkering with a well-established and complex machinery. Where the reforms of the nineteenth century were shot through with passion, those of the middle-twentieth are technical, professional, and, by and large, non-ideological. And yet, the years under review were marked by the most profound economic, social, and political changes. It is in the context of these changes that the question as to the adequacy of the current arrangements and methods by which the British Parliament conducts its business is raised. Though in fact the book never clearly answers the questions of adequacy, since it is more of a compilation of proposals for reform, it does present to the student of British and comparative politics a small silver-mine of information and potential insights. Parliamentary reform is something of a misnomer here. The book deals essentially with suggested reforms in the House of Commons. Those in the House of Lords are briefly treated in an appendix.

Proposals for reform are concerned with those areas of the body politic in which irritation and conflict are most acutely felt. This survey of parliamentary reform proposals then becomes an important guide to potential trouble-spots. Thus, although questions of electoral reform have been with us for a long time, the increasing role and power of constituency associations on the one hand and of the party in Parliament, on the other, place an altogether new emphasis on these reforms. Similarly, there is the widespread demand that the House of Commons ought to set up specialized Committees of Members who would link the House with individual Departments of State. A great number of proposals toward the formation of Departmental Committees have been put forward in the last few years, though here too some areas are felt to be more sensitive than others. Thus in 1957 a motion was put down on the House of Commons Order Paper saying that Parliament lacked control over external affairs (shades of Suez); demands have also been made for Committees on Colonial Affairs, on Defense, on nationalized industries, and on finance.

An increasing area for conflict, if recent reform proposals are any indication, is in the relationship between the M.P. and his party. In answer to the question of how "honest political dissent" can be encouraged, it has been suggested that M.Ps. should be guaranteed a reasonable income for life. J. Grimond has advocated greater latitude in free voting, and a whole host of proposals have been advanced to give back-benchers some *raison d'être*. Other important areas of suggested reform pertain to the relationship of Parliament and the Executive, with particular reference to the Cabinet's collective responsibility and efficiency, delegated legislation, and parliamentary control over nationalized industries. Here the scope of Parliamentary Questions and the proposal of a Parliamentary arbiter, along the lines of the Danish Ombudsman, are particularly relevant.

Finally, both public opinion and the amenities of Parliamentary life play an important role in shaping the day-to-day business of Westminster. As for the latter, W. J. Brown, a former Independent Member, remarked that "when it is said of the House of Commons that 'it is the best club in the world,' this must be taken as referring to the company, and not the comfort, of the club." The inadequacies of research facilities and of secretarial help are felt acutely. As for public opinion, the compilers of this survey feel that "the prestige of Parliament has probably never been higher." This rosy outlook is not borne out by the observations of Bernard Crick or Christopher Hollis, nor is it consistent with recent public reactions to cases involving parliamentary privilege. The survey, then, tells us a good deal about where the shoe pinches, and, additionally, whose shoe is being pinched, for it depends whether one has Conservative, Labour, or Liberal feet.

Other possible insights which may be gained relate to political trends. Thus, the creation of a Select Committee on nationalized industries may presage the development of some form of departmental committee. At the same time there is a visible trend towards smaller Committees. There seems to be an increasing demand for constituency television coverage especially if a network of local television stations can be developed. At the same time, whatever changes occur will take place only exceedingly slowly and gradually. As Sir Kenneth Pickthorn has said, "Procedure is all the constitution the poor Briton has."

Broadly speaking, parliamentary reforms have been proposed by two groups: the theoreticians and the practitioners, although in as literate a country as Britain, the two tend to overlap. The theoreticians are represented by such men as Jennings, Laski, and Ross; the practitioners by Churchill, Grimond, and Morrison, in addition to several former Clerks of the House and a host of M.Ps. Conspicuous by their absence are, however, such writers as S. E. Finer, J. D. Stewart, Harry Eckstein and Allen Potter. While their work is empirically oriented, and thus has relatively little reformative content, it does seem significant that so few reforms regarding pressure groups seem to have been proposed in Parliament.
—LUCIAN C. MARQUIS, *University of Oregon.*

The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824–1960. BY THOMAS L. KARNES. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 277. $6.00.)

In recent years Central American and foreign observers have turned attention again to the subject of federation or some type of union of the five states of the region. The subject has been of recurrent interest and discussion during the near century and a quarter since collapse of the *Confederación Centroamericana.* Professor Karnes has produced a timely and valuable work which sheds much light on the record of past attempts at union and on the prospects for future accomplishment of what many consider an ideal solution to political, economic, and social problems of the area. The book serves a real need in view of the paucity of works on Central America in the English language and the frequent lack of objectivity in the voluminous writing in Spanish. Political scientists and historians will find it useful both for general history and for understanding of the political question.

The author's approach is historical-analytical and, while it may not be "refreshingly new" as the dust jacket proclaims, the author has done a thorough, conscientious treatment. He has successfully avoided the errors of emotional involvement and too-easy assumptions which often vitiate writing on the subject. In this respect, the work is refreshing, as well as for the fact that the title very aptly labels the contents.

Professor Karnes has made a contribution that is threefold. In the first place, he analyzes two premises that often lead to the assumption that union of the Central American republics should be accomplished with ease: the supposed similarities among them and the supposed cohesiveness of the area as a political unit of the Spanish Empire. It is shown that neither of these premises is absolutely true. Despite obvious similarities, which may be superficial, there are important differences and a lack of uniformity with respect to size (both in area and population), ethnic composition, language, social structure, and religion. Furthermore, there was not a single, unified drive in the Spanish conquest of the area and a number of factors contributed to political and religious decentralization which allowed the provinces under the *Audiencia* of Guatemala considerable autonomy.

Secondly, the largest part of the book is devoted to surveying the numerous efforts and attempts to bring about federation and to analyzing the reasons for failure of all attempts after the brief period of union following separation from Mexico. This is a concise but thorough treatment which shows evidence of painstaking care in research, analysis, and writing. Comprehensive coverage and objective appraisal in tracing the story of repeated failure make this section a major contribution to the literature.

The third aspect of the contribution is found in the brief concluding chapter. Herein the author reveals his pessimism about prospects for future union, founding this view not merely on the record of numerous failures in the past. The reasons why individual attempts did not succeed might have been superficial, but there are several fundamental obstacles which have, and do, stand in the way. Foremost among them are: (1) political adolescence of the republics—the failure of all but Costa Rica to achieve representative government; (2) exaggerated nationalism and jealousies among them; and (3) Costa Rican isolationism.

The more optimistic proponents of federation may be disappointed with the brevity of Professor Karnes' treatment of ODECA. He relates the story of the founding of the organization in 1951 and refers to some of the subsequent political and economic activities, judging that accomplishments in the latter field have been more significant. It is not clear whether the author is fully aware of all of the activities currently being carried on under the auspices of the organization, including much cultural interchange and groundwork supposedly for future integration of educational systems, but at any rate he is wise in stating that ODECA is too young to be judged fairly.—Carl C. Moses, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute.*

Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of Latin American Leaders. By Robert J. Alexander. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. Pp. viii, 322. $4.95.)

Until recently, United States and European interest in the revolution which has overturned institutions in much of the world was focused on its more spectacular forms in Asia and Africa. However, events of the last few years—Vice President Nixon's confrontation with violence in South America, the implantation of a Communist system in Cuba, and the enunciation of the Alliance for Progress—dramatically pushed Latin America into the foreground of United States interest and concern. Interestingly enough, the revolutionary process in this hemisphere, which we were so slow to acknowledge, is one with antecedents and a sustained development considerably predating most of the Asian and African experiments. Perhaps it is the case of being too close to our noses to see it. At any rate, the publication of this excellent study of the "prophets" of the Latin American revolution is most timely.

Quite rightly, the author's concept of revolution, like that of the Latin American, is far broader and more basic than the chronic revolts and uprisings which much of the press would fit under this label. Furthermore, it is a concept which is thoroughly respectable to a preponderance of Latin Americans inasmuch as it connotes "fundamental alteration of the political, social, and economic life" of one's country and is manifested in the ascendancy of urban working class and middle sectors and, in an incipient way, the peasantry to the councils of political decision-making.

As a consequence, the dozen leaders considered in this book are deemed heroes by these emerging classes. Much of their appeal derives from policies and enactments which substantially ripped their societies out of nineteenth century feudalism and launched them on the road of twentieth century values and aspirations. Not surprisingly, they are men of considerable diversity and complexity. Sequentially, they begin with the revered Uruguayan democrat, José Battle y Ordóñez, and move along to Cuba's Fidel Castro, modern exponent of totalitarian revolution. In between lie a variety of types—Lázaro Cárdenas (Mexico), Arturo Alessandri (Chile), Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (Peru), Rómulo Betancourt (Venezuela), José Figueres (Costa Rica), Luis Muñoz Marín

(Puerto Rico), Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles (Bolvia), Getulio Vargas (Brazil), and Juan Perón (Argentina). Despite their differences, all have been men of action, steeped in politics, possessing enormous leadership abilities, and prime movers in their countries' development.

The author approaches each of these men with meticulous care and a strong appreciation of the vital roles they played. Each of the "prophets" is set against an effectively sketched panorama of events, ideas, and forces of the times—all interacting in the fascinating unfoldment of revolution.

Professor Alexander is one of a small number of scholars with a background adequate to the demands inherent in this kind of writing. For more than two decades he has studied at first hand many of the currents of Latin America's revolution and, in the process, he has come to know most of its leaders. Only such close contacts could have produced this lively and authoritative work.

Questions need be raised on only a few minor points. The statement that Calles never returned to Mexico from exile counters this reviewer's impression that he was one of several ex-presidents who gathered together in September, 1942 to demonstrate solidarity in the war effort. In the section on Alessandri, the reference to "several attempted revolutions between 1833 and 1924" is somewhat debatable. Perhaps "revolts" would have been more precise.

But these are insignificant relative to the great merits of this book—certainly a worthy addition to Professor Alexander's list of distinguished contributions to the study of Latin America.—BEN G. BURNETT, *Whittier College.*

The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America. BY KALMAN H. SILVERT. (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1961. Pp. xi, 280. $7.50.)

Present and former members of the American Universities Field Staff recently have presented a freshet of books which are in reality selections of their report letters to the subscribers of the admirable service. Dr. Silvert's volume is of this group. Twelve of its sixteen chapters are slightly revised reprintings of papers written over a five-year period; one chapter is the substance of a convention paper, and another was written as a contribution to a book. On the whole, the volume is a *pasticcio* of efforts sandwiched between short opening and closing statements, and cemented into several sections by very brief explanatory remarks preceding each part. The result can be interpreted in several ways.

The intent at one level is to follow the AUFS plan of depiction in depth of selected national societies; Silvert's field experiences in Guatemala, Chile and Argentina establish general limits to the detailed papers. At another level, the four substantive sections concern, in order, the levels at which these national societies can be studied, some symbolic social and political situations, the positions of intellectuals and the Universities, and idiosyncracies which suggest reasons for some Latin reactions to common and uncommon situations. At yet another level, Silvert seeks, by means of the interspersed explanations and the foreword, as well as by the mixture of non-systematic elements, to offer the bases for several forcefully stated propositions concerning social development. Implicitly, guidelines for United States policies toward Latin America are also offered.

An unfortunate aspect of the book is its failure really to add up to an analysis or even to an argument. Aside from mild objection to the phrasing of the modest opening conceptualization, this reviewer cannot challenge its application to subsequent content; none really is undertaken. Further, Silvert makes no claim that he is more than intimating categories of analysis; this indeed is the case in comparison with the painstaking work of many other authors. The projection of broad terminal propositions, however generally acceptable they might be to the specialized students of the underdeveloped areas, comes rather abruptly; the most recently written AUFS letter employed, drawn from the challenge of Castro, is the sole groundbreaker.

A book properly should be greater than the mere sum of its parts. The offering of political taxonomies and of deviant disparities does not necessarily accomplish the job, despite the offering of undoubted literary competence. The cogency with which Silvert is fully capable of infusing his work is missing in this volume.

The end product therefore is kaleidoscopic. In book form these useful papers will reach many who are not reached by the AUFS reports. The anecdotes will give an air of authority to teachers impressed into Latin American courses by mounting departmental curricular demands and the tactics of Fidel Castro. The work will suggest the possibilities inherent in research and absorption of *ambiente* by a discerning reporter trained in one academic discipline but alert to the possibilities of others.—PHILIP B. TAYLOR, JR., *The Johns Hopkins University* (Washington, D. C.).

Social and Economic Frontiers in Latin America. BY HARRY STARK. (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, Company, 1961. Pp. xx, 421. $7.25.)

This book has some attractive features. Its maps, charts, and tables give us in easily assimilable form much useful data about Latin America's societies and their environments. Those parts of it that are narrowly economic in focus are interesting, sometimes insightful, and frequently provocative. The presentation is couched in terms that should be comprehensible to almost anyone, however limited his preparation. But really the book is very bad.

Lacking a discernible thesis and structural unity, the book draws indiscriminately upon the author's random impressions and his reading of an ill-sorted range of materials. (Although one finds a footnote citation of Tennyson's "Locksley Hall," one searches vainly for a specific reference to any material written in Spanish or Portuguese.) Its analyses of complex phenomena are quite unsophisticated, and woefully incomplete. It is poorly edited and produced. It is, to use a word favored by Professor Stark, "uniquivocably" a bad book.

If this were just another general introduction to Latin America, an updated Gunther, it would cause little concern. But the author of this book is a professor of Latin American Affairs at the University of Miami, and he has put it forward as a textbook designed to acquaint beginning students with Latin America's "social and economic frontiers." As a textbook it does a major disservice to the cause of serious Latin American scholarship; it greatly underestimates the intelligence and capacities of North American students who might be exposed to it; it perpetuates a distorted and stereotyped approach to Latin America that will do little to improve our understanding of the region and its peoples; and it is grossly unfair to the Latin Americans themselves.

Consider, for example, the parallel columns of "social and cultural traits" with which Chapter 3 begins. Here Professor Stark contrasts Latin Americans and North Americans in terms of twenty-eight "traits," of which the following are representative:

Latin American	*North American*
Follows heart	Follows head
Closer to species	More evolved
Gallery player	Team player
Lawless	Law-abiding
Ego	Social conscience
Cuts Gordian knot	Unravels Gordian knot
Procratinating (sic)	Gets things done

Aware that not all Latin Americans are properly to be classified as "lawless animals" (see the second and fourth items in the abbreviated list above,) Professor Stark qualifies what he has done: "Were it possible to fuse all Latin Americans and all North Americans into two individuals that we could call the 'average' Latin American and the 'average' North American, these two individuals would possess essentially the characteristics shown in the foregoing lists." A further qualification, not altogether compatible with the previous one, follows: "The traits I have listed as typically Latin American are those that would be possessed by an average individual taken from the numerically small but politically and economically predominant class."

In what the publishers describe as a "discerning analysis based on the author's personal and career background in this controversial country," Professor Stark undertakes a survey of contemporary Cuba. After all, as he says, "a book on Latin America appearing after 1961 . . . that did not contain some reference to the Fidel Castro revolution in Cuba would sound rather queer." The "discerning analysis," which takes up eleven pages of the book's four hundred, moves at this level of perceptiveness and profundity:

"Castro's early actions in cutting rentals in half and in announcing that large landholdings would be broken up and distributed to the landless peasant were the first inklings of things to come. The economic unsoundness of these measures gave birth to the suspicion that this bearded revolutionary might turn out to be an irresponsible demagog. . . . The seizure of property without equitable compensation goes sharply against American concepts of what is right."

That a book of this caliber could find a publisher and may find a market in our schools and universities is discouraging.—JOHN N. PLANK, *Harvard University.*

Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism. BY STANLEY G. PAYNE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 316. $6.00.)

1961 was a productive year for books on Spain. This excellent study is the latest addition to a number of significant works—those by Burnett Bolloten, Hugh Thomas and Arthur P. Whitaker—and is a valuable contribution. Its preparation was assisted by a Social Science Research Council fellowship and, according to the jacket, the author spent a year of personal investigation in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. He is an instructor in history at the University of Minnesota.

The author examines the genesis and evolution of the Spanish version of fascism from the formation of the *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista* (JONS) to the *Falange Española* becoming the state party through the party's demise at the hands of General Franco. The first half of the book is devoted to the short career and life (1903–1936) of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange. He enters the political arena in 1930 as Vice Secretary-General of the conservative *Unión Monárquica;* during the general election of 1933 his movement becomes the *Falange Española* (FE); the FE and the JONS unite; and in late

1934 he is acclaimed *Jefe Nacional* by the party's National Council. Now the FE is José Antonio's own instrument. The entire slate of FE candidates, including the *Jefe* himself, is defeated in the 1936 election and the victorious Popular Front government outlaws the FE and incarcerates its leader. Late that year José Antonio is executed.

The increasing political polarization between Left and Right precipitates a military insurrection—FE "intransigeance" serves as a "secondary catalyst"—which expands into a civil war on account of German and Italian intervention on behalf of the rebels. General Franco assumes command of the rebel forces and Ramón Serrano Súñer, his brother-in-law, becomes his civilian counterpart. General Franco thus achieves a "military-civilian synthesis" and begins his transformation of the FE into the party of the Spanish state.

The author examines Franco's tactics: the "born politician" balancing one group against another, capitalizing upon each faction's hates and internal dissensions, and using the FE as a buffer against all threats to his power. Serrano proves to be an astute manipulator and is essential to Franco's gaining control of all facets of the political spectrum; but he is no match for Franco—and later, neither is Hitler's *Real-politik*. Thus General Franco emerges as the master pupil of Machiavelli. In the words of the author: "His formula was a conservative syndicalism, bounded by all sorts of state economic controls, spiritually tied to Catholicism, ready for any kind of practical compromise, and always backed up by the Army."

Since the end of the Spanish civil war on the eve of World War II, General Franco has continued his policies of "divide-and-rule" and interlocking directorates. Their success is attested to by the longevity of his regime, now in its twenty-sixth year. The postwar "silent treatment" of Franco by the Western powers failed to weaken his position; it only strengthened it. Today the Falange is a corpse. It has been bled to death—with frequent transfusions along the way—by General Franco.

This significant book is indispensable to understanding contemporary Spanish politics. It is an example of good scholarship; it is extensively documented and much is from original sources, mainly in Spanish.—Larman C. Wilson, *University of Maryland.*

The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960–1961. By George Bennett and Carl Rosberg. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 230. $4.80.)

In February 1961 Kenya's first general election on a common roll basis was held. It was the culmination of a train of events that led from the Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House in early 1960. In the background of these events were the long-standing belief of many Kenya settlers that much of the best of Kenya's land was "white man's country," the not-long past horror of Mau Mau, and the new disorders in the Congo. Out of this election emerged an African-oriented government and the outlines of a party system of Africans in Kenya.

George Bennett of Oxford University and Carl G. Rosberg of the University of California at Berkeley have given an account of these events that is much more than a simple narrative of a swiftly moving bit of history. The events in themselves were important. In a large sense this was the period in which the final turn away from settler domination in Kenya was made. It was the time in which the fundamental problems of an African-ruled nation began to emerge, and a time of crucial testing for the new political leaders. Nevertheless, the value of this book lies in its broad picture of the great complexity of politics in even a moderate-sized new African country.

Before the campaign leading to the 1961 election, Kenya politics largely consisted of a struggle over multi-racialism. In the years following the easing of the Mau Mau emergency in the middle nineteen-fifties, the surface of Kenya politics was a troubled pattern of contests between different settler groups. One, which became the New Kenya Party led by Michael Blundell, sought some means of accommodating the rising demands of the great African majority of the colony. The other, ultimately organized by Group-Captain Briggs as the United Party, sought to preserve a way of life based upon settler pre-eminence in political affairs. In these contests, despite much sympathy from overseas, the New Kenya Party lost. The heritage of the Emergency was deep bitterness among the settlers and Blundell himself had to endure great vilification from his white opponents. At the same time, the idea of multi-racialism was not accepted by most Africans. The dominant settler group, however, did not win. A complex electoral system had been contrived with much ingenuity. Although it stopped far short of satisfying African leaders, it was openly a plan of transition to a government in which Africans would have the largest voice.

Almost abruptly, then, the major arena of Kenya politics became the African parties. The Kenya African National Union sought to become a counterpart for the Tanganyika party (TANU) which was its near namesake. For this endeavor KANU seemed to have great advantages, a strong base in the two largest tribes in Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo, and most of the well known

African leaders in the country, among whom it was increasingly evident that Jomo Kenyatta would soon be included. These advantages, however, carried correlative disadvantages. The alliance of the two largest tribes seemed to pose a threat to the numerous small tribes in Kenya. The conspicuous character of KANU's leaders laid the party open to intra-party rivalry and disunity. And in time Kenyatta proved less of an asset than he appeared while he remained in confinement.

A rival party, the Kenya African Democratic Union, appeared and it made itself spokesman for the small tribes and in general became more rural in orientation. The contest between KANU and KADU was lively but uneven. KANU was a heavy winner of popular votes. Nevertheless, this advantage was offset in part by the design of the election and by the greater cohesiveness of KADU. Through a combination of circumstances and KANU miscalculation, KADU became the party to assume the role of government to the degree possible at this stage of evolution toward independence.

The "Kenyatta election," then, was considerably more important that the title of the book suggests. Kenyatta was an issue and a lively one. Nevertheless, already in early 1962 there are signs that his charisma is wearing thin. And in any event the basic development of a system of two African parties was the fact of large significance. This book is essential to an understanding of this and of the politics of the nation that is to be.—GRANT MCCONNELL, *University of Chicago.*

I Speak of Freedom. BY KWAME NKRUMAH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1961. Pp. xiv, 291. $4.95; paper, $1.95.)

The slogan "Freedom and Unity" is increasingly heard in the new African states, and this book is Dr. Nkrumah's attempt to bring these two concepts before an American audience. This is, according to its subtitle, "a statement of African ideology," but it is not a disciplined formulation of political thought. Here is a selection of Nkrumah's speeches for the period 1947 to 1960, interspersed with his own commentary and summary of further speeches. The book begins with his return to the Gold Coast from England, and ends with a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960.

The first ten chapters cover the time dealt with in his earlier work, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah,* but there is considerable variance in the two accounts of his activities, a matter of differing selection and emphasis. The first book dealt principally with political developments in the Gold Coast and the work of the Convention Peoples' Party; the second one emphasizes far more continental and international aspects of the same events. There is no account here of Nkrumah's imprisonment, the development of party technique, or the Motion of Destiny speech in 1953 on coming independence. Instead there are comments on the African personality, positive action in international affairs, the Congo, and Ghanaian membership in the commonwealth. There is mention of international crises and the Berlin blockade. Nkrumah's thesis is perhaps most clearly stated in his preface: "The greatest contribution that Africa can make to the peace of the world is to avoid all the dangers inherent in disunity, by creating a political union which will also by its success, stand as an example to a divided world. A union of African states will project more effectively the African personality. It will command respect from a world that has regard only for size and influence."

Nkrumah does not concentrate entirely on international affairs; he discusses some Ghanaian political developments, but they do not occupy him as fully as they once did. Unfortunately in becoming more international he has become less interesting. While there is evidence of absorption and dedication to the enormous tasks faced by Ghana and all of Africa today, there is much absorption also with Kwame Nkrumah. This book does not bear out recent accusations of megalomania, but every other paragraph does begin with the word "I." There is little reflection of other personalities, or the description of local background and attitudes which contributed to the earlier book. There is an African background in terms of many of the issues considered, but otherwise this might be any prime minister, writing anywhere. The prose style is reminiscent of Lord Attlee's.

Since Nkrumah is writing on African freedom and pan-Africanism, there are some curious omissions. Except for a brief mention of the Saniquellie conference, there is no discussion of the Ghana-Guinea union, or any account of relations with Togo. Nigeria is mentioned once, and most of French-speaking Africa not at all. The Accra conference of independent African states and Nkrumah's travel to Liberia, India and the United States are considered in some detail. Since the book ends with 1960, there is no discussion of policy toward Gizenga in the Congo, or any recent political developments. Neutralism is mentioned, and carefully called non-alignment.

It would seem that Nkrumah has aimed this book at the general public rather than the specialist. Only a few speeches are reproduced in full, most of them having been excerpted in that particularly irritating fashion which gives the reader no clue as to how much of the speech he is actually reading. Nor are we given any really new information. This book might be recommended as a study in African psychology, but it is otherwise disappointing. Someday it is to be hoped that Nkrumah will give us, perhaps in his memoirs, a more systematic and informative account of his years as prime minister. In the meantime his first book stands as a far better introduction to African affairs.—MARGARET L. BATES, *Goddard College.*

The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa. BY VIRGINIA THOMPSON AND EARL ADLOFF. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 595. $8.75.)

The Adloffs have performed a valuable service in providing what is in fact the first balanced and truly comprehensive survey in the English language dealing with an area of former French Equatorial Africa. The AEF has been long neglected by English-speaking scholars; with the exception of mention in the works of Buell, Lord Hailey, and Hodgkin, and with occasional articles in periodical literature, most of the material available on the area has been of an official nature and in the characteristically lifeless style adopted by French colonial administrators. Moreover, the latter volumes tended to be compendia of economic statistics coupled with highly detailed descriptions of structures on the various levels of administration. Such works usually lacked any discussion of political matters—particularly after 1944—and one got the impression from them that apart from the aseptic consultative organisms created by the Administration from time to time, the area experienced little or no political change.

Happily, the Adloffs have devoted considerable portions of their volume to discussions on the nature of political activity in each of the four states treated (Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, and the Congo (Brazzaville) Republic). In addition, there is a useful historical introduction and a short but excellent statement on the growth of political organizations in the AEF after 1944.

Further, the volume examines the current economic and social problems of the area as a whole and of each of the new states in turn. This approach enables the reader to compare the economic development of the AEF in its former status as an administrative federation with the social and economic problems faced by the new states in their attempts to strike out on their own. At the time this book was being written (1959) the states of the old AEF had decided on tentative steps toward a loose union (the union des Republiques d'Afrique Centrale). Even though the Union itself did not get much beyond the discussion stage, it is interesting to observe how heavily the four states' former interdependence weighed in the planning for the Union and in their subsequent (1961) decision to enter the broader functional union of the Union of Africa and Malagasy States. The Adloffs' work provides a most useful basis for assessing the four states' contributions to the larger Union, and indeed, for a realistic appraisal of the possible future integration of the whole area, including the Cameroon and former Belgian Congo.

The book is not without its defects. It is somewhat unfortunate, considering the wealth of information and insight presented by the authors, that they chose to adopt the encyclopedic format of their earlier volume on French West Africa. This format recalls the older French presentations, and undoubtedly accounts for the dryness of some of the discussions (particularly those dealing with administrative and economic matters) and for the somewhat perfunctory manner in which the accounts of political activity are handled. These drawbacks, though limiting the usefulness of the book, do not detract from its overall excellence.

The story of the AEF, less politically and economically favored than the area of the former French West Africa, makes fascinating reading not only for those interested in African affairs, but for all concerned with problems of political and economic modernization. The Adloffs' contribution deserves to be widely read, and will undoubtedly find a preferred place among the increasingly large number of valuable works on Africa.—VICTOR T. LE VINE, *Washington University* (St. Louis).

African Affairs: Number One. St. Antony's Papers: Number 10. EDITED BY KENNETH KIRKWOOD. (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961. Pp. 164. $3.75.)

Like the inevitable double-feature movie, one a piperoo and the other a stinkeroo, this octet on Africa is of uneven quality. There is a notable essay on the differing connotations of political words like "politician" and "freedom" in Western Europe and in Africa south of the Sahara. Following this logically is an excellent analysis of the roots and shoots of nascent nationalism in the onetime colonial territories, by Thomas Hodgkin, who published a book on the subject five years ago. Other essays are on Islam in Nigeria (which essay gets lost en route from Nigerian savannah to jungle, examining individual bushes and trees); on demographic surveys in the Central African Federation (which surveys show awesome ingenuity and some important economic data); on urbanized Africans in the Union of South Africa (after a legalistic beginning, a sensitive and sensible discussion); on academic research on Africa in the Soviet Union; on the prospects for nonholocaust in South Africa (by a distinguished scholar and former Senator from Natal who refuses to despair). An essay on federation in French West Africa demonstrates that it is not only Africans but Western Europeans who use the same words differently. What French colonial administrators called federation is more like what is elsewhere called democratic centralism, and yet the author artlessly describes the breakup after de-colonization of what never existed before and which, on a truly voluntary basis, has been tried with little success since, in French-speaking Africa.

Altogether a motley lot of essays, but in various ways each provides information and within its stated competence is competent. It is well to know how provincial were Soviet scholars about Africa until after the 1955 Bandung Conference and even better to know how quickly they are now learning the realities. And it makes sense to relate the growth of Marxist parties in French-speaking Africa to the strength of the Communist party in France, in contrast to the situation in the English-speaking areas. But would it not be more relevant to consider more deeply why Marxism has become so intensely attractive to so many Africans, Chinese, Indonesians, Malayans, and Indians regardless of language, and whether Islam is in *practice* any more hostile to Communism in Africa than Christianity proved to be in the Soviet Union?

To understand the various reactions of Africans to tribalism, colonialism, urbanization, and Westernization, and to ascertain their future expectations, we have to know more than the institutional and legal soil out of which burst new growths that are supplanting tribalism and colonialism—growths that not even Africans in the midst of things can adequately describe. This collection of institutional analyses is nevertheless useful.—James C. Davies, *California Institute of Technology.*

South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid. By F. P. Spooner. (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960. Pp. 288, $5.00.)

There are those who say that economic pressures will finally bring *apartheid* to the ground or, at very least, alter it sufficiently to avoid a violent explosion in the Republic of South Africa. This argument (simplified) runs as follows: the demand for labor will force South African industry and mining to upgrade the skills and jobs of the Bantu worker. His continued presence, working and living in the European sector of the economy will be necessary. His population increase and lack of land will force him there as well. His increasing purchasing power will create increasing markets for goods, as well as demands for higher standards of living and political and social rights. Since white and black will become so totally dependent upon each other, neither can tolerate nor pay for the extremes of total separate development or segregation, let alone a violent African nationalism. Some form of social and political compromise will thus be forced.

This book, in spite of its subtitle, does not address itself fully to the economics of *apartheid*. Rather, it devotes well over half its pages to a thin résumé of the physical features of the country, its historical background and the growth of the conflict between Boer and Englishman. As a matter of fact, the book is almost quaint in its pleading for a return to the days when mutual understanding and cooperation between the two European groups was hoped for by so many Englishmen. The author, a businessman of English and Afrikaner lineage, complains that the Vortrekkers have been glorified, that the Englishman's contributions have been minimized and that the politics of the country have been rigged in favor of the Boer. The faith and trust placed in the Boer community in 1910 by the United Kingdom has not been answered with corresponding fair play. The book is wistful, vague and naive in its analyses of politics. A Victorian didacticism pervades its pages.

The problem of the author is that he cannot apply the spirit of the liberal English political tradition to contemporary South Africa. He is accurate when he states that the Afrikaner's isolation caused him to miss a century and to develop a narrow and self-righteous community. But one cannot move from this type of criticism onto a useful economic or political platform by claiming that the United Party is the party of 'reason,' that White superiority over the Bantu is patent, that it is 'unthinkable' to give the Bantu the franchise or that western democratic concepts lack relevance in South Africa because they do not teach discipline.

The author ends with a plea for the vision of Rhodes, a great multi-racial federation in South Africa. Economic development would be applied evenly throughout the land and not compartmentalized into white and black '-stans.' Domination supported by race alone would be ended in favor of the guided advance of the African by the more able European. The book is a good statement, perhaps unintended, of the Englishman's dilemma in South Africa.—Channing B. Richardson, *Hamilton College.*

The Edge of Freedom. By John B. Oakes. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. xiv, 129. $3.50.)

This book, subtitled "A report on neutralism and new forces in Subsaharan Africa and Eastern Europe," is a rapid and informed survey by a leading journalist of a key problem in contemporary politics, the meaning of "neutralism." It is a plea for "sympathy without condescension" towards the proponents of this doctrine.

The basic thesis is that the neutralism of the new African nations "is not a moral judgment, but a political one, a judgment that it is in their interest to stay away from the great power struggle." This view is sustained by brief snapshot analyses of recent political developments in Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, "French Africa," Congo, Rhodesia, and Kenya-Tanganyika. Mr. Oakes combines with this African overview some equally brief statements on the evolution of new forces in some Communist states, the USSR, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in the direction of "liberalization."

Having explained that the African neutrals are often lined up with the Soviet bloc on colonial issues—or rather, as Mr. Oakes says, that the Soviet bloc is lined up with them—the book outlines the major problems facing the new African nations: national integration (against tribalism), the scarcity of national leaders, the difficulties of economic survival. These problems are the central focus of contemporary African politics. The attempts to deal with them explain the particular paths the new African nations have taken far better than any kinds of conspiracy theories (external influence of world communism, the international network of capitalist firms, the political penchants of small groups of African elites). What has become clear in the last few years is that, whatever the political leanings of various African states, they have all been pushed towards similar solutions for similar problems. The creation of one-party states in Africa has been a way of countering tribalism and promoting national integration. It has been a means of utilizing the scarce numbers of skilled personnel to the optimum instead of "wasting" a certain number in opposition politics. It has been essential to economic survival not only by protecting the national budget against excessive demands of small but effective interest-groups (salaried employees organized as trade-unions, cash-crop farmers organized in syndicates) but also by ensuring the strongest possible stance towards the external world, increasing maneuverability in obtaining external economic aid. Mr. Oakes draws from these facts a very simple conclusion:

> "The new African states can succeed—and if given a chance they will—not as satellites of East and West, not necessarily as free-enterprise parliamentary democracies, but as independent entities growing along African lines out of the African soil. American policy toward them is, or ought to be, to help them stand on their own feet, help them sustain their independence, help them to achieve real freedom of choice in determining their own governmental systems. We must not be deterred from this goal because some of these countries are neutralist, many are socialist and most are, at least for the present, semiauthoritarian. None of these characteristics is in accordance with the American way; but in subsaharan Africa we are going to have to live with them."

Mr. Oakes performs a further useful service by placing before us in the same context the new forces of Eastern Europe. Here what he has to say is more familiar. He says it with the same tone of judicious patience and guarded hopefulness that he uses for his analysis of African neutralism. As we must "live with" the latter, so he suggests we must seek to "keep open the channels of communication" with Eastern Europe in the hope of hastening and intensifying the "process of dilution" of Communism that has long since been begun.

This does not pretend to be a work of scholarship, though it points to important problems to which scholars must address themselves. It is rather an attempt to cut through the daily newspaper reports with a clear viewpoint, and thus enable the reader to make more sober and more sophisticated judgments on some current happenings.—IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *Columbia University*.

The Changing Patterns of the Middle East. BY PIERRE RONDOT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. 221. $5.00.)

This book is a skillful introductory survey of modern Middle East political forces and patterns. The "changing patterns" alluded to in the title will disappoint the student who expects to find a new key to new trends in the region, for the term refers to the fluidity associated with the the entry of the Middle East into the modern world against the background of centuries of stagnation. It is perhaps the foremost merit of the book that it adroitly blends historical analysis with contemporary observation. The instructor in Middle East politics faces no more exacting problem than that of conveying old history and pointing up its relevance to students accustomed to investigating behavior by analyzing last week's events, in the apparent conviction that history was correctly defined by the late Ford. Modern social science often permits the illusion, at least, that such a procedure is possible. In the study of the Middle East even the illusion evaporates, given the different scale on which time in that region is measured, and the extent to which political behavior there consciously accrues from ancient dilemmas and myths.

A second significant merit of the book is the sure touch with which the author analytically interlocks the forces at play within each Arab country with those operating in inter-Arab relations, and in turn ties these to the relations of the Arab world within the broader international arena and the cold war. This too is a problem sharply felt by the instructor whose students may tend unduly to separate domestic politics from regional and international politics. Again, while in the west such a procedure is tentatively possible, permitting considerable quantities of data to be arranged in plausible models, it does not meet the test of the Middle East. This is so not only because of the colonial history which colors the attitudes of its people to the international arena, but the more so because of the economic and strategic significance customarily attributed to the region by external actors.

The broad historical perspective of the author enables him to select and state with unusual lucidity three basic stages in the political development of the modern Middle East. These are the "period of Arab nationalism" from 1919–1936, the "period of Arab-Israeli tension" from 1936–1955, and the "period of Soviet intervention" which began in 1955. While this selection of stages assists in the detection of patterns, it does not greatly enhance the accretion of conclusions. If the analysis permits any conclusion, it may only be that no change need be anticipated in the characteristic political patterns of the region.

One generalization which the author is at great pains to elaborate seems open to serious challenge: the prime importance of Zionism and the establishment of Israel as fundamental determinants of Arab political modes and reactions. This aberration possibly affords an instance of how the political scientist can usefully caution the political historian. There can be little doubt that the Zionist incursion accelerated the Arab revolution. However, it is patently unlikely that Israel was necessary to revolutionary Arab nationalism or significantly shaped it. Israel is but an incident in the ubiquitous clash between Islamic "tradition" and western "progress" which works itself out within the various economic and social strata of the population, within the various states, among those states, and through the avenues of the cold war. The author clarifies these forces with distinction, and on his own terms it would appear redundant to lean upon Israel for the explanation of Arab movements and diplomacy. Were Israel to be struck from the modern map of the Middle East, or indeed had it never been allowed to decorate that map in the first place, Nasser would still be Nasser and the cold war would surely rock the cradle of civilization.—Noah Lucatz, *Southern Illinois University*, (East St. Louis Center).

Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism. By Ferenc A. Váli. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xvii, 590. $9.75.)

Professor Váli's monumental study of recent Hungarian politics was published almost exactly on the fifth anniversary of the October 1956 revolt in Budapest. Following in the footsteps of the first excited accounts breathlessly detailing the sensational events of the revolt, this historically objective and scholarly book with its panoramic view of pre- and post-revolutionary Hungary will immensely enrich our understanding of the intricate maze of recent Eastern European politics. The diligent author has performed an admirable job in a relatively brief time-span. Indeed not only has he offered us a meticulous analytical survey of the events immediately preceding the climactic few days of the popular explosion itself, but he has also been able to investigate and present the manifold "means of coercion and control" as well as of "satellite synchronization" so shrewdly and ruthlessly practiced by the Kádár government ever since November 1956. In a lucid chronological and logical sequence the causes of the "rift" lead first to the effect—the "revolt"—and ultimately to the after-effect itself: to the tortuous road travelled and the manifold ups-and-downs staged by the present regime in Budapest.

Váli's book is divided into five major phases. The author first examines the "Hotbed of Conflicts: The Stalinist Dictatorship" (1949–1953), then the period of "Dual Leadership—Conflicting Policies" (1953–1955), followed by the era of "Single Leadership—Divided Party" (1955–1956), "The Revolution" (1956) and finally by the fifth phase: "Aftermath of a Revolution" (1957–1961). The recurring *Leitmotiv* throughout is the inevitable and explosive conflict of nationalism and communism which has produced not only violent popular revolts in Eastern Europe, but has also been responsible for the Polish, the Yugoslav (and more recently even the Albanian) "roads to socialism." It is the author's fervent conviction that this endemic and infectious pattern of violent nationalism will oppose Soviet-imposed forms of Communism everywhere throughout the once-monolithic bloc and will eventually denote the total "bankruptcy of Soviet-satellite relations."

This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees with Professor Váli's principal conclusions concerning the Revolution itself—namely that it was negativist (an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist outburst triggered off by massive popular resentment against Soviet rule), spontaneous, largely unplanned and overwhelmingly leaderless. The author disagrees with those of our fellow-professionals who portray the Hungarian revolt either as essentially a "test case of national Communism," or as primarily socialist in orientation, or again as a struggle in the search for self-determination for all of Eastern Europe. Actually, Váli has offered us such an eminently thorough and careful reading of Hungarian history—ranging from published sources in several languages to personal interviews of numerous refugees and to the full use of the Columbia University Hungarian research project—that his "Nationalism Versus Communism" theme looms as by far the most valid psychological-political interpretation of Hungary's post-World War II evolution.

In this context, evolution is probably not the most felicitous phrase. Postwar Hungary looms more like a case study in galloping and involuntary political satellitism in which the principle of greatly reduced sovereignty and dependence on the dominant power remains qualitatively constant, while the degree of dependence and the means and techniques of control seem to fluctuate quantitatively according to the changing dictates of Soviet and world politics. The picture painted in this scholarly study is a far cry from the expected monolithic unity; on the contrary, even the dull ideological facade of today's Kádár government hides fascinating and multiple political deviations both to the left and the right. The story of the post-revolutionary repressions is almost equally complex and not simply a stereotyped sequence of horrors presented to the indignant reader with television-patented breathlessness. Dr. Váli's first-rate discussion of gradualism and selectivity in Kádár's repression process is one of the most noteworthy aspects of his work.

A related facet of prime significance to the political scientist is an analysis of the essential duality of Hungary's post-revolutionary government. At first political power was exercised *literally* on simultaneous levels by the revolutionary institutions on the one hand and the so-called "legal" institutions on the other. It then took the Kádár regime several months to liquidate, by a police process of continuous erosion, the remnants of such important revolutionary organs as the workers' councils and finally establish the monopoly of its own, widely publicized and allegedly "legal" institutions. Indeed, there seems to be an element of creeping duality in all phases and all types of satellite government. Soviet-inspired Communism inevitably pits party-rule against government-rule, semi-popular rule against rule by a small and antagonistic clique (*e.g.*, the perennial Rákosi-Nagy struggle for power), military against civilian, or native Communists embroiled in factional controversies with Moscow-oriented and Comintern-trained Stalinists. In Váli's scholarly account most of these patterns of duality emerge with force and clarity despite the incredible murkiness and elusive "Now you see me, now you don't" aspect of Hungarian domestic politics.

The Harvard University Press performed an outstanding publishing job which further enhances the professional value of the excellent bibliography, charts, maps and index of *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*. This reviewer emphatically agrees with the London *Times* which highlighted its summary of the book (in its issue of January 18, 1962) with the trenchant comment: "Mr. Váli has used his voluminous sources with skill. His narrative marches purposefully forward and his analyses are always illuminating. *This is contemporary history at its best*."—ANDREW GYORGY, *Boston University*.

Our Fundamental Rights: Their Nature and Extent (As Judicially Determined). BY D. N. BANERJEE. (Calcutta: 1960. Pp. ix, 483. 37s. 6d.)

Professor Banerjee's monograph is a detailed examination of the impact of judicial review, as exercised by the Indian Supreme Court, on the application and extension of the Bill of Rights section of the present, republican constitution of India. The author is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Calcutta.

Indian scholarship, since the new constitution went into force on January 26th, 1950, has been rich in studies of various aspects of its judicial interpretation; but the interpretive writing on political and civil Rights under the constitution has largely been undertaken by foreigners—for example, by Alan Gledhill and C. H. Alexandrowicz—and the definitive study by an Indian author has still to appear. Part of the trouble may be that Indian writers, after more than a decade of working judicial interpretation of the constitution, are still too deferential in their approach to the judicial process as a whole and disinclined to take strong positions in regard to individual judicial opinions or even individual judges personally. There is, to be sure, very often a fine line to be drawn between fair comment and criticism that is purely intemperate or pejorative; but, as Jeremy Bentham points out, "the law is not made by judge alone, but by judge and company." Certainly the detailed and continuing appraisal and criticism of judicial opinions—both as to their reasoning and also as to their end results—in the law reviews and commentaries in the United States, has been, over the years, a major factor in the effectuation of legal change and growth.

Professor Banerjee, in common with other Indian commentators, relies far too heavily on lengthy quotations from assorted judicial opinions, from both majority and minority judges, incorporated directly into the main text, the footnotes being formal and cursory. This makes for a somewhat discursive presentation and lessens the impact of Mr. Banerjee's evaluations, when he chooses to make them. When he does so, he writes with power and eloquence. Thus, after reviewing the case law on the "Fundamental Right to Property" under the constitution, and the ensuing constitutional amendments which the federal government had enacted to overcome judicial decisions hostile to its land expropriation and related measures, Professor Banerjee concludes that the right to property has "become, legally speaking, whatever might be the socio-political justification of the changes, almost, unlike our other Fundamental Rights, a myth." One can only regret that he has not further developed these and similar appraisals of the actual working operation of the constitutional Bill of Rights, for this would give this careful and detailed review of the case law the light and shade effects that it needs to shape and determine judicial responses in future cases.—EDWARD McWHINNEY, *University of Toronto.*

Parliaments and Electoral Systems: A World Handbook. Pp. 128. 15s. (London: The Institute of Electoral Research, Ltd. 1962.)

The latest publication of the Institute's series on elections and electoral systems is a thumbnail description of the formal governmental structure, the system of electing the national legislature, and the suffrage provision (usually age) in 118 countries, exclusive of unions. It is scarcely a substitute for the *Statesman's Yearbook* or the Council on Foreign Relations' *Political Handbook of the World,* but it may be a quicker reference for the items mentioned above. There is an interesting description and classification of terms, in which such devices as the block vote, the cumulative vote, the limited vote, and the single non-transferable vote are grouped together in a sub-category of "majority" systems called the *simple recurring majority* type. There is no index, but the countries are listed alphabetically. The date as of which the data are valid is not specified, but it must be early in 1961, because Syria is still classified under the United Arab Republic.—AVERY LEISERSON, *Vanderbilt University.*

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The Center of Latin American Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, began in January the publication of *Latin America in Periodical Literature.* The new monthly publication is designed "to present in summary form the material relating to Latin America included in a large number of periodicals of widely varying subject matter, published in this and other countries." The subscription price is $4.00 annually, and orders may be addressed to the Center (Los Angeles 24, California).

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity. By Lionel Gelber. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1961. Pp. x, 356. $5.00.)

This is a provocative and absorbing study in recent Anglo-American relations. It is an interpretive essay, not a documented and exhaustive monograph, and it profits from the virtues and suffers from the defects of the genre. The book has many brilliant insights but these are rarely developed in full and upon occasion their impact upon the major thesis of the work is not fully realized.

The author is a Canadian, a former Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and lecturer at the University of Toronto. What makes the work of peculiar interest, however, are not these academic qualifications but the fact that Mr. Gelber is Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Canada and puts forward a view of Anglo-American relations which many persons of authority in the Commonwealth undoubtedly share. His thesis can be put thus: Peace is preserved by an East-West balance of power and Anglo-American solidarity is the chief support of this equilibrium. This unique friendship makes feasible the coalition strategy of the West. Their special relationship is not only based upon a common law, language and literature but upon the fact that through their free institutions they have been schooled to cooperate. Their relations exhibit a dialectical process in which the English-speaking people diverge and then, on a new plane, reconcile clashing interests for the sake of a still higher common good. This higher common interest is the continuance of a free world order. It is this latter fact which enabled the transfer of primacy in the leadership of the West to occur with so little friction and jealousy. Differences did arise—there were wartime fears in Washington that Britain was trying to form an Anglo-American bloc against the Soviet Union, for example—but, given the magnitude of the problems faced and the difficult nature of the decisions taken, these differences were amazingly few. The most signal failure in cooperation involved, of course, post-war policies on atomic weapons and Mr. Gelber makes clear the tragic waste of resources which this entailed.

Although relying too heavily on the Eden memoirs, the chapter on the Suez crisis is worthy of the close scrutiny of American students. It makes clear that the chief failure of Dulles's policy lay in his inability to inspire confidence in the minds of British leaders, and that on the British side there was an inadequate grasp of the extent to which American policy was controlled by global rather than regional considerations.

The divergences at the time of Suez and the failure to continue the wartime cooperation on atomic energy suggest that, as it stands, Gelber's thesis is inadequate to explain all the facts concerning the Anglo-American relationship. A. E. Campbell has suggested (*The Listener*, October 4, 1961) that the idea of a special relationship between the United States and Britain is a myth which served the function of permitting Britain to withdraw gracefully from clashes with the United States. This may put the matter a trifle too baldly but it does emphasize an important point, namely that the relationship in question arose only in the last decade of the nineteenth century when the United States achieved great power. During this early period Britain did in fact give way whenever serious clashes occurred—in Venezuela, Panama and Alaska. In two world wars America intervened only when forced to do so. Certainly the thesis that a special relationship existed was always more strongly felt in Britain than in America and is reflected in the author's perfunctory treatment of the dilemmas presented by the emergence of the Common Market. He fails to grasp the significance for his thesis of the fact that, while the British consistently dragged their collective feet, the Americans could see no basic reason why Britain should oppose closer relations with Europe.

The parts of the book dealing with the impact of the new weapons upon coalition strategy are particularly fine. The complex variables involved are analyzed with acuteness and rare subtlety. In sum, this is a work of considerable penetration, clearly written and forcefully argued. If the major thesis is pressed too hard at times and cannot bear the full weight demanded of it by the author, it nevertheless serves as an organizing hypothesis for a good deal of recent international politics.—C. B. JOYNT, *Lehigh University*.

Around the Edge of War. BY JOHN FORTH AMORY. (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc. Pp. 185. $4.50.)

This book joins the barrage of criticism of American foreign policy which has become more intense with each passing year. The author adds a cryptic overtone to his study by writing under a pen name and depicting himself as "a strategically placed Washington expert."

The book correctly points out that a major failure of post-war American foreign policy has been the inability of the United States to understand and support the rising underprivileged majorities in the underdeveloped countries of the non-Western world. The author labels these emerging revolutionary forces as "people power." Instead of assisting the evolution of these groups the United States is supporting small reactionary elites in these countries who are suppressing the inevitable forces of progress and are primarily concerned with maintaining their dominant position.

The present nuclear stalemate between the Western and Communist blocs, the author claims, has encouraged the Soviet Union to pursue its aggressive aims by exploiting these massive discontented groups and utilizing them for its own ulterior ends. The Communists have achieved this important goal by stressing political, economic, and social reforms to needy and receptive people. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in directing this revolutionary tide, and if the United States fails to halt this trend and win the support of these rising forces, the world balance of power will shift decisively and irrevocably in favor of the Communists.

One solution to this dilemma as proposed by the author is appropriate and timely. He encourages the United States to place greater stress on non-military aid programs in the underdeveloped countries. He urges an emphasis on American ideology upholding the rights of the individual—a "Jeffersonian weapon"—to capture the thinking and aspirations of these people. This policy would create a "nuclear shield" by steering the uncommitted nations away from the Communist bloc and shifting the balance of power in favor of the United States.

Yet in spite of some sound analysis and good proposals this book has several serious shortcomings. With gross oversimplification of an exceedingly complex process the author places the blame for the failures of American foreign policy on a single group: the American overseas investors. In no way does he document what he believes to the the dominant power wielded by this group over the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. He merely assumes it exists.

The author fails to explain that the process of making foreign policy in the United States is extremely complicated and fluid. And the influence of American overseas investors on foreign policy in many regions of the world is a minor one. Dollar diplomacy has steadily declined since the 1920s. Since World War II the American military establishment has played a much greater role than American overseas investors in the conduct of foreign policy. This is especially true in Asia and the Middle East. And in many countries

American business interests are assisting, not opposing, the emerging progressive forces which are demanding a new and better life.

Another weakness in this study is the author's uninformed condemnation of the Central Intelligence Agency for many of the failures of American foreign policy. CIA is blamed for giving the top-level policy makers a distorted image of the world. Allen Dulles is depicted as a tool of "overseas business interests." While CIA has many deficiencies, its acquisition and evaluation of intelligence is probably the most noteworthy contribution it has made to the formulation of foreign policy in the post-war era.

Finally, when the author states that Latin America is the most vital region in the world to the national interest of the United States he reveals the narrow and parochial approach which distorts his assessment of the foreign policy process. He has posited certain premises regarding American objectives in one specific region and applied them to the entire world. Without adequate knowledge of the conditions in other regions of the world this is a dangerous and questionable practice.

In an era of continual tension and growing responsibility the American people need more enlightenment on the conduct of forign affairs. They need a better understanding of the many diverse forces inside and outside the United States which actually influence their foreign policy. While this book offers some good suggestions on long-range American objectives it does nothing to shed light on the process of making American foreign policy. Let us hope it is soon superseded by a better book on this timely and vital subject.—Frank C. Darling, *University of Colorado.*

When Nations Disagree: A Handbook on Peace through Law. By Arthur Larson. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 251. $3.95.)

In recent years an increasing number of lawyers and public servants have been urging the development of a "world rule of law" as our best hope of survival in the atomic age. Rarely, however, do they make explicit the basic assumptions and components on which a "world rule of law" should be based. *When Nations Disagree* is an attempt by Dr. Arthur Larson, Director of the World Rule of Law Center at Duke University, to set forth the underlying premises of the "world rule of law" idea and to present a concrete description of the steps needed to strengthen the rule of law in international relations.

Unlike others who often unrealistically advocate the substitution of law for politics in world affairs, Dr. Larson views "world law" as only one approach toward the creation of a more peaceful world, arguing that " . . . if a concept of 'world law' is given too diffuse a scope, it loses its distinctive power to set a clear line of practical action." While acknowledging the desirability of such ancillary actions as the strengthening of the United Nations and the encouragement of political, economic, and cultural moves, his main purpose is " . . . to see how the resources of law can be directly brought to bear on the problem of preventing conflict and building peace."

In view of the increasing number of books and articles dealing with nuclear deterrence and the possibility if not the probability of war, it is refreshing to find a book that seeks to exploit and project the capacity of states to attain internal order rather than pessimistically accepting the contemporary condition of international disorder.

Written in non-technical terms to reach a wide audience of civil servants, lawyers, businessmen, and teachers, *When Nations Disagree* attempts to enlist the support of the informed public for the "world rule of law" idea. As will be apparent subsequently, however, efforts to illuminate what is inherently a complex and controversial subject by discussion essentially popular in tone may result in oversimplification.

Following in the tradition of C. Wilfred Jenks' *The Common Law of Mankind,* Dr. Larson argues that international law needs to be expanded into a genuine world law which would differ from its predecessor not only by virtue of an expanded range of general principles drawn from the legal systems of non-Western as well as Western nations but also in its emphasis on an expanded scope of areas subject to regulation by law. He urges but does not elaborate upon the extension of the rule of law to such matters as outer space, international propaganda, and atomic energy.

But the existence of a body of law that is accessible, up to date, and suffused with principles drawn from the world's principal legal systems is only one component of an effective sysem of peace through law. The author devotes a considerable part of the book to an examination of three other basic prerequisites: improved machinery for the application of world law; acceptance of the "world rule of law" idea by all nations; and effective compliance with decisions rendered by an improved system of judicial machinery.

While space does not permit a detailed analysis of these suggestions, there is one major premise of central importance to the entire concept of world law. Explicit throughout is the author's assumption that most of the critical international disputes are justiciable in whole or in part, and Dr. Larson does a skilful job of delineating the legal aspects of the Berlin problem, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships. It is doubtless valid that there are legal elements susceptible to adjudication in each of these examples, but it is submitted that the author never adequately faces up to the intrinsic limitations of law as a means of solving fundamentally political disputes which involve not the clarification of existing legal rights but aggressive demands for a change in the *status quo.* How can it be " . . . pointless to try to calculate the relative gravity of those controversies threatening the peace that are capable of final settlement through the judicial process"?

Any realistic assessment of the future prospects for the judicial settlement of international disputes must in part depend upon the character of previous decisions by the International Court of Justice and its predecessor. The experience of these institutions, however, demonstrates that the cases successfully adjudicated did not involve disputes that gravely threatened peace and security. While the major contemporary disputes involve legal elements, the unwillingness of one or both disputants to accept judicial settlement renders them non-justiciable. Moreover, it is extremely doubtful that voluntary submission would result in final settlement. A very recent illustration is provided by the Indian dispute with Portugal over Goa that was adjudicated by the International Court of Justice in 1960. The decision rendered obviously did not deter India from using force to bring about a spurious kind of justice to a dispute which Dr. Larson over-optimistically predicted nearer to solution at the time the book went to press.

Only a few of the interesting aspects of *When Nations Disagree* have been touched on in this review. While Dr. Larson deserves credit for developing a systematic and concrete program for the realization of a "world rule of law" in contrast to the more usual banalities that accompany this concept, a more realistic appreciation of the limitations of the role of law in relation to politics in a system of nation-states still dominated by the centrifugal forces of sovereignty and nationalism would have increased the value of the book.—RONALD J. YALEM, *Norfolk College of William and Mary.*

Legal Problems of the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association. WITH A FOREWORD BY SIR KENNETH DIPLOCK. Published under the Auspices of The British Institute of International and Comparative Law. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 110 $3.95.)

The dream of saints, savants, and statesmen, from St. Isidore of Seville to Rousseau to Briand, of a politically united Europe may yet come to pass. It may be on the way, but it will certainly not come through mere verbalized transfers of aspects of sovereignty to improvised parliamentary institutions. As John Jay so sagely pointed out in one of his Federalist Papers, union in form was ripe for the American states because already there was union in fact. The precedent essential sense of community for Europe is being developed at the center by the Inner Six with their European Economic Community and peripherally by the Outer Seven with their European Fair Trade Association. Already the centripal forces engendered by solid success along pragmatic lines within the Common Market of the EEC have forced the Inner Six to extend their system to the hitherto omitted agricultural area of their community, have caused the United Kingdom to seek some kind of participation in the EEC, and have confronted the United States with the necessity—and opportunity—of making sweeping changes in its trade and tariff policies toward this new Europe and the larger Atlantic Community.

The present slender volume contains nine papers read at a conference held in London in September 1960 under the auspices of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and of the Federal Trust and Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. They deal entirely with legal problems involved in the economic, not political, relationships of the Community and the Association. They are the first of a series of supplementary publications brought out by the British Institute. Other publications, in the same series, planned for 1961, deal respectively with "Restrictive Trade Practices" and "Comparative Aspects of Legal Aid." Six of the nine papers are by officers of the EEC, including one on the Court of Justice by the President of the Court, Professor A. M. Donner. The other three are by non-officers similarly expert in EEC and Association affairs.

All of the papers assume a considerable knowledge of the structure and operations of the three European Communities: the Common Market or EEC, the Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom, as well as the two institutions common to the three communities, namely, the Court of Justice and the Parliamentary Assembly. Fortunately, seven of the discussions in the present work are confined to the EEC, the remaining two dealing with the European Free Trade Association and some of its relations to the EEC.

Of the seven papers centered on the EEC, two deal, respectively, with the objectives and constitutional structure of the EEC and with its legal framework; four deal, respectively, with (1) the establishment of companies, the spread of investment, and the problem of taxation, (2) the need for more uniformity in the law relating to the international sale of goods in Europe, (3) the law relating to industrial property (patents, trade marks, and licenses) within the community, and (4) rules of competition and restrictive trade practices. Each of these papers, as well as the two on the Outer Seven Free Trade Association, discuss highly technical legal problems of greatest value to the expert in the respective fields. They reveal considerable invention of techniques, devices, formulae, and harmonizations necessitated by this mutation of relationships to a developing community. In many ways the problems encountered and in process of solution in EEC are reminiscent of those encountered within the national market of the United States, criss-crossed by the confederation and federation of the states since 1776, but not yet enjoying the salutary ordering of affairs by a central power with authority to lay down increasingly the law of the land. In due course, if union in fact in Europe continues, central formal authority may emerge.

The paper on the Court of Justice of the European Communities by its President should have special interest for students of American constitutional law. The Court is very much *sui generis*. Its jurisdiction in terms of law and parties, its procedure in four languages, its non-use of dissenting opinions, its use of advocates-general as substitutes for the clarifying processes of lower courts, and other unusual features make fascinating reading. Its contribution to a reign of law among the European states concerned, even if confined thus far to matters of economic significance, is most heartening. Though the Court appears to operate closely within its European matrix, "it would be surprising," as Paul Freund observed in his "Forum" lecture on the Supreme Court of the United States, if the European Court were not to find "much of value . . . in the experience of the Supreme Court during a century and a half in striking a working balance between the needs of the individual states and the freedom of the common market."—HENRY REIFF, *St. Lawrence University*.

The United States and the United Nations. ED. BY FRANCIS O. WILCOX AND H. FIELD HAVILAND, JR. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Pp. x, 188. $4.50.)

Now that the United States stake in the United Nations is under close scrutiny, this slender volume which grew out of a mid-1961 conference held under the joint auspices of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Brookings Institution is of particular value. It is a symposium dealing with seven major subjects through seven essays. Each offers some timely observations and insights.

Joseph E. Johnson, in "Helping to Build New States" maintains that most new states should not be expected to develop Western canons of political behavior and suggests that the greatest contribution of the United Nations might ultimately be the smoothing of *Western* adjustment to the fact of the new nations. In the second essay, "The Six Imperatives of Economic and Social Progress," Paul G. Hoffman presents a succinct analysis of the United Nations Special Fund and proposes that a greater proportion of international public assistance—in pre-investment and investment fields—be channeled through the United Nations. Lincoln P. Bloomfield's careful observations on the "new arithmetic" of voting alignments in the General Assembly form the most perceptive part of a thoughtful essay on "The New Diplomacy in the United Nations." Ernest A. Gross, in "Shifting Institutional Patterns of the United Nations" focusses on the most significant structural developments in the world organization. Inis L. Claude's essay "The Containment and Resolution of Disputes" is probably the most valuable contribution. His comparative analysis of United States and Soviet responses to United Nations "sealing-off" activities in the "no man's land" of the cold war is truly excellent. In his essay on "The Capacities of the United Nations" Harlan Cleveland sets forth three capacities as the most crucial: to act, to befriend, and to create. A balanced assessment of United States policy in the United Nations by Francis O. Wilcox concludes the volume.

The book as a whole highlights two general problems of great importance: first, the increasing interdependence of the two great conflicts of our time—the struggle over the expansion or containment of Communism and the struggle over the liquidation of Western colonialism—and the increasing complexity of the United States position in the United Nations as a result. The Soviet exploitation of the colonial struggle and the anti-colonial exploitation of the East-West struggle are confronting United States policy makers with more and more agonizing dilemmas in all organs of the world organization. Second, and perhaps most important, the book points up the necessity for clarifying United States policy toward the United Nations. Should we regard the world body as another version of NATO, that is, as a vehicle for the furtherance of Western interests? Or should we view it as genuinely neutral ground in the East-West struggle? Inis L. Claude's thoughts on this point are well worth pondering:

> "We should concentrate less on equipping the organization to override Soviet opposition than on enabling it to gain Soviet acquiescence in, or support for, its playing an essentially neutralist role—one which contributes not to the winning of the Cold War by one side or the other, but to the limitation of the scope and intensity of that struggle. . . ."

—JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College*.

The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities. By Benjamin V. Cohen. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 106. $2.75.)

The three all too short chapters which comprise this book were delivered as the Holmes Lectures at Harvard in the Spring of 1961. They represent the distilled wisdom of a long and fruitful association with the United Nations extending back to the author's participation as a White House adviser in the Department of State deliberations which gave birth to the American draft of the Charter of the United Nations. The author's association with this work was a fruitful one as he is what in current parlance is called an "innovator." At any moment of deadlock or stalled action he could be counted on for a fresh idea or a new approach.

Mr. Cohen's basic thesis is that the Charter of the United Nations has within it all the possibilities and potentialities for growth to deal with today's formidable problems. The trouble lies not in the Charter but in the willingness of the Members to use it and to support action under it. The lack is one of will and of consensus. It is not the Charter which impedes the expansion of United Nations activities, Mr. Cohen rightly declares, but a lack of working consensus among the Member States. The Charter, he adds, has created an organism capable of life and growth, but that life and growth depend not only on the words of the Charter but on the way the Member States meet their responsibilities and exercise their rights and privileges under the Charter.

For Mr. Cohen the basic law of the Charter is to be found in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2—(1) that all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security are not endangered; and (2) that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. If these obligations are accepted in good faith by the Members of the United Nations, all other matters are manageable within the four corners of the Charter. The principles of the Charter are broad and comprehensive and made flexible enough, like our Constitution, to be adapted to exigencies which in the words of Justice Holmes, "could not have been completely foreseen by the most gifted of its begetters."

The first lecture is devoted to the elaboration of key examples of the Charter's demonstrated capacity for growth. These include the interpretation that an abstention by a permanent member of the Security Council, *is not* treated as equivalent to a negative vote under Article 27, par. 3; that the question whether a matter is a substantive vote shall be decided by a procedural vote (the potential double veto); that the General Assembly may make recommendations for collective measures in cases of threats to or acts of aggression, when the Security Council is unable to act; that Article 2, paragraph 7 on domestic jurisdiction "was not intended to take away powers granted to the United Nations by the Charter, but to provide a guide for their construction"; and that the competence and powers of United Nations organs may derive not only from the Charter but from treaties and *ad hoc* agreements. The significant conclusion is that "generally speaking Charter interpretations that would seriously retard the organic growth and development of the Charter have not prevailed."

The second lecture is devoted to an examination of the exercise of their responsibilities by the Member States. "If the United Nations is to live and grow, Member States must not only observe their obligations under the Charter, but exercise their rights and privileges under the Charter wisely and prudently." While almost a truism, this proposition is far from being taken as a serious guide for their conduct by many Members in the organization's significant business. A large part of the lecture is devoted to an appraisal of the narrow limits of self defense within which Members may legally resort to the unilateral use of force under the limitations imposed by Article 2, par. 4.

The author is less persuasive in his projections in lecture three entitled "What to do"—given a workable organization, but Members who have been unwilling to exploit its resources. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the nearly insoluble dilemma presented by the absence of a community of purpose between the two principal power groups in the United Nations. It is at this point that Mr. Cohen tackles the problem with proposals which are wise but would seem to have little chance of prospering as long as the Communists persist in objectives diametrically opposed to the basic purposes and principles of the organization. His basic proposition is that ways must be found to strengthen the consensus among all nations, and among the Great Powers in particular, that force must not be used as an arbiter of international differences. It is characteristic of the author and a tribute to his faith that he insists that, no matter how hopeless the effort may seem, we must continue to rely upon an appeal to reason and common interest. We must not let Communist scorn for bourgeois thinking cause us to lose "faith in the power of right reason." The more difficult the tasks of the United Nations may be, the greater the need for pressing for a consensus of thinking that will make active cooperation possible and meaningful. "In this quest for consensus there is no role for dogmatism and self righteousness. I would close no doors. In the United Nations, as 'in my Father's house,' there 'are many mansions.' "—DURWARD V. SANDIFER, *American University.*

International Immunities. BY C. WILFRED JENKS. (London: Stevens & Sons Limited; New York: Oceana Publications, 1961. Pp. xxxviii, 178. $6.00.)

Simultaneously, and perhaps paradoxically, with the increase in the tasks and scope for which international organisations are expected to provide solutions, there have grown in recent decades also the importance and power of the sovereign nation-state. In addition to the recent quantitative increase in their number, the authority of the sovereign states expanded also qualitatively. The newly independent nations display a passionate desire for independence from and equality with the older nations. Both are reluctant to concede to international bodies even small concessions or privileges as long as these might appear as infractions of their sovereignty.

In the municipal sphere the functions of national governments have increased not only in the totalitarian or authoritarian states but also in states with truly democratic institutions. Public controls and responsibilities are today larger than ever before. This is a natural consequence of the fact that in modern societies more and more tasks are entrusted to public authorities. In performing many of these tasks, international organisations can help individual states. Yet it is essential that international organisations carry out their activities independent of the control of the individual state in order to achieve their international goals. They are ultimately controlled by and responsible to the multi-national community of the member states. At the same time the maintenance of the municipal legal order cannot be simply brushed aside. A proper coordination between the two is imperative. International immunities are essentially a body of rules regulating the relationships between individual states and various international institutions insofar as the latter require special consideration and status within the municipal legal order. They are "an essential device for the purpose of bridling unilateral and sometimes irresponsible control by particular governments of the activities of international organisations."

With the advent of international organisations in the twentieth century it seemed at first quite natural to accord to the new international institutions and their functionaries the diplomatic immunities and privileges. This was done, for example, in the Covenant of the League of Nations [Art. 7(4)] and in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice [Art. 19]. With the gradual growth in size and number of international organisations it soon became obvious that a wholesale application of diplomatic immunities is impossible and that even analogy to them in the process of formation of new rules concerning international immunities can suffer from serious defects.

Wilfred Jenks, long an official of the International Labor Organization, considers that of the three theories employed to justify diplomatic immunities, namely the 'extraterritoriality' theory, the 'representative character' theory and the 'functional necessity' theory, only the last one can be usefully applied to the field of international immunities. Both types of immunities correspond to certain basic functional needs of international intercourse. Since these are not identical, though sometimes comparable, different solutions and regulations will probably evolve in the field of international immunities from the already recognised ones in the diplomatic field. There exist major differences between diplomatic practices and the activities of international organisations and their functionaries. Diplomatic representatives are chosen from amongst nationals of the sending state in agreement with the authorities of the receiving state. Substantial diplomatic exemptions from the jurisdiction of the receiving state do not exempt the agent from the jurisdiction of his own sending state. The diplomatic immunities are well sanctioned by the principle of reciprocity and the possibility of effective retaliation for any violation or infraction of the diplomatic code. Hence their predominantly customary character with but a few conventional additions. International immunities, on the other hand, cannot be sanctioned by the same method and require to a much greater extent precise conventional guarantees. An international organisation will usually employ, especially at its official headquarters, a substantially larger number of multi-national personnel than an average embassy. The duration of an individual employee's service period will very often be quite extended. At its headquarters at least, an international organisation will also require extensive facilities, office buildings and premises, and it will be often involved in substantial monetary and other material transactions. All of these factors increase the potential points of friction with the local jurisdiction for which satisfactory solutions must be found in advance, at least in principle.

The author finds the conception of international immunities based on the 'functional necessity' theory confirmed in the general acceptance of certain basic principles by recent state practice. "The thinking underlying these principles is essentially institutional in character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members." Jenks identifies two main historical sources from which the principles of functional international immunities were gradually derived, namely, the already mentioned diplomatic immunities, on the one hand, and "the writings and decisions of the great federalists, and notably of Hamilton and Marshall, on the arrangements necessary to give reasonable independence and authority to newly created federal instrumentalities," on the other.

With the use of this conceptual framework the author then carefully examines various aspects of international immunities. In the first, general, part he deals briefly with the basic theory of immunities, the legal process of determining the extent of granted immunities, and some special problems connected with international immunities such as the neutrality of a member state, subversive activities of functionaries and the relationship to third, non-member states. Parts two and three represent the core of the work. Here he deals comprehensively with immunities of international organisations as such and the immunities of persons connected with international institutions. In the last part the author discusses the future of international immunities, dealing specifically with problem areas that seem most likely to develop substantially in the future while their present regulation is still in a fluid stage. One is the pronounced trend toward uniformity of regulations that can be seen in recent practices concerning international immunities. The author weighs carefully the advantages of such uniformity as against the need to preserve the adaptability to new functions and problems arising from growth in size, scope and locality of the operations. The other special problem area is that of judicial redress against international decisions. The need to provide proper safeguards against arbitrariness on the side of international organisations in relation to their own officials and within the sphere of their immunities is weighed against the requirement for reasonable freedom of action unhampered by excessive and cumbersome legal procedures. The concluding chapter is on the central problem area, namely, the protection of international independence against national sovereignty.

The volume as such is a most comprehensive and up to date reference work on international immunities. One can only hope that the author will soon be able to fulfill his promise of a volume on *The Corporate Personality for International Purposes* of which the present book was originally intended to be a part.—PETER P. REMEC, *Fordham University.*

The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War. BY BURNETT BOLLOTEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 350. $6.50.)

"Although the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July, 1936, was followed by a far-reaching social revolution in the anti-Franco camp . . . people outside Spain were kept in ignorance, not only of its depth and range, but even of its existence, by virtue of a policy of duplicity and dissimulation of which there is no parallel in history." With this statement, Burnett Bolloten sets out to correct this situation, and a most formidable one at that, by presenting some years after the event, a thoroughly and well documented account of the techniques employed by a small group of Marxist-Leninists seeking to achieve their goal.

The author does admirably well in the task of tracing and pin-pointing the Communist intrigues in the anti-Franco government and, in particular, the efforts of Francisco Largo Caballero who, as Prime Minister, struggled to remain the master of a government beset by an externally Axis-supplied enemy and an internal enemy bent on the subversion of the existing government.

In Mr. Bolloten's account, we witness the manner in which the Communists skillfully secured pivotal positions by proselytism, defamation and infiltration in the reorganization of the police forces which, by October, 1936, were little more than an arm of the Soviet Secret Police. Once the Communists had achieved this goal, the Leftists were able to focus their attention on the left-wing opponents of Soviet policy and, as the author documents it, this became a decisive force in determining the course of events in the government of that era inasmuch as the Ministry of Justice had no control over the police forces nor their activities. The analysis of the Communist subversion of the police forces is followed by the detailed account of the creation of the Fifth Regiment, the balancing off of one class against another, control of the War Ministry, the successful infiltration of the Armed Forces, youth groups and other institutions in the society until Prime Minister Caballero, having lost his support in the coalition Cabinet, was forced out of the government and the Communists emerged the victors.

This is a masterful, highly informative work which effectively marshalls the intricacies of Communist strategy in the Spanish Civil War. In a sense, it is an "anatomy of a revolution" and provides a clear insight on the Communist tactics in a national revolution, it is timely in view of the recent events in Cuba and Laos.

In conclusion, the author writes with a high degree of skill acquired as an eye-witness to the events he speaks of plus many additional years of painstaking research on the subject. The reader is left with a detailed map of the Communist strategy in Spain. This reviewer found that Mr. Bolloten is without question justified in closing his study with a very apt quotation: "The Communist parties (of the world) are strong in proportion as the other parties and trade union organizations are weak and vacillating and play their game. That was the lesson of Spain and that, today, is the lesson of Europe and the world."—THOMAS W. NAGLE, *U. S. Naval Postgraduate School.*

The Backward Society. BY RAYMOND FROST. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1961. Pp. 246. $5.00.)

Generalizing simply but astutely is a formidable task for the specialist, but Raymond Frost can claim top honors. His book is an ABC of the problems and possibilities of economic development in the less industrialized areas of the world. Even though such an approach necessarily loses something for the reader interested in focusing upon a particular nation or region, it nevertheless offers a good deal to all those who wish to concentrate on the larger, more general aspects of building sound economies in the developing countries.

The author, working within the context of Western values (thereby precluding forced savings), outlines three means of "breaking out of the closed circles of inadequate savings and inadequate exports": generous grants of foreign aid, the discovery of scarce mineral deposits, and the opportunity offered by a boom in commodity export prices. He discounts the first two measures as unreliable but places considerable faith in the third. Little attention is paid to such incentive factors as changes in the tax laws or land reform, and the general effects of inflation are not elaborated upon. When commodity export prices boom, he emphasizes, the developing countries must capitalize fully upon their opportunity: they must avoid the temptations of increased consumption, and the resultant savings must be invested with the utmost care.

How are savings to be utilized most productively? To start with, Frost would rely ideally on the operations of the market mechanism. He is well aware of the social forces pressing the bureaucracy to perform a wider and wider range of functions in the developing countries, but he urges that government officials undertake only responsibilities which are general and basic. Some planning is obviously required, however, and the author devotes considerable attention to setting up appropriate guidelines.

If planners are to combine land, labor and capital in order to achieve the author's goal of balanced economic growth, they must devote greater energies to technical details as well as to overall purposes. Frost takes great pains to show that a poor combination will retard development. Thus power projects and highways are useful if productive—and to the extent to which they are productive; they involve a poor allocation of resources, however, if their yield is low. Investments in education and improvement of land are preferred to impressive construction projects where the costs of the latter are high relative to returns. Poverty and population pressure, he feels, make it imperative to invest in projects yielding rapid returns. "When investment produces quick returns its beneficient effect becomes rapidly cumulative. But if there is a long delay before the first additional dollars come in, then the cumulative effect of investment is postponed." For Frost, then, extensive sacrifice at this time may cause increasing misery both in the present and the future; no doubt this approach will be less exacting than one directed toward TVA-like projects, but one wonders if it is best designed to meet the challenge of rising expectations over the long pull.

The above thesis on the need for rapid returns from investments directly affects the nature of planning for foreign trade. Exports must be increased in order to finance the importation of additional capital goods. What kinds of exports can the less technically advanced lands produce most competitively? Frost urges these lands to export consumer goods. Not only does he feel that the adoption of a simple line of consumer goods will avoid the problem of complex and expensive imported equipment, but that it will also establish a good base for progress toward more complex and more expensive projects.

It is when Frost deals with non-economic questions—many of which turn out to be impediments to sound economic growth—that he seems least inclined to consider all factors. The pressures to spread governmental power among a number of constituent authorities and to invest in display projects may retard economic progress to some extent, but if these schemes give satisfaction, they must be weighed at every stage against the more purely economic goals. To do otherwise is to oversimplify the planners' task. It is not enough to indicate that national disunity is costly in economic terms without also indicating that minority ethnic group fears are costly in human terms. It is not enough to scoff at vast expenditures on the establishment of airlines or television stations without also understanding that people gain satisfaction from such prestige projects. Planners, in short, must not operate *in vacuo* but must allocate expenditures according to the principle of greatest satisfaction, for both the present and the future. Judged by this yardstick, a few grandiose schemes may seem prudent.

Certainly Frost does the public a major service by grappling resolutely with some of the most vital questions of our time. *The Backward Society* is a concise, well written study which deserves serious scrutiny.—DONALD S. ROTHCHILD, *Colby College*.

The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea BY HENRY REIFF. (University of Minnesota Press, 1959. Pp. 451. $8.00.)

This volume can be highly recommended on two counts, its assembly of relevant facts and its approach to the problems of the sea. First, it provides a comprehensive survey of the extraordinary number of treaties which the United States has entered into, bilaterally and multilaterally, with nations of the world to deal with the many problems of transportation, conservation, and jurisdiction which have arisen and will continue to arise. The extensive documentation will assist the reader to appreciate the vast amount of literature on the subject. The author rightly acknowledges his indebtedness to the late Judge Manley Hudson who first drew attention to the growing significance of treaty law in his authoritative nine-volume work, *International Legislation*, and convincingly shows the growing importance of multi-national conferences and especially of the increasing number of international agencies, such as the United Nations, its specialized agencies and regional international bodies which frequently work in association with national governments and private national and international associations.

The number of treaties rose greatly between World War I and World War II. Reiff suggests that rather than deal with this growth in terms of institutions and programs undertaken by the League, the United Nations, and other bodies, it is more profitable to concentrate upon the sea itself and to see national and international action in relation to it.

After World War II the nations were confronted with the older problems which had challenged mankind, plus new problems and opportunities which arose from the extraordinary range of scientific and technological developments. The treaties dealing with these new areas of activity—Antarctica, missile testing, conservation, disposal of waste, scientific cooperation, etc.—became more complex and more numerous, and required the services of the most highly-trained experts in many fields of endeavor. The inter-relation between the United Nations, its specialized agencies, regional bodies, national bodies and private associations increased to an extraordinary degree. The formation of the International Law Commission by the United Nations bears witness to the need of constant study of legal aspects, as do the great conferences on the law of the sea.

The second major contribution of the volume lies in its theoretical and philosophical implications. The voluminous treaty law arises *out of necessity*, being conditioned by the very nature of the sea itself and man's dependence upon it. Certain "compulsions" arise out of the sea which imposes "a degree of unification of effort and organization" and results in a growing inter-relation of the regimes. "The sea inspires profound respect for the facts. . . . To be durable, solutions of the very practical problems arising out of man's use of the sea must perforce rest firmly upon a realistic appraisal of the material facts." The theme that legislation must reflect the realities imposed upon us by the sea is extensively sound. The author describes the many uses and abuses of the sea and emphasizes mankind must approach nature with respect or even reverence if it is to utilize it to advantage and not to suffer from the catastrophe which follows the abuse and depletion of resources, whether on sea or land. Reiff sees beneath the political problems narrowly construed, and with van Wagenen and others speaks of the "community of the sea"; he stresses the need of a social science of the sea, for individuals, groups, and nation-states are now experiencing what appears to be a historic trend toward increased dependence upon the ocean.

> Focused on the sea, such a social science would assess the relation of men, groups, nation-states, and international agencies to the central phenomena and seek to discover what the interaction portends for a more secure, orderly, and cooperative world.

The community of the sea preceded the nation-state and "will most probably survive the transmutation of the state system into something else."

The sea which was once regarded as *res nullius* will increasingly become *res communis*. The implications of this approach cannot be dealt with in this review which must content itself with underlining the vital importance of constantly keeping in mind the necessity of basing human laws and institutions upon life itself. It is for this fundamental reason, among others, that changes in national and international organization must continuously take place and result in an ever increasing amount of what the present reviewer in his *Foundations of Modern World Society* (which appeared in 1941) called "transnational law." I perhaps may be permitted to recall that the approach which I made a generation ago paralleled that of Professor Reiff in his present work. Professor Reiff, however, has written a volume marked by a greater concentration of analysis upon the sea, a more extensive and imposing bibliography, and a greater degree of expertness in the field of international law. And one is happy the note the fluency and clarity of his prose, a contrast to some of the material now appearing in the field of the social sciences.—LINDEN A. MANDER, *University of Washington* (Seattle).

Food, Land, and Manpower in Western Europe. BY P. LAMARTINE YATES. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1961. Pp. xiii, 294. $7.00.)

This volume is one of four monographs which together constitute a major study of the economic resources and requirements of Western Europe. The main volume in the series, *Europe's Needs and Resources*, has also been published. The study has been sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund under the general direction of J. Frederic Dewhurst.

Yates' volume is primarily concerned with the changes which are taking place in both the consumption and production of agricultural commodities in Europe. With increasing affluence, Europeans are consuming rather more vegetables, fruit, sugar and eggs, while wheat and potatoes play an ever smaller role in diets. Aside from an excess consumption of sugar, Yates notes, the inter-war problem of lower-class malnutrition has disappeared. Or rather, it has been transformed; today the division is between nations rather than between social classes. The dividing line is roughly that between northern and Mediterranean Europe with France standing somewhere in between.

The pattern of production is characterized by the same geographic division. With the exception of Spain, Portugal, Greece, and parts of Italy, per capita production is rising rapidly. For Europe the Malthusian fear of population excess is no longer a real one. On the other hand, many countries do face the problem of surplus production and rural unemployment. Further, Southern Europe especially is still characterized by excess fragmentation of holdings, a lack of effective cooperation, a lack of effective government agricultural policies, and the continued use of primitive techniques.

Attempts to solve these problems are hampered by traditional attitudes and political pressures. Peasants are still loath to leave the land or to use the newer machinery. Further, a national tradition which glorifies the soil supports the efforts of marginal producers to obtain subsidies, and "requirements of security" result in artificial support for a highly inefficient agriculture.

Yates offers a number of policy suggestions, including an increase in technical training, consolidation of fragmented holdings, and a general attempt to develop well-run family farms of from 15 to 30 hectares. Considering European conditions, he sees no need for the larger units characteristic of the Soviet Union and much of the United States. He argues for the reduction of subsidies, and an effort to attract surplus farm labor from the land. Most of the current migration to the city is taking place from areas adjacent to large metropolitan centers. The real problem of rural overpopulation, however, lies in the more remote sections of the various countries. Yates suggests a two-pronged attack involving first attracting industry to these areas and then retraining the rural populations.

Given a modicum of intelligent attention to agricultural problems, Europe, by 1970, should be producing some 30 percent more food with some 20 percent less manpower. The effects of this transformation are likely to be substantial. Not only will it involve increasing affluence, but it will also bring about the disappearance of the most traditional-minded elements in European society. Even those who remain in agriculture are no longer the peasants of even 50 years ago. Given the rapid growth of transportation and communication networks, and the spread of universal education, the isolated peasant is disappearing, and is increasingly being replaced by farmers whose outlook does not differ overly from their urban brethren. The continuing revolution in agriculture, then, is contributing to the continuing revolution in the whole pattern of European politics.—STANLEY ROTHMAN, *Smith College.*

Soviet Policy towards International Control of Atomic Energy. BY JOSEPH L. NOGEE. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. xiv, 306. $6.50.)

Although the seemingly endless search for the means to control nuclear weapons continues, the author of this volume contends that the attempt to place atomic energy under direct international control and ownership has become a closed subject. Since the Soviet Union played the key role in creating this lamentable state of affairs, the subject provides a very neat and significant case study in Soviet "diplomacy" and foreign policy.

Professor Joseph Nogee of the University of Houston has traced in great detail the record of the Soviet Union's response to the fact of nuclear energy and to the challenge presented by the Acheson-Lilienthal Report which advocated international ownership of atomic energy installations. His account is confined primarily to the public negotiations and debates of the 1945–1953 period and is based on readily accessible, if burdensome, sources such as the record of proceedings in the United Nations bodies which have dealt with the problem. The author has painstakingly extracted all the significant statements from this prolix record and has examined all other relevant Soviet statements. Thus three-quarters of this study is devoted to the record of fruitless negotiations which reads like the depressing chronicle of an unending journey through a morass.

The monotony with which the Soviet delegates repeated certain propaganda themes in what were to have been "negotiations" has not prevented Professor Nogee from identifying the various nuances in Soviet policy. Initially Moscow was cautious and taciturn regarding atomic weapons and minimized their significance. When confronted with the United States plan for an International Atomic Development Authority, as presented by Bernard Baruch, the Soviet Union charged that this organization would be controlled by "American monopolists" who desired to dominate the Soviet economy. The Soviet purpose was to propagate the notion of an atomic weapons ban unrelated to any effective system of international control and based exclusively upon Soviet protestations of good faith. When Soviet concessions appeared to have been made they were usually quickly nullified by reversion to the basic Soviet line.

After charting the various phases of the search for an international control system—or more correctly, its rejection—Professor Nogee devotes the two final chapters of his study to an analysis of the sources of Soviet opposition to an international control agency and the techniques of "gamesmanship" employed in eight years of negotiation. Soviet opposition was based on the conception of national sovereignty as expressed in the United Nations Charter and its veto provision. Thus an international agency exercising control over Soviet atomic energy installations and foreign penetration of the Soviet economy were regarded as a less desirable prospect than the perpetuation of the *status quo* in the form of an arms race. To the Soviet Union international ownership of atomic energy facilities meant "capitalist ownership" in view of Western insistence that the veto be abolished in this vital area.

Professor Nogee's trenchant analysis of Soviet gamesmanship demonstrates that the Soviet Union's participation in protracted public negotiations prior to 1954 was designed to achieve certain objectives. Foremost among these was the effort to influence world opinion as well as American public opinion in an attempt to compel the United States Government to renounce use of the bomb. At the same time the negotiations were employed to depict the policies of the Western democracies as "aggressive" and to stall for time during which the Soviet Union could rush its own atomic weapons development program to completion and in this way render the United Nations majority (Baruch) plan obsolete. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 led to a campaign designed to stress Soviet use of atomic energy for "peaceful" purposes. While Soviet spokesmen did not appear to reject Western proposals outright they did so in fact by demanding that the West agree to conditions which would nullify international controls. The Soviet delegates, by compelling the West to reject a number of unacceptable Soviet proposals, were able to displace some of the onus of negativism entailed in their rejection of Western proposals. The author has examined in detail the various techniques of stalling employed to prolong the debates over the years.

In a separate chapter devoted to the test ban problem Professor Nogee contends, very convincingly, that the Soviet Union acted on the basis of a careful calculation in unilaterally ceasing bomb tests in March 1958 and in embarking upon test ban negotiations. Although his treatment of this particular subject does not extend much beyond 1959, it clearly underlines the dilemma persistently confronting American policy-makers.

This is a very important volume for anyone interested in the record of the Soviet approach to the problems of arms reduction. The facts of this record and Professor Nogee's accompanying analysis are indispensable for an understanding of the policy and tactics of Soviet gamesmanship in disarmament and test ban negotiations.—JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR., *University of Washington* (Seattle).

Strategy for the 60's, EDITED BY JAY H. CERF AND WALTER POZEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Pp. 155. $4.00, cloth, $1.50, paper).

This volume provides a twenty-eight page analysis and an outline summary of thirteen studies on United States foreign policy prepared, with one exception, by private research organizations for the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. The editors are the Director and Associate Director of the Foreign Policy Clearing House, a "nonpartisan, nonprofit, private organization devoted to communicating to U. S. foreign policy-makers the consensuses of major foreign policy research centers of the United States."

These thirteen reports are of interest not only because of the policy proposals that they advance but also because they represent a creative adaptation by the Foreign Relations Committee to the new challenges being thrust upon it. Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Committee, succinctly describes the predicament of the Committee in an introduction to this volume. In order to operate effectively, says Senator Fulbright, "the Committee needs ideas, background, and information originating from sources outside the government." In domestic policy fields congressional committees "have available to them the wealth of ideas and information generated by the domestic press, by domestic organizations, and by constituents generally." In the field of foreign policy, however, the Senator states:

> . . . it is the executive branch which has a near monopoly on information and ideas. This is attributable in part to the fact that the Department of State has some 20,000 employees in daily contact with countries and individuals throughout the world.

It is clear that Congress cannot long play its traditional role in our political system if it finds itself incompetent to make an independent judgment on the ever-increasing foreign relations elements of national policy.

The reports analyzed and summarized in this volume were financed by a Senate appropriation of $300,000 and printed on 1421 pages of fine print by the Senate between August 1959 and February 1960. Five of the thirteen reports discuss United States foreign policy for geographical areas: (1) Western Europe, (2) Africa, (3) Asia, (4) the Middle East, and (5) the USSR. Latin America is omitted because the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs separately contracted for seven studies. (It is unfortunate that the editors did not include these studies.) Five studies deal with the impact on United States foreign policy of (6) world-wide and domestic economic problems, (7) nonmilitary scientific developments, (8) developments in military technology, (9) principal ideological conflicts, and (10) economic, social, and political change in underdeveloped countries. The other three discuss (11) the formulation and administration, (12) operational aspects, and (13) basic aims of United States foreign policy.

It is impossible in a short review to give much consideration to the varied content of the reports. (The reader may find useful the critiques of Morton Halperin and James A. Robinson in volume four of *The American Behavioral Scientist.*) The reviewer was impressed with the number of stimulating innovations which, although not all entirely new, the reports bring to the attention of the Senate—*e.g.*, a United Nations university for advancement of science and humanities with branches throughout the world (proposed by Stanford Research Institute); development of an international career service for technical assistance personnel (Northwestern University); negotiation of an Indian aid agreement by India, U. S., USSR, and perhaps Japan, West Germany and others (Conlon Associates); a number of proposals for the further development of multilateral institutions for economic development programs (Council on Foreign Relations, Harvard, and Syracuse); and suggestions for working with the "next government" in foreign countries rather than just with the current regime (Syracuse).

Also worthy of particular attention are the proposals for further research. One recommends that consideration be given to the establishment of a foreign policy research organization similar to the Air Force-supported RAND Corporation (Brookings). Another recommends the development of a "conscious policy to promote foreign policy aims through a systematic stimulation of desirable nonmilitary scientific developments" (Stanford Research Institute). Many would agree with Senator Fulbright that additional sources of ideas and information on foreign policy problems are vitally needed—by the executive branch as well as by Congress! Hopefully, he and his colleagues will, with the stimulus provided by such ideas as these, devise means for satisfying these needs on a more continuing basis.—CHADWICK F. ALGER, *Northwestern University.*

National Character in Action. BY WASHINGTON PLATT. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961. Pp. xix, 250. $6.00.)

General Platt has essayed a highly important but much controverted task: his purpose is to make relevant for strategic intelligence contemporary investigations of national character. He writes: "In all aspects of international relations and especially in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, an intimate understanding of the character of other nations must always be one of the vital factors in the situation. . . ." And so, indeed, it must. But the path of application of this fugitive and evanescent material to practical diplomacy is beset with hazard and difficulty. It does no particular discredit to General Platt's book to note that he has not solved all the problems or been able to sidestep the difficulties. Unfortunately but understandably, they are as present on the last pages of his work as on the first. If vain, the attempt is nonetheless courageous, and in the process of tackling a formidable subject, General Platt has shed no little light upon it. He has, I believe, shown, largely through the works of others, that the notion of national character is a viable concept.[1] One does not have to adopt the tattered stereotypes of German stolidity and romanticism, French ardor and logicality, or British pragmatism and lack of humor to acknowledge that certain nations behave differently from others. This is something we all know as social scientists; we only recoil from our natural and correct observations when it is suggested that they be codified into concepts of national character. Since national character can be no more and no less than the sum of influences which make a Frenchman French or an Englishman English, it must comprise *inter alia* "geographic location, climate, a common history . . . , common economic interests . . . " political traditions, institutions and practices, and a certain cultural or linguistic identity. It may involve a distinct practical philosophy as well. General Platt makes a useful distinction between national character conceived as the sum of individual behavior and as the characteristic posture of a nation in foreign relations. He notes that the first must be dependent upon a prior analysis of personal and group character, and that the second cannot diverge limitlessly from the characteristic behavior of individuals.

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[1] In *People of Plenty* David Potter writes, for example: "After all its vicissitudes, national character is still with us. The fact is inescapable."

It is in the area of application of conceptions of national character to strategic intelligence production that General Platt most often goes awry. He affects to believe that it is feasible to make simple numerical rankings of aspects of national character. Thus, fighting qualities could be expressed by "2, 3, 4, and so on up to 10 as the 'do or die.' " "Similarly, when considering natural resources *industry* would be expressed by positive integers. Laziness by fractions." "An unusually aggressive spirit on the one hand or a defeatist spirit on the other hand may multiply the capability which would ordinarily be expected from a given situation by ten or one tenth respectively." Once these traits have been assimilated into national character for the purposes of a given intelligence estimate, it is then alleged that HF (Hard Facts)—NC (National Character) ×Sit (Situation) can produce the required intelligence information. The disclaimers General Platt issues to this highly oversimple numerical analysis are not convincing. He says that such calculations should be regarded as a "useful *guide to our judgement*" rather than as a "final answer." If such computations are to influence our judgment, they will mislead us: if they are not to influence it, they should be discarded.

The author falters as well in his hints for derivations of national character. How are we to go about grasping it? Since he admits that national character shifts over time, often in the relatively short run, he cannot give a satisfactory account of how we definitively come to grips with such fleeting traits. We are told, for instance, that the national character of Americans shifted between 1916 and 1917 from peace-loving to martial and bellicose. Assuming the validity of the change (and this reviewer would not do so), we are left with no clues that would make such a sea-change in character comprehensible to an intelligence analysist. The assessments of 1916 would be false in 1917. The answer is not mechanical computations of "optimism, enthusiasm, . . . progressive spirit, . . . and the will-to-win." Indeed, General Platt's conceptions of national character hark back to the national stereotypes which proved the greatest obstacle to acceptance of notions of national character in the past.

In the final analysis, the greatest aid to strategic intelligence production is informed work on individual countries. General Platt recognizes this need, and in an apparently pathbreaking appendix, he provides a brief bibliography of works informative for national character studies of specific countries. This list is probably the most useful feature of the book for intelligence officers. But the list itself is rudimentary and uneven. On the United States, David Potter, Louis Hartz, Clinton Rossiter, Daniel Boorstin, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. are notable in their absence. The section on Latin America contains no works by George Blanksten. The British section omits the pioneering works of Sir Louis Namier, and does not mention Samuel Beer, Leslie Lipson, or Harry Eckstein. The section on France does not include Herbert Luethy, Nicholas Wahl, or Stanley Hoffman, and that on Russia egregiously neglects Merle Fainsod and Barrington Moore. In East and West Asia there is no mention of the works of George Kahin, Leonard Binder, David Wilson, and Myron Weiner. National character may be a viable notion, but General Platt has scarcely shown us how it might be employed.—R. N. ROSECRANCE, *University of California* (Los Angeles).

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William H. Roberts

The Catholic University of America

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NEWS AND NOTES

1962 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1962–1963

The 1962 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–8, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D. C. Professor Byrum E. Carter of Indiana University is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee (comprised of J. Roland Pennock, Chairman; Dayton D. McKean; Lucian W. Pye; Weldon Cooper; Stanley J. Parry; and Jack Peltason) will propose the following officers for 1962–1963: President-elect, C. Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago); Vice Presidents, Alexander Heard (University of North Carolina); John D. Lewis (Oberlin College); Wallace S. Sayre (Columbia University); Secretary, Ruth Lawson (Mt. Holyoke College); Treasurer, Max Kampelman (Washington, D. C.); Members of the Council for two years: Franklin L. Burdette (University of Maryland); Charles B. Hagan (University of Illinois); H. Field Haviland, Jr. (Brookings Institution); Robert E. Lane (Yale University); Joseph LaPalombara (Michigan State University); Ithiel de Sola Pool (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Harold H. Sprout (Princeton University); Sheldon S. Wolin (University of California)

PROGRAM: 1963 ANNUAL MEETING

Early appointment of the Program Committee for the annual meeting of the Association, to be held in New York City in September 1963, makes it timely now to invite anyone having program suggestions for the occasion to convey them as soon as may be convenient, and prior to October, 1962, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Its members are: Karl W. Deutsch (Yale University) Chairman; David Easton (University of Chicago), Political Theory; Roy C. Macridis (Washington University), Comparative Politics; William N. Chambers (Washington University), National Government and Politics; Robert C. Wood (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), State and Local Government; Arnold A. Rogow (Stanford University), Political Behavior; James C. March (Carnegie Inst. of Technology), Public Administration; Harold W. Chase (Univ. of Minnesota), Public Law, National and International; Richard N. Rosecrance (University of California, Los Angeles), International Politics; Chairmen of Special Topics: Challenges to Constitutional Government, Charles M. Hardin (Rockefeller Foundation); Evolution of the Communist World, Zbigniew Brzezinski (Columbia University); The Developing Countries, Chairman to be appointed.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Twelfth International Congress of Administrative Sciences will be held July 16 to 20, 1962, in the Hofburg at Vienna. Three subjects are on the program: (1) Technical Assistance in Public Administration—Lessons of experience and possible improvements; (2) Public Relations in Administration—I. Official publications; and (3) Government Organization for Economic Development.

Special meetings for representatives of schools and institutes of public administration are also scheduled, to discuss (1) Teaching methods and materials, and (2) Cooperation among institutions. General reports to guide the debates have been in preparation for two years, with the cooperation of national reporters in some thirty countries. These Congresses attract over 500 participants from more than fifty countries, including those of Asia and Africa—officials in the control organs of central governments, directors of national institutes of training and research and professors of administration and administrative law. Further details from Don L. Bowen, director, American Society for Public Administration, 6042 South Kimbark Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois, or from P. A. Schillings, Director General, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 25 rue de la Charité, Brussels 4, Belgium.

The Southern California Political Science Association has held three meetings: (1) in July at Occidental College with Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago, speaking on "The Paradoxes of Democratic Government"; in November at Loyola University with William Ebenstein, Princeton, speaking on "Franco's Spain"; in January (1962) at Pomona College with Maurice Shock, University College, Oxford University, speaking on "How Europe Views the Cold War." Officers of the Association for the year 1961–62 are: president, Raymond G. McKelvey, Occidental College; secretary-treasurer, William F. Fitzgerald, Loyola University; executive committee: Carl Q. Christol, University of Southern California; Jeniellen Ferguson, San Fernando Valley State College; Ivan H. Hinderaker, University of California, Los Angeles; Lester H. Phillips, University of Redlands; William S. Stokes, Claremont Men's College.

Section K—Social and Economic Sciences—of the American Association for the Advancement of Science will hold sessions for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. in Philadelphia, December 26–31, 1962. Association members interested in presenting a paper at these sessions should forward titles and abstracts not later than September 10 to the Secretary of A.A.A.S. Section K, Donald P. Ray, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington 4, D. C. Papers should be based on current or recently completed research. The American Political Science Association is an affiliate member of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the A.A.A.S.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

1962 FOREIGN SERVICE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION TO BE GIVEN IN SEPTEMBER

The Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service of the Department of State, after careful study and consultations with private and government authorities concerned, has decided to schedule the 1962 Foreign Service Officer written examination on September 8, 1962.

The September date should give students more free time to prepare for the examination without interrupting summer or academic work. Too, the Board of Examiners will be able to begin oral examinations in November thereby enabling the induction of successful candidates soon after the close of the school year.

Candidates are eligible to take the examination if they are between the ages of 21 and 31 and have been U. S. citizens for nine years as of July 1, 1962. Candidates who are 20 years of age may take the examination if they have completed their junior year.

Application forms for designation to take the examination may be obtained by writing to the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. The completed application form must be received by the Board by July 23, 1962.

The department of government at Indiana University will establish a faculty seminar on political and administrative development, stressing the conditions under which viable political institutions, capable of directing and controlling public bureaucracies, emerge. The role of various elites or leadership elements in these societies will be studied through selected case studies by participating faculty members, research associates and graduate students. Fred W. Riggs, professor of government, will serve as seminar director. Financing is provided by a three-year grant of $105,000 from the Carnegie Corporation.

The Mershon National Security Center awarded the prize of $2,500 for the best book-length manuscript on national security submitted in 1961 to George Stambuk, department of government, Indiana University. The manuscript, *American Military Forces Abroad: A Postwar Pattern In International Relations*, will be published by the Ohio State University Press in 1962.

University Bureau Research in Government—An Inventory of Current Projects, published for the Conference of University Bureaus of Governmental Research, American Society for Public Administration, by the Bureau of Government, University Extension Division, University of

Wisconsin, Madison, 1961. 122 pp. Copies may be secured from the Wisconsin Bureau for $1.

Dartmouth College has received a grant of $100,000 from the Carnegie Corporation of New York for two related national security studies. Eugene Lyons will examine the command of international armed forces and Louis Morton will analyze command and other problems of World War II.

The Lilly Endowment of Indianapolis, Indiana has awarded Duke University $75,000 as the continuation of its research program in Christianity and Politics. The Program was initiated by the Lilly Endowment in 1957. The program is administered by Dr. John H. Hallowell, professor of political science.

Under grants received from the Ford Foundation and the New York State Senate, Columbia University, Hunter College, and Syracuse University have established a graduate New York State Legislative Internship Program, comparable in scope and intent to the APSA Congressional Fellowship program. The three-year grant of $75,000 from the Ford Foundation is supplemented by an annual grant of $10,000 from the New York State Senate. Dr. Ruth Weintraub, professor of political science and director of the graduate program in Arts and Science at Hunter College, is director of the Internship Program. Professors David Truman of Columbia University, Frederick Zimmerman of Hunter College, and Frank Munger of Syracuse University, compose the executive committee, and Professor Donald G. Baker of Skidmore College is faculty supervisor of the program.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER of Rutgers will serve as visiting professor of government at Columbia during 1962–63 with primary assignment to the newly created institute of Latin American studies.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON of the University of Wisconsin has been awarded an SSRC foreign area research grant for Latin-American work in 1962–63.

DAVID W. BARKLEY, associate professor of political science, Northeastern University, attended the Wilton Park conference, Steyning, Sussex, England, December 1 to December 16, as a Ford Fellow. While there, he led one of the discussions on the topic: "The Control of the State in Modern Society: An American Point of View."

PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, is the recipient of a $25,000 grant from a private, civic-minded donor for a study of the Third Indiana Congressional District.

RUTH BAUMANN, associate professor of political science, University Extension Division, University of Wisconsin, has been appointed an assistant to the dean of extension for the administration of the Wisconsin Urban Program which is supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, retaining part time her position in the bureau of government.

WALTER T. BOGART of Middlebury College has retired for reasons of ill health as chairman of the department of political science. DR. HARRIS E. THURBER has been named to succeed him as chairman. LEE A. LENDT, formerly at Columbia University, is now teaching in the department.

RONALD F. BUNN of the University of Texas will serve as visiting associate professor of government at Indiana University for the year 1962–63.

FRED G. BURKE, Syracuse University, begins a leave of absence for a year of continuing research in East Africa starting in July 1962.

WILLIAM N. CHAMBERS, professor of political science at Washington University (St. Louis) will be on leave of absence for the academic year 1962–63.

JOHN W. CHAPMAN of the University of Pittsburgh, delivered a series of lectures in Poland at the Uniwersitet Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, Lublin and at the Wyzsza Szkola Ekonomiczna, Krakow.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL, professor of international law and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Southern California has been appointed to the chair of International Law, Naval College, for 1962–63. TOTTON J. ANDERSON will serve as chairman of the political science department at the University of Southern California during Dr. Christol's absence.

MORRIS H. COHEN, associate professor of government, Clark University, has been elected president of the Worcester Plan "E" Association, the Worcester civic improvement organization.

JOHN A. CRITTENDEN, formerly of the University of North Carolina and recently law and behavioral science research Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School, has accepted an appointment as visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California.

RALPH CROW, American University, Beirut, has been appointed visiting associate professor for 1962–63 at Indiana University.

HENRY W. EHRMANN of Dartmouth College has been invited to deliver a lecture at the Free University of Berlin during an international gathering of political scientists organized May 8–10 to celebrate the inauguration of the new building of the Otto-Suhr-Institute (Institute of Politics) of the Free University. During July Professor Ehrmann will serve as Fulbright lecturer and director of studies at the American Seminar in political science to be held in Nice, France. He will spend the fall term on research leave in Paris and will also lecture at the Universities of Paris and Bordeaux.

DAVID G. FARRELLY, UCLA, has been appointed by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors to a 25-man committee which is charged with the study and review of the county charter. Professor Farrelly is chairman of a subcommittee on political activities of classified county employees.

PETER J. FLIESS, professor of government Louisiana State University, delivered the Maurice Falk Lectures at Carnegie Tech on January 10 and 11, 1962. The general subject of the lectures was Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity.

MERRILL R. GOODALL on leave as professor of government in the Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, has been appointed by the United Nations as its public administration advisor to the Government of Nepal. His assignment in Kathmandu begins March, 1962.

BERTRAM GROSS, professor of administration, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, who is spending 1961–62 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, is serving as visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, during the spring semester, 1962.

ROBERT W. HATTERY, assistant professor of political science, has assumed the assistant directorship of the institute of world affairs education, Extension Political Science Department, University Extension Division, University of Wisconsin.

C. LEONARD HOAG has been Fulbright Lecturer in political science at Kyung-Pook University, Taegu, Korea during the academic year 1961–62, having been granted a leave of absence from Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont.

J. C. HUREWITZ of Columbia, who will be on leave during 1962–63, will spend the year at the center for advanced studies in the behavioral sciences.

ALDOUS HUXLEY is serving as the Ford Rotating research professor in governmental affairs in the department of political science, University of California, Berkeley, for the spring term, 1962.

THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University for the winter and spring terms of 1962. He had recently served from 1957–1961 as United States Ambassador to El Salvador.

MAGID KHADDURI of the school of advanced international studies, will be at Columbia as visiting professor of government in the academic year 1962–63.

PAUL KECSKEMETI of the RAND Corporation will serve as lecturer in government and senior fellow in the research program on communism at Columbia University, in 1962–63.

KWANG-HSUN TU has been teaching on a Fulbright Exchange professorship at the University of Washington and University of California at Santa Barbara.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA, professor of political science at Michigan State University, who is spending 1961–62 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, is serving as visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, during the spring semester, 1962.

LOUIS E. LAMBERT has been appointed to the Governor's Advisory Committee on Traffic Safety for the State of Indiana.

WALTER H. C. LAVES has been appointed consultant to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare at Indiana University on its programs in international education.

REAM A. LAZARO has been named director of the institute of administrative management and lecturer in public administration at the University of Pittsburgh.

M. NELSON MCGEARY, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University is on leave of absence during the spring and summer terms of 1962. He will be working in Washington in the office of Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania.

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON lectured in March and April at the University of Buenos Aires, under an AID-supported cooperative arrangement between the Economics Faculty of that university and the Columbia Graduate School of Business; his subject was trends in research and teaching in public administration. In May and June he was engaged in staff work on "education and training" for the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, a study group set up in Washington by the Carnegie Endowment with the cooperation of the Department of State.

Douglas H. Mendel, formerly at UCLA, has received a grant from the contemporary China committee of the SSRC/ACLS to study Sino-Japanese relations. He will also spend September and October as guest lecturer at the Department of Oriental Studies, University of Melbourne, Australia.

Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, who is in South Asia on an assignment for the Council on Foreign Relations, with the assistance of a Guggenheim Fellowship and a grant for research on Asia from the American Council of Learned Societies, delivered a series of lectures at universities in India, Nepal and Pakistan.

Richard L. Park, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been appointed representative in India of the Asia Foundation.

J. William Robinson, chairman, department of political science and international relations at Whittier College, has been appointed director of the 39th annual session of the institute of world affairs to be held December 2–5, 1962 in Pasadena. The Institute will again be sponsored by the University of Southern California in cooperation with the colleges and universities of the Pacific area.

Oles M. Smolansky, UCLA, received a Rockefeller research grant to conduct a study of Arab politics.

Frances L. Starner, assistant professor of political science, San Jose State College, is on leave, 1961–62, on her second Fulbright Award. She is engaged in research on far eastern agrarian politics and has her headquarters in Manila, P.I.

Irvin Stewart, professor of political science, West Virginia University, is on leave of absence from March 1, 1962 to September, 1963, in order to undertake, at President Kennedy's request, the newly created position of Director of Telecommunications Management.

Joseph L. Sutton, Indiana University, has been appointed as a member of the Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Fellowship Committee.

S. Laird Swagert, professor of political science, San Jose State College, is on leave, 1961–62, engaged in work for the Stanford Research Institute.

Frank N. Trager, professor of international affairs, New York University, is on leave to serve on the faculty of the National War College for the academic year 1961–62. During the summer of 1962 he will participate in the 44th Conference on "The Defense of the West," at Wilton Park, Sussex, England. He will then return to the National War College for the academic year 1962–63.

Schuyler C. Wallace has resigned as dean of the school of international affairs at Columbia and will be on leave from the University for the next two years, to serve as director of the Ford Foundation's Foreign Area Training Fellowship program.

Quincy Wright will spend 1962–63 as visiting professor of international relations at Columbia University.

Harmon Zeigler of the department of political science at Emory University has been appointed field supervisor (southern region) by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

John H. Ballard of San Jose State College has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Robert A. Barrett, a doctoral candidate at the American University, has been appointed as lecturer in the school of government and public administration, the American University, effective February 5, 1962.

Jewel L. Bellush has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of political science at Hunter College.

Eliot S. Berkley has been appointed dean of the college of the Kansas City Art Institute.

Paul Bernstein has been appointed instructor in the political science department, University of Pennsylvania.

John D. Born, Jr. has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of history and political science, University of Nevada, Reno.

Don L. Bowen was appointed executive director of the American Society for public administration by the Society's council meeting here. This appointment, effective as of January 1, 1962, was announced by Elmer B. Staats, the society's president and deputy director of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget.

Donald Brandon has been promoted from assistant to associate professor of political science at the University of San Francisco.

David Brook recently received a doctorate from Columbia University and has been appointed an instructor of international relations and government at St. Johns University.

Ardath W. Burks has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Rutgers University effective February 1, 1962.

Edward McNall Burns, professor of political science at Rutgers University, is on leave of absence during the second semester of 1961–62. He will retire at the close of the current academic year after having served as chairman of the department over the past decade.

L. Gerald Bursey has joined the department of political science, Northeastern University, with the rank of associate professor.

Donald S. Carlisle, has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin beginning in September, 1962.

Harry M. Chase, Jr. has been promoted to associate professor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada, Reno.

Hsien T'ing Peter Ch'en has been appointed instructor in the Far Eastern studies program at Brown University.

Andrew W. Cordier has become dean of the school of international affairs at Columbia University.

Roger H. Davidson has been appointed instructor at Dartmouth.

Vincent Davis, Jr. has been appointed assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

After seven years as head of the all-university department of government and international relations at New York University, Marshall E. Dimock will resign at the end of the current academic year to resume his writing in Bethel, Vermont.

Jack D. Edwards has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada, Reno.

Malbone W. Graham, professor of political science at UCLA since 1924, will retire at the end of the spring semester. On May 25, 1962, a seminar and dinner in his honor was held at which the featured participants were three former students of Professor Graham: Malcolm Moos, of the Rockefeller Foundation, G. Homer Durham, president of Arizona State University, and Robert Walker of Oklahoma State University.

Duane Grimes has joined the department of political science, Northeastern University, with the rank of instructor.

Robert D. Hayton has been promoted to associate professor in the department of political science at Hunter College.

Huey Blair Howerton, a member of the faculty in political science at University of Mississippi since 1930 and chairman of the department from 1930–1958, retired in June after 32 years of service.

Peter H. Juviler has been promoted to assistant professor at the department of political science at Hunter College.

Jerome G. Kerwin, director, honors division, University of Santa Clara, and professor emeritus of the University of Chicago, has accepted appointment as professor of political science at San Jose State College where he will be teaching one-quarter time. Dr. Kerwin's principal duties will remain at the University of Santa Clara.

Mrs. Jean Kopytoff has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science at Brown University.

David Kovenock, has been appointed instructor at Dartmouth College.

Fred Krinsky, formerly of Syracuse University, has joined the department of political science, University of Southern California, as an associate professor.

Charles H. Kunsman, Jr. has joined the political science department at San Jose State College as an assistant professor, after a year at the University of Nevada.

Arend Lijphart was appointed instructor of political science at Elmira College, beginning September, 1961.

C. Peter Magrath has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Brown University.

Charles McCall, Yale, has been appointed instructor at Indiana University.

Steven Muller has been promoted to associate professor of government and director of the center for international studies at Cornell University.

ROBERT T. NORMAN of Harvard University has been appointed assistant professor of political science and director of the bureau of municipal research, Kalamazoo Michigan.

ROY OLTON has been promoted to associate professor of government at Western Michigan University.

STANLEY A. PEARL has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada, Reno.

JAMES W. PRATT, formerly at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, is now assistant professor of political science at San Jose State College.

CHANNING B. RICHARDSON, associate professor of government, has been named the first occupant of the newly established Henry P. Bristol chair in international affairs at Hamilton College.

JOHN W. RYAN, associate professor of political science, University of Wisconsin's extension division, is now associated with that university's center for international studies and programs in addition to his position in the bureau of government.

EDWARD V. SCHTEN has joined the staff of the bureau of government at the University of Wisconsin as an assistant professor of political science and as an assistant director of the Bureau. He will be responsible for education and training activities of the Bureau and will be located on the Milwaukee campus. Mr. Schten was formerly the director of research of the legislative research commission of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

KALMAN H. SILVERT, formerly of Tulane University, has been appointed professor of government at Dartmouth.

GEORGE STAMBUK has been appointed assistant professor of government at Indiana University.

RICHARD W. STAVELEY, assistant professor of political science, San Jose State College, is on leave for the year 1962, teaching at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

T. NOEL STERN, former president of West Chester State College in Pennsylvania has been appointed research associate in the bureau of government research at Indiana University.

JOHN C. STOESSINGER has been promoted to associate professor at the department of political science, Hunter College.

CLARENCE E. THURBER has been appointed associate professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University effective March 1, 1962.

JOSEPH B. TUCKER, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Ohio University.

FREDERIC A. WEED, head of the San Jose State College department of political science and public administration has been named a full professor.

IN MEMORIAM

Professor AARON M. MARGALITH died suddenly in his home at 175 Pinehurst Avenue, Saturday, October 21, at the age of 59. Dr. Margalith, former chairman of the social science department, 1949–1955, was professor of political science.

A native of Jerusalem, Dr. Margalith spent his early years in the Holy City, and there attended elementary and secondary schools. During the First World War, Dr. Margalith, although under age, joined the Royal Fusiliers of the British Army. He fought on the Sinai Peninsula where he distinguished himself by receiving both the British Victory and War Medals.

In 1921 he came to America and studied at the City College of New York and Temple University. He received both his B.A. and Ph.D. degrees at the Johns Hopkins University, the latter in 1929.

A member of the college faculty for twenty eight years, Dr. Margalith became a full professor in 1951 and also served as University librarian and chairman of the social science department. He was currently serving as faculty representative to the alumni-faculty-student relations special committee.

Mr. Margalith, a scion of a family of scholars, was the author of "The International Mandate" and co-author with Dr. Cyrus Adler of "American Intercession on Behalf of Jews" and "With Firmness in the Right," a statement of diplomatic action affecting Jews during the century before its publication in 1946.

—Yeshiva College *Commentator*

Professor LANE W. LANCASTER died of a heart attack in Bruges, Belgium, on March 27, 1962.

Thus came to an end a long and distinguished career as a teacher and scholar in the field of political science.

He was born in Bellaire, Ohio, on December 9, 1892, took his first degree at Ohio Wesleyan University in 1915, his Master's degree from the University of Illinois in 1918, and his doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania in 1923. He was a private in the U. S. Army in 1918. After serving as an instructor at the University of Pennsylvania from 1920 to 1923, he taught at Wesleyan University, in Middletown, Connecticut, from 1923 to 1930. He came to the University of Nebraska as Professor in 1930, and remained there until his retirement in the spring of 1960. He served as chairman of his department from 1939 to 1953, and from 1955 to 1957, a fact to which he attached no significance at all. He had no desire for administrative power, and regarded the teacher's calling as fully satisfying. He was visiting professor in several institutions, Northwestern University during the year 1940–1941, Yale University, 1948–1949, and the University of California at Berkeley, 1949–1950. He was Vice-President of the American Political Science Association in 1951–1952. He was also a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

In 1924 Professor Lancaster published a study on *State Supervision of Municipal Indebtedness.* His well-known book, *Government in Rural America*, appeared in 1937, with a second edition in 1952. In 1959 he published Volume 3 of *Masters of Political Science: Hegel to Dewey.* Over the years he contributed generously to political science journals and to books on American government.

After his retirement he moved to Berkeley, California, and in the fall of 1961 accepted appointment as Fulbright Professor of Political Science at University College, Swansea, Wales. He was on a holiday trip to Italy when he passed away.

Lane Lancaster was an unusually gifted teacher. He combined a genuinely friendly manner with an effortless mastery of the Socratic method. To a vast store of learning in political science he added a tremendous knowledge of English literature and history. He wrote with grace and charm, and was immensely popular with students without courting popularity. His many warm friends in the teaching profession join his widow and his two daughters in shedding a tear for a wise, decent and gallant man.—David Fellman

Austin F. Macdonald, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of California, died in his home in Berkeley, January 8, 1962. He had retired in August, 1961, because of failing health.

Born in Philadelphia, January 21, 1898, he was an honors graduate of the University of Pennsylvania in 1920. He took his M.A. there too the following year, was a Harrison fellow, 1921–23, and received his doctorate on a thesis published in 1923, *Federal Subsidies to the States*, a subject which he developed further in his book on *Federal Aid*, 1928. He taught at his alma mater until invited to Berkeley as a full professor in 1930. Despite his youth, he had already published four books and a dozen articles.

At California Macdonald continued his work in municipal and state government and in the late 1930's returned to an interest he had developed while still a graduate student at Pennsylvania, namely, Latin America. Professionally he was probably best known for his *American City Government and Administration*, first published in 1929, and *American State Government and Administration*, both of which have appeared in six editions. His *Government of the Argentine Republic*, 1942, was well received, and his *Latin American Politics and Government* has been widely used.

Professor Macdonald had many interests and was a prodigious worker. He travelled extentively and was an accomplished musician. He was an able lecturer, noted for his keen wit, and attracted huge upper division classes while at the same time his graduate students came to know him well. He was in frequent demand as a public speacker. He was a man of integrity, thoughtfulness, sincerity of purpose, and lived a well organized life. He is survived by his widow, Frances W. Macdonald, to whom he was deeply devoted.—Eric Bellquist

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APSA ANNUAL MEETING
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.
September 3-8, 1962

Hotel Accommodations

The Mayflower Hotel is the official hotel for the Annual Meeting. Flat rates for all rooms will be: $9.00 single; $14.00 double. The Statler-Hilton, located two blocks from the Mayflower, also has reserved a block of rooms at the same rate for overflow from the Mayflower. Reservations should be made at least two weeks prior to opening of the Annual Meeting.

Monday and Tuesday, September 3 & 4

Committee Meetings

Registration—September 4-8

A registration desk will be maintained in the Chinese Room of the Mayflower Hotel and will be open during the following hours:

Tuesday, September 4—1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Wednesday, September 5—9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Thursday, September 6—9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Friday, September 7—9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Saturday, September 8—9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.

Persons arriving on Tuesday are urged to register promptly and thereby avoid the heavy registration periods later in the week.

The registration fee will be $3.00 for APSA members and $5.00 for non-members. Social studies teachers attending only the Saturday joint APSA-NCSS meetings are not expected to register.

Students

Graduate and undergraduate students of political science are especially encouraged to attend the Washington meeting. Special panels on graduate research are being scheduled in conjunction with the regular panel sections. In addition, special sessions with Professor Harold Lasswell, Yale Law School, and Professor Arnold Brecht, New School for Social Research, have been scheduled for graduate students and young instructors.

Location of Meetings

Panel meetings, special meetings, and general sessions will be held in the Mayflower Hotel unless otherwise noted. The exact location of each meeting will be indicated in the Final Program distributed at registration.

Program Committee

Chairman: Byrum E. Carter, Department of Government, Indiana University. Committee Members:

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: Professor David Smith, Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

AMERICAN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: Professor James Prothro, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT: Professor Lucian Pye, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: Mr. Charles L. Clapp.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Professor Ethan Allen, Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Professor James Robinson, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: Professor Vincent Ostrom, Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: Professor Vernon Van Dyke, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.

SPECIAL GRADUATE SEMINARS: Professor Howard Penniman, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Professional Placement Service At 1962 Annual Meeting

(September 3-8, 1962)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Washington meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U.S. Employment Service for the District of Columbia, U.S. Department of Labor. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa. The service operated in St. Louis in 1961 in a most satisfactory fashion.

A staff of experienced Employment Service interviewers will be available at the Annual Meeting Placement Center to review employer's orders, interview applicants, and arrange for an interview between prospective employers and employees.

If you are planning to attend the 1962 Annual Meeting and wish to utilize the Placement Service, this is how to proceed:

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